Unique Security Challenges in Sabah & Sarawak

Overall security situation in Borneo

Several important challenges are threatening the peace & stability of the island of Borneo. The most prominent of these is Indonesia’s planned new capital city, Nusantara, in East Kalimantan province on the Indonesian side of the island. In addition, political tensions between Malaysia’s federal government & the states of Sabah & Sarawak are increasing; Brunei is facing significant economic & potentially, social problems & development is threatening the island’s environmental security.

International politics in Borneo’s wider region have also become more complex, notably over competing territorial & maritime claims in the nearby South China Sea (SCS). There is a danger that in the medium term some of these challenges might interact, creating greater strategic, political & economic problems for regional stability.

Borneo is the world’s 3rd-largest island, surpassed in size by only Greenland & New Guinea. Borneo is located at the heart of maritime SE Asia & has an area of 748,168?km2?(288,869?sq?mi).

The island of Borneo is politically divided among 3 countries: Malaysia & Brunei in the north, with Indonesia to the south. Indonesia controls approximately 72.5% of the island which it calls Kalimantan. The Malaysian states of Sabah & Sarawak are located in the north with the Malaysian federal territory of?Labuan situated on a small island just off the coast of Borneo. Both Sabah & Sarawak share a land border with measuring 2,019.5 km. Brunei comprises 2 small enclaves along Sarawak’s coastline. Closer collaboration between these 3 countries could provide insulation against future security-related shocks.

Despite Borneo’s size, its population is estimated to only be about 24 million. It is rich in oil, gas, timber & other natural resources & hosts one of the world’s largest remaining areas of tropical rain forest.

Malaysia

Malaysia's geographical position lies in the heart of the SE Asian region & shares its borders directly with 5 regional countries namely Brunei, Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore & Thailand. In the north, Malaysia shares the land border with Thailand. Meanwhile in the South, the Tebrau Strait is a border that separates Malaysia & Singapore. Whereas in the east, Malaysia has a maritime border with the Philippines in Borneo waters where there are many large & small islands that have important safety implications. In addition, Brunei shares the land border with Malaysia. Malaysia's largest neighbor is Indonesia that shares land borders & maritime areas. Malaysia faces difficulty in controlling the country's borders due to its extensive maritime areas as the prosperity of the local economy has attracted foreigners to come to Malaysia

63% of the country's borders are maritime borders; its coastline stretches 4,675 km. Peninsular Malaysia, the western portion of the federation, is situated on the eastern shore of the Malacca Strait, a strategically important waterway which ferries approximately 60% of global maritime traffic. The territory of the strait is divided between Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore & to a smaller extent, Thailand.

Looking east, the Malaysian regions of Sabah & Sarawak are situated on the island of Borneo. Malaysia claims a 334,671 km2 exclusive economic zone (EEZ) under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the southern part of the South China Sea (SCS) near offshore Sabah & Sarawak, though this entire area is disputed between overlapping claims with various justifications by Malaysia, China, the Philippines, Vietnam & Taiwan. Malaysia’s claims cover 10 atolls in the Spratly Islands near Sabah waters & the oil-rich Luconia Shoals (known in Malay as Beting Patinggi Ali) close to Sarawak. Malaysia also maintains a military presence on 5 of the 10 atolls situated in the southern portion of the Spratly Islands.

Malaysia’s offshore territorial claims include an estimated 5 billion barrels of oil reserves & 80 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves, making it a lucrative target for disputing countries, particularly China. The Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) stationed in the EEZ continues to face challenges in defending their strategic interests from the Chinese navy & coast guard, who trespassed into the EEZ 89 times between 2016 and 2019 alone. The Malaysian Government Audit Report for 2020 revealed Chinese vessels repeatedly exhibiting belligerent attitudes toward the RMN during standoffs within the Malaysian EEZ.

The protection of a state’s physical borders against any form of foreign intrusion is never an easy task for its security forces. Geography is a significant factor when it comes to maritime security for Malaysia. The totality of Malaysia’s waters, including the EEZs claimed, amounts to some 574,000 km2.?This is larger than Malaysia’s total land mass of about 330,000 km2 & 4,675 km of coastline. The maritime regions around Malaysia greatly contribute to the country’s economy (trade), the O&G industry & the fishery industry.

Note - An EEZ extends up to 230 miles out from the territorial sea of each coastal nation’s island. The coastal nation has the exclusive right to the sea life and other natural resources in this zone. All nations have the right of freedom of navigation and overflight through an EEZ.

Malaysia is not a contiguous country & neither are its maritime zones. Malaysia is geographically divided into 2 by sea. The responsibility to ensure security is twice as challenging when the land mass is separated by a large body of water. Malaysia is physically separated into 2 sizeable territories known as West & East Malaysia by the SCS. At the widest points, the distance across the SCS between West Malaysia & East Malaysia is about 1,600 kilometres. At its narrowest, the distance is about 600 km.

To complicate matters, the most direct maritime & air route between the 2 passes through international & Indonesian waters & airspace. China’s claims in the SCS & the de-facto changing of the status-quo with its reclaimed features further complicates things for Malaysia. Therefore, securing such a large area with less-than-adequate assets is an uphill security task.

Sabah

Sabah is the 2nd largest state in the Malaysia Federation. It is one of 13 states in Malaysia & shares its borders with 3 other countries – Indonesia, the Philippines & Brunei. There are various threats to the survival of this state, especially in the east coast of Sabah, which involve traditional threats such as continuous territorial claims by the Philippines & also non-traditional threats such as kidnapping for ransom (KfR), trafficking & illegal immigrants.

Historical records

Before joining the federal government in 1963 Sabah was under the British government. It is noteworthy to mention that the state is the product of 65 years of Chartered Company rule & 17 years of British Colonial administration. This began in 1881 when the state was under the British North Borneo Chartered Company (BNBC). In 1888, it became one of the protectorates of the British colonial administration but was maintained under BNBC administration. Less than 16 days before the formation of Malaysia, the British granted self-government to Sabah.

Sabah became a part of Malaysia in 1963, when the people of the state agreed to join with Sarawak & Singapore in forming the Federation of Malaysia.

Geography

Sabah covers 72,689 km2 of land. However, this does not include the land area of the islands which represent approximately 1,549 km2, while its maritime area covers 54,360 km2, constituting approximately 30% of the Malaysia’s EEZ. It stretches from the SCS in the west & the Sulu Sea to the north of Kudat & extends to the eastern coast, covering the Sulu Sea & the Celebes Sea in the districts of Semporna & Tawau.

The marine coastal zone is delimited by the interstate boundary of Sarawak & international boundaries of Brunei, Indonesia & the Philippines. To the Southeast, off the East Coast of Sabah between Semporna & Pulau Sebatik, the area extends to the continental shelf boundary in the Celebes Sea. The remaining part of the area between Semporna & Kudat lies in the Sulu Sea with the boundary being the Malaysia/Philippines international boundary. Around 30% of the marine coastal zone areas, or approximately 54,360 km2, are the territorial waters of Sabah.

Sabah is nearer to the Philippines & the many islands that are located within the vicinity of both countries. The east coast of Sabah has great development potential given its geo-strategic location & geo-political advantage. The waters off the coastal area serve as a hub for international sea lanes connecting the Sulu Sea & the SCS as well as the Celebes Sea & the Pacific Ocean. On a positive note, this also makes Sabah easily accessible to its nearest neighbours, Indonesia & the Philippines, facilitating economic ties & commercial activities with each other.

With a population of 230 million people with similar language, religion & tradition, illegal immigrants of Indonesia are undisputedly a threat to Malaysian’s security. Malaysia as a newly industrialized country with a huge development, economic & political stability has ‘pull’ a mass migration of other ASEAN nations such as Indonesia & the Philippines.

However, with a coastline that stretches about 1,600km, monitoring the security of Sabah to ensure that there would be no disruption to her economic interests, development & peace requires a concerted effort by the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF), Royal Malaysian Police (PDRM) & the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), which was established in 2004.

The threats against the security of Sabah may not only materialise in the form of a physical invasion by the country’s enemies but also materialise as other forms of threats such as illegal movements of people, piracy & other forms of crime. The porous border of Sabah, as evident in the invasion of Lahad Datu in 2013 as well as the kidnappings of foreigners showed that much needs to be done to secure the safety of her people & the sovereignty of the state & its surrounding waters.

Sarawak

Sarawak is the largest among the 13 Malaysian states, with an area almost equal to that of?Peninsula Malaysia or West Malaysia. Sarawak is also located in East Malaysia,?in northwest Borneo & is bordered by Sabah?to the northeast, Kalimantan to the south & Brunei the north.

In Sarawak, border security is one of major state security concerns. Due to the porous Sarawak-Kalimantan border, a worrisome number of illegal activities had been recorded. Throughout the years, cases such as illegal crossings, drug syndicates, kidnapping, auto theft, smuggling, infiltration of illegal immigrants were reported to local authorities. These are among many other cases that highlight the gravity of the security issue near the Sarawak-Kalimantan border. Despite the continuous effort to increase security by the Sarawak government through establishments of 5 new guard posts in Sarawak in 2018, security issues near the borderline are still a great concern. Sarawak's vulnerability is not only along its border with Indonesia but also its shores & airspace.

In an effort to bolster border control & address regional security challenges, Malaysia’s Defence Ministry announced the installation of a state-of-the-art GM400 long-distance air defence radar system in Bintulu, Sarawak. This comes as part of a strategic upgrade for the Armed Forces to monitor & secure the nation’s borders, especially amidst growing concerns in the SCS. The radar system will enhance the Military’s ability to detect territorial encroachments & navigate complex security issues in the maritime regions surrounding Malaysia.

Authority of the federal government in Putrajaya

Sabah & Sarawak's security management is governed & structured just like any other state in Malaysia. The federal government has absolute power on matters related to finance, education, defence & security, foreign affairs & transportation.

However, Sabah & Sarawak have wider jurisdiction under the Part VIIA of the constitution compared to other states in the federation. This enlarged constitutional power enjoyed by the 2 states is based on the 20-point agreement before the 2 states agreed to join Malaya & to form Malaysia.

The Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 1979 is the source of authority for the formation & responsibility of the Majlis Keselamatan Negera (MKN) or National Security Council at the federal, state & district levels. MKN has been given the responsibility to co-ordinate national security policies & to issue instructions on security measures including, public order & safety as well as security issues at the federal, state & district levels.

The East Coast of Sabah

Over the past decade, the terrorist threats facing Sabah are alarming. Since?2021, residents in the Eastern Sabah Security Zone (ESSZONE) have been subjected to curfews which are in force due to unabating terrorist threats, along with kidnapping attempts & cross-border crimes linked to the Islamic State linked Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The latest intelligence published in March 2022, suggests?that Mundi (ASG’s second-in-command), has sought refuge in Sabah, raising concerns that ASG-linked local groups & sympathizers may become active.

Terrorism

Due to the geographic position of Sabah with its neighboring countries, Indonesia & the Philippines, Malaysia serves as a staging area, transit hub & conduit for the transportation of weapons, operatives, finances & supporters to other regional & global terrorist organizations.

Sabah has emerged as the?preferred transit point?for Indonesian militants infiltrating the southern Philippines in order to commit terrorist acts there. The combination of these factors foreshadows a monumental risk to Malaysian national security.

Cross border criminals will travel along the east coast, while some enter Sabah at transit points to carry out their criminal activities. To protect the country from security threats, all government agencies & security forces must play their part to protect & to prevent such threats from happening.

The?Lahad Datu incursion/invasion?by Jamalul Kiram III of the Sulu Sultanate?into Sabah in 2013, which resulted in the deaths of over 60 individuals should have been a critical signal for Putrajaya to bolster Sabah & Sarawak’s security in ensuring such threats will not recur.

Putrajaya is strengthening East Malaysian security through various initiatives. The recent acquisition of?3 AW139 helicopters?by the RMN is an indication that more assets will be mobilized to enhance patrols in East Malaysian waters. Furthermore, the Malaysian Ministry of Defense initiated the building of a new army base in Lahad Datu?at a cost of RM646.15 million (USD146 million) to strengthen Sabah’s security & ability to deal with the emerging threats. Finally, a unit of?Special Action Commandos?(UTK) has been dispatched to Sabah to combat the ASG threat.

Apart from terrorism, other non-terrorist challenges, such as cross-border kidnapping for ransom (KfR) & illegal immigration remain rampant & demonstrate the need for Putrajaya to up the ante on border security in the region.

The main issues in the east coast of Sabah revolve around non-traditional threats from non-state actors. Cases of KfR & robberies by armed groups are rampant. However, this is not something new because such events have occurred in Sabah when it was still under colonial rule. During the armed robberies in the Lahad Datu district in 1984 & Semporna district in 1996, gunmen believed to be Filipino pirates, attacked police stations & military outposts in these districts.

In 2000, more serious incidents took place in Sabah when a group of people from the Philippines identifying themselves as the Abu Sayyaf group (ASG) abducted foreign tourists in the Sipadan & Pandanan islands. The 1st occurred on 23 April 2000, when the ASG terrorists, using small boats & armed with M-16s abducted 10 Malaysian workers & 11 foreign tourists. The ASG made various demands for the release of the hostages including the separation of southern Philippines administration from the central government of Manila, the establishment of an Islamic state in Mindanao, US$1 million ransom for each hostage & involvement of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation & UN in negotiations. The ASG also put forward several demands such as the establishment of a commissioner to look after the rights of refugees in Sabah. The group finally offered to release all hostages on 28 April 28, 2000. Libya which was the main negotiator in this incident, was said to have paid US$20 million to release all 21 hostages.

The 2nd KfR incident at Pandanan Island took place on 11 Sept 2000 when members from the same group kidnapped 3 Malaysians off a resort only a few kilometers from Sipadan island. Their modus operandi was similar. ASG made demands for the government to pay ransom for the release of all hostages. However, following a major military operation by the Philippines army in the ASG stronghold of Jolo in Oct 2000, all hostages were rescued.

Following the Sipadan & Pandanan KfR incidents, the Malaysian government responded by launching a major operation codenamed Ops in Sept 2000 with the deployment of security forces at strategic spots. This was a major operation in Sabah which involved the participation of all branches of Malaysian security forces. Its main purpose was to boost security in the Sabah’s territorial waters to stop intrusion, piracy, terrorism & any other cross-border elements.

The Malaysian government also strengthened & widened its border patrol area. Among measures taken was the implementation of 7 designated lanes for commercial vessels or passenger boat into Sabah waters. This policy effectively came into force on 1 April 2002 which included areas such as Kota Kinabalu, Tawau, Lahad Datu, Labuan, Kudat, Semporna & Sandakan. Through this policy, several previously favored routes like those through Nunukan Island in Indonesia to Tawau via Wallace Bay were no longer available. All vessels were not allowed to travel outside of the designated routes & failure to comply with the policy were regarded as serious offences under Malaysian law.

For foreign merchant vessels involved in barter trading in Sabah, the government identified several points where they were required to leave their arms before entering Sabah waters. The main purpose of this policy was to ensure the effectiveness of enforcement agencies to monitor the movement of people between Sabah & the neighboring countries & to ensure Sabah’s security.

The government also decided to ban the uses of pump boats in April 2002 to avoid any intrusion by outside elements. (The pump boat is a small boat powered by motorized water pumps & very popular among dwellers in the coastal area.) Pump boats were frequently used by criminal perpetrators in Sabah waters, especially immigrants & extremist groups because of its maneuverability in shallow waters, thus avoiding detection or arrests by Malaysian security forces.

Apart from the threat posed from KfR, another major threat to Sabah’s security is associated with the presence of terrorist-linked groups. Indonesian intelligence claimed that wanted terrorists (Nordin Top & Azahari) were roaming freely between the Indonesian-Malaysia territory of Kalimantan & Mindanao. Hambali, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) leader revealed that since 2003, the organization had transferred more than USD27,000 to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). More alarming was when he revealed that some JI members had opened bank accounts in Malaysia, deposited funds & handed over the ATM cards to MILF operatives based in Sabah.

A pattern of JI activities in Sabah emerged during the interrogation of Nasir Abbas, head of Mantiqi III (covering Brunei, Sabah, southern Philippines, Sulawesi & Kalimantan). Nasir was captured by Indonesian police in April 2003 told investigators that weapons & explosives used by JI were obtained from Zamboanga in the southern Philippines, which is a MILF stronghold. The weapons & explosives were ferried by boats to Tawi-Tawi then to Sandakan before being taken over land to Tawau. JI used public transportation to smuggle weapons & explosives into Nunukan, a border town on the Nunukan Islands in East Kalimantan. Public transport was used to avoid detection of their activities by the authorities.

Meanwhile, the Malaysian Army had deployed to several other islands & coastal areas such as Danawan, Sibuan, Boheyan, Roach Reef & Kapalai. To ensure the effectiveness of security in Malaysian territorial waters, in 2004, the federal government decided to establish the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA). The justification used for the MMEA’s establishment were the threats of terrorism, illegal immigrants & extremist group to Malaysia’s security.

Lahad Datu Incident

The Lahad Datu incident started when an armed group arrived by boats in Tanduo, Lahad Datu, Sabah on 11 Feb 2013. The group, identifying themselves as the ‘Royal Security Army’ (RSA), was reportedly sent by Jamalul Kiram III, self-proclaimed Sultan of Sulu. Their main objective was to reclaim Sabah from Malaysia. Malaysian security forces cordoned the area where the group had gathered & after several days of unsuccessful negotiations, finally decided to use force to neutralize the threat. On 1 March 2013, 3 days after Malaysia's extended deadline for the group to leave the area peacefully, a confrontation occurred between Malaysian security forces & the invaders. Two Malaysian police officers lost their lives while 10 members of the RSA group were killed with 4 more injured. On 3 March 2013, another incident took place in Kampung Sri Jaya Siminul in Semporna when Malaysian police were attacked by armed men believed to be from the same group in Tanduo. In the incident, 6 Malaysian police officers & 7 invaders were killed. After a 3-week standoff, the Malaysian armed forces started their massive campaign by launching air strikes. On 5 March 2013, RMAF F/A-18 & Hawk fighters bombed the militant position in Tanduo. This was followed by the clean-up operations codenamed “Ops Sulu”, later changed to “Ops Daulat” due to ethnic sensitivity in Sabah.

Establishment of ESSZONE & ESSCOM

In response to this incident, to prevent a recurrence & to better secure the area, the Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak declared the east coast of Sabah to be a “Special Security Area”. Subsequently, on 25 March 2013, the Malaysian government created the Eastern Sabah Security Zone (ESSZONE) covering 10 districts (Kudat, Kota Marudu, Pitas, Beluran, Sandakan, Kinabatangan, Lahad Datu, Kunak, Semporna & Tawau) covering approximately 52,262.90 km2, on the eastern seaboard of Sabah.

To enforce ESSZONE & as a first step towards redressing the many complex crosssectoral challenges of the area rooted in decades of policy abeyance, mismanagement & manipulation, the government established the Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM). ESSCOM leverages on the involvement & cooperation of multiple agencies including the PDRM, MMEA, MAF & the immigration department.

ESSCOM is responsible for coordinating operations, intelligence gathering, etc., to ensure safety & secure the waters off Sabah from external threats. To strengthen ESSCOM & to ensure the success of the organization, the government in April 2013 outlined a 4-pronged strategic & technical approach to beef up security in national waters, to provide protection to the ESSZONE community. The 4 elements are:

• enhancement of intelligence capability
• effective coastal surveillance 24-hours a day
• boosting the country's capability to intercept incoming threats from the sea
• strict enforcement of the law with immediate action taken once the threats reached the shores.

Furthermore, security cooperation protocols with neighboring Philippines & Indonesia were implemented to combat terrorism & cross-border crimes.

The government also took additional measures to increase security in the area. A total of RM804 million was allocated to the MMEA. To boost Malaysian enforcement agencies capability to provide prompt respond for any intrusion, the government also allocated RM230 million for the use of a modified oil platform & an auxiliary vessel as sea basing in the ESSZONE through its wholly-owned oil & gas company Petronas.

The RMN adopted the sea base concept from US Navy sea basing paper, where purpose-built ships & barges operate near contested waters to supply US Navy ships & as Forward Operation Bases (FOB). Within the Malaysian context, the sea base operates as a Forward Operation Base (FOB) where Malaysian security forces can launch interception & interdiction missions against any intruders, including KfR groups based in Southern Philippines, either via helicopter-borne units or fast interceptor boats.

The RMN operates 2 sea bases, the Tun Sharifah Rodziah & the auxiliary vessel, Tun Azizan. Tun Sharifah Rodziah is a floating oil rig Petronas had donated to the Navy, while Tun Azizan is a former merchant ship owned by MISC & converted into an auxiliary navy ship.

The government also upgraded the airport runway in Lahad Datu to cater for fighter aircraft & in 2016, transferred the RMAF Hawk Squadron from Butterworth, Penang to Labuan. However, despite efforts taken to strengthen ESSCOM’s capabilities, it was unable to prevent cross-border kidnappings or KfR.

On 15 Nov 2013, gunmen shot & killed 57-year-old Taiwanese tourist Hsu Li Min & abducted his 58-year-old wife Chang An Wei at Pom Pom Island Resort. The gunmen were believed to have arrived in a group of 8 via a speedboat from the neighboring southern Philippines. Chang was later released in December after a ransom was paid to the kidnappers.

On 2 April 2014, another abduction by 7 armed men occurred at Singamata resort, Semporna involving a Chinese tourist & a Filipino worker.

On 7 May 2014, a Chinese citizen who was also a fish farming manager in the Pulau Bait, Lahad Datu was kidnapped by a group of 5 armed men.

On 16 June, a group of gunmen attacked a fish farm in Kampung Sapang, Kunak & kidnapped the manager, Chan Sai Chuin.

On 12 July 2014, Malaysian Police Corporal Ab Rajah Jamuan was shot dead while his colleague Police Constable Zakiah Aleip, was taken hostage from a resort in Sipadan Water Village Resort, Semporna.

Following this incident, the government resorted to enforcing a 7pm-5am curfew in 6 coastal areas in the east coast to curb the presence of these armed groups. A curfew was enforced on 16 July 2014 covering 6 districts of Sandakan, Tawau, Kunak, Lahad Datu, Semporna & Kinabatangan. Until today, the curfew continues to be enforced involving most of ESSZONE & its territorial waters.

On the whole, ESSCOM did increase the level of security in the waters off the east coast of Sabah, especially in the hot spot areas. In the long term, this can regenerate economic activity when the level of security in the territorial waters can be guaranteed.

However, in Tawau which faces less security threats, economic activity is adversely affected by the curfew. The income of the fishermen in Tawau & Sebatik Island have decreased due to the curfew limits & restricted fishing zones.

In effect, ESSCOM merely made this region a federal-controlled military zone, taking it out of Sabah’s jurisdiction but did not stop the kidnapping of people in Sabah by Filipino gangs. Failure to effectively secure Sabah’s east coast highlighted the federal government’s neglect to make true the justification for the formation of Malaysia that only the federation could defend & protect Sabahans & Sarawakians from external dangers threats & invasions. The high point of this failure was the Lahad Datu incident in Jan 2013 which resulted in a large number of deaths.

ESSCOM has been criticized?for being inefficient?in achieving its primary objective of preventing transnational crime, raising questions about Putrajaya’s military approach to Sabah’s borders. In 2016, Dr Jeffrey Kitingan, a senior Sabah politician stated that, “ESSCOM is not the solution as there were more cross-border kidnappings during ESSCOM’s 3 years than the last 20 years without ESSCOM.”

These incidents forced the Malaysian government to place more emphasis on strengthening the role of the RMN especially in the eastern part of Sabah. The government moved to set up a new Navy submarine base in Kota Kinabalu & a Naval Special Warfare Forces (PASKAL) base in Semporna, as well as announcing a proposal to set up a new air base in Tawau.

Although the federal government had taken measures to address cross-border crimes in Sabah, these challenges are immensely difficult to resolve because of geographical factors. Sabah’s 1,600-km long porous maritime border lies close to the Philippine province of Tawi-Tawi & contains 107 islands that intruders can use as staging points before entering Sabah’s waters. More resources are required to protect the coastline, but the viability of a solely military approach to protecting Sabah’s borders need to be re-examined.

Illegal Immigration

Cross-border migration in the era of globalization has seen the migration & movement of people around the world. Although migration was not considered a security issue at first, international geo-political changes have made migration one of the main issues for national security. Cross-border human movement creates tension & have long-lasting effects on national security & regional stability.

Malaysia's security has been threatened due to migration issues involving border administration, immigration control & the distribution of economic prosperity. Migration also poses a threat to the ecological welfare, social stability, cultural values, religion & political stability of a country's government. Issues related to cross-border migration can impact national capabilities through 3 main factors, namely, the ability to maintain national sovereignty, national stability & power balance.

Apart from the KfR threat, illegal immigration continues to be one of the central issues in Sabah. From 1990 to 2007,?approximately 300,000?immigrants, mostly Filipinos & Indonesians, were deported from Sabah. As of 2020, the number of?illegal immigrants in Sabah?is estimated to be approximately 1.2 million, with the highest concentration in Tawau, the region closest to the southern Philippines. The underlying cause for such a high degree of illegal immigration can be traced to kinship & economic opportunities.

Before the advent of modern borders, some of the earliest immigrants to set foot in Sabah were?the Bajau & Sulu?from the Mindanao region of today’s Philippines - a fact that forms the basis of the Philippines’ historic claim over Sabah. Following the?Moro conflict?in the late 20th century, many crossed illegally into Sabah, capitalizing on kinship & family ties to integrate. Relatives or friends provide illegal immigrants with shelter & nourishment, perpetuating chain migration.

Furthermore, the potential kinship between Sabahan security personnel & illegal immigrants may result in lax enforcement of immigration laws. Poor economic opportunities back home provide additional justification for migrants to cross the border.

Cross border movements for trade & economic activities are also common features in the east coast of Sabah where the population living in the remote villages on the islands in this region procure their food & daily supplies from the east coast towns of Sabah. Many of them also seek medical treatment & find employment in Sabah instead of their own countries.

Nearly 5 decades of internal conflicts & civil war in the southern Sulu region of the Philippines have caused an influx of thousands of Filipinos from the Moro ancestry to seek refuge in Sabah. However they were regarded as illegal immigrants due to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention & its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.

The migration of large numbers of Filipinos into Sabah is incessant, despite the peace agreement that had been signed between the Philippine government & the MNLF in 1976 & again in 2014

Sarawak is equally at risk from illegal immigration, stemming from its equally porous border with Kalimantan. Indonesia’s new capital?Nusantara?in East Kalimantan province should prompt Putrajaya to double down on Sarawakian security concerns. It is expected that the Nusantara project will involve the eventual relocation of?some 30 million Indonesians, leading many Sarawakians to believe that it?could increase illegal border crossings into Malaysia. If unaddressed, transnational crime syndicates will also flourish which will undoubtedly threaten Sarawak’s security.

The Malaysian Army has been tasked with building 7 new security checkpoints along the border between Kalimantan, & Sarawak & Sabah. Six of the posts will be in the Sarawakian border districts of Lundu, Serian, Balai Ringin, Lubok Antu & Padaleh in the Bario Highlands. These are also used as bases where Malaysian authorities operate to stop the entry of illegals. With the six new checkpoints?to be built plus the new one in Sabah, East Malaysia will have a total of 18 border security posts manned by the Malaysian Army.

Although numerous measures have been taken by the Malaysian government to address the problems of cross-border crimes, it has been exceedingly difficult to resolve. One of the main reasons has been due to geographical factors such as Sabah’s vast land area, long porous borders, the presence of many islands in Sabah’s waters & its close proximity to Indonesia & the Philippines.This comes following the discovery of "rat holes" along the snaking 1,881km boundary line between Malaysia & Indonesia. These are?illegal tracts to gain access into Malaysia established mostly by human traffickers, enabling foreign workers & other aspiring migrants without permits to seep into the country. The situation is exacerbated by rising development in the Kalimantan provinces that is seeing a surge in populations there.

In Sarawak, new rat holes are emerging undetected along the 1,000km from the mountains of Ba’kelalan in northereastern Sarawak to the tip of Sematan at the western corner of?the state.

There are also numerous syndicates smuggling goods & weapons from Kalimantan into Malaysia. The police have emphasised on the need for enhanced & tightened security along the Sarawak-Kalimantan boundary to prevent influx of illegals into the state for work & for smuggling activities. The General Operations Force (GOF) has set up a new base adjacent to Kalimantan in Sri Aman district, about 200km from Kuching. Two more GOF bases are being established in Sabah. The existing GOF base in Sibu district focuses on key border points along Sibu, Kapit, Belaga & all the way to Ba’kelalan. These GOF bases assist in controlling the movement of people & goods, for which better monitoring?is required.

The length of Sabah coastline is approximately 1,600 km, stretching from the SCS & the Sulu to the Celebes Sea, makes it very difficult to prevent sea robberies or cross-border criminals from slipping into Sabah. Even if the Malaysian government increases the number of personnel & patrols in Sabah waters, the presence of hundreds of islands in Malaysia-Indonesia-Philippines waters make it exceedingly difficult to patrol Sabah territorial waters effectively.

In Semporna, the presence of many tiny islands such as Kapalai, Maiga, Bohey Dulang, Mataking, Pandanan, etc, make it very easy for the gunmen to slip into Sabah. Gunmen would use any of the 107 islands or islets in Tawi-Tawi as a staging point before entering Sabah waters. These islands are used for shelter, escape or hideout from Malaysia’s security forces.

Due to its close proximity to certain parts of Sabah, it only takes a few minutes by boat to reach Philippine or Indonesian waters such as the area in Tanjung Labian (Lahad Datu), Tambisan (Sandakan), Pulau Mataking (Semporna), Sebatik (Tawau), Serudung (Tawau) etc. In Semporna, it would take just a few minutes on a speedboat to escape from Sabah into Sitingkai Island of the Southern Philippines & around 15 minutes from Mataking Island on Semporna to the nearest island in Philippine waters.

Sibutu, Taganak, Bongao, Mengesee, Balabac & Cagayan are provinces in Southern Philippines which are very close to Malaysia territory. Tawi-Tawi Island in the Philippines for example is only 27 nautical miles from the Sabah’s shore, making it plainly visible from Tanjung Labian in Lahad Datu.

Another challenge is the presence of stateless people or sea-nomads (known as Palau among locals) which is often seen as a major constraint in addressing the cross-border issue & a major cause of concern for Malaysian authorities. This group is estimated to number around tens of thousands & roam freely around the east coast of Sabah & the Philippines. They can be found in several areas such as Kudat, Sandakan, Lahad Datu & Semporna. The main problem arises from the fact that their ancestors had been dwelling in this area, much longer than the formation of Sabah. Unfortunately, this marginalized group is only taken care of by the authorities when it came to security issues, as happened after the Lahad Datu incursion/invasion.

The presence of sea-faring communities who lead a nomadic lifestyle & do not carry any form of identification, poses a big problem to the local authorities, the security & enforcement agencies. It is difficult for the authorities to determine the status of this particular group of people, some of whom have long-standing family ties with the locals. They may fall into any one of these categories – stateless people, refugees (in which case the UNCHR will confirm the status), illegal immigrants or those who entered Sabah because of the economic growth in the state. The Sandakan Municipal Council estimates that 25% of the 400,000 people living in Sandakan are of unknown status.

Military might will deter some but will not succeed in preventing all instances of border violations, as seen with Ops Pasir. In any event, the Malaysian federal budget does not have the margins to support the increases in defense spending for Sabah & Sarawak that are needed. The 2022 Budget has only allocated?RM 26.4 million (USD5.9 million) to ESSCOM, a reduction from 2021 Budget’s allocation of RM26.8 million (USS6.1 million). As the government pushes an expansionary fiscal policy post-COVID-19, increased defense spending is not a priority.

The Malaysian government needs to explore how better to tackle the root causes of the emerging non-traditional security threats. Putrajaya should utilize its network of Village Security & Development Committees in rural areas to educate villagers on the importance of their role in protecting national security & to rebuild trust in the Federation.

A very important factor in the security of Eastern Sabah is related to law, peace & security in the southern Philippines. As long as peace, law & order together with economic development cannot be restored in the southern Philippines, the problem of cross-border crime will continue to be a serious threat for Malaysia, & Sabah in particular. It is clear that the political, social & economic disorder in southern Philippines has affected the security of Sabah with the influx of illegal immigrants, smuggling of controlled & prohibited goods, piracy in local waters & kidnapping of tourists.

Another issue that was highlighted was the problem of differing border water maps between neighboring countries. This has led to disputes over maritime boundary that were not resolved & complicated the control of operations & safety by the authorities of the respective countries. The illegal immigrant problem in Sabah has given concern to the government & local communities because immigrants have led to high crime rates & threaten security in Sabah. Sabah waters are spacious & very porous, where its openness has led to the existence of many backdoors that have been favourable for outsiders to discretely enter Malaysia.

The Sulu Sea, located between Sabah & the southern Philippines, is a pressing security threat. The presence of ASG militants in the southern parts of the Philippines poses dangers to shipping in the area. The Philippines is concerned about foreign terrorist fighters slipping into its southern territory. Malaysia shares the Philippines’ perception about the security of the Sulu Sea. The primary Malaysian concern is securing its territory in Borneo from further intrusion by Filipinos who laid claims to Sabah.

Eastern Sabah’s Sulu Sea Region

Currently, the main threat plaguing the area is KfR.?Increased coastal patrols, beat-bases & surveillance managed to reduce the number of kidnappings from coastal resorts, fish-farms & villages. From mid-2016 however, kidnappers began to focus on maritime targets: sailors on the various trade vessels, fishing boats & tugboats that ply the busy routes between the southern Philippines, eastern Sabah & East Kalimantan. Given the vastness of the maritime region, security forces have yet to get a handle on this.

Additional threats come from the movement of supporters & members of various armed groups, including groups associated with extremist ideologies, based in the southern Philippines.

The formation of the trilateral patrols involving Malaysia, Indonesia & the Philippines in the Sulu Sea is a key response to the various threats. It is a largely maritime-based operation although air & eventually ground-based security assets will be involved. Maritime Command Centres have been set up in Tarakan (East Kalimantan), Tawau (Sabah) & Bongao (Tawi-Tawi) to coordinate these patrols.

However, having too many external players involved too soon will likely prove to be counterproductive to the ultimate aim of security in the Sulu Seas.

The West Coast of Sabah

The South China Sea (SCS) Dispute - China’s nine-dash-line claim

The location of the SCS also makes it militarily strategic, valuable for national security. For SE Asian nations, the SCS is important to their economic well-being & security. Coastal nations grew & developed economically, culturally & politically around it. China’s massive claims on the sea therefore has huge implications for these countries. Vietnam, for example, is a claimant state whose only strategic gateway to the oceans is the SCS, thus leaving it at economic & strategic disadvantage if its maritime access to the East Sea (as the Vietnamese call it) is hindered or left to the mercy of another power. The Philippines is another country that has vigorously opposed China’s aggressive behaviur in the SCS. Although the Philippines has access to the Pacific Ocean besides the SCS, it is geographically too exposed & thus vulnerable to China’s activities in the area. The US & other countries that are frequent users of the SCS have highlighted the importance of freedom of navigation as guaranteed under UNCLOS. China, however, disagreed with the interpretation as this would allow states to enjoy unqualified freedom of navigation & overflight within an EEZ & reacted forcefully to?USNS?Impeccable?activities within its EEZ. Thus, the implications of dispute in the SCS are not confined to just the claimant states.

The SCS is not only economically important for Malaysia as a maritime nation, but it is also as important from the perspective of national security. The 3 core areas that must be defended & secured are the Malay Peninsula, Sabah & Sarawak. ?Sabah in view of its geographical location is especially vulnerable to many threats from the seas around it. To strengthen the defence & security of the 2 territories, Malaysia made concerted efforts towards modernizing its navy & strengthening its defence forces in the area. ?The submarine base in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah is a symbol of Malaysia’s will to protect its maritime territorial integrity. However, in the event of aggression from another country with stronger capabilities, there is no guarantee that protecting Malaysia's maritime territorial integrity can be attained.

Increased tensions in SCS will put additional burdens on Malaysia’s effort to beef up its defence & security in Sabah & Sarawak which are exposed & vulnerable to the fall-out from the dispute. ?As Malaysia’s national security is not just protection from external threats, such additional pressure will divert attention towards efforts at consolidating & maintaining internal peace & security.

The SCS is bound to the north by China, whose contentious claims to more than 90% of the region, was initially espoused by the nationalist government in 1947, citing ancient maritime records.

The 1.3-million-square-mile waterway is vital to international trade & may be the most strategically important waterway of the 21st century. About a third of all the world’s maritime trade goes through the SCS. Half of all oil & gas tankers from the Middle East sail into it on their way to China, Japan, the U.S & elsewhere. It is also home to lucrative fisheries & supply routes that carry 80% of China’s crude imports.

The SCS is a hub of marine & hydrocarbon resources. The area serves as fishing grounds for Chinese fishermen & people living near the sea, with China becoming one of the largest fishing industries in the world since 2010, owing to the abundance of marine resources in the region. The fishing industry in China not only contributes significantly to national economy but also lets China play an important role as the ‘biggest exporter of aquatic products in the world.

Beijing claims indisputable sovereignty over almost all of SCS & most of the islands & sandbars within it, including many features that are hundreds of miles from mainland China. China claims more than 90% of the SCS as its territory – demarcated on its maps as a nine-dash line which extends hundreds of miles south & east from its most southerly Chinese province of Hainan. More recently, it had updated its claims as a 10-dash line – based on what it has long maintained as its historical rights. Beijing wants full sovereignty over the region to exploit its resources to their fullest potential.

Its sweeping claims of sovereignty over the SCS & the estimated 11 billion barrels of untapped oil & 190 trillion cubic feet of?natural gas have antagonized competing claimants Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan & Vietnam. China’s increasing?assertiveness?in the SCS has raised tensions over competing territorial claims & maritime rights.

China’s claims in the SCS are based on notions of sovereignty, colonial victimhood, nationalism & security. China has long felt vulnerability from the sea since colonial powers used sea power to enslave the Chinese. Therefore, its current maritime strategy is aimed at eliminating such vulnerabilities by undertaking steps such as extending a ring of security around China’s periphery through force structure development, which often includes frequent dispatch of maritime petrol vassals & surveillance aircraft to its neighboring seas as well as skies, war exercises, modernizing its naval capabilities & employing maritime militias particularly in the SCS.

In the 1970s, China began to assert control over different islands, reefs & waters in the SCS, often by force. It drove out Vietnamese troops from the western Paracels in 1974. By the late 1980s, China controlled all of the Paracels. China built oil-drilling rigs in waters near the Paracels that Vietnam still claimed. This provoked protests & riots against China in Vietnam. In the Spratlys, China won the 1988 Battle of Johnson Reef where about 70 Vietnamese were killed. Afterward, China detained non-Chinese fishermen & harassed foreign ships sailing near its occupied islands & reefs.

China began building artificial islands in the 1990s. This often involved dredging sand from the seabed & crushing coral to “reclaim” land for a reef that in its natural state was underwater at high tide. China claimed the artificial islands were for civilian purposes. One of the first artificial-island projects began in 1995 on Mischief Reef in the Spratlys. At first, the Chinese built structures on stilts since the reef was below high tide. Then, the reclamation of land was speeded up with the construction of a harbor & airstrip capable of handling combat aircraft. The Chinese claimed these were necessary for self-defense.

Meanwhile, in 2009, China presented the “nine-dash line” for the first time at an international conference, making this assertion: China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the SCS & the adjacent waters, & enjoys sovereign rights & jurisdiction over the relevant waters, as well as the seabed & subsoil thereof.

China turns more assertive

A significant turning point came in 2012 when China asserted its “nine dash line” by trying to take Scarborough Shoal as its territory, even though the Philippines had claimed it earlier. The shoal lies about 200 km (124 miles) off the Philippines coast & inside its EEZ. China seized the shoal & the Philippines launched a case with the Permanent Court of Arbitration. A stand-off?resulted between the Philippines navy & Chinese fishing vessels in the Scarborough Shoal. China remained in control but allowed Filipino fishermen to fish there.

This marked a shift in Chinese rhetoric about its approach to maritime claims & set the stage for the conflicts in the SCS. From the Chinese perspective, it has been essential to reassert the country’s sovereignty & jurisdiction in the region. To achieve this, Beijing has pursued actions to “rule the sea by law”. This has involved extensive land reclamation projects on atolls, the strengthening of China’s coast guard, regular patrols of the sea & reforms to domestic maritime laws. In accordance with the Communist Party’s directive of “ruling the country by law”, these measures ensure clear laws & regulations are in place to govern China’s maritime domain. They strengthen China’s jurisdiction over the contested seas, justifying its steps to build military facilities on islands there. However, these activities have been very controversial & have faced international legal challenges. Merely imposing domestic laws & regulations does not automatically legitimize China’s maritime claims & interests.

In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague issued its ruling on a claim brought against China by the Philippines under UNCLOS, ruling in favor of the Philippines on almost every count. While China is a signatory to the treaty, which established the tribunal, it refuses to accept the court’s authority.

After the arbitration-court ruling, China speeded up building & militarizing its 7 artificial islands in the Spratlys, Mischief Reef & 2 others have airbases. Satellite imagery has confirmed China’s increased efforts to reclaim land in the SCS by physically increasing the size of islands or creating new islands altogether. In addition to piling sand onto existing reefs, China has constructed ports, military installations & airstrips - particularly in the Paracel & Spratly Islands, where it has 20 & 7 outposts, respectively. China has militarized Woody Island?by deploying fighter jets, cruise missiles & a radar system.

The building up & operationalization of China’s reclaimed features will be a significant problem for Malaysia. This drastically reduces the operational distance between Chinese bases in Hainan & the Paracels & Malaysian waters.

China maintains that under international law, foreign militaries are not able to conduct intelligence-gathering activities, such as reconnaissance flights, in its EEZ. According to the US, claimant countries under UNCLOS, should have freedom of navigation through EEZs in the sea & are not required to notify claimants of military activities.

To protect its political, security, & economic interests in the region, the US has challenged China’s assertive territorial claims & land reclamation efforts by conducting FONOPs & bolstering support for SE Asian partners. In response to China’s assertive presence in the disputed territory, Japan has sold military ships & equipment to the Philippines & Vietnam to improve their maritime security capacity & help deter Chinese aggression.

China’s navy & coast guard still maintain an almost constant presence around the North & South Luconia Shoals. The widely publicized swarming of Chinese fishing fleets in waters claimed by Malaysia in 2016 are going to be much more common as China further tests the limits of Malaysian resolve in the SCS.

China has developed a sophisticated toolbox to advance its national interest. The country’s growing & multifaceted military instrument is meant to signal, compel, deter & engage in joint-kinetic operations. But most of all, it is meant to awe regional states into acquiescing to Chinese interests, values & interpretations of international law. In short, it aims to reinforce a notion of learned helplessness.

The People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM)

China's armed fishing militia, officially called the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) by the US Department of Defense - plays an instrumental role in Beijing's strategy to enforce its sovereignty claims in the SCS & ECS. PAFMM is a government-supported armed fishing force of unknown strength under the command of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It has existed for decades & augments Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) & PLA Navy (PLAN) operations.

This maritime militia comprises civilians who on paper hold jobs as commercial fishermen. The blurring of lines is deliberate: China’s leader, Xi Jinping, has stressed the need for civilian-military unity to promote national security. Beijing does not formally acknowledge the paramilitary force's existence & claims it comprises patriotic fishermen. The militia's unofficial nature gives Beijing plausible deniability when the ships enter contentious territory. Observers believe the Chinese government is using the fishing boats to assert de facto control over contested areas in the SCS, including in the Spratly Islands archipelago where Whitsun Reef lies.

This fleet, built largely with government money, helps China dominate the SCS - one of the most crucial & disputed waterways in the world. Beijing says many of these boats are just fishing. But they bristle with machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades & high-velocity water cannons. They are here for intimidation. Working in tandem with an aggressive coast guard, these militarized fishing boats assert Beijing’s presence more than 1,000 miles from the Chinese mainland. The boats patrol the disputed Spratly islets. Their reinforced steel hulls make it easy to ram smaller boats. Chinese vessels are often several times larger than the traditional or even commercial fishing boats of coastal SE Asian states & are purposely built with steel hulls. The Chinese ship, Yuemaobinyu 42212, that rammed & caused the sinking of the Philippine fishing boat F/B Gem-Ver in June 2019 at Reed Bank measured 44 meters long & 8 meters wide. By contrast, the F/B Gem-Ver was 19 meters long & 1.8 meters wide with a hull constructed of wood.

Chinese trawlers are usually equipped for longer & farther journeys at sea, have also been known to swarm by the hundreds & anchor in the EEZs of SE Asian states for months, escorted by Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels. In March 2016, between 80-100 fishing vessels accompanied by the CCG, encroached into Malaysia’s EEZ around the Luconia Shoals. They swarm other countries’ outposts & squat on shoals within sight of foreign coastlines.

Early PAFMM forces demonstrated their significant contributions to island seizure campaigns starting in Jan 1974 with the Battle of the Paracel Islands against South Vietnam. Back then, Beijing did not have much of a PLAN to speak of & the PAFMM was more capable of amphibious operations than the navy itself. Either way, the presence of Chinese fishing vessels around the Paracels?slowed down?South Vietnamese decision making on the use of force against PAFMM as well as their response times to counter PLAN maneuvers. Additional time?allowed?Beijing to coordinate more effectively. When 2 fishing trawlers?delivered?500 PLA troops to the Western Paracels, the South Vietnamese soldiers defending the disputed islands surrendered immediately.

PAFMM's debut on the world stage was a resounding success, elevating the narrative that fishing militia forces were essential to the success of China's maritime strategy in the SCS. Following the Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974, the PAFMM has been observed in nearly every major PLAN & CCG operation to harass maritime counter-claimants at disputed features or to seize the features from them.

Grey Zone Operations

Grey-zone operations refer to the use of ambiguous tactics by a state to achieve its strategic objectives without engaging in overt military conflict.

Most of these fishing boats in this maritime militia do not actually fish & is upending the rules of the sea. By providing backup to the CCG & maintaining a constant presence in remote waters, often parking on contested reefs for weeks at a time, they amplify China’s ambitions in the SCS. Such gray zone tactics help China quietly gain command over disputed areas. None of these grey-zone tactics constitute an act of war, but are part of China’s carefully calculated strategy to strengthen its territorial claims over the waters without escalating the conflict. This grey zone approach has delivered gains for China, advancing its position in the disputed sea without triggering conflict thus far. It allowed Beijing to undermine the position of other disputants in contested spaces while maintaining deniability. 2023's incidents concerning the waters were China’s way of embarking on horizontal escalation, which has happened more regularly & with greater intensity. It has so far avoided vertical escalation, which would entail actions such as boarding & inspection of foreign vessels, as well as the use of kinetic force.

While China’s actions were carefully calibrated to be as disruptive as possible and stopped short of acts of war, avoiding conflict might not be China’s ultimate goal. China’s grey zone tactics are designed to bait the other party into escalation, which would thus free Chinese forces to respond in kind – & the use of force would then be legitimized as a form of self-defence or response in kind to what the other party does.

It is difficult to know if the frequency of grey zone actions has increased in the past year as several incidents involving SCS claimants have been unpublicized. Most of the recent reported incidents were based on information released by the Philippine government & military. One of the main reasons why Chinese grey-zone actions have appeared more frequent this year is because the Marcos Jnr administration has been eager to name & shame Beijing each time they occur.

It is part of Manila’s assertive transparency policy which seeks to counter China’s tactics by making it incur reputational damage for its provocations while winning international support. The dent in China’s image has been significant. By blatantly disregarding international law & showing its readiness to push around its neighbors, China has shown itself as untrustworthy & has undermined its opportunities to resolve issues without force.

Filipino President Ferdinand Marcos Jr has taken a very different tack in defending Manila’s territorial claims in the SCS & when it came to his country’s relations with China. His predecessor, Duterte, was known for his China-friendly stance, which led him to look the other way when it came to the Chinese coastguard’s hostile activities in the SCS. When Duterte was president, his tendency to keep incidents in the SCS under wraps quickly facilitated China’s grey zone actions with minimal consequences.

Other ASEAN countries with interest in the disputed waters, such as Indonesia & Malaysia, have preferred to keep the issue “low profile” due to their significant trade with China.

While Beijing has been undertaking similar actions in the SCS for years, it is recognized that there has been a significant increase in the frequency & intensity of grey-zone activities in 2023. The Philippines's increasingly confrontational posture & heightened nationalist sentiment in China mean neither side is likely to back down & escalation may be inevitable. Beijing has used this method across its vast frontier, from the mountainous borders with South Asia to rocks in the ECS. Once China incrementally takes over, a new reality reigns.

A key lesson learned for Beijing was that leveraging fishing militia forces was far less likely to trigger US intervention in the matter even when the threatened neighbor was a US ally. It is fair to say that this was the genesis of Beijing's strategy to routinely employ irregular forces in grey zone operations in the SCS & ECS.

President Xi recently visited the Chinese coastguard command HQ to urge its personnel to assert China’s maritime rights. As such, the SCS dispute could intensify to alarming levels next year. It is dangerously likely that one of the grey-zone skirmishes could result in a collision or deaths. Given the attention focused on these issues it may be difficult to de-escalate from such a crisis.

PAFMM has played & will continue to play a particularly important role in establishing a de facto Chinese operating presence in disputed areas, in effect, changing the facts on the ground, or at sea, as it were, to challenge counter-claimants' ability to maintain control over disputed features. These classic “gray zone” operations are designed to “win without fighting” by overwhelming the adversary with swarms of fishing vessels usually bolstered from the rear together with CCG & possibly PLAN ships, depending on the contingency, in escalatory concentric rings.

Tensions have also been exacerbated by the increasing US presence in the SCS. The recent operations of USS Gabrielle Giffords off the Second Thomas Shoal signaled that the Americans are willing to play a more active role in supporting the Filipinos in asserting their sovereign rights. The warship conducted operations alongside the Philippine Navy in the SCS a few days before it sailed near the reef on Dec 4 2023, drawing a strong reaction from Beijng.

US actions may be perceived by Beijing as a sign that Washington intends to play a more active role in the waters including taking part in joint escorts with the Philippines for missions to the Second Thomas Shoal or at least positioning US military assets to provide cover to the Philippine maritime convoys.

While the US does not claim any territory in the waterway, it is treaty-bound to defend the Philippines, the nation most at odds with China. Furthermore, should there be conflict over Taiwan, the presence of Chinese military bases & vessels nearby in the SCS could impede the ability of the US & its allies to maneuver.

The US has accused the Chinese fishing fleet of engaging in unsafe & aggressive actions. Some of its boats were recently filmed engaging in standoffs at Scarborough Shoal & Second Thomas Shoal, whose ownership remains disputed between Manila & Beijing. The Philippine Coast Guard, which has been?watching the buildup for years, said the Chinese ships ignored the radio challenges of its patrol boats sent to document their illegal presence.

What China is trying to do is, over the years, is to get everyone accustomed to the idea that?China?is here to stay & nobody can get rid of them. They are slowly expanding their scope & reach to the edges of their nine-line claim & almost up to the coastline of their neighbors.

China has been the traditional aggressor in conflicts in the SCS. Besides seizing the Paracels from Vietnam in a military operation in 1974, China fought naval battles with Vietnamese forces over who would control the Johnson South Reef in the Union Banks region of the Spratly Islands in the SCS in 1988. The occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995 only adds to the Chinese image as an aggressor.

China's willingness to use force in the past to settle claims in the SCS positions it as a key player in determining whether the Spratly Island issue can be settled peacefully.

China Coast Guard (CCG)

The CCG is now the world’s largest & its range & presence in the SCS have increased dramatically in recent years. Stocked with retired navy corvettes & newer vessels that are longer than most US Navy destroyers, the Chinese coast guard boasts ships that dwarf those of other nations.

Even though the roles & practices of the CCG have generally been in line with those of other coast guards around the world, China’s new CCG law poses a formidable risk to other SCS claimants. The new law expands the role of the CCG by allowing it to fire on what China considers foreign vessels illegally present in its so-called jurisdictional waters, including the highly contested SCS.

Article 46 of Chapter VI of the CCG law provides that the maritime police agency may use police equipment or any other equipment or tool on the spot; however, Article 48 states that weapons used may also be shipborne or airborne. The permission to use weapons against foreign ships at reefs claimed by China & the authorization to destroy structures built by other claimants have serious implications for other disputants & users of the SCS.

Furthermore, in Aug 2021, China’s Maritime Safety Administration released a new rule on reporting requirements for foreign vessels, which came into effect on 1 Sept 2021. This will raise additional operational complications for other vessels, including those of the MMEA & RMN, sailing in disputed areas.

The Spratly Islands

The Spratly Islands archipelago is situated in the southern part of the SCS & comprises a collection of over 230 shoals, reefs & small, mostly uninhabited islets that are spread over an approximately 150,000 square miles. They lie approximately 120 miles west of the Philippine Island of Palawan, 150 miles northwest of the Malaysian State of Sabah, 230 miles east of the Vietnamese coast & 900 miles south of the Chinese island of Hainan.

The various claims to the Spratly Islands are complex. The basis for the claims vary from historical (China, Taiwan & Vietnam), to right of discovery (the Philippines), to association with continental shelves & the Law of the Sea Convention (Malaysia & Brunei). These claims are further complicated by the conflicting & overlapping boundaries generated by the various sources of these claims. China, Taiwan & Vietnam claim the Spratlys in their entirety, the Philippines claim some 60 islets, rocks & atolls that are collectively call Kalayaan, Malaysia claims 3 islands & groups of rock at the southern limit of the Spratlys & Brunei claims a single reef well south of the bulk of the islands.

The Spratly Islands dispute only highlights the limitations of the Law of the Sea Convention. A major shortcoming is that the Law of the Sea Convention starts with a premise that sovereignty of land territory is established prior to consideration of maritime issues. Occupation of the Spratly Islands has been intermittent & transitory in the past, therefore no clear cut ownership of the 'land territory' has been established. The Law of the Sea Convention does not provide for a binding arbitration process to resolve disputes over conflicting Exclusive Economic Zone claims arising from the Convention. In fact, Malaysia & Brunei's claims on the Spratlys were based on their application of the Law of the Sea Convention & further complicated the overall Spratly Island situation.

The economic value of the Spratly Islands

The Spratlys are highly valuable because of its rich fish resources & projected oil & gas reserves in the seabed surrounding these islands. The economic value of this location is the greatest catalyst in the continuing dispute between the contestants. The SCS is an important fishing area for all of the littoral nations of the area. This is supported by the fact that the most recent incidents between the countries involved in the Spratly dispute have revolved around violations of fishing claims in Malaysia & the Philippines by Chinese fishermen.

The greatest economic factor in the long term is the potential for oil & gas deposits in the area of the Spratlys.

One of the complications in oil & gas exploration of the Spratlys has been the depth of the seabed. With developments in sub-sea & floating production systems technology, the likelihood of economically feasible access to the oil in the region increases. However, this technology is expensive & requires the involvement & investment of major corporations to exploit these resources. With the economic boom of East Asia & the fact that existing oil resources are projected to decline by the end of the century, new sources of oil & gas are necessary to fuel the engines of economic progress. The oil & gas potential of the Spratly Islands region is an increasingly important reason for claimants to hold steady on their claims.

2023 provocations in the disputed area & what it augurs for the region

In Jan 2023, China’s largest coast guard ship (CCG Vessel 5901) intruded into Malaysia’s EEZ, along with the EEZs of several other SE Asian countries, including the Philippines. Oil exploration & drilling in the Malaysian EEZ were interrupted.

In Feb 2023, China flashed a military grade laser at a Philippine Coast Guard vessel approaching the Second Thomas Shoal, temporarily blinding its crew. A laser attack is typically seen as hostile because it can also precede firing on a target.

This incident took place about a month after what was initially seen as a fruitful visit by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr to Beijing. The President summoned the Chinese ambassador himself, which was a highly unusual move as the Foreign Ministry typically overseas such summons. Analysts cite this event as the turning point in Philippine policy after years of a much more muted approach to China.

This intensification in the SCS dispute between China & the Philippines is attributed to the historic shift of the Philippines’ role in the US Indo-Pacific Strategy.?The Philippines is the most deeply integrated SE Asian country in?the US's?Indo-Pacific Strategy. There is a possibility that the US, Japan, Australia & the Philippines will jointly patrol the SCS?in the near future, as the Philippines wants more enhanced military cooperation with the US & its allies?to strengthen Manila’s hand in dealing with China.

China’s more recent activities in the SCS have raised further concerns in the region. Its ships have?collided?with Filipino vessels, fired water cannons at others & used sonar pulses?close to an Australian ship, injuring its divers.

The US & its allies view this increasingly assertive behavior as evidence China seeks to challenge the established maritime order, marking it as a revisionist power. The US & its allies have a straightforward view on the SCS. They believe these should be open waters accessible to all states & SE Asian countries should be able to enjoy their rights to their EEZ along their shorelines.

The Philippines is strengthening its defense capabilities by modernizing its armed forces & establishing a substantial presence in the EEZ, especially in the West Philippine Sea, where maritime tensions with China persist.?The Philippine Air Force (PAF) faces a pressing requirement for advanced fighter aircraft capable of safeguarding the country’s airspace & surrounding waters, particularly in light of heightened tensions.?The decision to retire the F-5s in the mid-2000s was retrospectively deemed ill-conceived, leaving the PAF with an array of propeller-driven aircraft & a void in genuine supersonic capabilities.?To enhance its defense capabilities amid escalating maritime tensions with China, the Philippines negotiated with the US to acquire combat-proven F-16 fighter jets. However due to affordability issues, the PAF is looking elsewhere for their needs

Clashes in the disputed waters in 2023 portend further incidents in 2024 that could result in a serious conflict.

In Dec 2013, leaders of Japan & the 10-member ASEAN, commemorated 50 years of friendship in Tokyo, by pledging maritime security cooperation & supply chain security. China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned in a telephone conversation with his Philippine counterpart, Enrique Manalo, that China would respond resolutely if the Philippine side “misjudges the situation…or colludes with ill-intentioned external forces.” Returning home from the Japan-ASEAN summit, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr was equally firm when he said, "The Philippines won’t give up its territorial rights."

The red lines reaffirm that anything is possible.

Statements coming from both China & the Philippines are unnerving as regional players begin to align themselves across the SCS. The French have announced a plan to hold joint patrols with the Philippines, as did India. Both were denounced by Beijing.

The SCS is widely recognized as a potential flash-point for global conflict. The recent confrontations between Manila & Beijing have raised concerns among many observers of potentially developing into an international incident if China, a global power, decides to act more forcefully against the Philippines, a US treaty ally. Washington & Manila are bound by a mutual defense treaty signed in 1951 that remains in force, stipulating that both sides would help defend each other if either were attacked by a 3rd party. Since Ferdinand Marcos Jr came to power, the defense cooperation between the?Philippines & the US?has seen a major breakthrough.

It is understandable for the US & the Philippines to develop military relations,?as they?have been?traditional?security allies for 7 decades. The increased cooperation between the 2 countries became apparent earlier this year when the Philippines granted expanded access to 4 new bases for US troops. The bases requested by the US are located in Isabela, Zambales & Cagayan provinces, all of which are?near the Taiwan Strait & the SCS. This strategic move is significant due to the strategic location of the bases in the southwest Pacific.

From the Chinese perspective, the location of these 4 bases is troubling with 3 of them near the Taiwan Strait & 1 facing the SCS. It demonstrates that the?US which has been keeping close tab on the Taiwan Strait & the SCS is preparing for possible military conflicts?in these troubled waters. By granting wider access to US troops, the?Philippines?has made it very clear that if conflicts were to break out in the region, it will stand with the US.

More than 1 month after the announcement that the US would be granted access to 4 more military bases in the Philippines, the US started rehabilitating the runway of the Basa Air Base in Pampanga. With the rehabilitation of Basa Air Base, the US Air Force (USAF) can take off from the Philippine & go to Taiwan or the SCS, which is much closer than taking off from Andersen AFB in Guam. The US?Army?can also store weapons & ammunition in the Philippine bases which greatly shortens supply lines & improving combat efficiency?in a conflict.

The US military has progressively heightened its regional activities. Notably, in March 2023, the USAF deployed F-22s to the Philippines, marking the 1st instance of 5th-generation aircraft operating there. In April 2023, the partners held their largest military exercise. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned that US-Philippine military cooperation must not interfere in SCS disputes.

Sino-Philippine tensions have largely focused on the?Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef that is part of the disputed Spratly Islands, which is claimed by multiple countries including China & the Philippines.

In 1999, the Philippines intentionally grounded the warship, Sierra Madre, on Second Thomas Shoal to shore up its maritime claims. The Shoal is located roughly 190 kilometers off the western coast of Palawan Island. The Sierra Madre is decades old & will eventually sink without substantial maintenance

Chinese vessels have routinely blocked Philippine supply ships to undermine Manila’s position in the SCS. Beijing has also fired water cannons & used blinding lasers as part of its tactics. Similar incidents have occurred before, but the Philippines is publicizing the incidents more than during the Duterte administration.

This pattern of Chinese behavior has also become routine across the SCS in recent years, from vessels intruding into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone for long stretches to protests registered against energy exploration by Malaysia & the Philippines.

The US has condemned China’s recent actions in the contested sea & threatened to intervene under its mutual defense treaty obligations if Philippine vessels came under armed attack there.

The 2 major clusters of land in the SCS are the Paracels & the Spratlys. Although largely uninhabited, they may have reserves of natural resources around them.

China’s need for the resources in the SCS is tempered by the realization that she still requires foreign investment & technology to continue with its economic expansion.

Ultimately, China aims to dominate existing maritime governance agreements & treaties, allowing it to impose its own agenda & safeguarding its maritime rights & interests. However, the Philippines & Vietnam strongly oppose China’s unilateral statements on the SCS, correctly perceiving them as assertions of regional hegemony.

Malaysia's response

The SCS remains a core issue in Malaysia’s national security & needs careful handling. Its ‘low-profile’ response to the SCS dispute is not an indication of ‘reverence’ to big brother, but rather managing its vulnerability as a small country up against a big, assertive & unpredictable power with a global ambition. At the same time, it does not preclude Malaysia’s ability & willingness to remind the Chinese dragon that in international diplomacy, superiority of firepower alone does not guarantee respect & legitimacy.

In a strategic move to enhance its monitoring capabilities of the SCS, Malaysia is set to acquire & has already acquired 3 long-range radars to act as the nation’s eyes & ears, detecting any attempts by foreign entities to breach its airspace & waters. This development comes amid recurring incursions by CCG vessels into the country’s EEZ, particularly near Beting Patinggi Ali, an area rich in Malaysia’s oil & gas resources.

Among the nation’s most valuable assets is the Kasawari Gas Field, situated in waters with a depth of approximately 108 meters within Block SK316, about 200 km north of Bintulu, Sarawak. Preliminary assessments carried out in early February 2012 indicated that gas-in-place for the Kasawari field was over 5 trillion standard cubic feet (TSCF) with estimated recoverable hydrocarbon resource of just over 3 TSCF, making it one of the largest non-associated gas fields in Malaysia. Petronas's discovery of this field in Nov 2011 further solidifies Malaysia’s position as one of the world’s leading exporters of LNG.

According to Defense Minister Datuk Seri Mohamad Hasan, the waters around Beting Patinggi Ali & Kasawari Gas Field contribute nearly 25% to Malaysia’s GDP & it is imperative to safeguard them at any cost. The importance of these assets underscores the need for constant vigilance & protection in the SCS.

Overall, the Ministry of Defense will operate 14 coastal surveillance radars in the ESSZONE area to ensure the safety of the Eastern Sabah coast from various threats, especially KfR groups & cross-border criminal elements. The acquisition of these 6 Coastal Surveillance System (CSS) radars is to replace 5 CSS radars that have experienced damage & cannot be repaired.

In early Dec 2023, Malaysia & France finalized the Letter of Acceptance (LOA) for the Ground Master 400 Alpha (GM400) long-range air defense radar which will be deployed in Bintulu, Sarawak, facing the SCS, to monitor airspace sovereignty along coastal areas & the EEZ. The GM400 boasts enhanced detection capabilities, extending up to approximately 515 km & can effectively track high-speed fighter aircraft, guided missiles, helicopters & unmanned aerial systems. Notably, the GM400’s unique feature is its ability to simultaneously track low-flying tactical drones & high-altitude targets like bombers at a distance of 515 km.

The GM400 radar in Bintulu will complement the Lockheed Martin AN/TPS-77 stationed in Labuan. With a coverage range of about 470 km, the AN/TPS-77 (provided by the US government as part of its contribution to Malaysia’s defense capabilities) is a mobile radar capable of re-deployment via C-130 Hercules aircraft, trucks, or trains.

The 3rd set of radar for monitoring maritime & aerial movements in the SCS will be stationed on Malaysia-owned Layang-Layang Islands, a part of the Spratly Islands. This long-range radar system will facilitate surveillance beyond the EEZ in the Spratly Islands. As tensions persist over territorial claims in the resource-rich Spratly Islands, Malaysia reinforces its monitoring capabilities to ensure the protection of its economic interests & territorial sovereignty in the SCS.

Improving Navy-Coastguard Nexus

The RMN has a direct responsibility to ensure Malaysia’s national interests are preserved. But as much as the navy is the key player, it often has limitations. For instance, coast guard vessels are more suitable than warships to perform law enforcement functions, especially in sensitive areas like the SCS. This is simply because the coast guard’s image, with the vessel’s ‘white hull’, is far less intimidating than a ‘grey hull’; the coast guard can therefore be a useful tool in safeguarding the SCS especially in managing Grey Zone Operations. Coast guard vessels do not stimulate enmity among conflicting nations compared to warships performing law enforcement arrests. Coast guard vessels are less threatening than larger, more heavily armed warships. In terms of cost effectiveness, it is also wiser to use white hulls versus grey hulls because a typical warship is fitted with advanced technology & is extremely expensive to construct.

Besides practicality & cost-effectiveness, the job scope & law enforcement leverage of the MMEA needs to be considered. In the MMEA Act 2004, the MMEA’s roles are:-

• the maintenance of law & order
• the preservation of peace, safety & security
• the prevention & detention of crime
• the apprehension & prosecution of offenders
• the collection of security intelligence

The MMEA can exercise its powers in any water space where federal law can be applied, especially in the EEZ. The MMEA is the sole authority in providing layered support to the RMN to tackle encroachment into Malaysian waters & perform coastal water safeguarding.

Malaysia is dealing with increased & more coordinated incursions by Chinese vessels into Malaysian waters. These are carried out by a variety of agencies: the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the China Coast Guard, China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command & China’s maritime militia. They have been increasingly aggressive in their maneuver, especially the maritime militia, leading to a few incidents of physical contact between vessels at sea. Nearly all are unreported in the public sphere.

In response, the MMEA & RMN have increased their patrols by as much as 30% & deployed more assets in the SCS. This has led to a shortfall of patrols & assets in other areas, especially in West Malaysia. RMAF has also deployed more aircraft, including fighters, to the island of Labuan, fronting the SCS in East Malaysia. In spite of lower spending on defence, more funds have been made available for the purchase & upgrading of naval assets for MMEA & RMN, which are sorely needed in the SCS.

It is important to understand the major differences in perspective between China & the other nations involved in the SCS conflict. While China is routinely portrayed as aggressive & provocative, from China's perspective they are the victims of past aggression & encroachment by their neighbors. They are merely acting to protect their territorial integrity. They are not expanding their territory by taking additional reefs & islands, but merely recovering them.

Over the past 10 years, tensions in the SCS have persisted. On numerous occasions, stare downs have precipitated the firing of water cannons, ramming & the sinking of vessels. This maritime discord has also increasingly been flanked by airborne intimidation. Even though the territorial dispute involves 6 parties with overlapping claims, China’s outsized presence, heft & mounting forcefulness in these multiple domains present unique challenges to its smaller neighbors.

Although Indonesia does not stake a territorial claim, part of its exclusive economic zone in the North Natuna Sea overlaps with China’s assertion of a “nine-dash line,” resulting in incursions & confrontations familiar to claimant states.

China’s decision to militarize the SCS points to the country’s interest in the area as more than just about access to resources like fish, gas & oil. The maritime & territorial disputes have not changed, but recent far more aggressive developments could potentially alter the status quo. Despite this development, Malaysia remains consistent in its formal position that disputes should be settled through peaceful means, diplomacy & mutual trust. Friction in the SCS over the last 5 years have relegated dispute management to a secondary focus. Instead, parties are increasingly interested in capturing strategic advantage.

In the near future, the larger hazard of increased aerial projection by China over the SCS is made more probable by China’s extensive military buildup & fortification on features across the Paracels & Spratlys.

Fish stocks

The environment of Sabah & Sarawak makes this area one of the world’s richest ecosystems. Sabah has a vast spread of deep waters & therefore a huge amount of fish stock. Sarawak also has deep waters & abundant fish resources, but deep-sea fishing efforts remain limited. Given the intense demand for fish & fish products, the harnessed resources vis-à-vis the potential resources are clearly mismatched. Fishing is quite profitable, even taking into consideration its operating expenses and the degree of riskiness in the industry. Most importantly, fishing is the only issue that is shifting from a non-traditional to a traditional issue & ultimately requiring the RMN to play a stronger role in protecting the industry.

Illegal fishing is also a significant problem for Malaysia. Since 2016, some 256 foreign vessels with assets worth RM180 million have been seized & a total of 2,199 foreign crew have been detained during the same period. They are from countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam & Thailand. The Department of Fisheries continues to rely on cooperation with MMEA & RMN to both monitor & enforce the necessary laws when it comes to illegal fishing in Malaysia’s territorial waters & EEZ.

Fishing boats that have received military training have flocked to the disputed areas, especially the Luconia Shoals. Vietnamese fishing vessels have also crossed Chinese, Malaysian, Indonesian & Philippine waters – in a recent case in April 2020, 1,000 Vietnamese fishing ships intruded in these countries & caused conflict.

However, with encroachment from Vietnam, Thailand & Indonesia, the biggest challenge for Malaysia is maximizing the use of its current maritime assets while at the same time improving its assets procurement.

Illegal, unreported & unregulated (IUU) fishing

Illegal, unreported & unregulated (IUU) fishing remains a serious challenge among even SE Asian nations themselves. Depleting fish stocks in the SCS means that boats are increasingly driven to stray farther from their originating coastlines into other countries’ overlapping maritime zones. However, the pressures of China’s expansive fishing fleets raise the stakes by several orders of magnitude.

The swarming & anchoring of large Chinese fleets of fishing & maritime militia vessels in other claimants’ EEZs as well as the harassment of SE Asian energy survey vessels in the SCS are unrivaled in scale & nature. The whole idea is to project presence while saying, "I am here & there is nothing you can do to chase me away."

However, it is the tactical combination of harassment at sea & in the air that is especially unsettling. In 2014, the standoff between Vietnam & China over an oil rig in the Paracel Islands not only escalated into collisions & ramming at sea but Hanoi also reported the Chinese mobilization of dozens of aircraft.

While the Malaysian government has been adamant that the defence of its territory is non-negotiable it is also intensely aware that as a small country with stretched resources, it must be practical & discerning in protecting its sovereignty in the short, middle & long-term.

Sarawak

In Sept 2013, a CCG vessel was anchored near South Luconia Shoal (Beting Patinggi Ali), just 84 nautical miles off the coast of Sarawak. In 2014, Chinese naval patrols around James Shoal (Beting Serupai in Malay), only 43 nautical miles off the coast of Sarawak.

In Sarawak, on 31 May 2021, the RMAF reported that 16 People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) aircraft were "flying in tactical formation" at up to 27,000 ft & came within 60 nautical miles (110km) of Sarawak. Attempts to contact them went unheeded & Malaysian fighter jets had to be scrambled from Labuan Air Base to carry out a "visual identification". Malaysian Foreign Minister Hishammuddin Hussein said the planes had entered the country's "maritime zone" & that a complaint would be lodged with Beijing.

As it is not directly involved in the territorial disputes, Indonesia has long tried to position itself as a disinterested honest broker between ASEAN & China. Foreign incursions into Indonesia’s EEZ around the Natuna Islands (which lie between the Malaysian peninsula to the west & the island of Borneo to the east) & elsewhere, including suspected Chinese underwater drone activity, have however prompted Jakarta to bolster defences in the area & to rename the waters the North Natuna Sea in 2017. In Dec 2019, dozens of Chinese fishing vessels, with a China Coast Guard escort, entered Indonesia’s EEZ. Jakarta summoned China’s ambassador & sent warships to the area. In early 2020, Jakarta scrambled jets to drive off the Chinese boats & in Nov, announced the establishment of a navy “combat squad” headquarters on the Natuna Islands.

Malaysia’s balancing act

Malaysia has always steadfastly defended its waters through diplomatic means. However such dealings are usually conducted behind closed doors. Malaysia's envoys at Wisma Putra are doing their best to ensure consultations with China are to Malaysia’s advantage. It also helps that China is open to talks with Malaysia. Malaysia understands that it is facing 2 big superpowers – China & the US has to tread carefully. The dispute in the SCS was also a test of ASEAN’s centrality, as the grouping is responsible for protecting the waters. Any joint statement on the SCS should be worded carefully as China remains Malaysia’s largest trading partner.

Like many other SE Asian countries & out of necessity, Malaysia will have to hedge & balance its bigger & more powerful neighbors in the region. In Sept 2015, even as Malaysia held the largest bilateral exercise of any ASEAN country with China, the next month it welcomed to Kota Kinabalu the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Lassen for a port visit just after the destroyer had been conducting a freedom of navigation operation off the coast of the SCS.

In Nov 2015, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM-Plus) that Malaysia hosted as ASEAN Chair, Malaysia’s defence minister flew out in a helicopter with US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter for a cruise on the USS Theodore Roosevelt in the SCS. A few days later, the press reported that the RMN offered China the use of Kota Kinabalu as a port of call to strengthen defence ties between the 2 countries to overcome problems & issues relating to overlapping border claims.

The Malaysian government has had to balance firmly defending its claims & maintaining good relations with China. Putrajaya issues diplomatic protests concerning Chinese intrusion into Malaysia’s maritime zone but also engages in regular dialogues with the Chinese government to avoid unintended problems at sea. Over the past 2 decades, Malaysia’s diplomatic initiatives have been largely personality driven from the top, heavily influenced by a mix of personal relationships & geopolitical interests.

China’s insistent & increasingly assertive challenges to Malaysia’s claims, particularly off the coast of Sabah & Sarawak – key states of domestic political significance – will test Putrajaya’s quiet approach.

Issues & Challenges Protecting the Oil & Gas Industry in the SCS

The oil & gas (O&G) industry is a significant contributor to Malaysia’s economy. It represents approximately 20% of the country’s GDP.

Malaysia has limited oil pipelines & relies on tankers to distribute products onshore. Movement of products must be safe & guarded at all times. The RMN must provide support & resilience to ensure the accessibility & continuity of O&G projects, which are key to boosting the economic growth of the country. In terms of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) projects, predominant companies like Shell & Petronas have invested heavily in the areas of Sabah & Sarawak. Besides EOR projects, risk service contract (RSC) projects have been helping to maximize oil production as well as deep-water projects offshore at Sabah, which will boost the total oil production of the country. Examples are the Kikeh oil field, (operated through a partnership between Petronas & Murphy Oil) & the Siakap North-Petail satellite field.

The Gumusut-Kakap project is the main artery for crude oil production in the country. Shell, Conoco Philips, Petronas & Murphy Oil are all connected to the Kimanis area, where Sabah Oil & Gas Terminal is located, making this area a vital stress point. Since crude oil is the biggest chunk of Malaysia’s economic returns, Miri, Kikeh & Kimanis at Borneo demand higher commitments from the RMN in terms of stability.

In Sabah, there are several prominent natural gas & condensate fields such as Kebabangan, Kamunus East & Kamunsu East Upthrown Canyon. In the north, Malaysia has the Kinabalu Non-Associated Gas project & the Rotan field.

RMN Capabilities

With such a vast number of projects ongoing & bolstering the economy of the country, the RMN must serve an increasing number of functions to ensure a stable & peaceful environment for economic activities. China’s attempt to control & gain supremacy over this area through expansion of O&G projects & militarization threatens Malaysia’s strategic & economic interests. The encroachment of the CCG around Malaysian waters at the Luconia Shoals has been challenging due to Malaysia’s economic dependency on China.

The RMN must ensure undisrupted movement of goods & security of vital sea locations for economic productions. Malaysia’s military presence is strongest at Swallow Reef, the Mariveles Reef & the Ardasier Reef, none of which are adjacent to Malaysian air or naval bases. As a result, air & sea-lift capabilities are crucial to the reinforcement of remote garrisons as well as other offshore capabilities.

The RMN plays a significant role in safeguarding Malaysian maritime interests. Over the last few decades, Malaysia has rigorously worked towards building the RMN to address these challenges. The 15-5 program has been the crust of the RMN fleets’ transformation as it was focused on acquiring new ships to replace ageing ships, reducing cost & logistics problems & most importantly building an efficient fleet.

The RMN's Eastern Command has increased its presence & focus on foreign vessel intrusions into Malaysian waterways in the SCS. It is establishing its 4th naval command off the coast of Bintulu to increase its presence & patrol along the Sarawak coast.

Its continuous presence at sea derives from various geographical factors. First, Malaysia’s long coastline spans a length of 6,037 km2. Malaysia sovereign rights, which include the EEZ covers an area of 569,845 km2 as compared with Malaysia’s total land area of 329,758 km2.

Malaysia’s territorial waters cover a total of 65,035 km2. A 600-km stretch of the SCS separates Peninsular Malaysia from the states of Sabah & Sarawak. The RMN can ensure Malaysia’s maritime interests are preserved in the SCS.

At the end of the 1990s, Malaysia bought its 1st submarine & the country commissioned its 2nd submarine in Nov 2009. Both are stationed in Sepangar, Sabah. Both vessels are armed with torpedoes & mines & can launch anti-ship SM 39 Exocet missiles. It is also fitted with SUBTICS integrated & UDS International supplied weapon control & sonar systems.

The RMN also obtained 4 small Laksamana class missile corvettes & Leiku class frigates in the later 1990s. It is thus equipped with the necessary equipment to respond to challenges offshore & useful in managing threats towards the fishery & O&G industry. However, the RMN’s ships cannot respond quickly along the coastline or address the devious behaviors & movements of illegal fishermen & sea robbers.

The New Generation Patrol Crafts were expected to come into service in 2020, but implementation has stalled. The Littoral Combat Ship project that was expected to be completed by 2023 came to a dead-end due to ineffective administration.

Modern electronics & weapon systems, countermeasures & quick response capabilities are important features in today’s maritime domain. The ever-changing innovations & advances in the technology of both traditional & non-traditional threats make it challenging for states to ensure their capabilities are up to date.

Lack of profitability, corruption & poor shipbuilding expertise & technology are factors contributing towards this drawback, though cost remains the greatest challenge for the RMN in modernizing its fleet.

The function of the Royal Malaysian AirForce (RMAF) in the context of maritime surveillance & maritime patrol aircraft is important. It is a flexible instrument for surveillance, transport & combat rescue missions & counter measure or response efforts. The RMAF in the air domain complements & supports the maritime duties of the RMN. Interoperability between the RMAF & the RMN is crucial in addressing the problems in the SCS, especially given that the RMAF has rapid response capabilities that the RMN lacks.

It is important to focus on the RMAF’s capabilities especially because Peninsular Malaysia is separated by the eastern states of Sabah & Sarawak. This geographical factor makes the RMAF even more important to the RMN’s activities at sea.

Improving RMN-MMEA cooperation

The RMN has a direct responsibility to ensure Malaysia’s national interests are preserved. Much as the navy is the key player, it has limitations. Coast guard vessels are more suitable than warships to perform law enforcement functions, especially in sensitive areas like the SCS. The coast guard is a useful tool in safeguarding the SCS especially in managing Grey Zone Operations (GZOs).

Coast guard vessels do not stimulate enmity among conflicting nations compared to warships performing law enforcement arrests. Coast guard vessels are less threatening than larger, more heavily armed haze grey warships. In terms of cost effectiveness, it is also wiser to use white hulls versus grey hulls because a typical warship is fitted with advanced technology & extremely expensive to construct.

Besides practicality & cost-effectiveness, the job scope & law enforcement leverage of the MMEA needs to be considered. In the MMEA Act 2004, the MMEA’s role is the maintenance of law & order; the preservation of peace, safety, & security; the prevention & detention of crime; the apprehension & prosecution of offenders; & the collection of security intelligence.

This role includes the internal waters, territorial sea, continental shelf, EEZ & Malaysian fisheries waters as well as the air space over the zone. The MMEA can exercise its powers in any water space where federal law can be applied, especially in the EEZ. The MMEA is the sole authority in providing layered support to the RMN to tackle encroachment into Malaysian waters & perform coastal water safeguarding.

The MMEA has further reaching capability & more experience in managing the complexity in the SCS. The MMEA has approximately 88 ships & 164 boats. Its main ships, KM Pekan & KM Arau, are Langkawi class that can carry land helicopters & UAVs. It also has 2 fixed wing aircraft Bombardier CL-415MP amphibious platforms with an Airborne Maritime Surveillance System to detect oil spills & small targets via forward-looking infrared sensors. These assets have proven useful in protecting Malaysia’s offshore O&G & detecting illegal fishing boats.

Malaysia should consider relocating pre-existing MMEA & RMN assets from Peninsular Malaysia to Sabah, as there is substantially less risk of a maritime threat to the former. This gives East Malaysian security operations the assets they require without increasing financial commitments.

Indonesia, Vietnam & the Philippines are building their navies. These neighboring maritime forces do not put Malaysia in a comfortable position.

*** This is my final article in Linkedin. Since March 2016, I have written & posted a total of 121 comprehensive articles on subjects that are within my areas of expertise. Nonetheless, I will continue to write & post on private membership & subscription based forums.

Endro Sunarso is an expert in Security Management, Physical Security & Counter Terrorism. He is regularly consulted on matters pertaining to transportation security, off-shore security, critical infrastructure protection, security & threat assessments, & blast mitigation.

Besides being a Certified Protection Professional (CPP?), a Certified Protection Officer Instructor (CPOI) & a Project Management Professional (PMP?), Endro is also a Fellow of the Security Institute (FSyl) & the Institute of Strategic Risk Management (F.ISRM).

Endro has spent about 2 decades in Corporate Security (executive protection, crisis management, critical infrastructure protection, governance, business continuity, loss mitigation, due diligence, counter corporate espionage, etc). He also has more than a decade of experience in Security & Blast Consultancy work, initially in the Gulf Region & later in SE Asia.