Unveiling the Risks of Exposed T5 PLCs, Vulnerable Routers, and RTSP Misconfigurations

Unveiling the Risks of Exposed T5 PLCs, Vulnerable Routers, and RTSP Misconfigurations

Welcome to the 21st installment of OT Hunt where we dive into the challenges and opportunities within the realm of ICS/OT devices connected to the internet. This series aims to raise awareness among asset owners and ICS vendors, encouraging them to proactively secure their infrastructures.

The Discovery: T5 PLCs on the Internet

One day, I was exploring ZoomEye using the query device:"plc", searching for new PLC brands or types. To my surprise, a more refined search with the filter device:"plc" +app:"T5" revealed almost 2,500 online T5 PLC devices. These were predominantly located in Italy, with smaller distributions across other countries.

This discovery piqued my curiosity. What exactly is the T5 PLC? After some digging, I found that it originates from a French vendor, COPALP (now COPA-DATA France), which specializes in industrial products like historian and PLCs. Learn more about them at COPA-DATA.

Observations on Security: The Weak Links

Unfortunately, my findings revealed significant security lapses, particularly in China, where many T5 PLCs were exposed with weak configurations. Here’s what stood out:

1. Open FTP Ports with Anonymous Login

  • Several hosts had FTP ports open with anonymous login enabled, granting unauthorized users access to files and data.

2. Open Telnet Ports

  • The presence of open Telnet ports further amplified the risks, as attackers could potentially gain control over the devices using plaintext credentials.

3. Vulnerable Cermate Routers

  • Many of these devices were connected via Cermate routers, which act as HMI gateways to the internet. Shockingly, most of these routers had their web management interfaces exposed with default credentials (admin/admin), leaving them wide open to attackers.

4. RTSP Ports (554) Exposed

  • The Real-Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) was also commonly exposed. RTSP is used for controlling streaming media servers but, when misconfigured, can increase the attack surface dramatically.

The Risks of Exposed RTSP Ports:

  • Discover Internal Camera Streams: Attackers can access internal camera feeds.
  • HMI Access: Some HMIs receive data from cameras, creating an indirect pathway to the ICS network.
  • Pivoting into ICS Networks: Exploiting RTSP can provide a foothold for lateral movement.
  • URL Brute Force Attacks: Attackers can discover stream URLs via brute force.
  • Credential Brute Force Attacks: Tools like Hydra can be used to brute force RTSP credentials.

Testing RTSP Configurations: Tools and Techniques

If you're dealing with RTSP exposure, testing its configuration can help identify vulnerabilities. Here are some tools and methods to try:

1. curl Command

curl -i -X DESCRIBE rtsp://10.10.14.30/Streaming/Channels/101
        

  • This command reveals details about the media being streamed.

2. nmap with RTSP Scripts

nmap -sV --script "rtsp-*" -p 554 10.10.14.30
        

  • Useful for finding: RTSP server version Available streams and channel URLs Supported RTSP methods

3. Hydra Brute Force

hydra -s 554 -l admin -P /path/to/wordlist.txt rtsp://10.10.14.30
        

  • Discovers media/channel paths using brute force with wordlists.

4. VLC for Stream Viewing


vlc rtsp://10.10.14.30/live
        

  • Open unauthenticated streams in VLC to view media. This could expose facility videos and images, providing attackers with critical insights.

Summary: The Cost of Exposure

When industrial devices like PLCs are exposed to the internet, the risks are high. My research found that many T5 PLCs also had open Modbus ports (502), which attackers could exploit using open-source tools to pull data. Combining this with vulnerable services like FTP, Telnet, and RTSP creates multiple entry points for attackers.

The critical question is: Who knows what's behind these exposed devices?

Conclusion: Stay Vigilant

This article highlights critical security vulnerabilities in T5 Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and routers utilizing the Real-Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP).These weaknesses can be exploited by cyber criminals to disrupt industrial control systems, leading to potential operational failures and safety hazards. The article underscores the importance of implementing robust security measures, such as regular firmware updates, network segmentation, and stringent access controls, to safeguard these systems against cyber threats.

ICSRank is here to help you discover, assess, and secure your ICS/OT systems. Stay tuned for more insights in future OT Hunt installments. Together, we can defend critical infrastructure against evolving cyber threats.

Let’s make security a priority. Your vigilance matter

VASEEM SMD. CISSP

CyberSecurity Expert,IBM Qradar, LogRythm Siem,DarkTrace Threat Visualizer 6.0, DarkTrace Detection Response,DarkTrace Email Security, IBM Cyber Threat Intelligence, Splunk Siem, OT Security,EDR, XDR, SOC Analyst Level 2

2 个月

Mitigation Strategies: Update Firmware Regularly: Ensure that both the PLC and router firmware are updated regularly to patch known vulnerabilities. Disable Unused Services: Disable open ports, including RTSP ports, when they are not necessary. Use a firewall to restrict access to critical services to trusted IPs only. Use Strong Authentication and Encryption: Enable strong password policies and consider using encryption for any sensitive data, including video feeds transmitted over RTSP. Network Segmentation: Place critical devices like PLCs and cameras on separate networks to isolate them from the rest of the infrastructure, limiting exposure to attacks. Monitor for Unusual Traffic: Regularly monitor network traffic for unusual behavior that may indicate attempts to exploit vulnerabilities or unauthorized access. By understanding and addressing the vulnerabilities associated with T5 PLCs, routers, and RTSP ports, organizations can significantly reduce the risk of security breaches and system compromises. Hardening is best

Ashish Kumar

OT Security Engineer@ Siemens,|xEmersonAutosol Noida|

3 个月

Great insight, Hardening is important to secure an OT device...

Mohamed Abdelrhafour, CEH, CISM, CISA, TüV FS-Eng.

Senior OT/ICS/IT & Cybersecurity Consultant

3 个月

Interesting

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