The US needs a Grand strategy of Cascading realism

Dr. Andrew A. Michta called in Orbis for a new American grand strategy. The issue, however, is not a lack of a grand strategy but the will and courage to channel the flow of history into a coherent strategic proposition. Despite polarization, both parties agree that the US is over-stretched, and if we are not careful, we could be caught in a global war in which we would be a target for all discontents rather than a champion for the good. I suggested in the National Interest two years ago, right before the start of the War in Ukraine, that we need to develop the diffuse public expectations into a grand strategy of cascading realism, which combines flexibility and high-value, selective alliances with a genuine will to back up our commitments with actions. Below is a rundown of the argument. However, even more interesting and engaging is this Deep Dive podcast created by Google NotebookLM.

Matei, Sorin Adam. "A Twenty-First-Century Strategy to Counter Russia, China, and Iran." The National Interest, 18 Feb. 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/twenty-first-century-strategy-counter-russia-china-and-iran-200063 .

Main Themes:

The limitations of the current U.S. strategy: The current approach, characterized by viewing great power relations primarily through the lens of competition and acting as a guarantor of the global order, is proving unsustainable and costly.

The rise of "irreversible competition": U.S. adversaries, particularly China, Russia, and Iran, are engaging in a form of “competitive conflict” where they reap the benefits of competition while achieving irreversible outcomes typically associated with conflict.

The need for "cascading realism": The author proposes a new strategic framework—"cascading realism"—which acknowledges the reality of conflict, emphasizes flexible response, and prioritizes shared responsibility with allies.

Key Ideas and Facts:

Misinterpreting Conflict as Competition: The U.S. has consistently underestimated the willingness of China, Russia, and Iran to use force and coercion to achieve their goals, mistaking their actions as mere competition rather than deliberate conflict. This misinterpretation stems from:

Wishful thinking and a desire to avoid conflict.

Inertial strategic thinking rooted in Cold War paradigms.

A lack of clear criteria to distinguish between competition and conflict.

Case Studies in Irreversible Competition:

South China Sea: China effectively seized control of the South China Sea through a calculated strategy that masked its true intentions. It leveraged economic engagement, deflected attention with technological advancements, and presented its actions as benign competition for resources.

Iran's Influence in the Middle East: By exploiting the U.S. focus on ISIS, Iran expanded its influence in Iraq and Syria, securing territorial control and marginalizing U.S. influence. The U.S. mistakenly assumed Iran would act as a rational actor bound by realpolitik, overlooking its ideological motivations.

Russian Annexation of Crimea: Russia's swift annexation of Crimea exposed the West's overestimation of its own deterrence capabilities and Russia's willingness to risk conflict.

Principles of Cascading Realism:

Convergence of Purpose: Align U.S. interests with those of like-minded nations and institutions, prioritizing pragmatic collaboration over legalistic idealism.

Flexibility of Action: Devolve responsibility to allies, empowering them to act as first responders in regional conflicts while providing them with robust material, economic, and moral support. The U.S. should adopt a policy of "immediate response" to deter aggression but avoid being the sole or primary intervener.

Shared and Cascading Responsibility: Global order should be the collective product of the U.S. and its allies, not solely a U.S. burden. This requires deeper diplomatic, economic, and military coordination, ensuring that all stakeholders share the costs and benefits of maintaining stability.

Quotes:

"The real problem with these developments is that they have been mistakenly seen in the United States in competitive terms. In fact, they are blooming conflicts."

"U.S. adversaries have already bypassed the competitive constraints of the legalistic world order adventuring on the terrain of conflict, asking for more and usually keeping what they take."

"The United States should consider a strategy of selective and deeply collaborative realism."

"The guaranteed global order should satisfy the cumulative values and needs of the United States and its allies, starting from the ground up, not from top (the United States) to bottom (U.S. allies), which is the current situation."

Conclusion:

The U.S. must adapt its strategic thinking to confront the reality of a multipolar world defined by "competitive conflict." "Cascading realism" offers a potential framework for navigating this new era by recalibrating U.S. engagement, prioritizing allies, and embracing a more flexible and collaborative approach to global security.