US-China Cyclical Perspectives: from War to Amity to War, again?

A War to end All Wars? Ever since then-President Donald Trump signed off on the US National Security Strategy document identifying China as the source of the USA's most profound strategic insecurity - 'displacement anxiety', if you will - in December 2017, [https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf esp. pp.45-46], subsequent policy documents from various departments and offices of the Executive Branch, official statements and remarks made by cabinet-level and other senior officials, and legislative action - have made clear the USA's determination to erode China's capacity to reject permanent subordination to the systemic primate's will. Even as the Russia-Ukraine war approaches its first anniversary amidst significant NATO/EU reinforcement of Ukrainian defences, China remains the military-strategic focus of US [and to an extent, allied] grand-strategy.

Forces are being reorganised, reinforced and redeployed, orders of battle revamped, alliances boosted and/or re-engineered, and military technology is being telescoped rapidly to deliver weapons-systems to combat Chinese forces in a conflict - specifically to defend Taiwan or ostensibly to sustain free commercial navigation across the South China Sea but, in fact, as senior commanders have discussed - to neuter China's 'aggressive' behaviour in parallel to reducing - paraphrasing the words of Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin - Russia's capacity again to do what it is doing to Ukraine.

Now, a senior US Air Force Commander, General Mike Minihan, Commander of the USAF Air Mobility Command, has written to the senior leaders of his Command, 'My gut tells me will fight in 2025'. Minihan instructs his senior subordinates to focus on building “a fortified, ready, integrated, and agile Joint Force Maneuver Team ready to fight and win inside the first island chain.” He directs all personnel to update their emergency contact-lists and to “fire a clip into a 7-meter target with the full understanding that unrepentant lethality matters most. Aim for the head.” [https://www.reuters.com/world/us-four-star-general-warns-war-with-china-2025-2023-01-28/, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/us-air-force-general-predicts-war-china-2025-memo-rcna67967, https://fortune.com/2023/01/28/war-china-taiwan-likely-by-2025-warns-american-general-mike-minihan/ ]

With responsible senior commanders of the US armed forces issuing specific operational orders as pointed as these, outside observers could be forgiven for assuming war preparations across the USG generally and US military forces in particular are geared towards engaging and destroying much - and possibly most - of PLA combatants in a major war within the next two years. Whatever the justification for such combat, official policy rhetoric and -documentation have left little doubt that the USA is determined to put China down. The preparatory and parallel economic, financial and scientific-technological endeavour to arrest the rapidity of China's growth and constrain it diplomatically has been widely reported by media. The potential flashpoints capable of triggering cataclysmic combat - it would be reasonable to assume that China would not quietly accept the beginnings of another 'century of humiliation' and will respond - have been identified and their characteristics analysed in some detail [https://warontherocks.com/2022/08/the-fourth-taiwan-strait-crisis-is-just-starting/, https://www.nbr.org/publication/regional-voices-on-escalating-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait/, https://www.southchinasea.org/files/2012/03/Cossa-Security-Implications-of-Conflict-in-the-S.ChinaSea.pdf, https://www.cfr.org/report/military-confrontation-south-china-sea]

All everyone seems to be waiting for is the spark triggering an incident with incendiary escalatory potential. Given the dialectics currently at play, such incidents are just a matter of time. Just how did we get here? Were there mileposts warning us of this trajectory of planetary tragedy - nuclear exchanges will devastate the Earth's atmosphere with radioactive dust clouds reaching every nook and cranny over time -? Is such a conflict unavoidable? Are the USA and China really 'destined' to fight to the death? Has it always been so? Does the history of US-Chinese relations, especially since the end of the Kuomintang's Republic of China - offer any insights, even lessons? Do the USA's own diplomatic archives shed any light?

Why China Matters: Within two years from Japan's surrender in August 1945, the KMT-run Republic of China under Chiang Kaishek was under intense political and economic pressure. The Communist Red Army was steadily moving south and east, eroding the area and population under Chiang's control. The Central Intelligence Group - a principal precursor to the CIA, submitted a detailed report on 1st November 1947 on the Chinese question and its possible answers. The first point was to explain China's inherent significance, and its importance to US grand-strategic interests in the post-War and early-Cold War world:

"The centre of gravity in the Far East lies in China which is at once the largest state and the base area of East Asia. The great majority of the people in East Asia are Chinese, inhabiting over 3 million square miles of Chinese soil. Chinese culture - ideas, social institutions, language - has for centuries been the dominant culture of the far East. Economically, China is an important factor in the lives of its neighbours, while politically and militarily China is potentially the greatest power in East Asia.

"China is now passing through a critical period of social, economic and political instability brought on largely by the impact of Western civilization which began in the early nineteent century and has now been felt in almost every phase of Chinese life. For more than 100 years the Far East has been an area of international friction, principally because of China's internal weakness, which has invited foreign encroachment on Chinese sovereignty. Since the end of World War II, China has failed to derive much profit from the defeat of Japan because it has been torn internally by the civil war between the National Government and the Chinese Communists, while menaced on the north by a revival of Russian imperialism. Present trends in China are in the direction of increasing instability and increasing strength of Chinese Communist military and political influence.

"Without foreign assistance, the National Government has little prospect of reversing or even materially checking these trends because of its declining military strength, the maladministration and corruption prevalent throughout the Government's civil and military structure, its inability to cope with economic deterioration, and its lack of popular support. Scarcely any positive factors are operating to promote the stability of the National Government other than (a) prospects of military and economic assistance from the US, and, (b) promise of substantial internal reforms. There is, however, considerable doubt that the present Government can or will accomplish the latter. Without such reforms, moreover, it is extremely questionable whether any reasonable amount of US assistance could achieve any long-term political and economic or stabilisation. Within Nationalist territory, the Nationalist Government lacks popular support and the prestige of Ching Kai-shek has greatly diminished."

The CIG insightfully prophesied the end of the KMT's reign and the RoC's demise on the mainland. However, the Truman Administration, focused on Russia's refusal to adhere to various understandings reached with the USA and the UK during the World War - in Tehran in 1943 and at Yalta and Berlin towards the end of Nazi German resistance - and sensing the beginnings of revanchist threats from the Eurasian heartland, felt obliged to sustain Chiang's RoC for as long as practicable.

A Moment of Reappraisal: The Director of the Department of State's Policy Planning Staff, the key internal think-tank at the time, wrote on 24th February 1948: "My main impression with regard to the position of this Government with regard to the Far East is that we are greatly over-extended?in our whole thinking about what we can accomplish, and should try to accomplish, in that area. This applies, unfortunately, to the public in our country as well as to the Government.

"It is urgently necessary that we recognize our own limitations as a moral and ideological force among the Asiatic peoples. Our political philosophy and our patterns for living have very little applicability to masses of people in Asia. They may be all right for us, with our highly developed political traditions running back into the centuries and with our peculiarly favorable geographic position; but they are simply not practical or helpful, today, for most of the people in Asia. This being the case, we must be very careful when we speak of exercising “leadership” in Asia. We are deceiving ourselves and others, when we pretend to have the answers to the problems which agitate many of these Asiatic peoples.

"Furthermore, we have about 50% of the world’s wealth but only 6.3% of its population. This disparity is particularly great as between ourselves and the peoples of Asia. In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security. To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming; and our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives. We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the luxury of altruism and world-benefaction.

"For these reasons, we must observe great restraint in our attitude toward the Far Eastern areas. The peoples of Asia and of the Pacific area are going to go ahead, whatever we do, with the development of their political forms and mutual interrelationships in their own way. This process cannot be a liberal or peaceful one. The greatest of the Asiatic peoples—the Chinese and the Indians—have not yet even made a beginning at the solution of the basic demographic problem involved in the relationship between their food supply and their birth rate. Until they find some solution to this problem, further hunger, distress and violence are inevitable. All of the Asiatic peoples are faced with the necessity for evolving new forms of life to conform to the impact of modern technology. This process of adaptation will also be long and violent. It is not only possible, but probable, that in the course of this process many peoples will fall, for varying periods, under the influence of Moscow, whose ideology has a greater lure for such peoples, and probably greater reality, than anything we could oppose to it.

"All this, too, is probably unavoidable; and we could not hope to combat it without the diversion of a far greater portion of?our national effort than our people would ever willingly concede to such a purpose. In the face of this situation we would be better off to dispense now with a number of the concepts which have underlined our thinking with regard to the Far East. We should dispense with the aspiration to “be liked” or to be regarded as the repository of a high-minded international altruism. We should stop putting ourselves in the position, of being our brothers’ keeper and refrain from offering moral and ideological advice. We should cease to talk about vague and—for the Far East—unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.

"We should recognize that our influence in the Far Eastern area in the coming period is going to be primarily military and economic. We should make a careful study to see what parts of the Pacific and Far Eastern world are absolutely vital to our security, and we should concentrate our policy on seeing to it that those areas remain in hands which we can control or rely on.

"It is my own guess, on the basis of such study as we have given the problem so far, that Japan and the Philippines will be found to be the corner-stones of such a Pacific security system and that if we can contrive to retain effective control over these areas there can be no serious threat to our security from the East within our time. Only when we have assured this first objective, can we allow ourselves the luxury of going farther afield in our thinking and our planning. If these basic concepts are accepted, then our objectives for the immediate coming period should be:

(a) to liquidate as rapidly as possible our unsound commitments in China and to recover, vis-à-vis that country, a position of detachment and freedom of action;

(b) to devise policies with respect to Japan which assure the security of those islands from communist penetration and domination as well as from Soviet military attack, and which will permit the economic potential of that country to become again an important force in the Far East, responsive to the interests of peace and stability in the Pacific area; and

(c) to shape our relationship to the Philippines in such a way as to permit to the Philippine Government a continued independence in all internal affairs but to preserve the archipelago as a bulwark of U.S. security in that area.

"Of these three objectives, the one relating to Japan is the one where there is the greatest need for immediate attention on the part of our Government and the greatest possibility for immediate action. It?should therefore be made the focal point of our policy for the Far East in the coming period.....our present controls are temporary ones which cannot long endure, and we have not yet worked out realistic plans for replacing them with a permanent structure. Meanwhile, our own public has been grievously misled by the sentimentalists on the significance of the area to ourselves; and we are only beginning with the long and contentious process of re-education which will be necessary before a realistic Far Eastern policy can receive the popular understanding it deserves."

The next two decades, as all readers of this commentary know, saw vigorous efforts to contain Soviet expansionary efforts across the European landmass, and the presumed Sino-Soviet alliance's encroachments into US 'controlled or influenced' spheres. Wars in Korea, and later Indochina, covert Indo-US proxy campaigns in Tibet and the Sino-Indian border conflict, US-RoC clandestine operations in south-eastern China, and communist-tinted 'national liberation' movements in still fluid post-colonial successor areas sustained an energetic focus on adversarial Sino-US dynamic as part of an overarching containment strategy.

Warfare by Other Means: The 1950s proved particularly fraught. Engaged as the USA was in reconstructing Europe, Japan, South Korea, and building resource-intensive alliance networks broadly surrounding the Sino-Soviet Eurasian landmass, US leaders explored ways of reinforcing deterrence by securing 'friendly neutrals' while also seeking to subvert the solidity of the variegated Soviet and PRC ethno-political landscape, and boost influence among states around Communist Eurasia. The Presidential Commission on International Information Activities advised the President shortly after the Korean Armistice went into effect - on 30th June 1953: "The purposes of the United States in its actions abroad spring from two basic concerns: first, for the physical security of the United States; second, for the development of a world environment favorable to the survival and flourishing of free institutions. The United States must, therefore, adopt not only those policies necessary to its military security but also those essential to the creation of world conditions consistent with the maintenance of these free institutions.

"The nature of the conflict lies in this fundamental clash, and the conflict will continue until one side or the other drops behind in the development of capabilities or loses its will to continue the struggle. This view is widely held, but there has not always been a full recognition of the measure of the task imposed upon the United States, and there are important differences of opinion as to the policies by which United States objectives can best be pursued.

"The relationship between the Soviet regime and the satellites and Communist China is another source of weakness. Soviet exploitation has created resentments among the captive peoples. Satellite rulers maintain themselves in power only by force and are dependent on the support of the?Kremlin. A struggle for power in the?Kremlin?may make it difficult for the Soviet regime to act promptly and decisively toward the satellites and there may be corresponding struggles within these countries. As a result, opportunities may arise for satellites to break away from the?Kremlin, though this would seem unlikely before an internal?Kremlin?conflict had reached an advanced stage.

"Communist China appears to have more the position of ally than satellite.?The alliance has probably been advantageous to each partner. There are deep and historic conflicts of interest, however, which might in time lead to open rivalry. The Soviet rulers will attempt to gain domination over Communist China because of concern over its present capabilities for independent action. The Chinese Communist regime is almost certain to resist Soviet efforts to reduce it politically and economically to satellite status; moreover,?Mao Tse-tung?may now regard himself as the independent leader of the communist movement in Asia and may be reluctant to take directions from the new Soviet rulers.

"Despite these latent sources of conflict, the Chinese Communists probably attach great importance to maintaining the Sino-Soviet alliance and may be willing to make some sacrifices to accommodate their aspirations to Soviet policies. There is small likelihood that a split will develop between them in the near future. It also seems unlikely that the regime can be overthrown from within by popular resistance, even with such covert support as might be provided." The recommendation was to aid and encourage any prospects of breaches between the USSR and China, although how this could be achieved while maintaining formal treaty commitments to Taiwan was not explained. It would be a while before the USA took this advice.

A Turning of Tables: A decade-and-a half of energetic action sustained the Cold War perspective, but grand-strategic policy priorities - unbeknownst to the Executive bureaucracy outside the NSC - dramatically changed. On 5th September 1969, an interagency commission ordered by President Nixon, reported: "Our overwhelming strategic nuclear advantage against the Chinese and our expected Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) capability to defend against their Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threat increases the deterrent and warfighting value of our forces. We can strike Chinese strategic forces, cities, or major military installations with little military risk, though there may well be political inhibitions to the initial use of nuclear weapons by the United States. At present the Chinese have no way of responding in kind against?CONUS, although they could strike our Asian Allies.

"If the Chinese had?ICBMs, they might be tempted to respond by striking?U.S.?cities, but it would be an irrational act, since the?U.S.?return strike, requiring only a small proportion of our nuclear weapons, could destroy all major Chinese cities. Tactical nuclear weapons could be used against a conventional Chinese invasion if the Chinese forces massed for attack against a coherent territorial front or if we were willing to use nuclear weapons on large areas to destroy their reserve troops and support facilities. Even with tactical nuclear weapons, however, we could not destroy the?Chinese capability to fight if they were determined to continue the war.

"Also, the Chinese could attack our bases and ports in Asia and the cities of our Asian Allies with nuclear weapons, a capability which lessens our nuclear weapons advantage. Therefore, both our tactical and strategic nuclear forces add to our deterrence and war-fighting capability against a Chinese conventional attack in Asia. However, the advantage we would gain by using theater nuclear weapons has to be measured against the effects of a Chinese nuclear response in Asia."

That well-reasoned national-security perspective was challenged by Nixon's clandestine initiative to build diplomatic bridges to Beijing, one that finally succeeded after Pakistan's leader agreed to carry the first messages from Nixon to Zhou Enlai, and Zhou's response. On 9th July 1971, meeting the Chinese Premier at their first - secret - meeting in Beijing, NSA Henry Kissinger began, "President?Nixon?has asked me to convey to you and Chairman?Mao?his high personal regards. He looks forward to meeting with the leaders of the People’s Republic of China personally to exchange ideas." Reading from texts personally edited and approved by Nixon, Kissinger added, "For us this is an historic occasion. Because this is the first time that American and Chinese leaders are talking to each other on a basis where each country recognizes each other as equals. In our earlier contacts we were a new and developing country in contrast to Chinese cultural superiority. For the past century you were victims of foreign oppression. Only today, after many difficulties and separate roads, have we come together again on a basis of equality and mutual respect. So we are both turning a new page in our histories." Nixon's message to the PRC leadership was: "We are here today, brought together by global trends. Reality has brought us together, and we believe that reality will shape our future."

Kissinger's later visits, and Nixon's dramatic trip to China, meeting with Mao, and the proclamation of the Shanghai Communique, and the steady fashioning of a tacit counter-Soviet partnership which took on Moscow's activities in Indochina, South Asia, Central America, southern Africa, the Horn of Africa and, most spectacularly, in Afghanistan - over the Cold War's closing decade with coordinated responses, have been well-documented elsewhere. The two partners closely collaborated in high-technology intelligence collection, analysis and exploitation vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and other sources of shared anxiety. US-Chinese relations transformed the Cold War dynamics across the world.

On 8th October 1973, Kissinger, addressing a Pacem et Terres [peace on Earth] gathering, noted some of the effects wrought largely as a result of this new and rapidly coalescing Sino-US proto-alliance:

"Above all, whatever the measure of power, its political utility has changed. Throughout history increases in military power, however slight, could be turned into specific political advantage. With the overwhelming arsenals of the nuclear age, however, the pursuit of marginal advantage is both pointless and potentially suicidal. Once sufficiency is reached, additional increments of power do not translate into usable political strength, and attempts to achieve tactical gains can lead to cataclysm.

"This environment both puts a premium on stability and makes it difficult to maintain. Today’s striving for equilibrium should not be compared to the balance of power of previous periods. The very notion of “operating” a classical balance of power disintegrates when the change required to upset the balance is so large that it cannot be achieved by limited means. Nor when we talk of equilibrium do we mean a simplistic mechanical model devoid of purpose. The constantly shifting alliances that maintained equilibrium in previous centuries are neither appropriate nor possible in our time.

"When we refer to five or six or seven major centers of power, the point being made is not that others are excluded but that a few short years ago everyone agreed that there were only two. The diminishing tensions and the emergence of new centers of power have meant greater freedom of action and greater importance for all other nations.In this setting, our immediate aim has been to build a stable network of relationships that offers hope of sparing mankind the scourges of war. An interdependent world community cannot tolerate either big-power confrontations or recurrent regional crises."

It was not until 15th December 1978 that the USA and China could agree on the terms and conditions on the bases of which they would establish full, formal, diplomatic relations. President James Carter, proclaimed the Joint Communique' to his compatriots and the world: "The United States of America and the People’s Republic of China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979.

"The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

"The United States of America and the People’s Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique?and emphasize once again that:

"Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.

"Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

"Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

"The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

"Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world."

Given this historical context, General Mike Minihan's orders - dated 1st February 2023 - to his forces to prepare for fighting China in 2025 do raise questions about the fundamental nature of perceptions and comprehensions of the reality dividing the two shores of the Pacific.