Trump vs. Harris: Two Visions for American Foreign Policy

Reilly Hurley & Alexander Brotman

The next president is likely to inherit one of the most complex geopolitical in-trays since the end of the Cold War. From the continued war in Ukraine, conflict in the Middle East, competition with China and flashpoints like the South China Sea, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, there are a myriad of foreign policy challenges. Donald Trump has a record from his first term in office, while Kamala Harris has a record supporting Joe Biden as Vice President over the past four years. Both leaders have very different frameworks and lenses through which they view the world, owing to their unique experiences and the advisors who provide them counsel.

In this election, the United States’ ability to project power abroad and to sustain democracy at home will be watched by millions. The first test is likely to be whether there is a peaceful transfer of power four years after the violent riot which shocked both Washington’s allies and adversaries. For Harris, the link between democracy at home and legitimacy abroad is paramount. Harris would likely have more of a values and alliance-driven foreign policy, expanding upon President Biden’s outreach to nations in the Indo-Pacific to counter China’s influence, while supporting Israel and taking a more proactive role in Washington’s own hemisphere. For Trump, personal relationships and unilateral decision-making are critical for political enrichment and strength. These contrasting styles will determine how both candidates approach thorny issues like North Korea and Russia, as well as climate change, pandemic preparedness, and trade. There will also be the unknown emergencies that are nearly impossible to predict but which could have devastating outcomes. Most importantly, both leaders will have to find the right balance between restraint and overseas engagement, and the pursuit of protectionist policies vs. the realities of an interdependent and still highly globalized world.

This article contrasts Trump vs. Harris's foreign policy through the lens of three key policy areas. NATO/Ukraine, Iran, and the Indo-Pacific were chosen because they allow us to explore some key differences and similarities between the two political camps concerning the most pressing areas of global competition.?

Iran

Since the Obama Administration, the U.S. has been trying to ‘pivot to Asia’.? There’s just one problem, its focus keeps being pulled back to the Middle East, in no small part because of the influence of Iran. At the time of writing a high-stakes showdown is playing out between Iran and Israel, which has the potential to plunge the region into a larger war. The challenge of managing Iran policy persists, and the next U.S. President will face difficult decisions.?

Iran’s animosity toward Trump is no secret. In fact, in mid-July, the U.S. Secret Service reportedly received information about an Iranian plot to assassinate the former President. This hostility is not without cause. When examining Trump’s Iran policy, we can draw from a long, turbulent history.

In 2018, the Trump Administration withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), likely due to the influence of national security advisor John Bolton.? Brokered by the Obama Administration to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, the JCPOA was largely seen as effective in achieving Washington's goals, though it had its share of detractors . Trump’s unilateral exit from the agreement and the reimposition of sanctions were seen as a betrayal.?

Despite this, Iran continued to comply with the deal along with the other parties, China, France, Russia, Germany, the UK, and EU.? However, Iran’s strategy faltered when the U.S. pursued a ‘maximum pressure’ campaign, reimposing heavy sanctions and cutting Iran off from the global financial system.? In the end, Iran bore the cost of sanctions while also being prevented from pursuing its nuclear aims, a lose-lose.?

While the maximum pressure policy had some success , such as reducing Iran’s currency reserves and curbing economic growth, it largely failed to contain Iran’s proxy activities in the broader Middle East. Iran’s influence arguably grew, which led Trump to order the 2020 killing of Qasem Soleimani, in response to perceived threats against U.S. personnel.?

Soleimani’s killing—he was the commander of the Quds Force and widely considered Iran’s second most powerful figure—marked a new low in U.S.-Iran relations. This action likely prompted Iran to formally end compliance with the JCPOA, although it had already begun distancing itself. Nevertheless, Iran maintained its cooperation with the IAEA, leaving the door open for future talks with a new U.S. administration.?

However, the new Biden Administration did not negotiate, and no return to the JCPOA was imminent.? If anything, there was remarkable continuity in Middle East policy.? This may be due to the popularity of Trump’s policy among the Gulf States and key U.S. allies such as Israel.? Indeed, Biden continued to negotiate along the lines of the Abraham Accords , an effort Trump had begun.? However, Iran viewed these negotiations with alarm, especially after it became apparent Saudi Arabia might join.? This would constitute the consolidation of a U.S.-Saudi-led block, in opposition to the Islamic Republic’s regional goals. So Iran decided to upset the applecart and it did so by using its influence in Hamas to spark the ongoing Israel-Hamas War .?

When evaluating the policy of a potential Harris Administration we can take some clues from the way Biden has handled the present crisis between Israel and its neighbors.? Biden’s approach has been de-escalation with deterrence, stationing multiple carrier groups in the Persian Gulf, and Mediterranean, but using Gaza peace talks as a possible incentive for Iran to de-escalate.? The U.S. has only taken defensive action on behalf of Israel, shooting down drones during Iran’s retaliatory missile salvos in April and September 2024. U.S. naval actions in the Red Sea to deter the Houthi group, another Iranian proxy, yielded mixed results, ultimately failing to prevent missile strikes launched over Israel.??

Biden has given Israel latitude to pursue an aggressive strategy in the ongoing conflict, including an embassy bombing, and high-profile assassinations. However, the relationship with Israel has been strained by a dramatic escalation, including a systematic assault on Hezbollah leadership , and a ground operation in Southern Lebanon.? The U.S. was blindsided by Netanyahu who gave the impression he was pursuing de-escalation, before delivering a fiery speech in front of the UNGA, mere hours before the killing of Hassan Nasrallah , the political leader of Hezbollah. After the retaliatory missile barrage by Iran, The U.S. position became clear as it urged Israel to be restrained in its response. Biden is trying desperately to avoid a regional war before the U.S. elections.?

If Harris continues similar policies, we can expect continued attempts to de-escalate the region. This would be especially likely if her current national security advisor, Philip Gordon , remains in his role. Gordon’s previous writings suggest a strong aversion to escalation or counterinsurgency conflicts, and he would likely seek to avoid deeper U.S. entanglement in the region.? Given Gordon’s influence, it is possible we will see the first major departure from Biden's policies under Harris, with Israel given a shorter leash to carry out aggressive operations that could drag the U.S. into a wider war.??

In the right circumstances, we could even see a return to nuclear talks between Tehran and Washington.? Although Iran was stung during its last attempt at detente with the West, it seems to be leaving the door open for talks. Ayatollah Khamenei hinted at the possibility of talks in an August speech, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian also indicated in September that Iran could be ready for talks with the West regarding nuclear policy.? Of course, that was before the killing of Nasrallah.??

Iran refrained from launching large-scale direct attacks on Israel, perhaps waiting for the U.S. election before considering a deal. However, they were eventually forced to respond after the killing of Nasrallah, to maintain deterrent credibility in the region.

Harris and Gordon may find a deal tempting if it can avoid regional escalation, and allow the U.S. to pivot to East Asia. However, this possibility seems remote at the moment with deepening conflict engulfing the region. In fact, in a recent 60 Minutes interview , Harris pointed to Iran as the U.S.’s main international rival, casting doubt on any hope of a diplomatic resolution. Another added factor is the internal politics of Israel.? Israel’s ruling coalition and Netanyahu are vehemently opposed to such a deal and may try to sabotage it from the outset. The ongoing operation in Southern Lebanon is in part motivated by Netanyahu’s dire political position fighting a multi-front war which may only by winding down with the killing of Yahya Sinwar .?

Considering a Trump Administration, there is no reason to believe he or his national security team will deviate from a hardline policy described earlier in the article. Given Trump’s preference for transactional, bilateral dealmaking and the popularity of his previous policies among Arab states and Israel, alike, we are unlikely to see any softening on Iran or limits placed on Israel.?

In response to Iran’s October missile strike on Israel, Trump advocated for Israel to strike Iranian nuclear facilities. Given these and other statements, there is a strong likelihood that a Trump Administration may attempt to more actively confront Iran, and punish it and its proxies with direct strikes. In particular, we could easily see a concerted campaign against the Houthi group, strikes on Iranian infrastructure, or deeper involvement in Lebanon.??

It is difficult to gauge the influence of potential Trump national security advisors such as Elbridge Colby and Richard Grenell concerning Iran.? While Grenell has expressed a strong isolationist streak, Colby has voiced skepticism of U.S. ability to prioritize multiple regions and advocated for a strong shift toward China at the expense of other regions. Both advocate for a more self-reliant EU and NATO, with Grenell voicing general euro-skepticism and Colby seeing a rebalance as a strategic necessity.? While we can assume some level of hawkishness from these two on Iran, a deeper involvement in the Middle East would clash with their priorities on a global scale.?

While a hawkish approach may be successful in tightening pressure on Iran, it has downsides. Namely, Iran would also be free to pursue its own damaging unilateral action if the possibility of negotiation is removed.? It could also embroil the U.S. in a regional war, in direct conflict with the clear aims of Trump’s likely national security advisors to pursue a complete pivot toward East Asia. Finally, despite a hardline approach, a Trump Administration will still have to grapple with a potentially nuclear-capable Iran.??

In its latest report , the IAEA said that Iran has enriched its uranium to 60% purity, a step away from weapons-grade.? Indeed, a nuclear-armed Iran is a very real scenario that both Harris and Trump will need to confront.? Given the implications for the greater Middle East, this will be a key test of either administration.?

Confronted with the idea of Iran possessing a nuclear weapon, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stated, “We will have to get one” .? Setting aside a nuclear-armed Iran, a new era of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East would be a disastrous outcome for Washington.? This only underscores the vital importance of a thoughtfully crafted Iran policy for both a Harris or Trump administration, particularly if either ever wants to fully pivot to East Asia.?

China and the Indo-Pacific

If Washington can shift its focus away from the Middle East and avoid being drawn into a regional war, perhaps it will complete its “Rebalance” to East Asia. The pivot has been a priority for U.S. policymakers since the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of China as a major power. However, it was truly solidified in a paper by Hillary Clinton in Foreign Policy.

The paper outlines the region's importance to U.S. interests, noting Asia’s significant share of the world’s population and GDP. Indeed, as it stands today, the Indo-Pacific accounts for more than 60% of the global population, and East Asia alone represents nearly 30% of global GDP. The paper also called for closer cooperation with China, reflecting an ambivalence about U.S. relations with the growing superpower.?

Though the Obama Administration found itself consistently embroiled in crises in the Middle East, it was able to begin shifting its strategic focus. The administration increased security cooperation and bilateral military alliances with East Asian nations and pursued efforts such as the TPP to boost trade and anchor U.S. presence in the region. Though the relationship with China remained somewhat uncertain, we began to see the early stages of a containment strategy during the later Obama years.

However, it was the Trump Administration that accelerated the process. Within the first year of his Presidency, Trump fulfilled his campaign promises and plunged the U.S. into a trade war with China. The policy disrupted international norms around trade and triggered the unraveling of U.S.-China relations. If the trade war lacked a clear guiding philosophy beyond political PR, the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) did not.

NSS 2017 marked a critical turning point for Washington, highlighting key areas of conflict with China, including unfair trade practices and rampant intellectual property (IP) theft. The document’s adoption in 2018 set the stage for a ‘whole of government ’ approach to China policy, mobilizing federal efforts to increase tariffs, impose sanctions, and crack down on IP theft and espionage within the U.S. The U.S. Pacific Command also shifted its posture around this time and renamed itself to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

This policy was likely driven by newly appointed Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who vocally opposed China’s ambitions. Trump’s attempts to negotiate a trade deal with China in 2019 must have been somewhat frustrating for Pompeo, but he didn’t have to wait long. The unforeseen events of 2020 and the global pandemic erased any hopes of reversing the trajectory of U.S.-China relations. Once again, China landed on Trump’s bad side, and the ‘whole of government’ approach continued at full throttle. Additionally, the supply chain disruptions and China’s strict pandemic protocols made the subsequent decoupling easier.

Though Trump’s policy was criticized at the time and seen by many as extreme, it is notable that Biden largely continued his policies . This marks an important acknowledgment by Washington policymakers, that China’s rise to superpower status was largely enabled by the U.S.-led order, and that the U.S. must now act to reverse China’s influence. Biden largely kept tariffs and sanctions intact and even deepened the divide with China through the CHIPS Act .

Some key differences between Biden and Trump lie in their approaches to containment. Biden has opted for a more multilateral strategy in the Indo-Pacific, while Trump favored a bilateral approach. Biden has leveraged organizations such as ASEAN and APEC, as well as the new trade initiative IPEF, to counter China’s influence in its own backyard. This approach, likely crafted by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, gives us insight into how a potential Harris Administration might operate.

The Russo-Ukraine War only accelerated the decoupling and de-risking processes under Biden, as China and Russia formed an uncertain partnership of convenience. Though China largely kept Russia at arm’s length, avoiding direct military support, Biden used the conflict to further consolidate U.S. alliances toward China’s containment. Reshoring and friend-shoring gained momentum, benefiting nations like Vietnam and Mexico, while the CHIPS Act propelled U.S. firms like NVIDIA to greater prominence.

China has been heavily investing in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), utilizing its relationship with Russia to secure essential resources. It has leaned into the BRICS network, providing an alternative for nations looking to reduce exposure to U.S. sanctions regimes. China has solidified its claims in the South China Sea through aggressive island-building . Perhaps most importantly, it has ramped up military exercises around Taiwan, to normalize such actions ahead of a potential blockade or invasion, and make preempting such an operation very difficult. Reintegrating Taiwan remains not only a key domestic political goal for China but a major geostrategic one, allowing it to secure sea routes and break free from encirclement by U.S. allies.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has been strengthening its military encirclement of China. Through partnerships with Japan and the Philippines, the U.S. has fortified the first island chain with an extensive missile defense network, with Taiwan serving as the linchpin. Washington has solidified its relationship with the island nation, even hosting rotations of U.S. military trainers. Overall, the U.S. has used increasing Chinese aggression in the South China Sea as a rallying point to build support among China’s neighbors. This containment strategy has been bearing fruit with South Korea and the Philipines recently tightening military cooperation , and Japan’s PM Ishiba floating the idea of an East-Asian NATO.?

We are likely to see much of the same strategic maneuvering from a potential Harris administration, leveraging China’s aggressions against itself while maintaining strategic ambiguity regarding Taiwan. It seems likely Harris will seek to avoid direct confrontation with China while continuing to strengthen economic and defense relationships in the region, leaning on agenda-setting in multilateral organizations. This approach has worked well for Biden, and there’s little reason to believe Harris’s National Security Advisor, Philip Gordon, would diverge from it. Gordon has emphasized the importance of confronting the Russia-China axis through strengthening multilateral alliance structures in Asia, particularly ASEAN, AUKUS, The Quad, and the trilateral relationship between Japan, South Korea, and The Philipines.?

Interestingly, the success of a Harris Indo-Pacific strategy might depend on effective diplomacy in other regions. The U.S. will need to use agile diplomacy to avoid large-scale conflict in the Middle East, a highly uncertain issue at the time of writing. Philip Gordon’s transatlanticist approach will also be critical in Washington’s attempt to “walk and chew gum at the same time” concerning the EU and NATO. If Gordon sees U.S. strength as rooted in its global alliance structure, he will know that failure to support allies in one part of the world could have far-reaching consequences in other regions. Harris and Gordon will therefore look to strengthen support for Ukraine and NATO allies while maintaining strong relations in the Indo-Pacific.

While this article highlights many similarities between the two U.S. political camps regarding Indo-Pacific strategy, some notable differences exist. This is especially apparent concerning the idea of “walking and chewing gum.” Elbridge Colby, a likely candidate for future National Security Advisor under Trump, doesn’t believe the U.S. has sufficient power projection to fully commit to two regions. He has argued that Europe should take the lead in countering Russia, asserting that European states are strong enough to confront Russia on their own, freeing the U.S. to focus on the Pacific. Depending on how influential you consider the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 , this document takes a similar stance.?

Colby contends that China can be prevented from achieving regional dominance through a strategy of denial. This means maintaining control of the first island chain and making any attempt by China to seize Taiwan so costly that it would severely weaken China. Another challenge for a Trump Administration will be managing multilateral relations and maintaining momentum in regional trade and defense organizations. Trump has a history of alienating U.S. negotiating partners, however, his first term was not as bad as many might think. Despite trade tensions, Trump built a strong rapport with Japan’s Shinzo Abe. With South Korea’s Moon Jae-in, he focused on North Korean diplomacy but faced friction over defense costs. In the Philippines, Trump aligned with Rodrigo Duterte on security, despite human rights concerns.

Whether it is Harris or Trump, the next President will quickly find that ideals often bend to pragmatism when faced with the reality of confronting China in the Indo-Pacific. As noted throughout the article, there is significant consensus between the two camps when it comes to this region. Their differences are more evident at the broader strategic level, where success or failure may ultimately be determined. Policy is more likely to conform to international constraints than to ideology. Nevertheless, many analysts believe China will attempt a move toward Taiwan by 2027 when the PLA will have sufficient regional power projection . Whether this manifests via political pressure, a blockade, or an all-out invasion remains to be seen. The next President will need to rise to the challenge, facing what could be the most significant geopolitical event of the 21st century.

Ukraine and NATO

As the conflict in Ukraine will enter its fourth year at the time of either Donald Trump or Kamala Harris’ inauguration, relations with NATO are likely to remain a key foreign policy priority. Donald Trump has long been criticized for his views on NATO, most recently by inviting Putin to do whatever he pleases to NATO member states who have not committed 2% of their GDP to defense. Since Trump left office in January 2021, over 20 of NATO’s 32 member states are now meeting the 2% threshold, which is increasingly being advocated as a floor and not a ceiling in the years ahead. However, Canada is not expected to reach 2% until 2032, while Poland will likely be past 5% before the next US election in 2028.

In contrast to Trump, Vice President Harris is likely to remain a transatlanticist in Biden’s image, valuing the importance of NATO and America’s long-standing alliances when confronting other geopolitical threats such as China. While Harris is unlikely to be as brash as Trump in reprimanding NATO allies, she and Trump both share a commitment (along with many European leaders) to Europe carrying more of its weight in the defence of its own territory. For their part, the Trump campaign and former senior defense officials like Elbridge Colby who support Trump and would likely serve in a second Trump term, view this position as helping Europe by making it become more self-reliant. Self-reliance, burden-sharing, and collective responsibility will remain the buzzwords for NATO and Europe regardless of who wins in November. While it remains improbable that the US would formally withdraw from NATO in a second Trump term, the mere threat is likely to be repeatedly used as a weapon from which to extract greater commitments and concessions from allies.

It is hard to predict where the conflict in Ukraine will stand at the time of the inauguration in January 2025. Ukraine’s ambitious Kursk offensive has dramatically altered the battlefield, while Ukrainian cities continue to be bombarded by Russian missiles and another long winter of energy cuts and threats to critical infrastructure looms. A key early test of how committed Harris is to Ukraine’s victory will be whether she allows Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike military targets deep inside Russian territory, something Washington’s allies like the UK have already allowed. This would greatly increase her standing in Poland, the Baltic states, and with other key NATO allies.

In contrast, Trump has promised a push for a negotiated settlement along the existing lines of the conflict, something that is trickier now given Ukrainian moves into Russian de jure territory, a position President Zelenskyy has no plans of relinquishing anytime soon. In contrast to Harris, Trump sees victory in Ukraine not as the restoration of its full territory and Euro-Atlantic integration, but in the cessation of hostilities to potentially notch as a diplomatic win. At the presidential debate on September 10, Trump didn’t answer the question as to whether he wants Ukraine to win the war, only saying the war must end and that he would be able to end it prior to his inauguration. In response, Harris claimed Trump would have let Putin roll into Kyiv unimpeded, further threatening NATO member states like Poland. Harris has received the endorsement from leaders of the large Polish-American community in Pennsylvania, and Zelenskyy visited a munitions plant in Pennsylvania during his recent trip to the US, while also meeting with Harris, Trump, Biden, and others. In contrast to Harris, Trump and his running mate JD Vance both claim to care very little or not at all as to what happens in Ukraine, something that aligns more closely with Republican voters who are less likely to see supporting Ukraine as in America’s interest.?

Amongst NATO allies, Trump will have some positive relationships as well as some more acrimonious ones. In his first term, Trump was able to build strong relationships with French President Emmanuel Macron, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, and Poland’s President from the formerly ruling Law and Justice party, Andrzej Duda. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico are other natural allies for Trump. Furthermore, NATO’s new Secretary General and long-time Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte is also someone who knows how to effectively manage Trump, even being called a ‘Trump whisperer’ during his first term. However, under Trump, relations with Germany are likely to be some of the worst on the continent, owing to its low defense spending and critical comments made by former ambassador to Germany Richard Grennell , and former National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien . Both men may have key national security roles in a second Trump administration.

It is too simplistic to say relations with NATO will be positive under Harris and poor under Trump. For Harris, NATO is a natural ally that serves a critical role in upholding the international order, while for Trump, NATO is an uncomfortable partner that is capable of both helping and hurting the United States. While intergovernmental organizations like NATO are important, relationships at the bilateral level amongst individual leaders still matter greatly in international politics. Trump may be capable of enacting more positive reforms within certain NATO member states, preferring to deal outside of large institutional frameworks, while Harris may excel in high-level, strategic agenda setting. Different NATO member states are likely to interpret their presidencies differently, with some opting for complacency under the protection of continued American security guarantees, and others deciding to accelerate their own commitment to collective defense.

While Harris and Trump have different visions regarding support for Ukraine and the future of NATO, they share a similar worldview that demands Europe step up to the new geopolitical reality. The peace dividend that resulted from the end of the Cold War is long over and Europe is unlikely to be the center of geopolitical affairs in the remainder of the 21st century. However, its security remains critical for power projection and stability in other spheres of conflict like the Indo-Pacific, which is set to dominate Washington’s focus in the decades ahead.

Concluding Remarks

While researching this article we were struck by the surprising convergence in the philosophies of the two camps, although there remain key, differences that will be critical in deciding the course of world affairs

The stark differences between Harris and Trump on NATO and protectionist policies versus a multilateral approach underscore the ongoing debate over the best course for U.S. foreign policy. Harris’s likely commitment to a values-based, alliance-driven strategy would continue Biden’s efforts to reinforce NATO and maintain America’s role within multilateral institutions. In contrast, Trump’s approach prioritizes transactional, unilateral actions, emphasizing “America First” by demanding greater financial commitments from allies and encouraging more independent European security efforts. This divergence in NATO policy could have significant implications for U.S.-European relations and the stability of the transatlantic alliance.

Despite these differences, a rare alignment emerges around the Indo-Pacific. Both Harris and Trump view China as the primary competitor to U.S. influence, with bipartisan support for strategic competition through military positioning, economic policies, and alliances. While Harris may lean toward multilateral partnerships like ASEAN and The Quad, Trump’s approach centers on strengthening bilateral relationships and reshaping trade dynamics to counter China. Ultimately, both candidates recognize the stakes involved, indicating a shared commitment to countering Chinese power and safeguarding U.S. interests.

The next president's policies mustl not only tackle immediate challenges but also shape the course of global affairs for generations to come. Their approach—whether prioritizing multilateral alliances or a more America-first stance—will influence how power and stability are maintained worldwide. Decisions on foreign policy, trade, and global engagement will set a foundation for the U.S.’s role in an evolving international order, impacting allies and adversaries alike as they navigate a rapidly changing world.

About Reilly Hurley: As the Editor-in-Chief of The Geopol Journal and a keen geopolitical analyst, I focus on great power competition in a rapidly evolving international landscape. With an academic foundation in political science and international relations, I bring deep insights into the forces shaping our world.

About Alexander Brotman: Political risk and intelligence analyst with experience in geopolitical risk writing, corporate investigations, and protective intelligence. Graduate of The University of Edinburgh with an MSc in international relations and passionate about all things related to geopolitics, technology, and intelligence. Writer and researcher for a diverse set of audiences and with exposure to a broad set of industries and stakeholders, currently embedded with a multinational tech company delivering actionable insights and analysis for C-suite executives.