Unsung Strategist of World War II

The Second Most Powerful Man in the World: The Life of Admiral William D. Leahy, Roosevelt's Chief of Staff

By Phillips Payson O’BrienDutton, Penguin Random House, LLC, 2019

Reviewed by Commander Lawrence M. Kryske, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

?Who were the key strategic players during the Second World War? Andrew Roberts, author of Masters and Commanders: How the Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941-1945 (2009), would assert they were Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, George Marshall, and Alan Brooke. Lewis Lehman in Churchill, Roosevelt, and Company: Studies in Character and Statecraft (2017) might add Harry Hopkins. Conventional wisdom would include on the American side a dash of Douglas MacArthur, Ike Eisenhower, Ernest King, and Chester Nimitz. But what about the most senior member of the U.S. military organization, Fleet Admiral William Daniel Leahy? According to hundreds of works on World War Two, was he even there?

Phillips Payson O’Brien in The Second Most Powerful Man in the World: The Life of Admiral William D. Leahy, Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff brings a new, in-depth perspective on a person who helped shape the fighting of the Second World War. While Walter Borneman in The Admirals: Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy, and King—The Five Star Admirals Who Won the War at Sea (2012) acknowledged Leahy’s impact, he did so with a paucity of detail. He did observe that “Leahy wielded power as much as [he] witnessed it,” and might be considered, the “Unseen Wielder of Power.”

Some historians, nonetheless, have overlooked Leahy’s influence on grand strategy. At best he was considered only an observer to the actions of others, as documented in Witness to Power: The Life of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy (1985) by Henry Adams, the only other full-length biography of Leahy. Adams used Leahy’s papers and journals yet failed to discern the extent of his authority.

Several biographers have inadvertently airbrushed Leahy out of history (but not with malice or design). ?David Roll in The Hopkins Touch: Harry Hopkins and the Forging of the Alliance to Defeat Hitler (2013) and in George Marshall: Defender of the Republic (2019) has only sparse references to Leahy. Robert Sherwood in Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (1950) similarly minimized Leahy’s presence and actions. Sherwood (along with Harry Hopkins) was a principal speechwriter for FDR. He certainly observed the significant amount of time Leahy spent alone with FDR. Yet these occurrences merited only a dozen brief references in an almost thousand-page book.

Grace Tully, Roosevelt’s principal secretary, in FDR: My Boss (1949) must have seen Leahy almost daily. She often traveled with FDR and the admiral to Roosevelt’s home at Hyde Park, NY, yet she mentioned him in her memoirs only three times. Furthermore, her White House appointment diary often fails to include Leahy, although he briefed FDR almost every morning and had numerous meetings with him both during the day and after hours. Doris Kearns Goodwin in No Ordinary Time: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt—The Home Front on World War II (1994) whose book won the 1995 Pulitzer Prize, cites Leahy on twelve occasions in a seven-hundred-page book but seemed to miss the significance of Leahy’s influence and contributions.

The quandary about Leahy stems from his autobiography, I Was There, which was published in 1950. He wrote his memoirs at the request of President Truman, not because he sought the limelight. Truman had such great respect for Leahy that he asked him to stay on when FDR died. Despite Leahy’s position as FDR’s and Truman’s Chief of Staff and as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he gave almost no interviews to the press. When he lobbied Congress, he conducted himself outside public view.

Leahy’s autobiography minimized his participation in events, giving the impression that he was more of an eyewitness to history than an architect of grand strategy. He also adopted a serious, matter-of-fact tone, thereby producing a work devoid of any colorful anecdotes. This is the book most contemporary historians used to flesh out Leahy’s role during the war. He downplayed his own involvement with strategic matters, resulting in historians misjudging his contributions.

Admiral Leahy, however, kept a manuscript journal which he began after graduating from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1897 and continued until 1956. Copies of this diary can be found in the State Historical Society of Wisconsin Library, the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, the Naval Historical Center in Washington, and the U.S. Naval Academy Library. His Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff papers are in the National Archives. As Leahy advanced in pay grade in the Navy and held positions of greater responsibility, he kept more detailed journal entries. Unfortunately, other than the two biographies of Leahy and Borneman, historians have apparently ignored this rich vein of detail about Leahy’s strategic contributions while serving as both Roosevelt’s (1942-1945) and Truman’s (1945-1949) Chief of Staff.

Leahy first met then Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Roosevelt in 1913 while he was a lieutenant commander. He enjoyed both a professional and social relationship with Roosevelt from that time forward. Roosevelt was instrumental in selecting Leahy as his Chief of Naval Operations in 1937. FDR, realizing that the gathering storm of war was approaching, wanted Leahy by his side once the conflict commenced. Thus, when Leahy completed his tour as CNO in 1939, FDR stashed him first as Governor of Puerto Rico and then as American Ambassador to Vichy France.

In mid-1942 FDR brought Leahy back from France and appointed him as his Chief of Staff. While the crippled FDR claimed Leahy would be “his leg man,” the President really used the admiral to help him understand the complex military issues associated with waging a world war against two technologically advanced and aggressive nations. Leahy was also to serve as the first Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff above General Marshall, Admiral King, and General Arnold of the Army Air Corps. In practice, Leahy rarely took a contentious point of view during JCS deliberations, instead choosing to persuade FDR in private on a course of action he favored.

Working in parallel with Leahy was Harry Hopkins, a former social worker, New Dealer, and since the 1930s, a confidant of FDR. Hopkins worked primarily in the political and war production domains. FDR used him to establish relations with Churchill and then with Stalin to learn how America could assist them in their struggles against Nazi Germany. Hopkins successfully earned the trust and confidence of both allied leaders. Hopkins was a doer not a talker, an implementer not a planner. Churchill called him, “Lord Root-of-the-Matter” because of his incisive way of identifying key issues and then promoting discussions to solve them. Many Washington insiders considered Hopkins a Rasputin, but he was solidly FDR’s Rasputin.

Leahy and Hopkins tolerated each other but never became close friends. Surprisingly, both were born in Iowa only 180 miles apart (Leahy in 1875 and Hopkins in 1890), and both were buried following services in Episcopal churches (Leahy in 1959 and Hopkins in 1946). The September 28, 1942, issue of Life Magazine devoted the cover and ten pages to FDR’s new Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy. Noel Busch writes, “While the two men are not intimate enough to call each other by their first names…the President uses the minds of his associates for checking purposes…consulting each on his own specialty, and [mediating] collisions of opinion among his immediate counselors.” FDR wanted to think aloud and have listeners who were congenial, trustworthy, and knowledgeable. In both Leahy and Hopkins, FDR fortunately found what he was seeking.

Phillips O’Brien’s comprehensive biography reveals Leahy’s positions on scores of critical issues during the vicissitudes of the war. Two are noteworthy. Leahy was firmly against the development and use of the atomic bomb. He regarded it as “a terrible instrument of uncivilized warfare represent[ing] a modern type of barbarism...” But Leahy, however, was also a realist and knew if the world were to be “spared the terrors of atomic warfare, the United States must have more and better atom bombs than any potential enemy.”

Leahy also opposed any invasion of Japan. Marshall, MacArthur (who was to lead the invasion), and Nimitz all favored the invasions of Kyushu (in November 1945) and later Honshu (in March 1946). Leahy thought Marshall minimized the number of potential casualties and that invasions were unnecessary since American naval and air superiority could starve Japan into submission. President Truman concurred with Marshall, but the use of the atom weapons that Leahy opposed resolved the invasion dilemma.

Fleet Admiral Leahy’s role during the Second World War has been largely obscured, both by his own desire to maintain a low profile and historians’ unfamiliarity with the significant amount of time and fruitful discussions he had with both Roosevelt and Truman. To Leahy, loyalty meant keeping his actions behind the curtain so the two presidents he served received the benefit and glory of his counsel.

Both the Navy and the nation have done little to honor Leahy’s selfless and devoted service. He is indeed a forgotten man. But as O’Brien wistfully observed, “Leahy would have preferred it that way.”

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Commander Lawrence M. (Larry) Kryske, U.S. Navy (Ret.) was a career surface warfare naval officer, a private school administrator and instructor, and a professional speaker on leadership topics. Among his five books are, Churchill Without Blood, Sweat, or Tears: Applying His Methods for Today’s Leaders (2017) and Churchill’s Cat: A Feline Remembrance (2021). He can be reached at [email protected].