Understanding Online Radicalization and Propaganda: A study on the case of ISIS

By Rahman Huseynov

Introduction: Defining Online Radicalization

Through the use of online media, particularly social networks like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, an individual can become radicalized to violence through the process of being exposed to an ideological message and belief system that promotes a shift from mainstream beliefs toward extreme viewpoints. These extreme views—which are the product of radical interpretations of popular religious or political doctrines—tend to excuse, encourage, provoke, or condone violence in order to bring about a variety of social, spiritual, or political alterations. People who spend much time-consuming extreme content online typically start to perceive reality distortedly, to the point where their opinions no longer seem radical. An individual's actual community can be replaced by online connections with like-minded others, which can also create an online social environment that resembles a gang where violent and deviant behavior is commonplace. Online extremist content consumers may also experience an increase in feelings of moral outrage, desensitization to violence, and willingness to carry out violent acts in support of a cause.

The accessibility and convenience of the Internet have led to its adoption by individuals and institutions around. The Internet is used by people and organizations for communication, news posting, press release distribution, photo and video sharing, fundraising, and news gathering. People are becoming more and more accustomed to using social media, having more access to the Internet, owning gadgets with Internet capabilities, spending more time online, interacting with others virtually, and consuming content from various sources. In order to recruit, nurture, and facilitate radicalization to violence, violent extremists and criminal organizations are also taking advantage of this easy access to an ever-widening range of people. Radical recruiters can connect with more individuals online and in more ways than one if they were using traditional methods. The Internet also makes recruiting more fruitful. A range of conventional websites, popular social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, as well as other online services, are used by extremists to disseminate their opinions, promote animosity toward enemies, encourage acts of violence, exalt martyrs, establish online communities with like-minded people, offer moral or legal defenses for suggested actions, and interact with and train new recruits. Extremists disseminate explosive content, including blog entries, lectures endorsing radical ideologies, instructional videos on handling weapons and making explosives, films of successful assaults, and statements endorsing and promoting violence and attacks.

Background: The Rise of ISIS

The establishment of the Islamic State in 2014 was the most remarkable breakthrough in radical Islamist ideology in the 21st century. Although the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is a branch of al-Qaeda, it has disseminated a more radical and brutal concept of Jihad than any other organization. ISIS evolved from al-Qaeda in Iraq, which was established in 1999 by Jordanian fighter Abu Musab al Zarqawi. The U.S. intervention in 2003 gave him cause a boost. In 2006, he lost his life in an American airstrike. Al-Qaeda opposed the theologically unlawful or perhaps alienating Sunni populace from their horrific sectarian atrocities, even in the early days of the organization’s existence in Iraq. Al-Qaeda prioritized killing Shiites and other Muslims it believed to be rebels and deserving of death in Iraq while advocating for a united Islamic front against the West.

The organization usually expanded its statehood ambition into Syria in 2013 and renamed itself the ISIS in an attempt to assert control over fighters it had sent to the country in 2011. Unveiling a long-standing objective of al-Qaeda, albeit in a different form, ISIS declared in June 2014 that it has established a caliphate complete with its own army, economy, and administration.

ISIS Propaganda Tactics

The ISIS group’s use of social media in the twenty-first century to disseminate its message has been startingly effective. ISIS began posting footage of hostage executions and other atrocities on social media in the summer of 2014 to recruit fighters and support its narrative that it had effectively formed a caliphate. The propaganda of ISIS frequently presents its campaign in “epochal terms,” launching a frontal attack on the borders and national divides in the Middle East that were established by Western powers following World War I. In the history of contemporary jihadist propaganda, ISIS is the most recent of three generations. In the first, Osama bin Laden used videos to disseminate his message. Bin Laden recorded his long-winded speech in extremely formal Arabic using a single stationary camera. Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born cleric who was murdered in a drone attack in Yemen in 2011, served as a representative of the second generation. Al-Awlaki was a well-known figure on YouTube, maintained a blog and a Facebook profile, and contributed to the publication of the full-color English language magazine Inspire. ISIS is a prime example of the third generation, and it fully embraces the newest communications technologies. ISIS is able to spread its message through thousands of Twitter accounts in multiple languages, Hollywood-style movies, and proficient use of other social media networks and websites.

The “Al Hayat Media Center,” which ISIS established, produces material that is especially meant for non-Arabic speakers, especially younger audiences. Its production is similar to that of mainstream broadcasts. Still, their videos can be identified easily with glossy logos that appear in the corners of the screen, either an ISIS flag in black and white or an Arabic script logo shaped like a teardrop that appears to be emerging from a digital waterfall. The Center produces videos in multiple languages and formats, ranging from short “mujatweets” that are suitable for Twitter to one-hour documentaries that showcase action sequences and special effects in the style of Hollywood movies. "Eid Greetings from the Land of Khilafah," a jihadi-style travel program shot in Raqqa, Syria, showcases ISIS militants from Western nations expressing their happiness at being there. This program is part of Al Hayat Media's lineup. The final words of the show are, "I wish you were here," A fast-paced action montage featuring the film's more violent scenes has been spliced in, and a recruiting hymn is playing in the background. There isn't much proof of ISIS atrocities like rape, kidnapping, mosque destruction, persecution, executions, and beatings of women caught without hijab in these movies.

Up to 90,000 posts are created daily by the ISIS propaganda machine on Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and numerous other social media sites. Twitter is the most widely used social media network for ISIS propaganda, with over 288 million active users globally. It is situated in San Francisco. Twitter has suspended accounts associated with ISIS in an attempt to counteract threats, propaganda, and recruitment activities from the group. However, despite these measures, ISIS adherents continue to retain thousands of active accounts on the social media platform. Death threats against the executives and staff of Twitter have resulted from the social media company’s efforts to combat ISIS.

Individual Factors Affecting Radicalization

Youth Radicalization

It is clear enough that ISIS is eager to recruit young people and children to become either active militants fighting on the front lines in Syria and Iraq or so-called “lone wolves” who carry out terrorist attacks that are motivated by the group but may not be directly coordinated with it. A brief examination of media headlines on lone wolf attacks in the second half of 2014 and into 2015 indicates that the ISIS message has obviously appealed to kids who are older, rather than only the children in training camps who have been portrayed in ISIS propaganda movies. On social media in September 2014, ISIS representative Abu Muhammed al-Adnani called on backers across the globe to carry out so-called “lone wolf” assaults in the capitals of Western coalitions in response to the Obama administration’s missiles a month earlier to stop the terrorist army’s apparently unstoppable advance in Iraq. This seemed to be fatally effective: Martin Roulea, a 25-year-old lone wolf who was influenced by ISIS, ran over two Canadian troops in a parking lot in Montreal two months after al-Adnan’s call before being shot and killed by police. Christopher Cornell, then 20 years old, was detained by the FBI in January 2015 on suspicion of planning to open fire on US federal employees as well as the Israeli embassy. He stated that he was speaking for ISIS.

Gender Radicalization

The motivations of men and women differ, according to recent research on female recruitment to suicide terrorism. More specifically, women typically engage in high-risk political involvement for personal reasons, while men usually do so for patriotic or religious ones. Women choose to engage in high-risk activities as a form of retaliation or as a way to reclaim their dignity after being victims of war crimes such as rape. Men and women engage in high-risk conduct for various reasons, with women’s participation originating from personal and deeply held beliefs.

It is important to look at the problem from the set of “push” and “pull” factors which impact on women’s radicalization process. Three primary push factors – elements that drive women to radicalization – were discovered. The main factors ‘pushing’ women towards ISIS are thought to be a sense of social and cultural isolation in the local (Western) society, a sense of persecution for the Muslim society worldwide, and dissatisfaction with the apparent lack of international attention given to this problem.

According to reports, the desire to carry out their religious obligation, the need for a sense of sisterhood and belonging, and the romanticization of the experience of joining ISIS are the primary pull factors that lead women to move to ISIS territory. ISIS's online media strategy makes extensive and successful use of these push and pull variables in addition to the organization's gender conventions. The majority of the female recruits for ISIS's female-focused media campaign are Western women who use Facebook, WhatsApp, Tumblr, Twitter, and Kik.

Despite the fact that both men and women utilize internet recruitment, online spaces are kept apart, and channel owners ask not to receive any direct messages (DMs) from the opposite sex. Female internet accounts tend to focus more on domestic life under the caliphate, while profiles targeting men emphasize their responsibility to fight for the caliphate and display photographs from the battlefield. There are a lot of pink and purple hearts, landscapes, and flowers in the government propaganda targeted at women. They showcase images and narratives of what some have dubbed a "Muslim Disneyland," an idealized depiction of the ISIS utopia. Positive accounts from female ISIS refugees center on the close bonds between ISIS women's sisterhood and between spouses.

Women are offered financial incentives, such as a free house with complete appliances, in addition to the emotional and social advantages of living in the caliphate. ISIS gives women a sense of security, community, and belonging to a global cause – things that many Western women find themselves stuck between when it comes to morals. Furthermore, many stories aimed at women claim that Western civilization has failed women by sexualizing them and forcing the absurd notion of gender equality upon obedient women. ISIS is presented as providing a different kind of female empowerment based on compassion for motherhood and sisterhood.

Counter-Terrorism Measures

Stopping Terrorist Content from Proliferating Online

The initial approach for stopping radicalization on social media and the internet is to use digital technologies and methods to stop and outlaw the dissemination of propaganda and terrorist information online. This covers things like passing laws and implementing policies, preventing access to social media sites and certain content, and screening and eliminating terrorist-related content from platforms. These mechanisms work together because new technological tools that are developed for the purpose of prevention can only be modified and added to the legislation pertaining to digital prevention. It should be mentioned that utilizing platforms and technologies often owned by the private sector is necessary to stop the dissemination of terrorist content online, making collaboration and public-private partnerships essential to this specific approach. An instance of this kind of collaboration is Tech Against Terrorism, an endeavor created to counter terrorist narratives on the internet in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2354 (2017). The initiative strengthens the ability of smaller start-up businesses and gives the private technology sector internet resources to stop terrorist information from spreading across their platforms. The project collaborates with the UN Security Council authorities on a regular basis and involves a number of private-sector organizations, including Facebook.

Restricting Access and Content: Balancing Security and Right to Free Speech

Several governments have blocked access to a terrorist group's social media and internet accounts as one method of combating terrorism online. Various social media networks, as well as certain websites and pages, have been blocked. For instance, the government momentarily limited access to Facebook, Facebook Messenger, Instagram, WhatsApp, YouTube, and Viber during the Easter 2019 attacks in Sri Lanka that targeted churches, hotels, and other prominent tourist destinations. In 2017, Indonesia also banned the widely used social media platform Telegram because of increasing worries about the impact of ISIS in the area and its specific use of the program to propagate its messaging through private Telegram channels. The propagation of terrorist messages online is slowed down by blocking websites, social media pages, and entire social media platforms, but this also hinders regular communication routes for the general public. That is to say, while content blocking for a short period of time might be useful in emergency situations, such as the aftermath of the multi-pronged jihadist attacks in Sri Lanka, long-term content blocking will ultimately force both terrorist organizations and the general public to look for other ways to communicate. In this manner, for instance, if WhatsApp is blocked in a nation, it's possible that another app with comparable capabilities would take its place, allowing both the general public and terrorists to connect again. Furthermore, claims have been made that censoring social media information violates people's fundamental rights and that it has been used to stop political opposition parties' ideas from spreading. In this regard, governments may need to take into account striking a balance between upholding fundamental human rights under international law and blocking websites, all the while making sure that their actions do not infringe on such rights.

Removal and Filtering of Extremist Content

The removal of specific posts or websites by technology companies or other third parties is an another strategy to stop the spread of terrorist information online. This can be accomplished in a number of methods, including demands for content removal by government agencies, self-regulation by internet corporations, artificial intelligence tools like "upload filters," individual hackers, and content removal spearheaded by civil society.

Artificial Intelligence is another method that social media companies utilize to get rid of terrorist information from their sites. Image matching technologies, for instance, classify content that has already been deleted from terrorist websites and prevent the uploading of similar new photographs or films. The GIFCT has created a "Hash Database," which is a common record of the distinct digital fingerprints, or "hashes," of terrorist images and recruitment films. People are also able to take direct action against online terrorist propaganda. To give one example, a group of hackers associated with the "Anonymous Collective" also "declared war" on ISIS propaganda and online accounts with the hacking operation #OpISIS, which sought to expose, tamper with, and disable suspected ISIS profiles.

Conclusion

I am going to conclude by answering two research questions:

1. How does the online radicalization of ISIS impact human rights, and what are the implications for balancing effective counterterrorism strategies with the protection of fundamental rights?

2. What tactics do ISIS use in online platforms for recruitment and propaganda, and how can counterterrorism efforts address these tactics while upholding human rights and navigating challenges in content moderation and surveillance?

Starting with the first research question, ISIS's efforts to radicalize people online have presented serious obstacles to both international security and the defense of human rights. These initiatives involve recruiting members, inciting violence, and disseminating propaganda via social media, online forums, and other digital platforms. In an effort to strike a balance between the preservation of fundamental rights and effective security measures, this phenomenon has compelled countries and international organizations to reevaluate their counterterrorism efforts. Several fundamental human rights are impacted by online radicalization, including (1) Information and Expression Freedom: Although the internet is a potent instrument for promoting free speech, ISIS's use of digital channels to disseminate extremist information pushes the bounds of this liberty. (2) Right to Privacy: Surveillance and data collecting are common components of counterterrorism efforts, which raises the possibility of privacy violations. (3) Protection from Discrimination and Hate Speech: The propaganda of ISIS has the potential to incite hate speech and discrimination, which could compromise people's rights to equality and security.

Among the successful counterterrorism measures are (1) Content Moderation and Removal: The process involves locating and eliminating extreme information without compromising the right to free speech. (2) Surveillance and Data Collection: Putting into practice appropriate, required, and legal surveillance measures. (3) Collaboration with Tech Companies: Assisting tech firms in addressing online platform abuse while upholding user privacy.

Balancing effective counterterrorism with the protection of fundamental rights requires not only Legal Frameworks and International Human Rights Law to provide a human rights law foundation for counterterrorism policies and laws but also Ensuring Transparency and Accountability while preserving openness in counterterrorism efforts and bringing human rights offenders to justice.

To answer the second research question, it is very important to understand ISIS's internet recruitment and propaganda techniques to create successful counterterrorism plans. These tactics must protect the core human rights that terrorists aim to subvert and be successful in obstructing ISIS's online impact. ISIS's tools (1) Social Media and Encrypted Messaging: Propaganda, clandestine communication, and international recruitment.

(2) Digital Platforms for Radicalization and Recruitment: Potential recruits can be influenced and radicalized by using online periodicals, forums, and videos. (3) Psychological Strategies in Propaganda: Using stories of glory, victimization, and religious obligation to control audiences.

Among the initiatives taken to counter ISIS online are (1) Monitoring and Intelligence Gathering, which monitors online activity to stop intrusions and obstruct recruitment. (2) Cyber Operations, which target ISIS's digital network to reduce its online visibility. (3) Involvement with the Community, which Puts deradicalization initiatives into action and advocates for alternative narratives.

To encounter obstacles of Human Rights and Content Moderation, initiatives such as Balancing Security and Freedom of Speech is crucial. It identifies offensive speech without violating the right to free speech. Moreover, Ethical Considerations in Surveillance are important because ensuring privacy and lawfulness face the mentioned challenge. Furthermore, to prevent unfair surveillance or discrimination against communities as a result of counterterrorism measures, the Risk of Overreach is of paramount importance. To effectively counter ISIS's online reach and preserve the principles it intends to destroy, a balanced strategy that upholds human rights and promotes international cooperation is necessary.

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