Ukraine And The Slide To War

Europe’s Newest Frozen?Conflict

The eyes of world leaders are once again on Ukraine, where we hear that the seven year old conflict in the country’s east could fast inflame into an international war which would be the largest in Europe since WW2.

The country has been the site of a proxy conflict since 2014, when a popular uprising overthrew the government of Viktor Yanukovych in 2014.

The Euromaidan revolution, as it came to be known, toppled a leader who was malleable to the interests of Moscow and had been hesitant to align Ukrainian policy with the West’s institutions, such as the EU and NATO.

The new regime, a loose alliance of liberals, pro-Europeans and Ukrainian nationalists, made it clear that they intended to operate in a manner more independent from Moscow’s influence.?

Among the Russian elite, this was perceived as an existential threat to their nation and they swiftly moved in to destabilise the new Ukrainian state and stall its integration into the West.

The country is split in half by the Dnieper River, and its eastern portion has large minorities of ethnic Russians and Russian language speakers. These areas witnessed local protests against the new state motivated by fear of repression or the extinction of their identity in the new Ukraine.

These were mostly spontaneous and genuine but Russian intelligence did play an active role in cultivating these resistance groups. The central government acted to repress these groups and eventual violence broke out, with multiple militias forming to fight the Ukrainian armed forces.

These groups, collectively labelled “separatists” by the Western media because many of them want to secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation, are most established in the Donbas region, a post–industrial strip of land containing two self declared rebel statelets situated on the border with Russia.

These two statelets, called the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics, are covertly supplied with Russian weaponry and volunteers and have managed to hold back the armies of the central Ukrainian state.

Within the security vacuum created when the government fell, Russia enacted a daring annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. With subterfuge and a public vote to give it the air of legitimacy, Moscow was able to seize Crimea, preventing the loss of a vital warm water port and major base of Russian naval operations.

Now, Ukraine finds itself at the periphery of two major power centres, one of them is the liberal and institution-based empire of the American order.?

And the other is the neighbouring Russian Federation, whose elites view Ukraine in a similar way that Chinese leaders view Taiwan, as a breakaway province and accident of history which is being used by the American empire as a staging point to undermine their state and territorial integrity.

The United States has the military power, the economic strength and the allies but it does not view Ukraine as being a core national interest, and, indeed, considers it a distraction from more pressing concerns in the Asia-Pacific. This was acknowledged by President Obama in the early days of the conflict, and explains the reason the United States has been reluctant to expend diplomatic capital and resources in Ukraine.

This is the opposite for policy makers in the Kremlin, who view the fate of Ukraine as being an issue fundamental to the very project of modern Russia.?

Borderland Between?Empires

The reason that Ukraine holds such a key role in the Russian strategic worldview stems from Russian history and geography.?

Russia’s experience of the outside world has oscilated between expansion and retreat and this stems from one geographic fact; namely that between the Russian heartlands and the wealthy Western European there is a vast tract of indefensible terrain called the North European Plain.

It total, it extends from the Pyrenees in southern France to the Ural mountains in Siberia. It encompasses the powerful states in the West and centre of Europe and may be the longest continuous flatland on Earth.?

This region is the peripheral highway by which armies of numerous core European powers have marched to strike into Russia’s core.?

With no defensible terrain separating them from potential enemies, Russian leaders have sought to push their territory outwards as far from their core in the European northeast to create a buffer between them and any potential invaders.

This strategy has worked. All major attempts to invade Russia have failed because the attackers have been weakened by the constant slog of fighting through seemingly endless territory. With their supply - lines overstretched and their armies gradually diminished, they are ultimately finished by the onset of the brutal Russian winter.

This strategy is intergenerational and apolitical, running deep within the blood memory of Russia’s elite, whether it is the imperial aristocracy which established the wide frontiers of the Russian Empire, or their descendants in the Communist Politburo who crafted a ring of puppet states from their conquests in WW2.

When the Soviet Union collapsed and NATO expanded, Moscow lost this buffer zone to protect her core territories.?

In Russia’s northern European flank, her second city, St Petersburg, is within striking distance of NATO tanks. To the south, Turkey, a NATO member with a powerful army, controls the Bosporus Straits and could, in theory, blockade Russia’s access to the Mediterranea nSea in the opening stages of a conflict.

This is why Ukraine is so important in the strategic considerations of the Kremlin. Ukraine as part of NATO would put Russia in an indefensible position in the event of conflict between Moscow and the West, where the Russian military would be forced to defend a long border of flatland.?

This geographic truth is even marked in the etymology of the country’s name. Ukraine comes from the Old East Slavic word ukraina, meaning borderland.

At present, Russian military assets would be able to see off any threat of invasion from the Baltics and would likely be able to conquer them in the opening stages of any potential conflict. This becomes considerably less feasible should they also be required to defend or attack across the long plains of the Ukrainian — Russian border.

Distrust and?Paranoia

Ofcourse, to the West, the Kremlin’s analysis appears as nothing more than paranoia.?

For one, Ukraine is not in NATO and European nations have been reluctant to allow it in, fearing such a step will unnecessarily anger Moscow. During the Ukrainian civil war, most Western countries have been hesitant even to provide lethal aid to the country.

Aswell, even if Ukraine was a NATO member, the idea of the alliance invading Russia is absurd. NATO’s Article 5 is a purely defensive measure which can only be activated when a member—state is on the receiving end of an attack, not if they strike another state.

Yet, Moscow cannot take that chance. Most recently developed countries, such as Russia, or China, understand that entrusting the good will of foreign nations with your own national security is a foolish decision and will be perceived as weakness, and geopolitics is a brutal arena where weakness will be exploited.?

The last time Russia was weak, she lost a third of her territory, and suffered a brutal economic collapse from which she is still recovering. The years following saw continuous defeat and could almost be called Russia’s equivalent of the Chinese “century of humiliation.”

Those years also taught Russian policy - makers that they have no reason to trust the West. After the fall of the USSR, Russian diplomats apparently pressed their Western counterparts that NATO not expand past Germany, and were given assurances of this.?

The Kremlin still maintains this to be the truth, though Western diplomats have always denied it. Several years later, NATO engaged in an air campaign against Serbia, a Russia ally, during the Yugoslav Wars. Moscow vehemently objected to this but was too weak to do anything to prevent it.?

Throughout the early 2000s, the US unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and invaded numerous nations in the War On Terror.

Russia saw this as nothing more than the United States attempting to establish itself as the globe’s unquestioned imperial power, and such a world order would be utterly hostile to the interests of the Russian state.

It was 2008 when the first major pushback came.?

The post — Soviet state of Georgia, bordering Russia’s southern republics, had been moving considerably closer towards NATO since its independence. Poor relations with her northern neighbour had already been poor.?

Georgia borders the Russian republic of Chechnya, in which Moscow was engaged in a brutal operation to repress local Islamist separatists. Moscow always suspected that the Georgian government was ignoring, or even encouraging the arming of these groups to destabilise Russia.?

For a long time, Russia had sought to use spies and soft power to prevent the slide towards the West. However, when that was shown to fail, Moscow used its military might.?

The casus belli came when Georgia attacked the breakaway statelet of South Ossetia whom Moscow had been sponsoring.

Russia seized upon the opportunity and the resulting Russo — Georgian War lasted less than two weeks but it may be the most significant episode from which Putin and the Russian military have drawn lessons in how to respond to the West.?

Map of Georgia prior to Russian invasion. Russia’s separatist proxies are shown in green. Image from Goran tek-en, via Wikimedia Commons.

Georgia is a country friendly to the United States, but it lacks any discernable strategic value besides a pipeline transporting oil to Europe (this is significantly less important now in the face of the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline and the US shale revolution).?

When Russian armour and airpower moved in, they made short work of the beleaguered Georgian Armed Forces. More importantly, the West took no real action. Every Western government “condemned” the Russians but nothing else. It was a complete military and geostrategic victory for Moscow.?

This taught Putin that the West would not defend distant nations with no official status within NATO, and that Russian forces could make short blitzkrieg attacks to quickly reset the political balance in Moscow’s favour.?

The Shrinking Window Of Opportunity

Georgia acted as a testing ground for Western resolve and Russian military capability, and Putin learned that one was weak and the other could be deployed effectively to alter the situation without being dragged into a long grinding war.?

The parallels to the current situation are eerie.?

Prior to the invasion, Georgia was a testing ground for Moscow’s techniques of so — called “hybrid warfare.” This ambiguous term was coined by Western analysts to describe a form of conflict designed to subvert an opponent with methods just below outright warfare.?

This includes the use of proxies to create small statelets out of the enemy’s territory. In Georgia, there was Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and in Ukraine, the far eastern Donbas region.?

The Georgian war was preceded by mass cyber attacks against the country’s vital infrastructure. Ukrainian authorities have registered a major uptick in the number of cyber attacks against their own country.?

And just like in Georgia, Putin may be sensing a shrinking window of opportunity to strike.?

Conflicts ensue when state leaders believe that the price of inaction is heavier than the price of a quick and effective military operation. Putin and his military advisors will be calculating the possibility that their military forces will be able to enact a swift victory which will draw Ukrainian elites to the negotiating table.?

Surveying the geopolitical environment, this may be the best time to maximise the possibility of success.?

For one, Ukraine’s military capacity has improved considerably since 2014. When hostilities originally started, the Ukrainian army was neglected and underfunded. Since then, its soldiers have been battle — hardened by years of fighting with the separatists and its high command has opted to adopt NATO standards and has been supplied with advanced weaponry and technology.?

While it still pales compared to Russia, Ukraine is certainly capable of putting up more of a fight than previously.?

And this improvement is likely to continue. If the military balance shifts too heavily in Kyiv’s favour, Putin may lose any chance of a swift victory and his opportunity could be gone forever.

Reflective of this is that the Russian proxies in the Donbas are losing on the ground. Over the past few years, the situation has been frozen in stalemate, with Ukrainian forces and the separatists engaging in a cycle of occasional ceasefires and violent flare ups.?

Such a situation suits Russia, yet there are signs that the scales are beginning to tip in favour of the Ukrainian central government.?

The new Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, has signalled his desire to end the insurgency with total victory, and the unconditional surrender of the separatists. This would mean that the Minsk 2 agreement, which would have given Moscow leverage over Ukraine, is unlikely to be honoured.

If this was to happen, Russia would be confronted with a confident and militarily powerful Ukraine and would lose all ability to influence Ukrainian domestic politics.?

On a global level, Putin may also see favourable circumstances. Moscow knows that the US is concentrated on the Asia — Pacific. Washington is far more concerned with China and will invest more military and diplomatic capital in the defence of Taiwan than Ukraine.?

This is because Taiwan is far more important in Washington’s strategy than Ukraine, being central within the Pacific’s First Island Chain, and therefore, representing the gateway to the Pacific Ocean.?

The US will be unwilling to divide its attention, and more importantly its military forces, between Ukraine and Taiwan.

In Europe, both France and Germany have been attempting reproachment with Moscow. Berlin is completely dependent upon Russian gas, and has shown a willingness to disregard the strategic concerns of the eastern European states to attain it (see, Germany’s support for the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline).

Russia appears to be betting that Europe’s energy crisis will only intensify and that the European states will be willing to sacrifice Ukraines sovereignty for Russian energy.?

Putin has also made solidifying logistic links with China’s industrial capacity a prime objective, meaning that if Germany was to cancel the pipeline, it would be a blow to the Russian economy but also bearable as China’s appetite for Russian energy is unlikely to diminish.?

In Europe, the only powers who would seriously resist Russia is the Eastern European bloc and the United Kingdom, neither of which have the capacity to intervene or seriously damage the Russian economy. Poland is already doubling the size of her military and British–Russian relations have been poor for years.

Putin likely believes that relations with these nations are so low that it makes no material difference whether they sink even further.?

Finally, there is resistance to sanctions. After the Crimean annexation, a heavy sanctions regime was afflicted upon Russia which destabilised the country but, ultimately, did not impact the hold of the United Russia Party over the country.?

These sanctions forced the Kremlin to attempt to insulate the Russian economy from further harm and the current Russian economy now appears considerably more robust in the face of international pressure.?

Russia has de-dollarised itself, choosing itself to hold large reserves of gold bullion and euros. This is likely to mitigate much of the damage that sanctions would do to Russia.?

Exclusion from the SWIFT payment system has been floated, but it is debatable how realistic, or effective, this actually is.?

Ultimately, Putin has shown that he is willing to sacrifice Russian economic interests for what he sees as Russia’s core geo-strategic concerns. Economic growth can always be recovered, he may reason, but once Ukraine is gone, it isn’t coming back.?

The Prelude

“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting,” Sun?Tzu.

Having said this, Putin would prefer to achieve his objectives without war. He is currently concealing his intentions so as to allow him a greater degree of future maneuverability.

The recently released list of demands made by Russian diplomats could entail a pre-war effort to control the narrative and present Russia as the defending party.

But they could also be an attempt to anchor Western expectations so Moscow can then push for more moderate concessions which appear more reasonable.?

The list of demands included the withdrawal of NATO forces from Eastern Europe and assurances that Ukraine would never join the alliance. These demands were completely beyond the pale for NATO and Moscow knows this.?

Putin has won a small propaganda victory as Western capitals have come to the negotiating table in recent days yet none of this has manifested in material concessions just yet.?

In the meantime, Ukraine will continue to be softened up.?

The country is already a target of intense information warfare.?

There are large swathes of the country who now hate Russia and will never be won over but the information drive isn’t aimed at them. Instead, it will be aimed at the silent majority of Ukrainians.

Russian information warfare comes via a number of channels and is intended to demoralise the population. Ultimately, it will be aimed at intensifying local anger at politicians and corrupt state institutions and demoralising the Ukrainian public so much that they have little desire to resist foreign meddling.

The response of the Western state and their unwillingness to intervene on Ukraine’s behalf will likely feature heavily in this information campaign. Effective information warfare contains large elements of the truth and seeks to target social rifts and fissures present within the target population.

And Ukraine has more than enough. The country is massively corrupt and its leaders are unpopular throughout the population. The Russian information war will target these facts. They will present the Ukrainian leadership as willing to sacrifice young men in a hopeless conflict simply for their own greedy purposes.

Likely, the information warfare will make a lot out of the fact that Russian military power is vastly superior to Ukraine’s and any attempt to resist it is pointless.

Ultimately, if this campaign is effective and Ukraine is softened up, Russia may find itself pushing against an open door, and may be able to achieve a relatively swift victory and force Ukraine to the negotiating table. Key demands would be the federalisation of the Ukrainian state, and assurances that Western troops will never touch Ukrainian soil again and the country would never join NATO.

Such an achievement would completely alter the entire security structure of Eastern Europe. It would mark Putin as one of Russia’s greatest leaders and potentially signal to China that the sun has finally set on the unipolar order of American leadership.

But if Russia fails to fulfil her strategic objectives and the current antagonism only pushes Ukraine further from Russia’s orbit, then Putin could see the reputation and legacy he has spent the last two decades creating turn to ash almost instantly.

The Russian leader has a history of high stakes gambling, but he is also a calculating and rational actor. He will be enjoying the current uncertainty being caused by his actions but he also knows that it cannot last forever, and eventually he will need to take action or risk appearing weak to his opponents.

And eventually he will make a decision, and when it comes to will mark a new stage in the global order.?