Understanding the Impact of Pause and Resume on PCI DSS Compliance
Simon Turner
Experienced Governance, Risk, and Compliance Executive in the IT/Telecommunications industry
As per usual, this article is the result of a recent conversation at a networking event, and I wanted to put it down in writing to help provide some clarity based on my thoughts. Even though the initial topic had nothing to do with PCI DSS, it unavoidably made its way into the discussion, as it often does. Reflecting on that conversation, I’m sharing insights drawn from the PCI Security Standards Council’s Information Supplement, “Protecting Telephone-Based Payment Card Data.”
This article can be used in conjunction with my previous one about "Achieving PCI DSS Compliance in Contact Centers: Navigating VoIP, Cloud Services, and Telephony Security Solutions" which provides a view on compliance, business impact and Cloud Providers.
Note - While writing this article, I was considering the interchangeable use of terminologies such as "Call Centre" vs. "Contact Centre." I asked AI, as you do, and it provided the following information:
The difference between a call centre and a contact centre primarily lies in the communication channels they manage:
In essence, a contact centre provides a more versatile, multichannel customer support experience, while a call centre is dedicated specifically to phone-based interactions.
So, in my next article, I plan to discuss the use of Chat in "Contact Centres" and the acceptance of credit and debit card payments, as well as how this affects PCI Scope. keep an eye out for more details. Anyway, moving on...
Pause and Resume for PCI DSS Compliance in Call Centres
For call centres handling payment data, implementing PCI DSS-compliant processes is essential. Pause and Resume functionality is frequently used to prevent sensitive cardholder data from being captured in call recordings by stopping the recording when payment data is provided, then resuming afterward. While this can help reduce PCI scope by removing sensitive data from recordings, it’s important to recognise the broader implications for PCI DSS compliance. Specifically, Pause and Resume only addresses the PCI DSS requirement for the storage of cardholder data, but telephony systems, as a whole, remain in scope and must be secured accordingly.
1. Telephony Systems and PCI DSS Scope
In environments where cardholder data is processed over the phone, telephony systems fall within PCI DSS scope. Any part of the infrastructure involved in capturing, transmitting, or processing sensitive card data, including voice calls, must comply with PCI DSS requirements. This includes telephony systems used to manage VoIP or traditional calls carrying cardholder data, as these systems have the potential to expose sensitive information if not properly secured.
Even with Pause and Resume in place, telephony systems remain in scope because:
Thus, while Pause and Resume helps limit the storage of card data within call recordings, it does not exempt telephony systems from broader PCI DSS requirements related to securing cardholder data during live transmission.
2. How Pause and Resume Impacts PCI DSS Compliance Scope
Pause and Resume can help reduce PCI scope by addressing only one specific PCI DSS requirement:
However, Pause and Resume only removes the PCI DSS requirement for the storage of cardholder data. It does not remove other PCI requirements that apply to the telephony infrastructure handling live or transmitted data.
3. PCI DSS Requirements Still in Scope for Telephony Systems
With Pause and Resume in place, certain PCI DSS requirements remain relevant to the telephony systems and live handling of cardholder data:
Note: The above is not meant to be an exhaustive list of all PCI requirements; it's just an example of a few. Talk to your QSA with telephony knowledge for a full listing.
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4. Risks and Challenges with Relying Solely on Pause and Resume
While Pause and Resume effectively limits the storage of cardholder data, it introduces several challenges and does not fully address PCI compliance for live data handling:
5. Lets not forget Legacy Call Recordings
Many years ago, when I was an active QSA, I came across my organisation's legacy call recordings. It's possible that they were unaware of the existence of PCI DSS. It was always a surprise to them that these calls could be in scope of the PCI Standards.?
Legacy call recordings can present unique challenges for PCI DSS compliance, particularly if they contain sensitive cardholder data (CHD) that was recorded before the implementation of Pause and Resume. These recordings fall within PCI DSS scope if they contain CHD or sensitive authentication data (SAD) and must be safeguarded accordingly. However, managing and securing legacy recordings can be complex, especially if redaction or secure deletion is not feasible.
Scope Implications: Any stored call recordings that contain unredacted CHD/SAD automatically extend the PCI DSS scope. Such recordings must be treated as sensitive data assets and protected following all PCI DSS requirements for storage, access control, monitoring, and encryption. This can increase the burden of compliance, as legacy recordings may reside across various storage systems or lack modern security controls.
Redaction Challenges: If redacting CHD/SAD from legacy recordings is not technically viable, organisations are faced with the continued responsibility of managing these recordings within PCI DSS scope. This may require substantial operational changes to ensure compliance, including limiting access to authorised personnel, implementing encryption protocols, and conducting regular security reviews to verify that these controls are in place.
Compensating Controls: When redaction is not possible, compensating controls must be implemented to mitigate the risks associated with unredacted CHD/SAD in legacy recordings. Compensating controls for legacy call recordings might include:
Documenting the Compensating Control: Organisations must document and justify any compensating control in alignment with PCI DSS requirements, ensuring that it not only meets the original security control's intent but goes above and beyond. This documentation should include a risk assessment, a clear rationale for the control choice, and details on how it sufficiently mitigates the risks associated with storing CHD/SAD in unredacted recordings. Your QSA will validate this, and you may need to collaborate with your acquiring organisation to guarantee their comprehension of the risk involved. I know we could have a whole article on this, but this is not the time or place :).
In summary, legacy call recordings with unredacted CHD/SAD bring additional compliance and security challenges. Where redaction isn’t feasible, implementing and documenting compensating controls is essential to minimise risk and meet PCI DSS obligations for these data assets. I have known organisations to make the decision to delete legacy recordings even when they are regulated, as the cost of securing them far outweighs the cost of any associated fines.
Conclusion
I'm hoping to have put to rest one of the most common misconceptions that with pause and resume your PCI scope dissapears and that you are compliant. Although Pause and Resume can effectively eliminate the PCI DSS requirement for cardholder data storage, it only partially fulfills the PCI compliance requirements for call centres. Telephony systems remain within PCI scope because they still handle live cardholder data during transmission, necessitating encryption, access controls, and monitoring.
While this article focuses on technologies like Pause and Resume, it’s essential to remember that people and processes are always in PCI DSS scope too. Effective security relies not only on technology but also on trained personnel following robust procedures to protect cardholder data. Every agent handling sensitive information and every process guiding them plays a critical role in maintaining compliance. And while we’re exploring technology advancements, the human element remains crucial—at least until AI eventually steps in to handle it all for us!
Organisations using Pause and Resume should be aware of its limitations and might want to consider additional measures like DTMF masking, secure IVR, and tokenisation to ensure comprehensive PCI DSS compliance across all telephony systems. Combining these tools with robust access control and monitoring policies will help protect sensitive cardholder data throughout the entire call process, from live handling to transmission and storage.
ASK - I'd love to hear your thoughts on the matter and the conversations you've had about Pause and Resume. Also, whilst I haven't mentioned it, it's the big one I get asked regularly, and where the answer is, "it depends", which SAQ do we fit into? SAQ A, C, or D?
PCIDSS #Compliance #DataSecurity #CallCentres #CyberSecurity #AI #PaymentSecurity #FinTech #RiskManagement #CustomerExperience #DataProtection #CyberRisk #TechInnovation #SecurePayments
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in this LinkedIn article are solely my own and do not necessarily reflect the views, opinions, or policies of my current or any previous employer, organisation, or any other entity I may be associated with.
Business Information Security Officer (BISO) | Cyber Security & Risk Consultant | PCI DSS Compliance Specialist | Author | Speaker | MSc, CISM, CRISC, CDPSE | 20+ Years in Security Risk Management
1 周In 2002, I was introduced to two types of threats that could impact Contact Centres that use Pause/Resume: 1. Today, electro-magnetic emanations (aka TEMPEST) are referred to as a Side Channel Attack. Where the credit card details are manually entered by the Call Agent, a threat actor could intercept and compromise them. https://isurushivantha.blogspot.com/2018/08/side-channel-attacks.html 2. Hardware keyloggers. The threat actors plug the device between the IT system and the wired keyboard. https://www.vadesecure.com/en/cybersecurity-terms-and-definitions-vade?letter=K Although the likelihood of such attacks might be low, the impact could be significant.
Secure, compliant, frictionless payments with exceptional CX
3 周Really great article Simon. Very well put. Thank you. I've lost count of the number of times I get (mistakenly) told by a potential customer that their telephone payments are PCI DSS Compliant because they use pause and resume. Probably about the same number of times I'm told it's unreliable and doesn't work! I agree with John Greenwood, the depth and accuracy of your article is so helpful. I'll be tagging and referring others to it.
Helping organisations make better customer contact decisions.
3 周Thanks for sharing Simon. What I love about your articles is the depth and accuracy of your statements. Let me add a bit more colour and context. 1. That pause resume only takes the call recorder and call recording storage out of scope. Which means that the agent, desktop, everything that the agent is connected to, the building, ALL remains in scope. 2. Pause resume comes in two flavours, manual and automatic. Neither of which are reliable. Which means that entities should invoke processes that monitor the level of recorded account data within their call recording storage. Which means that the call recorder and call recording storage drift in and out of scope. 3. You mention that technology does not always effectively deal with legacy call recordings. Well, that's not quite the case. Back in 2012, I deployed the world's first legacy call recording solution. This was agreed between the team of engineers I employed to build it and Visa. It gave the organisation compliant access to 150m call recordings, and alongside the world's first hosted DTMF solution effectively enabled the entire 2,500 seat contact centre to attest using SAQA, rather than D or C. Keep up the good work Simon and look forward to your next article.