Ukraine Downs Russian Hypersonic Missile With U.S. Patriot System

Ukraine Downs Russian Hypersonic Missile With U.S. Patriot System. What Else Did the West Send?

Fighter jets, tanks, missile defenses and heavy engineering equipment await Vladimir Putin’s military’s – and Kyiv’s expected counteroffensive could start at any moment

Over a year after Russia invaded Ukraine and months after the international media became fixated with the slow and bloody Russian advances in and around the city of Bakhmut, the attention is turning to the expected Ukrainian counteroffensive.

“Preparations are coming to an end,” Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said late last month. “In addition to being provided a weapon, it must be mastered. Equipment has been promised, prepared and partially delivered. In a global sense, we're ready," he told reporters in Kyiv.

A day before Reznikov spoke, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said its members had provided Ukraine with 98 percent of the promised equipment. This includes roughly 1,550 various armored vehicles and 230 tanks. "In total we have trained and equipped more than nine new Ukrainian armored brigades, this will put Ukraine in a strong position to continue to retake occupied territory," Stoltenberg said of the unprecedented military aid. Despite this, Stoltenberg said, Russia should not be underestimated. Moscow was looking to send thousands of additional troops to Ukraine and was willing to accept huge casualties, he said.

On Wednesday, Russia accused Ukraine of trying to assassinate Putin with a drone attack on the Kremlin. It's unclear what exactly took place and whether it has a connection to the expected Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Western countries have been supplying Ukraine with billions of dollars of military aid. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, which has a database of the military aid given to Ukraine, the U.S. has provided Kyiv with $46 billion in aid (including training and contracts for commercial satellite imaging). The U.K. is a distant second, with $5 billion, followed by the EU.

International support for Ukraine has provided it with a nearly unimaginable amount of equipment, although this still isn’t enough for everything Kyiv needs. The sheer variety of the equipment that has been sent poses a significant logistical challenge due to maintenance and resupply requirements of all those different systems.

According to a report by the Oryx intelligence analysis site, Kyiv has a Tower of Babel made up of tanks, armored personnel carriers and other armored vehicles. Ukraine also has a large number of artillery guns and systems, missiles, and various types of drones. Given that these are varied advanced and complex systems, which are about to run the gauntlet of battlefield conditions, Ukraine faces huge logistical challenge.

Russia’s war on Ukraine may be a conventional one, but it is also an extreme case of troops using every available weapon. Even ancient bolt-action Mosin-Nagant rifles and Maxim machine guns from the 19th century have been put on the front lines.

Fighter jets

• MiG-29: Air-to-air and air-to-surface. 41 planes were supplied by Slovakia and Poland
• Sukhoi Su-25: Reinforced fighter jet designed to assist ground forces. 18 planes were supplied by North Macedonia and Bulgaria

Ukraine is still negotiating over procurement or donations of advanced planes from the West, especially the F-16 fighter jet. But even if the U.S. and other Western nations come to an agreement on supplying the jet to Ukraine, the Ukrainian military will still face a challenge. Equipping itself with a completely new aerial platform means preparing the logistical system for it and training the pilots, ground crews and other staff so the new planes can be integrated into battle.

In the meantime, Slovakia and Poland have begun transferring 41 Mig-29 fighter planes, a model that is already in service in Ukraine’s air force. These are old planes from the Soviet era armed with air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, but lacking advanced capabilities or special advantages over their Russian counterparts.

Nonetheless, these planes can help in replacing some of the dozens of planes the Ukrainians have lost in battle. According to various reports, some of the planes Ukraine has been receiving are not in great condition, and may simply be used for spare parts.

Over the past year, Ukraine has received 18 Sukhoi Su-25 jets from North Macedonia and NATO, via Bulgaria. But this wasn’t a major upgrade. At most, it was a replacement for the 16 planes shot down in battle. The Su-25 is considered to be the Soviet equivalent of the famous American A-10 “Warthog” – an armored ground attack plane developed to provide close air support for ground forces using a combination of guided missiles, rockets, bombs and a mounted gun.

Tanks and Armored Personnel Carriers

• 30 M-55s tanks from Slovenia: Old soviet tanks that have undergone substantial upgrades by Israel's Elbit Systems
• 84 Leopard tanks from Germany: effective range of over 5 kilometers, stabilizer systems enabling precision fire while in motion, and thermal sights that allow identification of targets at night and in poor visibility
• 31 M1A1 Abrams tanks from the U.S.: Not delivered yet. Protects crew by being the only tank whose ammunition is fully separate and secured with blow-out panels
• BMP-1: 73-mm gun, wire-guided anti-tank missiles. Weaknesses include outdated fire-control systems and thin, inadequate armor
• 40 Marder 1A3 APCs from Germany: Equipped with a 120-mm gun and MILAN anti-tank missiles
• 100 Bradley APCs from the U.S.: Equipped with a rapid-fire gun, a TOW wire-guided anti-tank missile launcher, and advanced fire-control systems. Main weakness is a vulnerable aluminum armor
• Hundreds of M113 APCs (known as Zelda in the Israeli military): Dates back to the Vietnam War. Extremely vulnerable.
• Hundreds of Stryker APCs from the U.S. and other nations: Able to carry nine soldiers at speed, making it suitable for extracting troops under fire

Ukraine is equipped with a wide variety of Soviet-era tanks, some of which have been upgraded over the years. The vast majority of the tanks it has received from European countries and the United States are variants of the T-72, the main workhorse tank of the Russian and other armies.

Israel is doing everything it can to avoid trouble with Russia, and has therefore not given Ukraine the advanced anti-aircraft systems. Slovenia, however, has (with the assistance of Germany) sent 30 M-55S tanks, old Soviet-era weapons that have been significantly upgraded by Israeli defense contractor Elbit Systems.

Ukraine has made it clear that it wants to buy Western tanks, which offer significant advantages in protection. Such tanks are usually made from composite materials, have advanced fire-control systems, are capable of driving in reverse at high speed – an ability which is critical for "shoot and scoot" tactics for emerging, firing and reversing back to safety as fast as possible– at three times the speed of Russian tanks.

Many tanks also have isolation between ammunition and the crew compartment, saving lives if the tank is hit, but the only tank with true and full separation is actually the American M1 series.

Ukraine was mainly interested in the Leopard 2 tank, but Germany – which developed and produces them – was reluctant. It agreed only after the U.K. promised to send 14 of its own Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine, and the U.S. joined in with 31 M1A1 Abrams tanks – enough for one tank battalion, more or less.

The Leopard 2 has been Germany’s main battle tank for the past 40 years and is used by many other armies in Europe and elsewhere. The tank was designed to counter the threat of a conventional-arms invasion by the Soviet Union. Since the Leopard entered service in 1979, it has undergone many upgrades. The models Ukraine is receiving are among the most advanced in service.

All told, Ukraine is expected to receive over 84 Leopard tanks from two advanced models. Sixty-two have already been supplied. They are armed with a 120-mm gun with an effective range of more than 5 kilometers, stabilizer systems that enable precision fire while in motion, and thermal sights that allow identification of targets at night and in poor visibility.

Videos of Russian tanks exploding, with their turrets being blown far away, have gone viral online. Experts say these explosions are the result of the automatic ammunition loaders in the Soviet-era tanks. When designing the Leopard tanks, Germany chose to protect the crew in case the tank took a hit.

Russian tank turrets fly far away upon impact.

Steel doors separate the ammunition compartment from the crew compartment. The ammo compartment roof has blow-out panels – relatively thin armor designed to channel the force of the blast in a direct hit upward, rather than inward, where the tank crew are. However, unlike the American Abrahams tanks - some of the ammunition is stored in the front part of the tank hull, next to the driver. Experts believe that this design had a major role in the catastrophic destruction of a Turkish Leopard 2A4 tank which was hit in northern Syria in January 2017.

Inside the Abrams tank.

Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark have promised to supply over 100 older Leopard tanks, but these are not expected to arrive before the counteroffensive begins.

As part of the effort to get Germany to send its Leopards, Britain decided to send 14 Challenger 2 tanks – enough to equip a single company of tanks. The Challenger 2 holds an impressive record that has remained unbroken for over 30 years: it destroyed an Iraqi T-72 tank with direct fire at a distance of 4,700 meters during the Gulf War.

The Challenger 2 is equipped with advanced armor made of layers of composite materials, which proved itself in Iraq 20 years ago when a tank crew survived dozens of RPG impacts. However, the Challenger suffers from considerable drawbacks, and even the British defense secretary admitted in 2019 that the tank lags behind its Western counterparts.

The Challenger is equipped with a 120-mm barrel gun, but unlike the Leopard and the Abrams, it uses a rifled barrel and unique ammunition suitable for no other weapon. While the ammunition is kept separately, it’s still in the crew compartment, and impact to the gun propellants or some shells could lead to dire consequences.

The U.S. has promised to deliver 31 M1A1 Abrams tanks, but these aren’t expected to arrive in time for the expected counteroffensive. The Abrams is essentially the only tank whose ammunition is fully separate and secured with blow-out panels.

The Abrams tanks used by the U.S. military are equipped with composite armor that includes depleted uranium, which helps protect from kinetic energy penetrators, vehicle-piercing munitions made of hard metals. But this armor is so secret that the export variants use a combination of composite materials and ceramic plates, without the depleted uranium.

Similar to tanks, most combat-ready armored personnel carriers the West has delivered are of a type already in use by the Ukrainian military. Most are variants of the Soviet BMP-1, equipped with a 73-mm gun and older generation wire-guided anti-tank missiles. Its weaknesses are outdated fire-control systems and thin, inadequate armor.

Germany has sent 40 Marder 1A3 APCs, equipped with a 120-mm gun and MILAN anti-tank missiles. The missile is wire-guided, which forces the APC to remain exposed from the moment of firing until the moment of impact. By contrast, the British Javelin and the Israeli Spike can lock onto a target independently. The advantage of these systems is that they are harder to disrupt electronically.

Having trained Ukrainian crews, the U.S. has begun to deliver over 100 Bradley APCs. The famous fighting vehicle is equipped with a rapid-fire gun, a TOW wire-guided anti-tank missile launcher, and advanced fire-control systems. The Bradley had its baptism by fire in the Gulf War, and has continued to prove itself since, despite its vulnerable aluminum armor and many other problems. The model delivered to Ukraine is equipped with an additional layer of protection.

Ukraine has also received hundreds of M113 APCs, the model known in the Israeli military as “Zelda” that dates back to the Vietnam War. Many militaries have continued using versions of this APC in combat roles, despite its being an aluminum can that barely provides protection from machine-gun fire. Generations of soldiers and commanders in the U.S. and Israel alike have begged to have it retired from service at the front lines, and use it mainly as a personnel carrier, command vehicle, and ambulance.

The U.S. and other countries have also sent hundreds of Stryker APCs to Ukraine. The Stryker was frequently struck with IED’s and simple RPG launchers during its use in Iraq and Afghanistan. In response, the APC was equipped with cage-like slat armor to make such attacks more difficult. Its advantages are its ability to carry nine soldiers and its speed, which makes it suitable for extracting troops under fire.

Artillery

• HIMARS. GPS-guided rockets with inertial navigation with a reach of up to 90 kilometers
• Excalibur shells from the U.S. and Germany. Accuracy of 4 meter radius from target

With all due respect to tanks, APCs, and assault drones, the war in Ukraine has restored artillery to its former glory, and both sides are making massive use of mortar fire, as well as mobile and stationary artillery guns and rocket launchers.

However, there are differences between the two sides regarding artillery. After its initial invasion faltered, Russia returned to relying on a strategy of indiscriminate artillery devastation. The results can be seen in Bakhmut, Marinka, and other front-line cities now reduced to rubble. The tactic did not lead to the collapse of Ukrainian defenses, however.

Ukraine is instead trying to focus on precision strikes, thanks in part to the more precise ammunition it has received from the U.S. and Germany. Excalibur shells, for instance, turn 155-mm guns into a precision-guided weapon, with a circular error probable (CEP) of 4 meters - which means there's a 50% chance of the shells hitting within a 4-meter circle around the target.

The capstone of the aid thus far is the HIMARS rocket launcher systems delivered by the U.S. Unlike the Soviet Grad or Smerch launchers, the American system launches guided rockets known as GMLRS, which use GPS guidance and an inertial navigation system to strike targets with precision at ranges of over 90 kilometers. However, the U.S. has thus far refused to supply ATACMS rockets, which carry a much larger explosive charge and have a range of 300 kilometers.

Artillery has taken on an even more important place on the battlefield due to the inability of either air force to achieve air supremacy in such an environment so saturated with anti-air systems. Thus, for example, it has been many months since we’ve heard about the Bayraktar TB2 – a reconnaissance and attack drone made by the Turkish firm Baykar that devastated Russian forces early in the war. In the past half year, most of the focus on Telegram channels following the war has moved to homemade or commercial drones, costing a few hundred or thousands of dollars each, used for reconnaissance or precision bombing using improvised explosive converted from hand grenades or rocket-propelled grenades.

Prominent on the list of Western arms are micro air vehicles. You won’t find massive drones like the Israeli-developed Hermes or Heron here. Instead, there is a long list of suicide drones like the U.S.-developed Switchblade, as well as tactical platforms carried by troops that can be used for intelligence, artillery guidance, and offensive capabilities if necessary, with the requisite upgrades.

One of the most intriguing weapons is also the smallest – the U.K. and Norway have donated over 850 Black Hornet Nano micro drones, each the size of a regular pigeon, which can perform reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering missions at a range of up to 2 kilometers.

Engineering Equipment

In preparation for the Ukrainian counteroffensive, Russia has spent the past year constructing a defensive line hundreds of kilometers long. These include trenches and bunkers surrounded by barbed wire, anti-tank obstacles, and a great number of landmines. Natural obstacles, such as the area’s many rivers, also increase defenses.

These challenges have made engineering equipment critical to the success of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. Czechia has sent two pontoon bridges and Germany has sent 20 armored vehicle-launched bridges and armored mine clearing vehicles. The U.S. has sent M58 MICLIC systems equivalent to Israel’s Tzefa mine-clearing device – explosive charges strung along a long cable and launched by rocket onto a minefield. After the cable is stretched on the ground, the charges are set off, causing the landmines to explode as well and creating a passage lane several meters wide and some 100 meters long, allowing tanks and infantry to advance.

Air Defense

Russia is making extensive use of cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and suicide drones like the Iranian Shahed-136 against both military and civilian targets in Ukraine. Therefore, a large portion of the foreign aid to Kyiv comes in the form of various air defense systems.

The first of three Patriot missile batteries arrived from Germany last month. The system is designed to protect from air incursions at a range of up to 160 kilometers, and against ballistic and cruise missiles at up to 60 kilometers. Ukraine claimed last week that the country managed to shoot down a Russian hypersonic Kinzhal missile using Patriot missiles, which American sources confirmed, in the face of Putin's previous claims that the Kinzhal could not be shot down.

Germany has supplied a large number of Gepard anti-aircraft guns and two batteries of IRIS-T anti-air missiles for intermediate ranges of up to 40 kilometers. Two more batteries are scheduled to arrive soon.

The U.S., which is expected to supply more Patriot batteries, has already sent Ukraine other air defense systems, such as the NASAMS – providing short- and intermediate- range defense – and the Avenger AN/TWQ-1 – a light and mobile anti-aircraft system providing protection for front-line troops from tactical threats such as drones, helicopters, and low-flying planes.

Ukraine Downs Russian Hypersonic Missile With U.S. Patriot System. What Else Did the West Send? - National Security & Cyber - Haaretz.com

++++++++++++++

The Problem With Russian Infrastructure

Moscow can barely handle increased trade with Asia.

By Ekaterina Zolotova - May 8, 2023

Russia managed to maintain exports in 2022 in spite of the Western sanctions campaign against it – and in spite of all the logistical difficulties it created. Trade losses to Europe were offset by increased trade with Asia. Whether by creating parallel imports or by creating new trade ties with countries that don’t support the West, bypassing sanctions has become a clear priority for Moscow.

But there are limits to how far Russia can truly reorient itself to East and South Asia. It’s true that some countries worry about the imposition of secondary sanctions, and it’s true that payments are complicated even if there is complementarity in their economies. But the biggest hindrance is insufficient infrastructure. The goods that used to go to Europe but now go to East and South Asia must be transported through the whole of Russia to reach their destinations, and there are growing concerns that transportation infrastructure will soon reach capacity. Put simply, it’ll be difficult for Russia to increase trade with its current system in place.

Reorientation

In 2022, Russia managed to redirect significant amounts of oil and coal to China and India, mostly because it had stopped supplying these goods to Western countries. Chinese companies, in turn, sharply increased export supplies to Russia, taking advantage of the withdrawal of many Western companies from the Russian market. As a result, Russian trade with China increased by 28 percent year over year. Trade has also increased with members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as with Turkey, through which Russia gained access to sanctioned goods. Russia’s new trade portfolio has changed the entire transport market, from transport links to the structure and direction of cargo flows. Instead of going through Black Sea ports or railways to the West, Russian goods flow south and east, through mainland Russia. Increasingly, more cargo is transferred from the Suez Canal to ports in Russia’s Far East. The volume of direct rail transportation through land border crossings with China, Kazakhstan and Mongolia has also significantly increased.

But new trade flows created new problems. Border facilities and domestic Russian infrastructure were ill-equipped to metabolize increased trade with the rest of Asia. Far East ports, which account for the bulk of current imports and exports, are already operating at 100 percent capacity. When the European Union refused to buy Russian coal last August, coal exports to China reached a five-year high, with nearly half of Russian rail capacity occupied by coal exports, making it difficult to ship goods with a higher added value that Russia has tried to leverage to make up for sanctions-related losses. Trucks are not enough to circumvent the bottlenecks; traffic jams increased, as did the time it takes for goods to reach China. Similar problems cropped up in the Caucasus.

In other words, southern and eastern transportation routes face three problems: They are too few, too poorly maintained and too small to handle increased cargo. Aside from pipelines, road and rail are the only way to move goods across Russia. Of the two, rail is self-evidently more important; a massive territory, a lack of access to maritime trade routes and a harsh climate necessitated as much. Though rail and road are more expensive, inland water transport is untenable because of short navigational periods and a general absence of west-east rivers. Roads account for a smaller portion of total freight turnover thanks to extremely small average transportation distances (this despite the fact that more than half of the goods are transported by road). For eastern trade, the only viable conduits are two regional highways. For southern trade, the only viable ones are developing roads along the Caspian Sea, the Р-217, which borders Azerbaijan, the A-161, which goes to Georgia, and the A-164 to South Ossetia, which is constantly shut down due to inclement weather and mountainous terrain.

Regional infrastructural disparities are explained by geography. The south and east developed much slower than the rest of Russia because the terrain and climate are difficult and harsh and because the low-density populations lived so far away from the main consumption centers. Transport routes were thus concentrated in the European part of Russia, where a significant part of the population with higher incomes lives. Here, there is a much larger market for goods, a closer proximity to European markets and fewer geographic barriers. Almost all the most important roads fan out radially from Moscow and St. Petersburg. Europe has therefore always been Russia’s biggest and most important trading partner, even if the specific beneficiary of trade changed throughout the years.

Bigger Changes

A much bigger change came in the 2010s after China became a more prominent trading power. It was then that Moscow began its pivot to Asia, a move meant to enhance its influence to the east, bring balance to its foreign trade portfolio and dull the effects of foreign sanctions, which started in 2014. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation members accounted for 33 percent of all Russian trade – a significant increase but still a smaller percentage than Europe, which accounted for nearly 36 percent. But increased trade never really translated into infrastructural improvement. Moscow continued to rely on the existing road and rail networks and on the Suez Canal and the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.

The current state of eastern and southern transport systems is therefore comparatively poor. It’s hard on the vehicles, and the vehicles are hard on the roads, which are in need of repair. There has been as much as an 80 percent uptick in traffic accidents on several highways as more vehicles flood the roads.

And this is to say nothing of prices. One of the biggest problems facing container-based shipment is high tariffs, which stymie rail-based trade to China. The cost is steep, but delivery times, inadequate capacity of container trains and the shortage of container equipment make matters worse. (Notably, Russia is highly dependent on containers, and many container companies left Russia after sanctions were imposed.)

The Kremlin is understandably concerned that if sanctions get tighter, its existing infrastructure will be unable to accommodate its long-term economic plans. Its infrastructural limitations may significantly slow down the supply of necessary goods to consumers and businesses from third countries, even as they prevent Russia from selling enough goods to the rest of Asia to make up for the shortfalls from sanctions. The Kremlin understands this is a long-term problem, so it has already planned a number of ambitious projects to solve it. For the next seven years, Russia can allocate $30.8 billion to the development of railway communication with China, which includes the creation of three new checkpoints along the Russian border, as well as the laying of 369 kilometers (230 miles) of tracks in Russia and 3,000 kilometers of railway in Kazakhstan, Mongolia and China. Russian Railways announced plans to invest 7.5 billion rubles ($97.4 million) this year in the development of checkpoints and rear terminals in the Far East. However, these projects require a lot of time and money, both of which are in short supply in Russia.

This puts the Kremlin in a tough position. Moscow needs urgently to create new infrastructure to facilitate the pivot to Asia, but doing so is difficult without the increased trade revenue the pivot is meant to provide. Failing to do so could imperil the government’s plans to forge new trade alliances.

..................................................

About Ekaterina Zolotova

Ekaterina Zolotova is an analyst for Geopolitical Futures. Prior to Geopolitical Futures, Ms. Zolotova participated in several research projects devoted to problems and prospects of Russia’s integration into the world economy. Ms. Zolotova has a specialist degree in international economic relations from Plekhanov Russian University of Economics. In addition, Ms. Zolotova studied international trade and international integration processes. Her thesis was on features of economic development of Venezuela. She speaks native Russian and is fluent in English.

The Problem With Russian Infrastructure - Geopolitical Futures

The End++++++++++++++