US Intel Do Loop

Al Qaeda-type Demise Pronouncements Anathema to our Threat Neutralization Capabilities since 1981???

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Situation (Feb 2013)

In 2007 the US Administration’s pronouncement that the elimination of Al Qaeda Iraq founder and leader Al-Zaraqawi lead to an immediate, premature follow-on proclamation of another pending demise of Al Qaeda (AQ) which has directly lead to the continuing compromise of our Preemptive Intelligence and Threat Neutralization capabilities. Such “couched” pronouncements, to put it mildly, have continued periodically to this day and there is limited political will available in the senior ranks to challenge the Oval Office, the NSC and the DNI on the subject. Those that do challenge have their access restricted or are encouraged out of the system.

Since 1981 there has been no shortage of preemptive insight, threat neutralization recommendations and causal effect analysis on how to handle the growing threats from Violent Enemy Networks, Transnational Organizations and Sovereign Competitors. But these insights are often the product of a finite few working on their own rather than part of a comprehensive, innovative Intelligence Community.? We celebrated the efforts of a lone analyst fighting to find Bin Laden but in truth she had to fight through a bureaucracy with the constant threat of job termination at the ready. I feel most of the strategic intel breakthroughs are of this nature not those of an integrated, preemption oriented IC.? And those leaders that fight for the latter often find themselves on the outside looking in. So from what has been heard around the water-cooler we find:

1981- a comprehensive plan was placed before key decision makers regarding re-seizing the landscape in Iran. It was rejected in favor of encouraging the Iraq-Iran conflict

1983- a comprehensive plan was available for dismantling Hezbollah & corresponding IRGC influence in Lebanon as well as initiating tracking activity of Maktab al-Khidmat in Afghanistan (Support Services for Arab Jihadists) founded by AQ Spiritual Leader & lead Strategist, Sheik Abdullah Azzam.? Azzam, born in the West Bank, recruited Bin Laden to the cause. What ensued was a retreat from Lebanon and minor oversight of the Afghanistan situation.

1989- a comprehensive recommendation was made to Support Massoud in Afghanistan after the Russian withdrawal but it was rejected for a plan submitted by Agency personnel to keep good relations with the Taliban & AQ elements.? One group of US State “experts” actually recommended recognizing the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan.? Some of these same experts have been advising the current & Bush administrations on AfPak, to our detriment in my opinion. We again left Afghanistan to their own devices.

1991- a number of threat? recommendations were made regarding actions to be taken in the Middle East & Levant but a limited action plan won out.? In 1991 the US gave Syria a $400 million weapons purchase grant.?

1993- a don’t retreat recommendation was made for AQ/Somalia so as to avoid a repeat of the disastrous retreat strategy in Lebanon in 1983 as well as a recommendation on the need to impede the integration of Transnational Criminal Organizations such as D-Company with Violent Enemy Networks. We retreated.? First AQ attempt on World Trade Center

1995- a thesis was postulated that the activity (outlined next) in mid-1995 was a concerted effort at establishing a core base for an Fundamentalist Islamic State.? In mid-1995 the following occurred within a 3 month period:

• Qatar- the overthrow in Qatar 26 Jun in favor of a more Muslim Brotherhood/AQ supporting regime ,?
• Egypt- the failed assassination attempt of Mubarak 26 Jun,?
• Pakistan- the coup attempt in Pakistan by Nawaz Sharif (a noted Tablighi Jamaat member) negated by GEN Waheed,?
• Syria- the reported, but lightly confirmed coup attempt in Syria by violent, fundamentalist Sunni elements of the Army’s Saraya al-Difaa unit,?
• Iraq- the near elimination of the Barzani lead Kurd element by the Talabani lead, Iranian supported Kurd element in Iraq only to have Barzani call on Saddam for a rescue
• Afghanistan- the formation of a Hekmatyar dominant GIRoA subjugating the more moderate Massoud-inspired elements

2001-? we know what happened here and the plethora of pre-mature AQ demise announcements by both former President Bush and President Obama since then while dismissing all fact based AQ transformational analysis put forth to the contrary.?

We know how the story continues to go as we have missed every opportunity to develop and execute a comprehensive Threat Neutralization strategy and an underlying Preemptive Intelligence capability in exchange for short term, undefined political gain.? So in addition to the goings on we are already behind in the transformation that is occurring in Central Asia—Central Asia, ruled by Qaddafi-like despots, at the center of a major energy, surrounded by nuclear powers, and a nascent Islamic uprising forming while AQ shifts away from a Pak-centric orientation and subtly? moves on to Azzam’s original vision.??

The So What

As a result of such compromised & ill-timed advertisements we have continued the backsliding, in our ability to stem the advances and the cooperative engagements of stateless Violent Enemy Networks, and Transnational Criminal Organizations (NOTE: we use 1979 and “no warning” of the pending Saudi Arabia Coup attempt, Iran Overthrow, & Afghanistan Invasion incidents as our starting point for discussion and distrust of our Intelligence capabilities).? And all the while our traditional Sovereign State competitors e.g. Russia, China, Iran, have prospered as the trust in the credibility of our “Word” has diminished correspondingly with allies.

By early 2008 it was apparent that the AQ network in Iraq survived and thrived. And the iconic effect of Al-Zaraqawi's very public "David taking on Goliath" challenge had attracted and emboldened a new generation of AQ followers and energized similar groups from Manila, to Mumbai, winding through the Maghreb all the way to Mexico City. And the constant reference to the lessening of AQ impact in SW Asia, all evidence to the contrary, puts our National Counter-insurgency Strategy at risk of disintegrating and jeopardizing our new Special Operations paradigm.?

These pre-mature, factually compromised political pronouncements followed similar situations in 1979 regarding Iran, 1983 regarding Hezbollah in Lebanon, and AQ in 1989, 1993, 1995, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007 and continue to this day.? ? As with these previous incidents such pronouncements continue to deal setbacks to efforts to radically re-construct our Intelligence System paradigm in order to move our efforts from a reactive, "track down" existing networks that to an opportunity seizing, preemptive effort that puts our National Security efforts in a proactive posture. Those at excessive Operational Risk are our Special Operations personnel, who based on the recent Quadrennial, will bear the burden of direct face-face confrontations and are in nearly constant “quack a mole” mode.

Background

We have been in a reactive posture for nearly four decades put in this posture with President Reagan deconstructing of our Human Intelligence capability in favor Technology oriented system anchored in his Star Wars program.? In 1984 President Reagan all but eliminated our Human Intelligence capability in favor of a technology based system a cornerstone of his Star Wars program.?

The rationale for this radical change was the inability of our Human Intelligence units to predict the Iran incident of 1979 combined with the similar shortfalls that failed to prevent the 1983 US Embassy and US Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut combined with the major findings of moles and traitors in our intelligence units. In reality having been assigned to the National Security Agency at the time it was a much more a budget struggle then it was a visionary move. Additionally there was a high degree of irrational distrust within the Beltway of many WWII & Cold War US Intelligence operatives with lineage traced to the USSR countries and China.

Recommendation

This US Administration and Congress needs to mandate that our Intelligence Agencies radically upgrade their Preemptive Intelligence and Threat Neutralization capabilities with a priority given to Special Operations units.? This change is needed in order to move to a proactive threat reducing, opportunity seizing organization from the current, reactive operating posture that does little to preempt threats to our National Security.? The Holistintel08 Plan (attached) is the first step in demonstrating how to exponentially increase our HUMINT capability and overcome thirty years of US HUMINT degradation. Please review that attached plan for the detailed rationale for this recommendation. (2014 NOTE: the HolisticIntel Concept submitted in 2008 to SOLIC was rejected)

For nearly thirty years now, since an assignment to the National Security Agency, I and others have repeatedly attempted to reconcile our lack of HUMINT capabilities and misplaced political pronouncements with the need for a more proactive Intelligence Organization.? One could say my continually updated recommendations are a melding of an upgraded WWII OSS capability integrating commercial professionals with traditional intel types and Special Forces to re-energize our HUMINT capability with the new, overly dependent Technology orientation.? (2014 NOTE: progressive leaders such as ADM McRaven and LTG Mike Flynn recognized the need for innovative activity for nearly a decade now but are retiring soon and will be sorely missed. )

I am in the process of updating my two decades old recommendation but attached a draft of what was eventually the 2008 Recommendation (recco) titled "Holisticintel08" for your review-- the predictive elements of narrative and analysis have proved true.? The recco was presented to three different Special Operations organization’s in an attempt to leverage the newly announced "Special Operations" uplift in size and scope and .? The organizations were the DoD Special Operations Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) team, USSOCOM in Tampa, and Special Operations arm of the National Security Council.? As with previous submissions we tried to identify champions within the "Politically In Favor" group.? The 2008 recommendation was reviewed and endorsed by senior current and retired members of US, British, Australian, Israeli, German, and New Zealand Special Operations & Intel Organizations prior to submission.??

Outcome

Again the effort went nowhere and AQ continues to evolve in stature, influence and impact. Their current configuration in more like a sophisticated, selective Angel Investor Group a la Cerberus rather than the previous over-reaching, undisciplined "franchise" development organization that sapped their finances and led to dilution of their "theological legitimacy" mantle.? They are focused again on providing funding, leadership structure, technology transfer, knowledge management, training, and financing to existing groups with leaders holding similar theological and operational goals.? They are back to being a force multiplier as was envisioned by the founder Abdullah Azzam in 1981 and employed successfully in Afghanistan through the 1980's, and by Al-Zaraqawi in Iraq.???

Time and again the facts disproved these type of Al-Zaraqawi type pronouncements as AQ elements continue their activity in Iraq, re-energize activity in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Chechnya, Somalia, and the Philippines, while initiating new activity in the GCC, Latin America, N. Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa.? There were other openly evident signs of AQ's evolving existence including a growing network integrating AQ activities with Hezbollah & the Taliban, increasing levels of revenue generating & knowledge transfer activities between the afore mentioned groups and traditional criminal cartels in Latin America, Africa and Asia and an alarming level of two-faced cooperation between supposed US allies in the Gulf Region and N.Africa and these terrorist entities.?

Post-mortem

As with previous efforts over the past years there was no political will to acknowledge the need for change regardless of the all evidence to the contrary. And we found the internecine warfare within the various SpecOps groups at extremely high levels as each was competing to be the lead group in leading the pending upgrade initiatives.? It didn't matter that the predictive elements of previous submissions in 1990, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006 regarding AQ transformations had proved true.

It didn't matter that that we were recommending a low cost, low risk pilot program to be placed in a low political visibility, high risk region, the Maghreb (Mali), that was seeing high levels of malevolent activity in lieu of placing the pilot in a broad-based, high visibility effort in Iraq or Afghanistan.? There is a litany of excuses we were given for declining the recommendation but none were based on the efficacy of the recommendation.? I can discuss with you if you want more background.??

Outlined is a little more background if you want to read on.?

Additional Background

These type of pre-mature pronouncements started in Viet Nam and were refined by the 1979 Iran change-over and continuing into 2013 are designed to provide political protection to whichever administration is in power to account for their failure to prevent the threat in the first place.? Such pronouncements continue to this day to the detriment of our security paradigm which continues our two decade long reactive Intelligence posture mode regardless of the threat.? We maintain the same reactive posture whether trying to close down malevolent groups such as AQ or dealing with Cyber Security threats from the Chinese.? As evidence of the continued detrimental political posturing one only has to look at two recent pronouncements from recently resigned US Secretary of Defense Panetta and GEN (ret) Stan McChrystal, former Afghanistan and JSOC Commander:

- Panetta when asked prior to the November 2012 elections about AQ's effect on the Arab Spring he came out with the following paraphrased pronouncement "the AQ resurgence in MENA (Middle East North Africa) can be attributed to an organization on last legs being lucky enough to seize the opportunity."? He indicated that it was nothing more than a last gasp effort to be relevant and they are no noticeable effect.? Such a statement false as all evidence points to AQ's extensive in Syria, Libya, Nigeria, Mali, etc.? There is documented confirmation that AQ's operations, training, financing, and logistical networks that has been operating and evolving for over a decade and a half.??

-? GEN (ret) Stan McChrystal, former Afghanistan Forces Commander & Commander JSOC, who led the hunt for Al Zaraqawi, spoke at the Brookings Institute the week of 3 February to initiate the new Brookings Intelligence Division.? In his talk he acknowledged four instances since 2001 when JSOC thought they had acted to get ahead of the enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan and found out they had miscalculated. In his talk he detailed at four separate instances since 2001 where they had thought they had reached a beachhead against the enemy they found the enemy morphed and moved to surface again in a more deadly construct. He also acknowledged that while we are closing the gap we still don't have a handle on their evolutionary tendencies—they are always ahead of us.????

As a result of the Al-Zaraqawi pronouncement recent efforts to gather up the political will to call for a radical overhaul in the US's dealing with AQ and other malevolent groups was dealt a serious setback heading into the 2008 elections. All efforts to get AQ recognized as an adaptable, sustainable, global enemy capable of employing the strategic learning's derived from Sun Tzu, Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, Clausewitz, Napoleon and US Grant came to a standstill. To the contrary, the Administration and the supporting Intelligence Agencies endorsed the proclamation that AQ was on their last legs and basically squashed all efforts to ramp up efforts to revise the vision and mission of our Intelligence units. (We call this kind of suppression “KILL THE WILL” and can lead to a generational demise of innovation, talent loss and Competitor Advancements.)?

Current Status (Result)

Our Intelligence systems will continue to be deficient in preempting the threats we are facing from Violent Enemy Networks whether in the form of ideology oriented groups such as Al Qaeda (AQ), drug cartels or sovereign threats from such enemies as the Chinese.? Regardless of how this all came about our Intelligence capabilities will be insufficient to meet future needs without a radical adjustment to the political will of the US Administration.?