UKRAINE - LONG TERM IMPLICATIONS
European Principal Group
Singular expertise in geopolitics, strategic communications and government affairs across the wider Europe area.
On 28th February, four days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we published “10 Long Term Implications”. Six months on we revisit and comment on our initial list and add a recommended reading list of articles from the last month. For further analysis or research on these or other topics please get in touch.
?UKRAINE – TEN LONG TERM IMPLICATIONS - SIX MONTH REVIEW
?1.???“There is no short-term fix. Even if Russia wins militarily or coerces the Ukrainian government to come to an agreement, the use of force has changed the European security landscape for as long as Russia remains stuck in an aggressive anti-Western mindset.”
?At the start of the conflict, many Western analysts predicted a rapid Russian military victory or proposed a quick negotiated settlement. Now, the Russian withdrawal from northern Ukraine, its shift of military focus to the Donbas and Southern Ukraine, and Ukrainian partisan operations in occupied territories all point to a longer war of attrition and insurgency. Russia’s rhetoric remains vehemently anti-Western. The last six weeks have seen a strategic shift that probably points towards stalemate. The Russians have barely made any progress in terms of territorial gains. Western weapons have come online, with the Ukrainians able to strike ammunition stockpiles and airfields with increasing effectiveness. Attrition of Russian units in Kherson may weaken their forces further. The Ukrainians do not have the capacity to launch a full-scale assault against Kherson, but as Russian equipment and morale dwindle, Russia might decide to cut its losses and withdraw. Winter is coming, which will slow hostilities. Moscow will therefore be focusing on its economic war with Europe, hoping that Europe’s resolve will crumble. Building a Eurasian post-conflict security architecture will take extensive and determined mediation – for now current actors such as the UN and the OSCE remain ineffective. Turkey has emerged as primary mediator but finding a solution will be a long-term problem.
?2.???“There is no return to any pre-war status. Any post-war settlement will not be a return to the post 2014 frozen conflict compromise that followed the annexation of Crimea.”
?Ukraine has made it clear that it wants to reclaim all its Russian occupied territory, including Crimea. Russia talks about reuniting former Soviet territories. Both objectives are from being achieved. Negotiations are stalled. While a ceding of territory from either side might seem a logical compromise to end the appalling bloodshed, any concessions would be a sign of weakness. Yet all ‘hot’ wars come to an end eventually albeit rarely to the borders with which they started. The only other option is a frozen conflict such as between North and South Korea.
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?3.???“Sanctions will need to be tougher. Putin has factored sanctions into his long-term planning. Innovative and novel approaches will be required to have an impact. Banning Russia from Swift would not be a silver bullet and would encourage rival alternatives. Businesses will need to lessen or remove Russian dependencies.”
?Sanctions rarely have the intended impact (in this case to punish Putin in the hope he reassessed his options). They tend to punish ordinary people who are not able to influence political decisions. European reliance on Russian oil and gas has kept the Russian war budget afloat. An alternative Russian blockchain payment system is being planned. Still, businesses need to avoid the temptation to open alternative routes to the Russian market and governments need to enforce sanctions policy. Russia hopes Europe will suffer over the winter and seek to negotiate a lifting of sanctions. Ukraine wants more sanctions. However, experts and influencers are divided on the impact of sanctions and how to balance the reality of energy needs and cost of living crisis, on the one hand, and countering aggression against a sovereign state on the other. Sanctions are damaging Russia, but the impact won’t be fully felt for a while. However, there are calls for a reassessment of the impact of sanctions. The implication is that if it is determined that EU sanctions are hurting member states more than Russia, they should be walked back on. This is na?ve thinking. Even if sanctions on Russia were lifted, energy and trade relations will not revert to the pre-war norm! Such a shift would only play into Putin’s hands.
?4.???“Europe needs unity. The Central and Eastern Europeans have been inherently more sceptical than most Western European nations about Russia. This scepticism has now been justified and Western Europe will need a political mind-shift to face the new reality.”
?As the energy and cost of living crisis impacts individual countries, those heavily reliant on Russian energy will struggle to maintain social cohesion and public support for being tough on Russia. The Baltic States, Poland and Romania will be at the vanguard of remaining tough while others – such as Germany, Italy and Austria – might weaken and seek compromise. The European Commission may emerge as more powerful as individual member states grapple with keeping electorates calm. However, foreign policy decisions in the EU require unanimity. This means that, even if powerful member states such as Germany turn against sanctions and seek to lift them, a new consensus will need to be negotiated at the European level. In other words, it will not be possible to lift or otherwise dilute sanctions without unanimous consent among member states.
?5.?????“Energy Security.?The cost of facing up to Russia comes at a price of higher energy costs and reducing reliance on Russian natural resources. This too requires innovative and novel solutions from new nuclear to Balkan's hydro and biomass. The Green Deal needs both accelerating and compromising to meet demand. US shale and North Sea Oil will be needed.”
?Energy is a topic poorly understood by the average voter. The need for baseload (certain supply) is met through nuclear, oil, gas and coal and well-planned hydro. Fossil fuels clash with government commitments towards achieving net zero. Wind and solar are intermittent and cannot replace the hydrocarbon baseload. US Shale and LNG are a costly substitute for Russian gas, which had been the go-to source of energy flexibility until the war. A mature debate is required with climate activists to balance the competing pressures of supply, demand, and environmentalism to enable a transition from a dependency on Russia to multifarious sources of energy. Winter 2022 will be tough for consumers and governments. North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Gulf will become more important to diversifying the energy mix. There is already a new gas pipeline that is being planned, which will pass up through Algeria. Europe will need to become more proactive in managing security issues with these states, however.
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6.???“Cold War II. To avoid World War III (escalation drawing in NATO), we need to win Cold War II. This means recognizing that Russia is a rogue state and should become as isolated as Iran or North Korea. But winning the Cold War will require a concerted effort at counter subversion, cyber resilience, and active soft power.”
?The debate on whether Europe should issue Russians should be granted tourist visas is indicative of the difficulty in managing a new Cold War with Russia. As is the realization that the majority of what used to be called the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War remain non-aligned today. Russia is rogue to “The West” but to others a trading partner and paradoxically “anti-imperialist”. Western, particularly US, perceived hypocrisy gives Russia a voice. However, there are signs that soft power initiatives are being developed, e.g., the G7 alternative to Belt and Road announced in July.
?7.???“Strategic Communications. If Russia is to be isolated, then there is a greater needed to counter its propaganda machinery. Built up over years, and well resourced, the lies need repeated rebuttal. Messaging needs to get through to the Russian people using influencers such as sport stars.”
?The full extent of Russian disinformation and manipulation of the media space is neither fully mapped nor understood, at least by the public. Propaganda in Russia remains strong, even if some people are using VPNs to access alternative views. Putin remains popular internally. Externally, there needs to be better co-ordination of Western messaging to lay bare Russia’s malign influence. Governments need to communicate clearly and candidly to reduce the power of Russian disinformation. This will remain a long-term challenge that will take years to have an effect and one that needs resourcing and understanding on that timescale.
?8.???“Russian people v The Kremlin. One glint of hope is that some ordinary Russian people are showing distaste for Putin’s war against their Ukrainian cousins. If Putin has miscalculated then, over time, the people may prove to be a bigger threat than NATO.”
?The “special operation” has not yet become a war, which under Russian law would require mobilization. In the regions there is some resistance to the calls for men to sign up voluntarily. Despite the high estimated casualties of Russian forces, there have been limited signs of discontent. Authoritarian states do not necessarily fall through organized opposition (which has in Russia largely been jailed or suppressed) but through a sudden “Spring” like uprising that is hard to predict. There have been strikingly few resignations from people in state positions that might indicate discontent no doubt for fear of compromising themselves. We should beware wishful thinking.
?9.???“China and India. China currently rates antipathy to the US higher than concern over sovereign incursions by Russia. China needs to recognise, as it becomes increasingly dependent on the world economy, that Putin’s Russia is a costly liability. China and India will want to exploit trade opportunities; the former wants Russian gas.”
?The tensions after US Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan have served to reinforce the anti-US Russian/China nexus. China is making full use of the opportunity Russia’s economic separation from the West has offered it to secure economic benefits. Equally, India has shown an independent streak and self interest in maintaining strong commercial links importing Russian oil and fertiliser. Both countries are participating in Russia’s military exercise Vostok. Western leverage over both countries is limited but China has, so far, refrained from providing direct military support to Russia. China and India, unsurprisingly, have put self-interest first. Fear of Western reaction/sanctions only has a limited sway in their decision making. India views its relationship with Russia through the calculation of its rivalry with China i.e., keeping Russia on its side / not against it. The Western alliance needs to rethink its Asia strategy as a result.
10. “NATO has renewed purpose. Contrary to Putin’s assertion NATO was not a threat but rather rudderless. NATO will now reinforce garrisons, seek greater interoperability, and increase defence spending.”
?The proposed accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO, now awaiting ratification by member states is the clearest signal of NATO finding a new purpose. Russia’s still threatens NATO and warns of NATO crossing red lines, but NATO is quietly and purposefully building greater resilience and preparing for the ultimate risk of escalation into direct conflict. – also shown by the commitments and, more importantly, finally actions to increase defence expenditure by major European countries. However, the relationship with Turkey, – a NATO outlier balancing economic self-interest, suspicion of Europe and its role as a mediator – will remain problematic.