Turkiye’s foreign policy under scrutiny as Erdogan takes power
Turkiye’s foreign policy under scrutiny as Erdogan takes power
ANKARA: It is perhaps no secret in which direction Turkiye’s foreign policy will be moving with the incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdogan winning another five-year term this past Sunday – which means a continuation of strategies the long-serving leader has championed in the past.
According to Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, Ankara office director of the German Marshall Fund of the US, Erdogan’s main priority would be to ensure the continued flow of much-needed cash from Russia and Gulf countries, while avoiding friction with Europe and the US so that he can attract investments from the West.
“While Turkiye’s relations with neither Europe nor the US can be expected to be put back on track, they can at least be stabilized as both Erdogan and his Western counterparts would benefit from this,” he told Arab News recently.
“The congratulatory messages from Europe and the United States suggest that this is also the tendency in the West.”
President Joe Biden congratulated Erdogan on his reelection, and tweeted: “I look forward to continuing to work together as NATO Allies on bilateral issues and shared global challenges.”
For Unluhisarcikli, Erdogan will also need to make tough decisions early on in his third term as president.
“The US, which has shown restraint so far due to the elections in Turkiye will press its points on Russia sanctions and NATO enlargement more strongly in the period ahead. Erdogan’s decisions on these issues and developments in the US about Turkiye’s request to purchase new F-16s could pivot the Turkiye-US relationship in any direction,” he said.
The administration of Donald Trump removed Turkiye from the F-35 fifth-generation jet program in 2019 over its acquisition of the Russian S-400 missile system.
Experts also underline that with Erdogan winning, Turkiye will continue its recent efforts to repatriate hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees to zones under Turkish control in compliance with international law.
Although being met with suspicion by Washington, the normalization efforts with Syria’s President Bashar Assad are also expected to continue as Erdogan, and his new ultranationalist and anti-immigrant allies in the parliament, consider the restored ties with Syria as the only solution to send back Syrian refugees in Turkiye to their homeland.
Erdogan’s new ally, Sinan Ogan, who ran as the third presidential candidate in the first elections, then endorsed Erdogan’s candidacy in the runoff, said during his campaign that he would consider repatriating refugees by force if necessary.?
Karol Wasilewski, an analyst for 4CF The Futures Literacy Company and a founder of Krakow-based Institute for Turkiye Studies, expects continuity in Turkish diplomacy and decision-making in the short run, on the economy and foreign policy.
“Erdogan would, most likely, continue his ambiguous foreign policy in which Turkiye, on the one hand, gives its Western allies arguments that it still can be considered an ally — that’s why I won’t be surprised if Erdogan finally agrees on Sweden’s membership — while, on the other, decisively pushes for its interests, even when it harms NATO internal cohesion,” he told Arab News.
Following the support he received in Sunday’s elections, and having regained flexibility for his political and diplomatic maneuvers, Erdogan is also expected to make some U-turns without risking any major backlash from his constituency.
While Sweden’s accession bid has yet to be approved by Ankara, Stockholm’s membership — which has long been rejected by Erdogan, who accused the country of harboring terrorists — may also be used as a trump card for securing a commitment from the US for F-16 fighter jets ahead of NATO’s next summit this July when Erdogan and Biden are expected to meet.
The admission of Sweden by Turkiye would help the US administration in pushing for F-16 sales through Congress.
But Erdogan’s uneasiness with the US support for Syrian Kurdish militia — People’s Protection Units or YPG — is unlikely to change under his third term as his government considers the YPG as an extension of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party in Turkiye.
On Friday, Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu said that after the elections, “whoever pursues a pro-American policy in Turkiye will be labeled a traitor,” hinting at a possible transactional relationship with Washington in the post-elections period.
For Wasilewski, Erdogan’s win may serve as another chance for Euro-Asianist segments in Turkiye to strengthen themselves in the security apparatus.
“In (a) five-year perspective, this may be something that would cast (an) even bigger shadow over Turkiye’s relationship with the West,” he said.
Another dimension of the post-election process would be the Western allies’ position toward Turkiye now that the election dust has settled.
“I wouldn’t be surprised if the US decided to increase pressure on Turkiye on areas that seems vital to their interests, such as sanctions on Russia,” he said.
“The way that Erdogan responds to this possible pressure will be one (other) factor determining Turkiye’s relations with the West,” he added.
In terms of Turkish-Russian relations, Ankara is expected to continue its current political and economic relations with the Kremlin as well as deepen its cooperation in the energy field, with the help of the personal rapport between the two leaders.
Close ties with Russia as well as the Gulf will also help Erdogan in achieving his goal of rendering the Turkish economy more independent from Western markets. Ankara has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, but continues to provide military support to Kyiv.
Turkiye’s $20 billion first nuclear power plant, that will be owned for the first 25 years by the manufacturer, Russian energy company Rosatom, was recently inaugurated in a virtual ceremony. And being the largest nuclear construction project in the world, Russian leader Vladimir Putin said the plant deepened Turkish-Russian ties.
Russia also delayed a portion of Turkiye’s natural gas payments in early May ahead of the general elections.
Attracting high numbers of tourists from Russia are also required to help the Turkish economy keep afloat during summertime, while Erdogan will also remain in campaign mode before Turkiye’s next polls, the municipal elections scheduled for March next year.
“Putin is well aware that close ties between Russia and Turkiye are vital to his interests, especially after Russian aggression on Ukraine, and will continue to put a great effort to preserve them in a good shape,” said Wasilewski.
“Feeding Turkiye’s dreams of being the gas hub serves Erdogan’s narrative of Turkiye as a great power,” said Wasilewski.
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Analysis?|?Why Turkey's Opposition Failed to Stop Erdogan
The diverse opposition under Kilicdaroglu lost to Erdogan not only because it was campaigning on a highly distorted, restrictive playing field. Its failures, both practical and on matters of principle, signal why Turkey's democratic future is so bleak.
By Simon A. Waldman
Even before Turkey’s pugnacious President Recep Tayyip Erdogan secured himself yet another five years at the helm of Turkish politics, international observers noted that the incumbent enjoyed?an unjustified campaigning advantage , by restricting the freedoms of assembly, expression, and association.
However, this is not the only reason why Turkey’s democratic outlook is bleak. It’s also because of the conduct of the opposition’s candidate, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, and his campaign during the two weeks between the first and second rounds of voting.
The first round of the presidential run-off, on May 14th, was closely fought. Erdogan fell just shy of the 50 percent majority needed to win, obliging him to face a runoff with Kilicdaroglu. That also meant that the opposition’s Nation Alliance had missed its golden opportunity to unseat Erdogan's two decades-long rule, along with that of his Justice and Development Party (AKP).
The fact that Kilicdaroglu did not win in the first round despite the anticipation by his supporters and most pollsters that he would emerge victorious,?was highly disappointing , for Turkish democracy as much as for the opposition bloc itself.
Yet, there were many positives of the initial Kilicdaroglu campaign. He?gained the support of six diverse political parties . He had?obtained the backing ?of millions of Kurds. He was flanked by two running-mates, the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara no less, bucking Turkey’s history of having centralized strongman as political leaders.?By openly identifying as an Alevi , Kilicdaroglu put forward a conciliatory message to Turkish citizens of different religious affiliations.
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And he did this while?campaigning in an environment heavily skewed in the favour of the Erdogan and his ruling AKP , who used state institutions to bolster their campaign and dominated the mainstream media. In some cases,?opposition politicians were attacked ?and the?embattled ?Kurdish oriented and progressive Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) was obliged to run under the banner of the Green Left Party to avoid being banned outright.
The Erdogan campaign even?disseminated fake footage ?to make it seem like Kilicdaroglu supported the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party,?knowing full well ?it was a fabrication.
Under such conditions, winning 45 percent of the vote in the first round, and forcing Erdogan to a rematch, was quite a feat for Kilicdaroglu. However, the opposition leader seemed to be suffering from the morning-after blues. The next day he was nowhere to be seen with only the odd social media post to his name. But he should have been visible, busy, and active, putting a positive spin of his 45 percent, creating energy and momentum.
After that, the Kilicdaroglu campaign descended into a confusing mix of xenophobia, anti-liberal sentiment, calmness and conciliation.
In the days before the 28 May run-off, Kilicdaroglu appeared before a packed studio audience on the YouTube channel BaBaLa TV where for hours he?calmly and methodically answered tough questions , from citizens who had not voted for him.
However, in other instances, harder was Kilicdaroglu’s tone and angrier his voice, especially when he promised to?expel Syrian refugees forthwith , a threat accompanied by explicit?street posters .
Sure, Turkey is facing significant economic pressures owing to a related mix of governmental mismanagement, the devaluation of the lira, and spiralling inflation. Hosting 3.6 million refugees is a?strain on employment , and there are inevitable?tensions and culture clashes . Turkey hasn’t received anywhere near the level of international support that it needs, so it is unsurprising that many in Turkey, including Kilicdaroglu supporters, feel frustrated and angry.
In the recent past, Kilicdaroglu called for?the EU to support Turkey’s hosting of refugees ?and voiced his intention to?deport Syrian refugees , but he did so less frequently and in a manner that was considerably less aggressive.
To make matters worse, Kilicdaroglu entered an alliance with Umit Ozdag, the leader of a far-right nationalist party which didn’t make Turkey’s high seven percent electoral threshold to enter parliament.
Ozdag ran his entire political campaign on scapegoating Syrians and other refugees. Kilicdaroglu stood beside Ozdag and then shook his hand?after producing a joint protocol ?that promised to endeavor to expel Syrian refugees within a year at the latest.
In that very same document, Kilicdaroglu accepted as legitimate, albeit with a few judicial caveats, the egregious removal by Erdogan's government of deputies from the Kurdish-oriented HDP who had been fairly elected to municipal posts and mayorships. Those elected officials had been promptly replaced by government appointees.
This has been the practice of Erdogan’s government since 2019, a strategy that Human Rights Watch called a?violation of voters’ rights , as it deprived millions of their democratically elected representatives, all part of the government’s bid to supress Kurdish communal sentiment and political representation.
The opposition lost to Erdogan not only because it was a distorted playing field, but because Kilicdaroglu’s campaign was, at least in the run-off, reactive rather than proactive, winking to extremism and confused in how to brand Kilicdaroglu.
But having an organized, principled, and efficient opposition is part of the democratization process. Being the lesser of two evils is simply not good enough.
If this is the state of the opposition and its leader, then together with five more years of Erdogan, the future of Turkey’s democracy is bleak.
About: Simon A. Waldman
Dr. Simon A. Waldman is a visiting lecturer and tutor at King’s College London and the co-author of The New Turkey and its Discontents
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Russia’s War Upends German Foreign Policy
By Judy Dempsey
World War II and its aftermath shaped Berlin’s approach toward NATO, the EU, and Moscow. Russia’s war on Ukraine ends that era.
It is impossible to miss. It is a small black plaque at the entrance to Reichenbach im Vogtland’s elegant town hall. Engraved are three short paragraphs.
The first is about how the Jews were rounded up at the town hall. They subsequently died in a subcamp of the Flossenbürg concentration camp. The second describes how, in April 1945, the Americans occupied Reichenbach, a pretty town in Saxony, southeastern Germany. The Nazi era ended. The third paragraph explains how the U.S. army passed control of the town to the Red Army. The latter deported 120 youths between fifteen and sixteen years old to Siberia. Many died there. Those who were eventually allowed home returned very ill.
The plaque encapsulates what this town and many others went through during the closing stages of Nazism: defeat, liberation, and, in the case of eastern Germany, occupation.
In this part of the divided Germany, the Soviet occupation lasted until 1990. Since then, the town’s population has shrunk from 35,000 to just 20,000. Young people have left. The old industry has disappeared. Some fine merchant buildings and town houses are empty or in disrepair. The church is closed for renovation. The local authorities are doing what they can to encourage tourism and put Reichenbach and its environs on the map.
At first glance, you wouldn’t think Russia’s war in Ukraine has affected the town. There are no signs of Ukrainian flags.
But the town’s council has gone out of its way to welcome refugees. Its?website ?explains how the war has shaken people. How with their own eyes they can see what is happening to a country so close to Reichenbach. The council is doing what it can to arrange housing, schooling, language classes, and jobs for the refugees. These efforts are replicated throughout most of Germany.
There is a wider political dimension to those efforts. Since the war in Ukraine began, the political elites’ but also the public’s perception of Russia has undergone such changes that it is hard to see Berlin returning to the status quo ante when and if this war ends.
The changes are complex and long overdue. They are about how Germany, shaken by Russia’s attack on Ukraine tore up the post–1945—indeed, the post–1990 order—has been forced to revise its foreign policy and its approach to Russia. The infatuation with Moscow?is over .
German foreign policy was like a triangle. One side was for NATO and the American security umbrella, which Germany could rely upon without making too much effort to invest in its own safety. The second was for the EU, which gave Germany an economic and political anchor. And the third was for Russia, which influenced the other two sides of the triangle.
Russia was a crucial factor affecting German foreign policy. It wasn’t just about the (West) German government breaking ranks with Washington back in the 1970s by financing a Russian gas pipeline and agreeing to buy gas from the Kremlin.
It wasn’t just about the complex and turbulent relationship between Berlin and Moscow over the centuries.
It was the fact that the combination of these factors, plus the influence of industry and other lobbies, prevented the German political elites from considering the countries of Eastern Europe in their own right.
When Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine gained their independence after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Berlin, consciously or not, looked at these newly independent and sovereign countries through the prism of Russia. It’s as if these states were still in Russia’s sphere of influence. So the rationale was: it’s best not to rock the boat by openly supporting those movements in the region that eventually want to join the EU and/or NATO. That would upset Russia.
This blinkered view of post–1989 shaped Germany’s policy toward NATO, toward the EU, and toward Russia—all at the expense of Eastern Europe. The NATO Bucharest summit reflected this German outlook. Berlin bowed to Moscow.
This triangle of interests is changing. The war in Ukraine shows just how NATO has adapted and how Berlin recognizes that it has to pay for its security, through NATO and at home by modernizing its depleted armed forces. This is about taking hard power and security seriously.
The EU is changing, too. It’s not going to be a?defense player ?or a hard-power organization. The structures and different interests of the member states prevent this. What it can do—and Germany must intellectually help achieve this—is take steps toward making the continent “whole and free.” There is still too much unfinished business from the immediate post–1989 era. Completing it means completing Eastern Europe’s transformation, however difficult that may be.
That brings us to the third element of the triangle—Russia. With its war changing Germany’s perception of Moscow, the triangle in its old form is redundant.
Here’s the chance for Berlin to make Eastern Europe the third side of a new triangle.
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