Unsafe Behaviours — Why employees are often NOT the problem

Businesses find that accidents still happen even after safety systems have been implemented. After conducting accident investigations, one issue stands out: most accidents are triggered by unsafe behaviours. Since multiple studies have confirmed that “85% or more accidents are caused by unsafe behaviours,” the next step seems obvious: focus on the behaviours of employees.

Commonly used approaches include training, briefing, policing, incentivising safe workers, and disciplining unsafe ones. A number of companies have gone a step further in implementing behavioural-based safety (BBS) programs. Such programs require employees to observe the behaviours of their colleagues using pre-defined checklists; when unsafe behaviours are spotted, the observers coach and counsel the worker. For the last few decades the above approaches have been used with varying degrees of success and failure.

The notion that unsafe behaviours directly contribute to accidents is correct, but it is also misleading. It can set up a manager to see employees’ behaviour as the isolated problem to be fixed, rather than a piece of a bigger puzzle. The fact is, behaviours don’t occur in a vacuum. They are driven by a network of factors, including safety systems, leadership, and culture. The evidence confirming this assertion is overwhelming:

• “a culture of widespread non-compliance with safety procedures” (Judge Chay, 2016) — Court judgement on SMRT employees killed by a train (2016)
• “safety system deficiencies created a workplace ripe for human error to occur” (CSB, 2007,) — Accident investigation of the BP Texas City Explosion (2005)
• “organizational or corporate level failures are the most critical ones that need attention if accidents are to be avoided” (Bowonder, 1986) — Accident investigation of the Bhopal Gas Leakages (1986)

There is a mismatch between what research and accidents analysis reveal, and what business does. Instead of focussing on system deficiencies or organizational failures that allow such behaviours to thrive, there is an over-emphasis on worker’s behaviour. Case in point: how often have you seen accident investigation reports concluding that the root cause is “employees not following procedures,” with the corrective action being to “re-train the employees”? How many times have you heard managers exclaiming, “Why can’t employees follow rules, and how can we change their mindset?”

Unsafe Acts at a Construction Company

Take the example of a construction company that had a two-storey temporary office. During lunch time, the project manager observed that a number of staff liked to run down the staircase. They didn’t hold hand rails and often hopped down two steps at a time. It was unsafe. To fix the behaviour, the manager sent out emails to remind his staff about staircase safety. He also assigned staff to paste precautions about trips and falls in the office.

But the situation did not improve. One day a staff member fell down the staircase and fractured his arm. It was then that someone in the management team asked the question, “Why are staff running down the staircase?” It turned out that the lunch area on the first floor had limited seats. The last few staff that arrived had to stand to have their lunch. As the management staff drove out for lunch, they were not aware of this issue. Once this situation was known, the solution was simple: staggered lunch times. Since the solution was implemented, staff no longer ran down the staircase during lunch hours, because they did not see a need to. When you change a system or culture, you change behaviours.

 Looking at Behaviours in a Broader Context

In recent years there has been a gradual shift from focussing narrowly on employees’ behaviours to looking at behaviours in a broader context. In the United States, there have been an increasing number of articles and discussions geared towards Human and Organizational Performance (HOP). Based on the work of Sidney Dekker, James Reason and Todd Conklin, the core principles of HOP are:

• Human error is part of the human condition, and is inevitable (i.e., expecting a worker to be mindful all the time is impractical).
• Human behaviours are the outputs of organizational culture and systems (i.e., when you put unsafe employees in an environment with a positive safety culture and a robust safety system, they will learn to work safely).
• To change behaviour, fix the systems to make safe work easy, and/or change culture norms to make safe work socially compelling.
• To understand specifically what needs to change, involve the employees and ask for their input.

There is often a difference between “work as intended” and “work as actually done.” Employees frequently know why they do what they do. When an employee doesn’t perform work as intended, it is often due to the following:

• Perceptions — “From my experience, this is OK.”
• Mental lapses — “I have forgotten.”
• Abilities — “I am required to finish this within X hours. Following the procedure will take 2X hours.”
• Social Environment — “My colleagues will mock me if I do things this way.”

Don’t jump to conclusion that an employee has a poor safety mindset. When you respond sternly and follow-up with more procedures, more policing and more paper work in a bid to control the employees, you achieve only short-term compliance. But if you ask the right questions and are willing to learn, you will gain untapped knowledge, which already exists in your organization. This knowledge will allow you to solve problems at the root.

The HOP approach is not exactly new; some of its principles are drawn from traditional safety concepts. What HOP does is act as a counter balance against the belief that employees’ behaviours are the problem. For too long, management has been obsessed with unsafe employees’ behaviours. In some workplaces this obsession has resulted in touchy relationships with employees. HOP brings the systems and culture component back into the equation. When management looks at employees’ behaviour in the larger context of organizational performance, rather than as an isolated problem, it changes how safety is managed in the workplace.

Next time you see an unsafe act, don’t approach the person as a judge and tell him what to do. Instead, be a curious participant. Ask yourself, “Why would a rational person do that? What am I missing?” Then ask the worker, “What makes you do the work this way? What do you need?”

When a worker feels understood and involved, you will not only obtain insights to forge long-lasting solutions to work safety issues; you will also gain his trust and commitment.

 References

1. B. Bowonder, An analysis of the Bhopal accident, Project Appraisal, 2:3, 157-168. 1987
2. Chemical Safety Board (CSB), Investigation report: Refinery explosion and fire, 2007
3. T. Krause & B. Kristen Leadership, 7 Insights into Safety Leadership, The Safety Leadership Institute, 2015
4. T. Conklin, Pre-Accident Investigations: An Introduction to Organizational Safety, CRC Press; 1 edition, 2012