Unequal friendships

Old ideas can be very useful in thinking about modern issues. The concept of unequal friendships is one of those.

As Nicole Pangle Smith has written, “by far the fullest and most probing classical study of friendship is to be found in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics”. (Smith Pangle, p. 2) Friendship, as it was understood then, encompassed a wide range of relationships of pleasure, virtue, and utility, including that of partners in a business venture.

For Aristotle, the best form of friendship is one that exists between equals. That doesn’t mean that friendship cannot exist in the face of disparities, but such a friendship is inherently less stable (or sustainable) and features an ongoing need for equalization, to keep things as much in balance as possible.

What kind of imbalance are we talking about? Is it really impossible for a wealthy and powerful person, for instance, to have a genuine friendship with a good person of modest means? Not exactly. For Aristotle, “[T]he greatest obstacle to friendship seems to be […] a permanent inequality in the attributes of two people in any respect that the superior puts great store by, whether it be wealth, power, virtue, or something else.” (Smith Pangle, p. 58; my emphasis)

The superior? This is not a comment about subordination or someone’s position in a chain of command (although this may indeed be the case). The ”superior” we are talking about here is the person in the relationship who brings more of something that this person sees as valuable above all. Superior in character, for instance, where character is seen as the currency that matters most.

What we contribute to a relationship creates claims on the other person – a form of moral accounting. “He’s not my intellectual equal”, one person might think deep down to themselves, “but…” Between the two, claims and countervailing claims gradually accumulate. If things get bumpy, as they are likely to, frustration may emerge at the imbalance: “He’s a really nice guy and we always have a great time together, but I’m getting sick and tired of always picking up the bill!”

Where it gets tricky is that two people in a relationship may have very different views as to what has most value. Perhaps the first person considers itself superior by virtue of what really matters most in life (to him) – his wealth. The other person, on the other hand, may consider herself superior by virtue of what really matters in her view – her scientific knowledge. Between the two, equalization comes perhaps in the form of gratitude (if it is craved by one), or public displays of obeisance (if it is craved by the other).

The main idea is that such a friendship will be inherently unstable due to the fact that there is such a disparity in what is most important to each. If your driving purpose in life is to benefit the common good through the advancement of knowledge, what are the odds that you can form a real, enduring friendship with someone who approaches every interaction in terms of their personal interests and cares only about the profits that your ideas will generate for him?

Saddest of all, perhaps? Long-standing friends who started out valuing the same things in life, in business, but gradually grew apart as one or both came to value different things above all others, triggering resentment and acrimony on both sides.

We would call this a fundamental clash of values, and it’s likely an insurmountable obstacle to an enduring friendship or partnership of any kind if values and purpose can’t be brought back in closer alignment.

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References

Smith Pangle, Lorraine. Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship.?Cambridge University Press, 2003, 255 pages.