Tubby: Raymond O. Barton and the US Army, 1889-1963

Book Review

Raymond 'Tubby' Barton commanded the division through most of the war, and the 400 pages of written prose details Tubby's ascent into and his actions while holding that command. It is immensely readable and researched using, among other sources, a trove of thousands of letters Barton wrote to family during his Army career. "So what," you might ask? The insight into Tubby's thoughts and actions are found within these pages. Rarely do we get this deep into the thoughts of a combat leader, so let me dive into some takeaways:

Tubby and other leaders of the American Army of WWII spent much of their time away from their headquarters despite the fact that their headquarters is where they were best able to see and communicate with the entirety of their unit. This made me question where I spent my time while in command…and truth be told, I should have spent more time with my subordinates, peers, and superiors when training or fighting. I always struggled to find the sweet spot between too much supervision and not enough. That wasn't even how I should have looked at it. Much like spending time with your family, the time spent, not the activity, is what counts. The benefits were often intangible, and it wasn't just a characteristic of Tubby. Leaders up and down the chain of command spent most of their time away from their headquarters, where they could see 'the big picture.' If you are not present, you are not leading. You could be away for a great reason, but your leadership is not impacting the situation unless you are there.

What did Tubby and his compatriots do while away from their headquarters? I saw two main things: they provided context and supplied energy. Barton, for the most part, provided and gained context wherever he went. He visited his regiments and battalions mostly, but he also met with adjacent units and higher headquarters, both imparting and collecting contextual information that helped him make decisions. His ability to provide the same helped others. In today's Army, a commander has plenty of tools to see the situation. What is left out of these impersonal means is a feel for what is happening.

Imparting energy was the second effect I observed. Tubby and his division's leaders didn't necessarily meddle in their subordinates' plans. Still, they helped them lead their teams and prioritized scarce resources when needed. Being present exerted some energy, but getting out and leading an attack was something else entirely. It was common for battalion commanders to lead company attacks and regimental commanders to lead battalions when a fight faltered. This was exemplified by Brigadier General Teddy Roosevelt, Jr, Barton's firefighter in Normandy. Roosevelt repeatedly put himself at the point of friction and personally led soldiers against the enemy. This culture led to some significant attrition of leadership, which brings me to my next observation.

The lethality of combat in 1944 was incredible, and I can only imagine what it might be today. The division lost 40% of its strength between June 6th and June 28th. In 22 days, only 5 of 27 rifle company commanders, 4 of 9 infantry battalion commanders, and 3 of 6 colonels and brigadier generals were left. Some were killed, some wounded, and some relieved. In the Hurtgen Forest, the division lost 139 front-line infantry leaders, including all three battalion commanders in the 22d Infantry. One battalion went through 5 commanders in an hour of fighting. This gives the reader an understanding so very different from the wars the United States has fought more recently. Do we relieve and move those incapable from one job to other pursuits? Is it even in our culture? Can we replace losses? What happens to the quality of the force when we replace our losses?

The final thought I want to convey from this book comes from the author's critical approach towards the campaign in Europe. The 4th Infantry Division fought as part of a larger formation and had to align its operations to support the larger objectives. Revisionist history is often scoffed at, but relooking the broad front strategy can furnish insight. Bourque touches on this a few times and is eminently qualified to poke holes in the approach as a Professor Emeritus at the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies – known as the Jedi school for operational planners. If combining mass and maneuver with firepower is the hallmark of the accomplished operational artist, as Bourque argues, then the broad front strategy, the breakout of Normandy, and the Hurtgen Forest fight are arguably unimaginative. Thinking about operations, where we want to fight battles, is often divorced from the tactical, the battle itself. The description of the 4th Infantry Division's fight in the Hurtgen Forest describes a tactical unit fighting within an operational context. I cannot help but think of the fighting in Ukraine to underscore this point. Ukraine's second offensive was far broader and gained little compared to their foray into Kursk. While I am not suggesting one is better, interrogating this history can help us understand the present. A broad front screams attrition, while a focused penetration could cause an enemy to collapse. It's food for thought as the US Army cognitively prepares for its next war.

Tubby is a MUST READ for the Field Grade officers who run our brigades, divisions, and corps. It's not just the leadership lessons that make this book powerful, but thinking about how a division fits into a larger fight. It is difficult to conceive and visualize that fight within the context of the forever wars. Bourque does an incredible job describing that fight within the life of one commander. Go grab a copy.

AFCEA Kansas City University of North Texas Association of the United States Army - AUSA Torch.AI Stephen Bourque