UKRAINE, status update, 2024-08-10; 23:30

(ENGLISH VERSION – scroll below later)

Nukirsti arterijas

Po netik?to ?oko ruskiai pagaliau prad?jo atsigauti, bando adekva?iai reaguoti. Pirmosios reakcijos bylojo apie akivaizd? pasimetim?. Dabar jau matome, kad ruskiai pama?u prad?jo koordinuoti ir valdyti savo veiksmus. ?iuo metu pastebime nors ir kar?tligi?k?, bet vis d?lto valdom? reakcij? ? ?vykius Kursko kryptyje.

?iuo metu jau ?inome, kad ukrainie?iai kovai ?ioje kryptyje met? pakankamai rimtus paj?gumus, kalba eina ma?iausiai apie divizijos dyd?io paj?gas. O kur dar ne ma?iau kaip tokio pat dyd?io sutelktas paj?gumas prie sienos, Ukrainos pus?je.

Tikrojo paj?gum? dyd?io nustatyti negalime, nes ukrainie?iai bene pirm? kart? ?io karo eigoje itin skrupulingai laikosi OPSEC, tad informacijos nutek?jimo prakti?kai nefiksuojame. Prie?inga situacija ruski? stovykloje, kur tiek gyventojai, tiek ir civiliai noriai dalijasi kovos technikos jud?jimo vaizdais ir ?ra?ais.

Ne ma?iau svarbu ir tai, kad ukrainie?iai operacijos rajone efektyviai blokuoja GPS ry?io signalus. Pana?u, kad ruskiams gali tekti i?sitraukti pasenusius popierinius ?em?lapius.

Jau dabar galime dr?siai teigti, kad ukrainie?i? puolimas pavyko. Puikai i?naudotas netik?tumo faktorius. Pavyko visi?kai primesti ?aidimo taisykles ruski? propagandai, kuriai tai buvo smūgis ?emiau juostos. Juk net baisiausiame sapne jie ne?sivaizdavo, kad ukrainie?iai be skrupul? ?siver?t? ? putinstan?. O paruo?tuk? propaganda neturi, tada matome pasimetim? ir bandym? chaoti?kai reaguoti.

Putlerio fizionomijos ir reakcijos, jau dukart skubiai su?auktuose saugumo komiteto pos?d?iuose tik ?rodo, kad ?i ukrainie?i? primesta ?dienotvark?“ yra skaudi - ne?inoma kaip reaguoti, koki? sprendim? reikia, norint i?spr?sti situacij?.

Pirmasis RDK reidas ? ruskyn? buvo skirtas atlikti ?valgybos veiksmus, patikrinti ruski? vald?ios reakcij?. Kadangi jos prakti?kai nebuvo, tapo akivaizdu, kad raudonos linijos egzistuoja tik pas ruskius galvose, o realiai j? n?ra.

Tad dabartin? Kursko operacija tik ?rodo, kad ruskiai prakti?kai negali panaudoti branduolinio ginklo. O gal jis jau tokios būkl?s, kaip ir visa ruski? kariuomen? – supuvusi nuo vir?ūn?li? iki pat apa?ios. Ar ruskiai i? ties? turi VEIKIANT? branduolin? ginkl?? Tok? klausim?, manome, u?siduota daugelis pasaulio kariuomeni? vad?.

Jau ?inome, kad be to, jog ukrainie?iai u?si?m? daugiau nei 500 kv. kilometr? plot?, diversin?s ukrainie?i? grup?s veikia gerokai toliau nei pagrindin?s paj?gos. Galime daryti prielaid?, kad ukrainie?iai neplanuoja beatodairi?kai ver?tis smarkiai gilyn ? ruskyn?.

Ka?kiek galbūt taip, bet i? esm?s tai labiau lokalus veiksmas nei didelio gylio operacija. Galime kalb?ti apie veiksmus iki 50-80 km gylio, bet ne 300-500 km. Be jokios abejon?s bus ple?iamas fronto ilgis, kuris leis ukrainie?iams manevruoti ruskyno teritorijoje, o ne Ukrainos.

Nukirtus pagrindines susisiekimo arterijas, kelius Kurskas- Belgorodas ir Kurskas Rylskas, rus? situacija, ir taip esanti bloga, dar smarkiau pablog?t?. Tai vienas taktini?, ta?iau labai svarbi? tiksl?.

Dar vienas, taktinis tikslas – u?kardyti nebaud?iam? ruski? jud?jim?, paj?g? pritraukim?. Bus atakuojama viskas, kas juda.

Matome ?enkl?, kad ukrainie?iai ne tik siekia pama?u, saugant savo karius ir technik? jud?ti pirmyn, ta?iau tuo pat metu stebime ?enklus, kad ukrainie?iai apsikasa ir ruo?iasi gynybai kai kuriuose ruo?uose.

Beatodairi?kas l?kimas gali kainuoti labai brangiai, tad labai svarbu nepamesti galv? ir priimti logi?kus sprendimus. Matome subalansuotus ukrainie?i? sprendimus.

Dabar dar tvir?iau galime teigti, kad viena pagrindini? u?duo?i? ukrainie?iams – priversti ruskius panaudoti strategin? ir operacin? rezervus. Ta?iau, kaip matome ?iuo metu, pana?u, ruskiai neturi strateginio rezervo, o operacinis rezervas pakankamai skurdus. Fiksuojami padalini? permetimai i? vis? fronto kryp?i?. Netgi i? pa?ios kar??iausios – Pokrovsko krypties, kur ir toliau fiksuojamas ruski? progresas.

Viena sud?tini? ukrainie?i? Kursko operacijos dali? – maksimalus ruski? reagavimo paj?g? naikinimas, taip provokuojant skirti vis daugiau paj?g?.

Jau seniau min?jome, kad ukrainie?iams netrūksta kari?, kad turi daug nepanaudotos kovos technikos, mat tam tikr? nomenklatūr? beveik nemat?me kovos veiksmuose, nors gautos kovos technikos pakankamai nema?ai.

Konstatuojame, kad ?mogi?k?j? i?tekli? srityje ukrainie?iai turi kur kas didesn? paj?gum?. Kovos technikos ir ginkluot?s santykis vis dar yra gerokai ruski? pus?je, ta?iau vakarieti?kos technikos ir ginkluot?s efektyvumas yra smarkiai didesnis.

Reaguojant ? ukrainie?i? veiksmus putleris papra?? bulbofiurerio Luka?enkos pagalbos. Pastarasis pasiunt? prie sienos balistini? raket? ir kitus padalinius. Tikslas labai ai?kus – pabandyti priversti ukrainie?ius skirti dal? paj?gum? Baltarusijos kryp?iai, taip susilpninant visa kita. Sp?tume, kad ukrainie?iai reaguos labai vangiai ir susitvarkys su vietin?mis paj?gomis, o nesieks permesti paj?g? i? kit? kryp?i?.

Bulbofiureris viso karo metu sugeb?jo ?vartytis“ ir neprisid?ti prie putlerio kariaunos. Taip, leido naudotis teritorija, dav? i?ve?imui ?audmen?, ta?iau Baltarusijos kariuomen? ne?sitrauk? ? tiesioginius karo veiksmus. Bulbofirueris supranta, kad taip pasira?yt? sau nuosprend?, tad nesitikime ?sitraukimo ? tiesioginius karo veiksmus ir ?? kart?.

Jeigu mūs? sp?jimai teisingi, ukrainie?iai nesibod?s ir ateityje pana?i? operacij? bus daugiau. Karo veiksm? perk?limas ? ruskyn? ir toliau veiks karo veiksmus rytuose ir pietuose.

Paslap?ia viliam?s, kad ukrainie?iai jau yra suplanav? galing? operacij?, kurios d?ka situacija ryt? ar piet? fronte kardinaliai pasikeist?. Tai būt? labai logi?ka veiksm? t?sa to, kas vyksta dabar.

Ukrainie?i? kovin? galia auga, prie to ypa? prisideda prie?l?ktuvin?s gynybos paj?gum? vystymas ir naikintuv? galimyb?s. Visi?kai realu, kad ka?kuris i? ?i? element? s?kmingai naudojamas ir Kursko operacijos metu. Fiksuojami jau nebe pavieniai sraigtasparni? ir l?ktuv? numu?imai.

Pabaigai apie trof?jus. Skai?iuojama, kad ukrainie?iai ? nelaisv? jau pa?m? daugiau nei 1.000 belaisvi?, perimtos kovos technikos ir amunicijos atsargos. Tai n?ra ypatingai dideli kiekiai, vis d?lto tai reik?mingas pasiekimas.

Lauk?me, lauk?me ir pagaliau sulauk?me gerokai aktyvesn?s karo faz?s. Kai dūmas i?nyko skeptik? teiginiai apie tai, kad Ukraina neturi paj?gum?, trūksta kari?, Syrskis blogas vadas, reikia galvoti apie nuolaidas ruskiams.

Priminsime, kad karus laimi strateginio lygio sprendimai ir geras j? ?gyvendinimas. Daugelis matom? element? yra tik dūm? u?danga, u? kurios verda nematomas gyvenimas.

Tad mes ir toliau stengsim?s maksimaliai objektyviai papasakoti apie tai, ko nemato daugelis, nesiveldami ? taktines detales. Netgi tada, kai dauguma sakys, jog mes neteisūs ar per daug optimisti?ki, liksime i?tikimi savo analitikai, i?vadoms, vertinimams, prielaidoms ir nuomonei, nesiveldami ? beprasmi?kas diskusijas. Ir toliau steb?sime, vertinsime ir dalinsim?s savo ??valgomis su jumis, mūs? skaitytojai.

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Iki pergal?s. Slava Ukraini! P.S. ir toliau renkame param? 3D printeriams ir plastikui. Eil?je laukia jau trij? printeri? ?sigijimas ir apie palet? plastiko. Galite prisid?ti, prisid?kite! V?? Miliūt?, LT437044090110465590

Paskirtis: plastikas

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ENGLISH VERSION

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?Cut off arteries

After the sudden shock, the Russians have finally started to recover and are trying to react adequately. The first reactions showed a clear confusion. Now we can see that the Russians have gradually begun to coordinate and control their actions. We are seeing a feverish but nonetheless controlled reaction to the events in the direction of Kursk.

We now know that the Ukrainians are throwing quite serious forces into the fight in this direction, at least a division-sized force. And then there is the mobilisation of at least the same size on the Ukrainian side of the border.

We cannot determine the actual size of the force because, for perhaps the first time in this war, the Ukrainians have been scrupulous about OPSEC, so we have virtually no leaks of information. The situation is the opposite in the Russian camp, where both residents and civilians willingly share images and recordings of the movement of combat vehicles.

Last but not least, the Ukrainians are effectively blocking GPS signals in the area of operation. It seems that the Russians may have to pull out their outdated paper maps.

We can already safely say that the Ukrainian offensive has succeeded. The surprise factor has been well exploited. It succeeded in completely imposing the rules of the game on Russian propaganda, which was hit below the belt. After all, not even in their wildest dreams could they have imagined that the Ukrainians would invade Russia. If the propaganda does not have any preparations, then we see confusion and an attempt at chaotic reactions.

Putin‘s physiognomies and reactions, at the twice-urgently convened meetings of the security committee, only prove that this 'agenda' imposed by the Ukrainians is painful - it is not known how to react, what solutions are needed to resolve the situation.

The first raid into Russia months ago was intended to carry out intelligence activities, to check the reaction of the Russian authorities. Since the reaction was practically non-existent, it became obvious that the red lines exist only in the minds of the Russians but not in practice.

So the current Kursk operation only proves that the Russians are practically incapable of using nuclear weapons. Or perhaps it is already in the same condition as the entire Russian army - rotten from top to bottom. Do the Russians really have a WORKING nuclear weapon? That is the question, we believe, that many of the world's military commanders have asked themselves.

We already know that, in addition to the fact that the Ukrainians have occupied an area of more than 500 square kilometres, the Ukrainian subversive groups are operating far beyond the main force. We can assume that the Ukrainians are not planning to push recklessly far into the Russians.

To some extent, perhaps, but in essence it is more of a localised action than a large-scale operation. We can talk about operations up to a depth of 50-80 km, but not 300-500 km. There will undoubtedly be a widening of the length of the front, which will allow the Ukrainians to manoeuvre on Russian territory rather than on Ukrainian territory.

?Cutting off the main transport arteries, the Kursk-Belgorod and Kursk-Rylsk roads, would make the Russian situation, already bad, even worse. This is one of the tactical but very important objectives.

Another tactical objective is to prevent the Russians from moving with impunity. Everything that moves will be attacked.

We are seeing signs that the Ukrainians are not only trying to move forward slowly, while protecting their troops and equipment, but at the same time we are seeing signs that the Ukrainians are digging in and preparing to defend themselves in some areas.

Reckless rushing can be very costly, so it is very important to make logical decisions. So far we are seeing balanced decisions by the Ukrainians.

We can now say even more firmly that one of the main tasks for the Ukrainians is to force the Russians to use their strategic and operational reserves. However, the Russians do not seem to have a strategic reserve, and the operational reserve is quite poor. Units are being redeployed from all directions of the front. Even from the hottest direction, Pokrovsk, where the Russians continue to make progress.

One of the components of the Ukrainian Kursk operation is the maximum destruction of the Russian reaction forces, thus provoking the deployment of more and more troops.

We have already mentioned earlier that the Ukrainians are not short of troops, that they have a large amount of unused combat equipment, because we have hardly seen certain ones in action, although the amount of combat equipment they have received is quite considerable.

We note that in the area of human resources the Ukrainians have a much greater capacity. The ratio of combat equipment to armaments is still well on the Russian side, but the effectiveness of Western equipment and armaments is considerably higher.

In response to the Ukrainians, Putler has asked for help from the bulbofuehrer Lukashenko. The latter sent ballistic missiles and other units to the border. The aim is very clear: to try to force the Ukrainians to devote part of their capabilities to the Belarusian direction, thereby weakening everything else. Our guess is that the Ukrainians will react very slowly and deal with the local forces rather than trying to redeploy forces from other directions.

Bulbofuer managed to ?muddle through“ throughout the war without joining Putin‘s army. Yes, he allowed the use of territory, he gave ammunition for export, but the Belarusian army did not engage in direct hostilities. Bulbofiruer understands that this would be signing his own sentence, so we do not expect direct hostilities this time either.

If our predictions are correct, the Ukrainians will not be deterred and there will be more such operations in the future. The transfer of hostilities to Russia will continue to affect hostilities in the east and south.

We secretly hope that the Ukrainians have already planned a powerful operation that would radically change the situation on the eastern or southern front. This would be a very logical follow-up to what is happening now.

Ukraine‘s combat power is growing, in particular through the development of air defence capabilities and fighter aircraft. It is quite realistic that some of these elements will be used successfully in the Kursk operation. No longer are there isolated helicopter and aircraft shoot-downs.

Finally, the trophies. It is estimated that the Ukrainians have already captured more than 1,000 prisoners, and that stocks of combat equipment and ammunition have been taken over. This is not a particularly large amount, but it is nevertheless a significant achievement.

We have waited, waited and finally arrived at a much more active phase of the war. When the sceptics‘ claims about Ukraine‘s lack of capacity, its lack of troops, Syrsky‘s bad leadership and the need to think about making concessions to the Russians went up in smoke.

We will remind you that wars are won by strategic decisions and good implementation. Many of the visible elements are just a smoke screen behind which an invisible life is brewing.

?So we will continue to try to be as objective as possible about what many people do not see, without going into tactical details. Even when the majority says we are wrong or too optimistic, we will remain true to our analysis, conclusions, assessments, assumptions and opinions, without engaging in pointless debates. We will continue to monitor, assess and share our insights with you, our readers.

Goodbye to victory. Slava Ukraini!

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