The UK's Tax Law General Anti-Abuse Rule: A Quick and Simple Guide
Alexander Shevchenko, PhD
A Chief Legal Officer (General Counsel) dedicated to building legal strategies and legal teams | Financial services, IT & crypto
Understanding UK tax regulations can be challenging, especially when dealing with complex frameworks like the General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR). Designed to combat abusive tax arrangements, the GAAR is a critical tool in maintaining the integrity of the UK tax system. The guide below offers a straightforward overview of the GAAR, its purpose, and how it applies, making it accessible for business leaders and legal professionals alike. Whether you are navigating tax compliance or simply broadening your expertise, this article simplifies the essentials you need to know about the GAAR.
1.?The UK GAAR Legislation and Other Sources
?? 1.1.?The GAAR legislation is provided for in:
The GAAR applies to arrangements entered into on or after 17.07.2013.
?? 1.2.?To better understand how the GAAR legislation works in practice, it is recommended to refer to the guidance and other publications prepared by the UK tax authority (HM Revenue and Customs, or HMRC), the opinions of the GAAR Advisory Panel, as well as relevant case law.
? Pursuant to section 211 of the FA 2013, in determining any issue connected with the GAAR, a court or tribunal:
2.?What Is the GAAR?
?? 2.1.?Broadly, “general anti-avoidance rule” is a concept which empowers the Revenue Authority in a country to deny tax benefit of transactions or other arrangements which do not have any commercial substance and the only purpose of such a transaction is achieving the tax benefit [1].
?In the UK, the expression “general anti-abuse rule” (GAAR) stands for the set of provisions that govern counteracting tax advantages arising from tax arrangements that are abusive, as set forth in part 5 of the FA 2013 (section 206 (2) of the FA 2013).
The GAAR is aimed at targeting tax avoidance broadly. By contrast, there exist specific or targeted anti-avoidance provisions that tackle particular tax avoidance schemes (for instance, transactions in securities or transfer of assets abroad legislation in the UK).
In essence, the GAAR provides a statutory mechanism for HMRC to counteract abusive tax avoidance arrangements – those, which, although within the letter of the law, are not what was intended by the Parliament [2].
The purpose of the GAAR is to discourage taxpayers from entering into abusive tax arrangements, and to deter the promotion and enabling of such arrangements [3] (including to counter contrived attempts to circumvent targeted anti-avoidance legislation [4]).
?? 2.2.?If there are tax arrangements that are abusive, the tax advantages that arise from them are to be counteracted by HMRC by making adjustments (section 209 (1) of the FA 2013).
? Adjustments as the method of counteraction:
?? Among other things, the GAAR is capable of counteracting abusive arrangements that result in UK tax advantages being obtained under double tax treaty provisions [5].
?? 2.3.?The GAAR does not provide for a clearance system of its own. Therefore, a taxpayer cannot approach HMRC for any GAAR related clearance for a transaction like e.g. within the transaction in securities framework.
?? A taxpayer who is uncertain whether an arrangement is within the scope of the GAAR may make a “white space disclosure” in the Self Assessment return indicating the uncertainty (paras. B16.5 and B17.1 of HMRC’s GAAR Guidance, Part B).
3.?Application of the GAAR
?? 3.1.?The GAAR is applied if the following 3 circumstances are present in conjunction:
?? If one them is absent, then the GAAR will not work (for example, where there is a tax arrangement, but it is not abusive).
?? 3.2.?The term “arrangements” includes any agreement, understanding, scheme, transaction or series of transactions (whether or not legally enforceable) (section 214 (1) of the FA 2013).
Arrangements are “tax arrangements” if, having regard to all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to conclude that the obtaining of a tax advantage was the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of the arrangements (section 207 (1) of the FA 2013).
?? So, if the arrangement satisfies the “main purpose” test, the arrangement is a tax arrangement.
As this test is objective, HMRC does not have to establish the taxpayer’s subjective purpose (paras. С3.3 and С3.4 of HMRC’s GAAR Guidance, Part C).
? The “main purpose” test is met inter alia (paras. С3.5 and С3.6 of HMRC’s GAAR Guidance, Part C):
?? A “tax advantage” includes (section 208 of the FA 2013):
???3.3.?The GAAR applies to the following taxes (section 206 (3) of the FA 2013):
???3.4.?Tax arrangements are “abusive” if they are arrangements the entering into or carrying out of which cannot reasonably be regarded as a reasonable course of action in relation to the relevant tax provisions, having regard to all the circumstances (section 207 (2) of the FA 2013).
??? This is often known as the “double reasonableness” test.
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?While the “main purpose” test sets a low threshold (because of broad definitions of “arrangements” and “tax arrangements”), the “double reasonableness” test narrows the scope of the GAAR (para. B10 of HMRC’s GAAR Guidance, Part B).
The “double reasonableness” test requires HMRC (or the court / tribunal) to consider whether there can be a reasonably held view that entering into or carrying out the tax arrangements in question is a reasonable course of action. This means that HMRC (or the court / tribunal) must consider what the range of reasonably held views is. If there is a reasonably held view (even if HMRC, or the court / tribunal does not agree with it) that entering into or carrying out the tax arrangements in question is a reasonable course of action, the test is not satisfied. If there is a conflict of views, the test is not satisfied (para. C5.10 of HMRC’s GAAR Guidance, Part C).
? The circumstances that will be taken into account while applying the “double reasonableness” test include [6]:
?4.?Examples of Arrangements That Are or Are Not Abusive
?? 4.1.?The GAAR sets out 3 examples of circumstances that might indicate that tax arrangements are abusive (section 207 (4) of the FA 2013):
?? 4.2.?The GAAR provides an indicator of non-abusive tax arrangements: that tax arrangements accord with established practice and HMRC had, at the time the arrangements were entered into, indicated its acceptance of that practice (section 207 (5) of the FA 2013).
?? 4.3.?Part D of HMRC’s GAAR Guidance specifies examples of arrangements that are or are not abusive. These examples are categorised as follows:
5.?The Counteraction Procedure
?? 5.1.?The procedure of counteraction of abusive tax arrangements is mainly stipulated in Schedule 43 to the FA 2013.
??It consists of the following key steps:
??? Since 2018, HMRC has issued over 5,500 GAAR notices (applying GAAR Advisory Panel opinions) to taxpayers who have used abusive tax arrangements [3].
??? 5.2.?HMRC is entitled to:
6.?The GAAR Advisory Panel
The GAAR Advisory Panel is the panel of persons established by HMRC for the purposes of the GAAR (para. 1 (1) of Schedule 43 to the FA 2013) – to provide a safeguard for taxpayers by giving an impartial opinion [6].
?This is an independent body made up of 8 experts with legal, accountancy and commercial backgrounds [3]. HMRC is not represented on the GAAR Advisory Panel [6].?
It sits in a sub-panel of 3 members (para. 10 (1) of Schedule 43 to the FA 2013).
??The GAAR Advisory Panel has 2 functions [7]:
?7.?Penalties
HMRC can charge penalties for arrangements entered into on or after 15.09.2016 (section 212A of the FA 2013).
?? The penalty is 60?% of the value of the counteracted advantage. This amount is fixed and does not change to reflect the taxpayer’s culpability. But HMRC has discretion to mitigate a penalty (exercised in exceptional cases only).
List of Cited References:
[3]?https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/66a8ebc349b9c0597fdb0784/HMRC_annual_report_and_accounts_2023_to_2024.pdf (p. 117).
[5]?https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5f5a2633d3bf7f723b6c34bd/gaar-part-d-2020.pdf (pp. 35 – 37).