U.S. Domestic Counterinsurgency in the post-Trump Era

In the wake of the January 6 storming of the U.S. Capitol the United States can no longer avoid the fact that it is confronted by a Domestic Insurgency--one which may lend itself to exploitation by hostile State and Non-State Actors which seek to destabilize, undermine and perhaps even destroy the United States of America.

It is therefore beholden on us to formulate and pursue a comprehensive and effective National Domestic Counterinsurgency Strategy in order to ensure domestic tranquility and provide for the common defense of the nation. This strategy must harness and coordinate dedicated elements of Counterintelligence; Civil and Psychological Operations; Special Forces and Federal, State and Local Law Enforcement agencies operating along the lines of existing Joint Task Force models.

In order to ensure effective intelligence sharing and coordination among disparate elements dedicated to carrying out this strategy, full advantage must be taken of the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS), the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), the National Data Exchange (N-Dex), the Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal (LEEP); Uniform Crime Reports (UCRs), Next Generation Identification (NGI); the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS); State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers; as well as other elements available to the Federal Government, including Defense and Military Criminal Investigations organizations and National Technical Means.

A successful Counterinsurgency depends on understanding the nature and scope of the Insurgency it combats--both as a baseline and in flux over time. It is necessary to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the Insurgency in material, personnel and organization. More than any other factor it is vital to develop an intimate knowledge of the ideas which drive Insurgents, and map the ways in which these ideas are communicated--online, in print, and face-to-face; and to understand how the Insurgency effects recruitment and support among those who are sympathetic to it. Extensive intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities must be continuously dedicated to this effort.

The Insurgency we face has no centralized Command and Control or Organizational Structure as yet--which presents both a challenge and an opportunity for mounting a successful Counterinsurgency. We are, thus far, facing a disparate collection of Extremist Groups and Individual Extremists with Ideological and Quasi-Religious Motivations that sometimes overlap and coincide. Almost all elements of this Insurgency would identify themselves as 'Right Wing' or 'Conservative,' but these terms bear no relationship to their traditional usage--and this language is in fact false, and misleading even to those using it to describe themselves. The true unifying feature of these Insurgent Elements is an anti-government orientation, which can in many instances be viewed as a form of (largely) unintended and unwitting crypto-Trotskyism--and in which, know it or not, they strive towards a state of 'permanent revolution' and 'social cleansing' that cannot be achieved outside a state of total anarchy. Being neither 'Right Wing' nor 'Conservative,' these elements are in fact revolutionary and deconstructivist; they seek to disassemble the state by violence, and offer nothing with which to replace it.

Recent events have made it clear that this Insurgency may find support-- stochastic, logistical, or more direct--among highly placed individuals within government and business. It may come from places as diverse and unexpected as the Executive Branch, the Congress, the Judiciary, former and current military officers and members of law enforcement organizations at all levels. It would be extremely naive of us not to imagine that active elements of this Insurgency can be found in critical infrastructure positions at Federal, State and Local levels. At some point we can expect to be confronted by Insurgents in places like the Postal Service, the Transportation Safety Administration, Customs and Border Protection and the Public Health Service--we can expect to find them working in our hospitals, operating our mass transit systems, and teaching in our schools.

The best known elements of this Insurgency include adherents of the quasi-religious, messianic and millenarian Q Anon 'conspiracy ideology' (not, strictly speaking, a group); members of the armed quasi-Libertarian Oath Keepers and Three Percenters groups; members of the Proud Boys; loosely organized collections of Bugaloo Boys (pro-civil violence accelerationists); as well as members of assorted White Supremacist groups, and Extremist Armed Militias. It is not at all unusual for Individual Extremists to simultaneously be members of more than one of these; nor is it unheard of for them to members of none of them--instead viewing themselves as 'lone wolves' acting according to their own ideologies, or simply seeking revolutionary violence in the absence of any ideology whatsoever.

What can we make of such a disorganized, and seemingly organic, collection of anti-democratic and anti-government forces? How do we array ourselves against it and counter it?

These are the questions which confront and confound those upon whom we will rely to undertake to the task of Domestic Counterinsurgency in the post-Trump Era. The Law Enforcement and Military measures needed are simple and self evident in comparison with the Civil and Psychological Operations aspects of this effort.

It will fall to Law Enforcement, with the support of Special Forces and Special Activities elements, to identify Individual Insurgents and Insurgent Groups which pose a clear and present Domestic danger; to preempt acts of Insurgent violence; and interdict weapons acquisition and transfer by these Insurgents. There are existing legal provisions for Special Forces and Special Activities elements to work in concert with U.S. Federal, State and Local Law Enforcement in the context of Joint Task Force operations--and these provisions should be strengthened and expanded moving forward; for this effort serious consideration should be given to expanding National Guard elements of Special Forces, and Army Psychological and Civil Operations for the specific purpose of supporting Law Enforcement on State and Local levels. It is particularly desirable to have National Guard Special Forces, Psychological and Civil Operations at the forefront of military aspects of this Counterinsurgency program due to the State, Local and Regional orientation and expertise they would bring to these efforts--and for the Federal, State and Local Law Enforcement employment such Guard members may have. Special Forces would primarily take field responsibility for Training and Advisory roles with State and Local Law Enforcement organizations in order to form dedicated Counterinsurgency cadres within them--but would, to a limited extent, be available together with Special Activities elements for more direct operations if need be.

Psychological and Civil Operations would have what is arguably the harder, and certainly the less well understood, job of countering the narratives of these Insurgents and reducing the susceptibility of local populations to their influence and activities on a day-to-day basis. Much of this work would take place in the realm of community involvement initiatives by Law Enforcement and other Local Organizations--and through messaging across multiple media. Words matter. It is necessary to clarify the nature of this Insurgency to national and local media, and--more importantly--to citizens at large; to differentiate confusing rhetoric from plain reality. Under no circumstances should we conflate these Insurgents with the 'Right Wing' or Conservatism--both of which have acceptable places in the body politic; rather these Insurgents should always and only be referred to in terms which actually describe them (anti-government, extremist, white supremacist, fanatical etc.) as precisely as possible. Similarly we should be at great pains to avoid using the term 'Civil War' which can, at least subconsciously, legitimize the violence undertaken by these Insurgents and can lend them an authority and organization they do not hold claim to--the word violence is itself a sufficient descriptor.

Community outreach, Psychological and Civil Operations are further confounded by the quasi-religious nature of many Insurgent ideologies --nowhere is this more evident than in the case of Q Anon, where messianic and millenarian hysteria of delusional proportions are the norm. Under no circumstances can we allow our efforts to conflict with legitimate religious freedom, or take on an anti-religious cast--yet we must be able to identify, understand and communicate the beliefs underlying Insurgent violence, many of which have a quasi-religious basis. We will have to do a better job of this than we did with what General H.R. McMaster wisely characterized as "un-Islamic terrorism;" and for this the terms 'un-Christian,' and perhaps even 'anti-Christian' may be helpful.

Psychologists, sociologists, community organizers, educators and librarians will all have important roles to play in an effective Counterinsurgency Strategy--dedicated funding and personnel will have to be provided by the Federal Government to make things work at State and Local Levels. Education and communication will be a great deal more important than firepower and imprisonment. To succeed our efforts must be nationwide, and will have to go on over many years--the political will must exist not to permit any thought of 'enemy territory' or seek any quick fixes. Neither will there be room for much secrecy beyond the operational Law Enforcement level--our efforts must be transparent and openly acknowledged extensions of national policy in order to succeed. The measures we take cannot be draconian, but they must not be halfhearted--we will always have to act within the law, yet not shrink from the full force of the law in order to promote the general welfare of our citizens under rule of law.