An update on the Russian drone operations we have seen 18 days into this war
Tim De Zitter
Supporting Ukraine - Lifecycle manager Land Combat Missiles , GBAD and CUAS and GMG systems (surveying Loitering Munitions) @Belgian Defense - OSINT non-professional
The role of UAVs in the Russian ISR and Strike concept
One of the most significant weaknesses of Russia’s military during the Cold War was its ability to gain and maintain battlefield awareness. In a conflict, once the military was able to make and keep contact with an enemy, it was believed that it could bring tremendous firepower to bear. Since the beginning of the Russian military’s modernization efforts, the military leadership has sought to address this weakness through new integrated command and control systems, greater use of space-based assets, and ground-based radar and electronic warfare advances.
The role of autonomy in an invasion of Ukraine General Gerasimov elaborated that today’s combat is “unthinkable without drones—they are used by gunners, scouts, pilots—everyone.
Many of these systems use increasingly automated control modes to quicken response times, for example, in air defense systems that have to quickly detect and assess a disparate array of airborne threats. UAVs, in particular, play an essential role in increasing the Russian military’s situational awareness and ability to maximize its strike systems on the modern battlefield.
UAVs are playing a much greater role in aerial ISR, target acquisition and designation, airstrike coordination, and artillery fire. These UAVs have become a key part of what the MOD calls the?“reconnaissance fire and strike complexes.”
The use of UAVs by the Russian Armed Forces in the Ukrainian War
I hereby try to give you an update based on Open Sources Intelligence (OSINT) of the use of UAVs by the Russian Armed Forces 18 days into the Ukrainian War
The early phase - the apparent lack of Russian drones
In the earliest phase of the conflict it seemed as if the Russian advance lacked ISR/combat UAVs that should have been part of their regular CONOPS/TTPs as defined by training, exercises, and military deployments to Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh.
Russian military columns appeared to walk into ambushes, with small units and groups of vehicles?maneuvring?in order to avoid larger Ukrainian military forces. These small detachments appeared to be without support—evidenced by so many social media posts—and suffered casualties. The ISR drones are supposed to prevent these losses from taking place, by providing a view of the battlefield and allowing soldiers and commanders to make educated decisions about their next steps.
Despite different UAV types available for many missions, the initial Russian drive into Ukraine did not feature the type of situational awareness that such drones are supposed to provide
One reason might be that the Ukrainian air defenses and electronic warfare networks were still to be?functioning, which could be interfering with Russian efforts to put its drones to use. Another is that despite the Russian military’s previous success with smaller UAVs, its acquisition of larger and more capable drones has only recently been cleared by the defense ministry.?
The second phase
As the Russian military adjusted its operations, tightened supply and logistics, and continued the advance from Crimea, Donbass and south to Kyiv and Kharkiv, more evidence emerged of Russian drones in ISR and target acquisition capacity.
On Mar 9 Russia’s Izvestia released footage from a ZALA-421-16E5G UAV showing Russian artillery strikes on Ukrainian positions in Mariupol.
Downed Orlan-10s, captured Eleron-3s and Eniks target UAVs evidence that the Russian military is returning to its concept of operations where UAVs scout the area, report adversary movements and positions, and provide coordinates for artillery, MLRS and airborne assets.
The Orlan-10 UAV, with a range of up to 120 km, makes up the largest share of the Russian 2000+ drone fleet. Other UAVs, such as Zastava, Eleron-3, Takhion, Granat, and ZALA, currently in service, provide ISR coverage at the tactical level, with a range between 12 and 100 km, giving Russian forces extended coverage of the battlefield. An interesting recent development with the Orlan-10 drones, noted by Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine, is that they can fly at an altitude of 6 km, perhaps complicating Ukrainian attempts to interdict them. There are also reports by Ukrainian solders that the upgraded Orlan-10s are more impervious to electronic countermeasures.
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The third phase
Now, additional evidence is emerging from both Ukrainian posts and Russian public channels that not only is the Russian military increasing its ISR capability with what looks like ZALA surveillance drones, but additional combat capability is added with Orion/Forpost-R UCAV.
This means that the evolution of the Orlan-10 and Forpost drones?from a pure ISR platform to a combat UAV (Forpost-R), that was initiated in 2021, is proving to be fruitful
Arming the Orlan-10 and Forpost has been a particularly important development for the Russian UAV fleet. With hundreds of Orlans and dozens of Forposts in service, the MOD gains significant ground attack capability that was?largely absent from its UAV force in previous years
11 Mar - Russian MOD claims that this video was made from a "combat drone flying at 4000 meters, striking the target with a precision weapon." If true, then its likely another strike by Orion UCAV.
The Russian Forpost-R MALE is a licensed produced version of the Israeli?IAI - Israel Aerospace Industries?Searcher UAV, with combat capability recently demonstrated during Zapad-2021 drills with Belarus.
At the same time, we saw no evidence so far of Leer-3 EW capability that was demonstrated in East Ukraine and Syria.
It also looks like Russian military started using ZALA Aero KUB-BLA loitering munition loitering munition UAV, and possibly Lancet loitering drone use may not be far behind.
The next phase
What to expect in the coming days? While the above-mentioned UAV capabilities did not appear well coordinated at first, and Russian forces still walked into Ukrainian ambushes, we should expect Russian military to field more ISR drones.
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