Unveiling the Post Office Horizon System Scandal: What Went Wrong and How to Prevent It
By ME!

Unveiling the Post Office Horizon System Scandal: What Went Wrong and How to Prevent It

Many have asked why I haven't written an article or conducted a troubleshooting analysis of the ongoing post office scandal and the injustice inflicted upon sub-postmasters. I have been closely following this story, not only due to my professional interests but also because several friends and family members own businesses that include post offices. This scandal has taken a toll on them mentally, financially, and socially, causing a great deal of uncertainty and pain. The technical complexities involved in this matter have made it challenging to investigate, analyze, and troubleshoot. However, in this article, I aim to shed light on the what, why, who, and how of the Post Office Horizon system scandal without delving too deeply into the technical intricacies.


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What: Is the Horizon system?

The Horizon system, introduced by the UK Post Office in 1999, was initially intended to revolutionize the operation of post offices across Britain. Unfortunately, it became the epicenter of what is now frequently referred to as the largest miscarriage of justice in British history. This article seeks to uncover why the Horizon system failed and the nature of the errors and glitches it encountered.

The UK Postal Service heavily relies on the Horizon system to sort and track letters and packages at postal facilities nationwide. Introduced in the late 1999s, Horizon was meant to replace outdated systems, modernize postal processing, and enhance efficiency. It is utilized for point-of-sale transactions in thousands of Post Office branches, managing financial accounting, inventory management, and reporting. Horizon's data is crucial for auditing accounts and identifying discrepancies or shortfalls at each branch office.

In simple terms, Horizon was like a cash register—a sophisticated electronic point-of-sale (EPOS) system—linked to a massive backend network that interconnected the entire Post Office system.

Why: Did it go wrong?

When introduced in 1999, Horizon replaced manual end-of-day accounting with automated processes for transaction data. However, the system's complexity soon became evident. Developed by the private firm Fujitsu, Horizon comprised outdated legacy infrastructure, custom code, and interfaces with third-party programs.

It quickly became apparent that the system was not up to the task. The Post Office was aware of these issues as early as 1999 when trials for the system's launch revealed "severe difficulties" experienced by subpostmasters. Horizon's patchwork of complex components made it susceptible to system crashes, data errors, and functionality bugs from the outset. The Post Office lacked in-house IT expertise to maintain Horizon and relied on external developers who failed to identify and resolve accumulating glitches.

As early as 2001, the development team had discovered "hundreds" of bugs. A comprehensive list has never been produced, but successive vindications of post office operators have revealed the types of problems that arose. The development team had a mix of experience, with only 50% of the team meeting above-average professional standards. This meant that the coding was not executed at a high level, and finding and fixing the bugs was not carried out effectively.

Despite Fujitsu's staff being aware of the bugs and defects, the system was allowed to remain live and was maintained without fully rectifying the core problems.

One bug, among the many identified, would cause the screen to freeze as the user attempted to confirm the receipt of cash. Each time the user pressed 'enter' on the frozen screen, it would silently update the record. Another bug resulted in duplicate transactions due to an error in the database underpinning the system. Despite these duplicates being clearly evident, the user operator was unfairly held responsible for the errors.

The Post Office denied the subpostmasters' reports of faults in the system, insisting that users make up any shortfall of money. In many cases, they untruthfully denied that any other system users had reported problems. By denying the existence of these issues, the system was never fully reviewed and recertified. One of the fundamental rules of product development is to listen to your users, and unfortunately, this principle was not followed.

Who: The Key Players in the Horizon System Scandal?

The Horizon System Scandal implicated several key stakeholders:

  1. The Post Office: As the organisation overseeing the UK's network of post office branches, the Post Office initiated the Horizon project in 1996 and contracted Fujitsu to develop the system. They were responsible for training and supporting postmasters but continued to assert the robustness of Horizon despite mounting evidence of problems.
  2. Postmasters: Postmasters were the primary users of Horizon at local Post Office branches across the UK. They operated the system for all transactions and accounting at their branches, raising early concerns about errors but finding little recourse. Many had their contracts terminated and faced criminal charges when shortfalls occurred.
  3. Fujitsu: The IT consulting firm was contracted to build and implement Horizon but failed to detect critical errors and provided poor support. They initially refused to accept any responsibility for the failures.
  4. Government: The UK government provided minimal oversight to the Post Office, despite its status as a public service. No independent audits were conducted on Horizon, and politicians took little action on early warning signs.
  5. Us: We the public are also involved in this, not just because we use the service & product given by the post office, but also that fact that the UK public own the Post office! Guess who has paid for this computer system and who will eventually pay for the compensation, that is rightfully due.

How: Preventing Faulty System Implementation?

The Horizon IT system debacle serves as a cautionary tale for organizations, highlighting the potential harm of poorly designed, implemented, and governed computer systems. To prevent such damaging scandals, organizations can learn from these lessons:

  1. Understanding System Requirements: Thoroughly comprehend system requirements before development begins to ensure they align with the system's capabilities.
  2. Thorough Testing: Conduct rigorous end-to-end testing, ideally by an independent quality assurance team, to identify issues missed during development.
  3. Listening to Users: Implement pilot programs with user feedback loops to address problems early and avoid compounding failures.
  4. Employee Training: Provide comprehensive training for users, especially for complex bespoke software, to enable them to identify and troubleshoot errors.
  5. Regular Auditing: Conduct independent audits post-implementation to reveal flaws missed during initial testing.
  6. Ongoing Maintenance: Invest in patches, upgrades, and maintenance to fix bugs and keep technology up-to-date.
  7. System Governance: Establish clear responsibility for monitoring system health, assessing risks, and recommending interventions.
  8. Implement Redundancies: Ensure critical systems have data backups and manual checks to counterbalance automation.
  9. Avoid Overconfidence: Acknowledge that no system is perfect and that governance is essential to prevent issues.

By proactively addressing these aspects in design, training, and governance, organisations can build trustworthy systems that serve stakeholders and prevent similar scandals in the future. Valuing human insight alongside technological innovation is key, especially in an era of increasing AI utilisation.

Conclusion

The Horizon scandal serves as a stark reminder of the potential pitfalls in computer system development. By understanding system requirements, taking proactive measures in design, ensuring adequate skills and expertise, implementing rigorous testing and error reporting mechanisms, maintaining clear communication and transparency, and learning from mistakes, it is possible to prevent poorly built computer systems and avoid similar scandals in the future. Embracing human insight alongside technological innovation will be crucial in the age of increasing AI adoption.

Mr?Rajesh Sisodiya

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