Trust Factor

Military formations have long searched to lessen the tension concerning the rigidity of their organisational frameworks and the demand for quick, determined, resourceful leadership plus versatility of action on the battlefield. General George Armstrong Custer's ego, for instance, blinded him to the facts of the situation at the Battle of the Little Big Horn, and it cost many men their lives in consequence. The US Cavalry of the nineteenth century looks to have lacked the organisational checks-and-balances required to halt one man's dangerous ambitions. But excessive centralised control, bureaucracy and restraint can be equally as perilous as too little.

During Operation Mercury, the German airborne invasion of Crete in May 1941, General Bernard Freyberg, the island's commander, and his subordinates decided on an outdated static defence when faced with aggressive, highly motivated but lightly armed paratroops. It was largely because of Freyberg's autocratic style of leadership and antiquated military thinking which enabled the Germans to eventually wrestle control of the island away from its Commonwealth defenders, a numerically superior force, and impel a humiliating evacuation.

Not only did the Germans operate every technological advantage readily available to them, but they also harnessed the team morale, or fighting spirit of the Fallschirmjaeger (paratroops), a wholly new variety of warrior. Unlike much of its adversaries back then the German military machine relied on swift campaigns of strike and manoeuvre. By forming all available units into Kampfgruppen, or Battlegroups, a local commander had the tools, understanding and freedom of action to ruthlessly make use of the slightest weakness in the enemy line without hesitation. In contrast, Freyberg's unit commanders practiced almost no freedom of control over the battles they fought and lost.

"You must comprehend the full reason of every enterprise, to ensure that if your leader be killed you can yourself fulfil it."'Ten Commandments of the German Parachutist', The Fall of Crete by Alan Clark.

Usually, the British Army of the Second World War still relied on training its soldiers to simply obey orders without asking too many questions. Officers seldom took NCOs into their confidence about operational matters, let-alone the rank and file. As a result, when a unit's officer was killed or badly wounded there was nobody ready to take command with enough operational knowledge to complete the mission.

The Germans embraced a much more enlightened and pragmatic policy, whereby every man was counted on to be able to step into the shoes of his direct superior. The German Army's system stimulated and rewarded initiative, adaptability and daring. The result was a crop of fine, resolute, skilled planners and aggressive leaders, such as Erwin Rommel, Walther Model and Kurt Student. Only later, as the war progressed, did the British and other Allied armies start to progressively adopt similar methods.

Victory or defeat in the corporate sphere may not cost lives but can most certainly cost livelihoods. Rigid organisational structures and strong corporate cultures can often do more to hinder talent than take advantage of it. As opposed to fast-moving, flexible organisations consistently ready to ruthlessly cash in on a competitive advantage, many companies are impeded by their own bureaucracy and an army of timid, indecisive middle managers. For fear of making the wrong decision, and being incriminated, these individuals make no decisions. As an alternative they choose to forever analyse or prevaricate. For significantly too long UK businesses have failed to value the importance of buying professional management training, management consultancy or regulatory compliance or risk management advise, learn how to better their internal communications and leadership skills.

In countless ways the German military approach may possibly be likened to Charles Handy's concept of a 'doughnut organisation', as expressed in his book 'The Empty Raincoat'. As a central organising principle Handy proposes a balance between 'core' roles, responsibilities or duties and a 'bounded space' where initiative, daring and imagination might be shared, cultivated or examined. The primary difference between a doughnut organisation and a traditional hierarchy, whether commercial or military, is one of trust.

The Allied commander of Crete saw no place for discretion or freedom of action among his line officers. Rigorous control of troop dispositions was designed to ensure an expected outcome. This proved counter-intuitive, as it simply robbed line-officers of their freedom of action; the option to adapt to changing circumstances on the battlefield. The German system also wanted to impose a regime of strict discipline and obedience within its ranks. The Germans instilled an extreme sense of duty and loyalty to the Fatherland within its troops. However, this was strengthened with trust in a shared vision, values and beliefs plus a man's personal qualities, for example integrity, intelligence and courage, in addition to his professional talents. Men were recognised, rewarded and rapidly promoted for their daring, inventiveness or inspired leadership. It's hardly shocking to learn that most of Germany's senior commanders during the latter stages of the war had been relatively junior officers at its outbreak.

These days we see many varieties of Charles Handy's doughnut organisation as numerous ventures finally come to understand that bureaucracy tends to remain cumbersome, unresponsive, costly and uncompetitive. One example of just such a transformation is the HM Treasury's National Savings and Investments agency (NS&I).

Until the late 1990s NS&I employed a staff of over 4,000 to develop, promote, sell and service its wide range of government-backed saving and investment products such as ISAs and Premium Bonds.

"The new shape of work will centre around small organisations, most of them in the service sector, with a small core of key people and a collection of stringers or portfolio workers in the space around the core."

Charles Handy, The Empty Raincoat.

Finding itself increasingly squeezed by new web-based entrants to an already overcrowded financial services market, NS&I struck a deal with Siemens Business Services (SBS). Siemens assumed responsibility for the bulk of NS&I sales and back office operations, excluding Post Office Counters Ltd. Over 3,500 NS&I employees, mostly sales, customer care and accounts people, transferred to SBS, securing their jobs and longer term futures.

The remaining NS&I 'core people' were then trusted to focus entirely on the development, marketing, advertising and launch of new financial products to the marketplace, or enhance existing ones. SBS received a guaranteed 10-year contract to run the NS&I call-centre plus its online and mail order businesses. Having dramatically increased its sales force almost overnight, Siemens could instantly compete for more service sector contracts. SBS also furnished NS&I with the advanced IT systems necessary for them to get closer to their customers, understand them better, explore new market opportunities, and compete more effectively.

To deliver its services and products so they consistently surpass customer expectancies, its necessary that a company's brands, people, suppliers and partners are meticulously aligned and demonstrate a high level of interconnectedness. That same organisational structure must also be versatile enough to foresee and adapt to changing customer needs, new opportunities and competitive threats. An organisation's people must be given trust, encouragement, focus and direction instead of rules, regulations or limitations. Present day IT, IS and CRM systems can also provide the necessary tools for quick, confident decision-making, and posting of corporate knowledge.

The process of gathering, assessing, sharing and, most importantly, using information can not be undervalued. The fall of Crete clearly illustrates the point. History taught General Freyberg that only a naval blockade or amphibious assault could capture his island. That meant deploying many of his men to defend the various ports, harbours or other small anchorages that punctuated the coastline. The Germans had other ideas. German strategy relied upon surprise, speed and a revolutionary new form of airborne warfare. Success or failure hinged on the paratroopers immediately seizing Crete's airfields rather than its harbours.

To secure and hold the airfields German paratroops needed to be swiftly reinforced and re-supplied with food, ammunition and medical supplies while their wounded were evacuated. The airport would also provide a base from which to fly continuous fighter and dive-bomber missions against the island's defenders. Certainly Freyberg's men did defend the airfields, but both he and they seem to have totally misjudged their strategic value. It was a simple enough equation: hold the airfields and hold the island. Do this and any seaborne element of the German invasion force would then be powerless to step in.

Nevertheless what made the loss of Crete such a severe Allied defeat was the fact that Freyberg, his superiors and political masters knew exactly when, where and how the Germans planned to strike. Due to the code-breakers of ULTRA having deciphered many of the Luftwaffe's Enigma radio traffic, the secret of Operation Mercury was out. Possession of this particular knowledge itself created a dilemma for the Allies, or so argue historians and academics. By doing something about intelligence gained by ULTRA the Germans might be tipped off to its existence, and modify their codes in response. Confronted with a potential intelligence blackout Allied High Command had a complicated choice to make. Ultimately, they chose to sacrifice the island instead of risk ULTRA.

Now, with the advantage of hindsight, it seems a highly questionable decision not to have exchanged or fully exploited ULTRA-gained intelligence for the defence of Crete. So what happened? It seems that Allied planners no-longer trusted themselves to make fair-minded strategic assessments or endorsements based on situational analysis alone. Doubt ground down their confidence, made them unjustifiably cautious, and blinded them to the opportunity of inflicting Germany's first major defeat of the war. Nevertheless, the Germans knew that airborne assaults were always hazardous adventures, and something of a gamble. Crete's garrison was a well-equipped, experienced and a numerically superior force, which really should have been quite capable of pushing back an attack by lightly armed infantry.

Honestly, surprisingly little about the failure of Operation Mercury would have given the Germans cause to examine the security of their Enigma codes. On the contrary, an Allied victory at this juncture of the war would have been an enormous boon, after countless defeats. Morale across Europe would have exploded while the myth of German invincibility would have finally been dispelled. And this achieved just a month before the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Strategically, the holding of Crete would have made the Mediterranean an even more dangerous location for German and Italian convoys, and made greater pressures on their forces in the Middle East.

The decision to protect the ULTRA secret was one point, but the inability to apply some solid military judgement in the defence of Crete was quite another. Any Allied officer worthy of the name ought to have learned some stark lessons about German strategic thinking, and the tactical deployment of Special Forces like paratroops since 1939, and planned accordingly. The Fallschirmjaeger really should have been entirely overwhelmed when at their most vulnerable: while aboard their slow and unarmed JU52 transport aircraft; during their descent; or following landing, before they could retrieve their weapons containers. Alternatively, despite suffering initial heavy losses, the Germans had the ability to adapt, overcome and finally win a truly stunning victory. As for the Allies, their defeat had no single or readily identifiable cause. Every little thing from poor communications to an inflexible command structure added to their eventual overthrow. Obviously, the lesson to be learnt here is that if something as intangible as trust, given or withheld at flash points, can decide the outcome of battles then think of what it can possibly do for your business.

Lee Werrell Chartered FCSI

Compliance Doctor

https://www.complianceconsultant.org

Source:

Battle Group! German Kampfgruppen Action of World War Two, by James Lucas, Arm & Armour, London, 1993

Changing Bureaucracies, William Antonio Medina, Marcel Dekker, 2001

Crete-- The Battle and Resistance, Anthony Beevor, John Murray Publishers, 1991

The Empty Raincoat-- Making Sense of the Future, Charles Handy, Arrow Books Ltd, 1995

The Fall of Crete, Alan Clark, cassell military paperbacks edition, 2001

The Lost Battle, Crete 1941, Callum MacDonald, MacMillan, 1993