The Trump effect: an insight into how national and international powers reacted to his announcement on US withdrawal
The 4th of november 2019 marked the day that the US government served official notice to quit the Paris Agreement, which initiated a year-long process to formally exit the Agreement. Already two years ago Trump announced his intentions to withdraw. Since then, political as well as economic powers inside and outside the US have reaffirmed their support for the Agreement. Even though some blame the very disappointing results of COP 25 in Madrid on a negative "Trump effect", initial reactions to the announcement on withdrawal indicated otherwise: many promises were made regarding ambition and motivation to make up for the absence of the US.
After laying out the environmental and political context, this article summarizes the implications of Trump's announcement on withdrawing from the Paris Agreement for the global climate regime. It illustrates that the doom scenario of the US leaving the Paris Agreement might not be such a doom scenario after all. However, the positive "Trump effect" might be turning into a negative one, with token climate leaders once again failing to live up to their promises.
The Context: Climate Change
During the industrial revolution, mechanization and automatization set out the foundations for a capitalist and consumerist global society. Besides spreading prosperity and development around the world as never seen before, with the US as a superpower, the dream for economic development also tilted the balance between consumption and conservation to a new, unsustainable equilibrium. One of the repercussions of such rapid and widespread development, was the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG). The greenhouse effect resulting from our atmosphere is what made life possible on earth. However, due to atmospheric concentration attaining its highest level in the last 3 million years, it might make life on earth a lot less pleasant. Anthropogenic sources of GHG are mainly the burning of fossil fuels, deforestation and the production of cement. The main sectors contributing through fuel combustion are, by decreasing importance, electricity and heat production, transport, manufacturing industries and construction, residential buildings and commercial and public services. The agricultural sector is also an enormous GHG emitter, mainly due to associated deforestation and methane produced by cattle and rice paddies. This pararagraph should by now contain only widely known facts.
In the past decades, the issue of climate change has established itself as a global threat to the promise of sustainable development. The Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development is a UN framework, adopted by all UN Member States in 2015, that has as a goal to provide a shared blueprint for peace and prosperity for people and the planet, now and into the future. At its heart are the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). SDG 13 is defined as “Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts”. These impacts include rising sea levels, changes in precipitation patterns, more droughts and heat waves, more intense hurricanes, an ice-free arctic, food crises, and so on.
The USA has contributed 1/4 of global cumulative CO2 emissions.
One of the biggest paradoxes within the climate change issue is related to impact distribution: those who have contributed less to global warming, are suffering the most severe consequences. This brings us to the role of the USA: in 2017, they had contributed 26% to global cumulative CO2 emissions, remaining the largest emitter in the world. Since 1990, USA emissions have stayed relatively stable, even decreasing in the past few years, dropping to 6,457 million metric tons of CO2 equivalents in 2017. This drop in 0.5% as compared to 2016 can be attributed to the switch from fossil fuels to natural gas, strict regulations from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and an increased use of renewables. Even though the overall trend looks promising, emissions were higher again in 2018. Also, it is important to keep in mind that in 2018 per capita CO2 emissions were 16.1 metric tons per person. For comparison, China still emits approximately only half of this per capita. The USA is only surpassed by 10 countries such as Qatar, Kuwait and Luxembourg.
The US is already experiencing negative effects of climate change, especially related to wildfires, flooding and typhoons, albeit with a lower impact than in developing countries. The Fourth National Climate Assessment Volume II, published in 2018, reports estimates for US annual economic losses due to climate change in 2090, according to the Business As Usual scenario. For example, heat-related deaths alone could cost them 141 billion $/year and damages to coastal property 118 billion $/year. For sectors where positive effects are observed in some regions or for specific time periods (for example, reduced mortality from extreme cold or beneficial effects on crop yields), the effects are typically dwarfed by changes happening overall within the sector.
An imperfect solution, the Paris Agreement
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in May 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit. Its objective is to “stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”. There are 197 Parties to the Convention. In the following years annual Conferences of the Parties were held, resulting in various agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The US Senate never ratified the Protocol. On the contrary, already five months before the Kyoto meeting, the Senate passed the non-binding Byrd-Hagel resolution, stating that:
“the US should not be a signatory to any protocol … which would (A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol … also mandates new specific scheduled commitments … for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period, or (B) result in serious harm to the economy of the US.”
In 2001 President Bush tried to justify the non-ratification: “I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80% of the world, including major population centres such as China and India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm to the US economy”. The refusal to ratify empowered the international community to adopt the Marrakesh Accords in 2002. However, the spirit of solidarity was short-lived. During the second term of the Bush administrations, the Bali Road Map was launched, which marked the beginning of abandoning Kyoto and creating an alternative agreement. The next attempt, the Copenhagen Accord of 2009, was branded a failure. The Accord was a deal struck by only the US and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South-Africa, India and China) and it can’t be considered a legal instrument.
The UNFCCC’s crown jewel is the Paris Agreement, which was adopted by all UN Member States in December 2015. The central aim of the Agreement is to “strengthen the global response to climate change by keeping a global temperature rise this century well below 2°C above pre industrial”. It entered into force on 4 November 2016. The Agreement’s biggest merit is the fact that it united developed and developing nations into a common cause to undertake ambitious efforts to combat climate change and adapt to its effects, with enhanced support to assist developing countries to do so. In order to reach these ambitious goals, appropriate financial flows, a new technology framework and an enhanced capacity building framework have to be put in place.
Setting a goal is obligatory, as well as intending to achieve them, but the achievement itself is not.
One of the Agreement’s tools are the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), which contain steps towards emission reductions and climate change adaptation, and a lay-out of what support the country needs or will provide. Some parts of the Agreement are legally binding and some aren’t. However, the “shalls” in the Agreement are not very strong. For example, Article 4 states that “Each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive NDCs that it intends to achieve.” This means that setting goals is obligatory, as well as intending to achieve them, but the achievement itself is not. The NDC of the US states: “… the United States intends to achieve an economy-wide target of reducing its GHG emissions by 26-28% below its 2005 level in 2025 and to make best efforts to reduce its emissions by 28%”.
Due to the status of the US and China as the greatest emitters, President Obama's support and his cooperation with China were seen as major factors leading to the convention's early success. However, during the last hours of COP 21 in Paris, the US panicked at the inclusion of a legally binding term, prompting last minute huddles. Suddenly an important sentence no longer read “should” but “Developed country Parties shall continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets”. Developing countries saw an opportunity in this alleged typo, but in the end the US got what they wanted and Article 4.4 was changed back to the non-binding “should”. The US certainly pushed for flexibility, because the Obama administration feared a blockade in the US Senate to anything that was binding. The Agreement was designed in such a way that Obama was able to formally enter the US into the Agreement under international law through executive action, bypassing the need for Congressional approval, since it imposed no new legal obligations on the country. The US has a number of laws already passed by Congress to cut carbon pollution.
Since it is mostly non-binding on substance but binding on reporting, the efficacy of the whole deal depends on countries “naming and shaming” each other to do better, made possible by mandatory transparency measures such as 5-yearly stock-takes. The first stock-take took place at COP 24 in Katowice, Poland. The Katowice Climate Package is a rulebook that sets out the essential procedures and mechanisms that will make the Agreement operational. However, several essential matters were postponed until COP 25. The procrastination continues: a mechanism to generate the 100 billion $ for the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and divide the financial burden between the Parties is still absent. At COP 25, the legal language on ambition was even weakened instead of strengthened. Climate Home News published a good summary of the major fights and minor breakthroughs at COP 25.
To this date, 195 Parties have signed the Agreement and 187 Parties have ratified it. The US ratified the Agreement in September 2016. The countries that are still missing are Angola, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, South Sudan, Turkey and Yemen. Turkey decided to sign to the UNFCCC as a developed country, but has since argued that it is a developing country in need of financial aid. Iran’s reluctance to ratify stems from an unwillingness to shift their economy and discontent with the possibility of economic sanctions. Until recently, Russia also belonged to this list. Large state-owned fossil fuel companies support Russia’s energy needs and wield huge political power, which inhibited formal acceptance. However, they finally ratified the Agreement in October 2019.
The earliest that any party can withdraw is on the 4th of November 2020, one day after the US presidential elections.
Article 28 of the Agreement enables Parties to send a withdrawal notification to the depositary, no earlier than three years after the agreement went into force. Withdrawal is effective one year after the depositary is notified, which means that the earliest that any Party can withdraw is on the 4th of November 2020. Although the design of the Agreement enables President Trump to withdraw, it would also make it easier for the next President to join again by administrative decision.
Disagreement within the US
On the 1st of June 2017, US President Donald Trump announced that the US would cease all participation in the Paris Agreement. Trump is a climate denier who has claimed climate change is a hoax perpetuated by China. His “We’re getting out” was an important part of his electoral campaign and also consolidates his efforts to dismantle decades of US environmental legislation, such as Obama’s Clean Power Act. His stance on climate action is rooted in his administration’s electoral populism and economic nationalism, a particular interpretation of individual liberty and a conviction that humanity has a right to exploit nature.
The “case” for leaving
The main argument made by people who want to leave the Agreement is that it shows American “losership”, not leadership. Trump argued the following in his announcement on withdrawal:
“Thus, as of today, the United States will cease all implementation of the non-binding Paris Accord and the draconian financial and economic burdens the agreement imposes on our country. This includes ending the implementation of the nationally determined contribution and, very importantly, the Green Climate Fund which is costing the United States a vast fortune.”
Emphasizing the unfairness of the Agreement, Trump stated that China will be able to do whatever they want for 13 years, building hundreds of additional coal plants. He also stated that India would be able to double their coal production and that they were relying on billions and billions of dollars in foreign aid. Even Europe would be allowed to construct more coal plants while the US would be constrained in every possible way. As the true populist that he is, he focuses on the American workers and taxpayers that he claims would absorb the cost in terms of lost jobs, lower wages and diminished economic production. The GCF is seen as a wealth transfer to the rest of the world. These economic losses would be disproportionately large compared to the environmental gains: only 0,015 °F (0,027 °C) by the year 2100. Furthermore, in recent years emissions have allegedly fallen drastically, attributed to American technology and the change from fossil fuels to natural gas.
Even though his “We’re out” might have sounded as if he would withdraw immediately, the White House later clarified that they would abide by the four-year exit process. The State Department also stated that the administration will nonetheless continue participating in international climate change negotiations, "to protect US interests and ensure all future policy options remain open to the administration." This flexibility for renegotiation is an important aspect of Trump’s motivation. His Republican background is also important: besides their conservative basis, with many coming from traditional energy sectors, they support the development of fossil fuel energy above all else. Lastly, Trump needed to fulfil his electoral promises, preparing for the next term of his administration.
The case for staying
Even though Trump has claimed otherwise, the world is not conspiring against the US. Our excitement over the Agreement resulted from the hope of finally being a step closer to tackling climate change, with commitments from everyone. A survey in June 2016 found that 71% of Americans favoured US participation in the Agreement, including 57% of Republicans. In June 2019, a poll showed that nearly 70% of Americans want the US to take “aggressive” climate action. The recent decrease in emissions in the US, 4.5% between 2014 and 2017, was partly due to the use of natural gas, but also because of stricter EPA regulations.
India and China are taking opportunities that the US is missing out on.
The Climate Action Tracker quantifies and evaluates climate change mitigation commitments, and assesses, whether countries are on track to meeting those. The map below displays the latest update from December 2019. The US’s efforts are classified as critically insufficient, based on the intent to withdraw, whereas China’s are highly insufficient. India is actually classified as 2° compatible. India and mainly China are profiting from new technologies, the latter establishing themselves as the largest producer of wind turbines and solar PV cells. They are taking an opportunity that the US is missing out on.
Arguing that even with the US doing what it promised, the world would likely pass the 2°C mark anyway, has been the problem all along for coordinating global common effort. With the Agreement offering a somewhat fair, non-binding solution, a developed nation that has the luxury to contribute should take up their responsibility. Quitting the Agreement would seriously harm international relations with allies. The Agreement strengthens competitiveness by ensuring a more balanced global climate effort, and will reduce future climate impacts, including damage to business facilities and operations, declining agricultural productivity and water supplies, and disruption of global supply chains. Ronald Reagan said it well: “Being good towards the environment … should not be a partisan issue”.
Implications
What are the possible implications of President Trump's announcement on the USA's withdrawal for the implementation of the Paris Agreement? The answer is two-fold: on the one hand, it might disincentivize other countries to keep up their promises, resulting in international slacking and free-riding. However, it could also work in the opposite direction, bolstering the commitment of Parties and stimulating subnational players such as States and companies to step up. In May 2019, the US House of Representatives passed legislation aimed at preventing withdrawal and mandating that the US develop a strategy to achieve the commitments it made. It is the first major legislation on climate change in nearly ten years to win congressional approval. Although symbolically important, the Republican-controlled Senate is unlikely to give it the green light. With Trump initiating withdrawal procedures on the 4th of November 2019, the USA can formally withdraw a day after the 2020 election. A formal withdrawal wouldn’t necessarily be permanent, because a future president could join in as short as a month’s time. Regardless of what happens on the 4th of November 2020, withdrawal or not, the President’s intentions have caused a wave of reactions.
Within the US
The US committed to making their best efforts to reduce emissions 28% by 2025. Current policy projections from the Climate Action Tracker leave the US in the highly insufficient part of the spectrum. Leading up to his announcement, Trump made plenty of changes, dismantling Obama’s efforts to further climate action in the US. Trump cancelled the Clean Power Plan and proposed the America First Energy Plan to replace it, which is intended to restimulate the fossil energy industry. He drastically cut the federal budget on climate change research and policies. Less directly, he appointed anti-climate officials to highly important positions. If Trump's climate policy is fully implemented, US emissions will flatten instead of decrease and GHG projections for 2030 could increase by up to 400 MtCO2e over what was projected when Trump first took office.
Several budget cuts will curb the progress in meeting the NDC targets. Revealed in the Budget Outline of the 2018 Fiscal Year, the EPA faces the largest budget cut in history: 31.4% of the whole budget. This stops financial support to the Clean Power Plan, cancels support to specific local actions and more than 50 EPA programs. The budget for NASA, the first organization to alert the global community to the impacts of carbon emissions, was ordered to refocus on space investigation and advanced aircraft. Internationally, the budgets for climate activities have been cut 28.7% and the support to global climate change initiatives has been cancelled, as well as for the GCF. The Obama administration previously committed 3 billion $, of which 1 billion $ has been paid.
Denying the climate policy of the former presidents harms the international image of the US as a responsible country, stripping it of its leadership position. Federal research institutions, universities and research organizations saw their budgets slashed, drastically impacting climate change research in the US. This is despite the US being the most prominent power in global climate research, accounting for 35.1% of all climate change publications, followed by the UK and then China. Before 2009, the US had more patents in the majority of low-carbon areas, but after 2009 the Chinese took over.
Even though all these measures seem very drastic, the trends on all levels but the federal seem to go in the right direction. Several articles in the Agreement encourage a diversity of stakeholders to join in the climate regime, with Article 5 emphasizing that non-party stakeholders are welcome to participate in international climate actions. Shortly following Trump’s announcement, business man Michael Bloomberg gathered thirty mayors, three state governors, more than eighty university presidents and the leaders of more than a hundred businesses to open negotiations with the UN to submit a plan for coordinating their contribution to the Agreement, America’s Pledge. He attended COP 25 in Madrid in December 2019, stating “I’m here because the White House isn’t".
Non-national actors such as cities and states can reduce their emissions in many ways, especially when it comes to renewable energy and infrastructure projects. Renewable power can be cheaper than coal, with the global average for onshore wind and solar PV in 2018 at respectively 0.056 and 0.085$/kWh. This makes them very competitive with any fossil fuel, which typically range from $0.05/kWh to over $0.15/kWh. Among city and state officials, businesses leaders, universities, and private citizens, there has been a whirlwind of participation in initiatives such as the US Climate Alliance, We Are Still In and the American Cities Climate Challenge.
The US Climate Alliance consists of 25 states committed to reducing GHG emissions consistent with the Agreement.
The US Climate Alliance is a bipartisan coalition of governors committed to reducing GHG emissions consistent with the goals of the Agreement, founded by the governors of California, New York and Washington. In two years the Alliance has grown from 3 states to 25. They intend to show that ambitious state-level climate action is achievable, benefiting their economy and strengthening their communities. Each member commits to implement policies that advance the goals of the Agreement and to report to the global community. However, Trump is fighting back: in September 2019, the White House revoked California's authority to set stricter auto emissions rules. California filed suit against this decision, which is likely be resolved only once it reaches the Supreme Court.
Similarly, corporations can take measures like buying renewable energy for their activities or ensuring their supply chains are climate-friendly. Especially multinational companies such as car makers will still need to follow ever-stricter emission laws adopted in other countries, or even individual states such as California. These companies, such as General Motors, have already invested billions into reducing emissions and are unlikely to change course. Other companies that reaffirmed their support for the Agreement include ExxonMobil, Shell and General Electric. Right after Trump’s announcement, 25 major companies signed a full-page ad urging the President to stay in the Agreement. These companies are among the top US tech, power, retail, health, consumer goods, manufacturing, and financial services companies, with a combined market capitalization of over $3.2 trillion. Some examples are Unilever and tech giants like Apple, Google and Microsoft.
25 major companies worth $3.2 trillion published a letter urging the President to stay in the Agreement.
In this way, thousands of leaders of different sectors nationwide have stepped in to fill the void created by the lack of federal climate leadership, reflecting the will of the vast majority of Americans who support the Agreement. If recorded and quantified non-state and subnational targets were fully implemented, these measures could come within striking distance of the US NDC, resulting in emissions that are 17–24% below 2005 levels in 2025. Global climate governance broadly includes participants by using public power to leverage private resources and taking advantage of existing market mechanisms instead of top-down policies. Therefore, national entities will likely be weakened. The withdrawal of the US from the Agreement will facilitate this trend.
International dynamics
Since Trump’s announcement, US envoys have continued to participate in UN climate negotiations. It is apparent that the withdrawal of the US, or just the announcement on withdrawal, might affect implementation through its influence on the willingness of other Parties to cooperate and contribute. Remembering the Byrd-Hagel resolution, with the US resisting to carry out climate action if India and China would be excused from this obligation, some fear the exit of other Parties from the Agreement.
Almost all the countries that issued a statement on the withdrawal resolved to continue the implementation of the Agreement and to strengthen their efforts, let's call it a positive "Trump effect". Most mentioned disappointment, insisted that climate change is a threat to the entire world and urged the US to stay in the Agreement. The most notable among them were China, India, Canada, Europe, Mexico, the African Union, Japan and the UK. Even North-Korea called it immoral and egoistic. AOSIS issued a statement saying “We are especially disappointed that the world’s largest economy and biggest historic emitter abdicated its responsibility on such a critical issue. Still, immediately after the US announcement was made, much of the world reaffirmed its commitment to the Agreement.” Christina Figueres, former UN climate chief, outed her gratitude towards Trump, for provoking an unparalleled wave of support for Paris.
Trump provoked an unparalleled wave of support for the Paris Agreement.
Only few countries or politicians were backing Trump, such as new UK PM Boris Johnson and Russian President Putin, who said “Don’t worry, be happy. We still have time. We should be grateful to President Trump: in Moscow it’s raining and cold and even … some snow”. Grzegorz Tobiszowski, Poland’s deputy minister of energy, commended President Trump for his decision as he was signing an agreement on developing a new hard coal-fired power unit. Despite some comments in favour of Trump’s decision, even China made it a point to say it would stay in the accord. It seems as if the “big exit” was not so realistic after all. However, this is if we can rely on the promises government officials make and if their successors will have the same mindset.
The bad blood between French President Macron and Brazilian President Bolsonaro showcases this issue. Bolsonaro has been known to want to follow in Trump’s footsteps, leaving the Agreement, which was one of his electoral promises. Even though he already came back on this, mainly due to the agribusiness business fearing international economic fallback, he still supports the idea of leaving: "I am still being ridiculed [for wanting to leave], but if it would have been any good, the US wouldn't have left". Macron recalled in a press meeting in August 2019 that Bolsonaro had sworn, hand on his heart, that he’d do everything for reforestation and Brazil’s commitments to Paris in order to sign the Mercosul. However, 15 days later, Bolsonaro broke his recent promises already, firing the head of the National Institute for Space Research, Ricardo Galv?o, accusing him of fabricating new alarming deforestation data. Bolsonaro’s government is considered by many as a great threat to the environment, with the current minister of environment being investigated for environmental fraud and a foreign minister that has argued that global warming is a Marxist plot. This is a far cry from the leftist government that participated in COP 21 and condemned Trump’s decision to leave in 2016.
As a bargaining condition Trump may probably deny the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities principle and require large developing countries to raise their mitigation goals, financial support and technology transfer. He can use environmental articles in trading agreements to make developing countries take on environmental responsibilities and obey higher environmental standards. Trump said on the matter of renegotiation: “But we will start to negotiate, and we will see if we can make a deal that’s fair. And if we can, that’s great. And if we can’t, that’s fine”. But it’s not fine: France, Germany and Italy, all members of the G7, have made it very clear that they have no intention to renegotiate. UNFCCC has emphasized that the multilateral agreement cannot be renegotiated based on the request of a single Party. If Trump would revise downward the US NDC, it would allow him to claim that he had renegotiated on terms more favourable for the US. However, climate policy experts agree that countries can do this without any special renegotiation.
Withdrawal will remove obstacles set by the US and trigger new global leadership.
If they don’t renegotiate, there is still the possibility of the US actually withdrawing. The US will cut off or decrease their financial support to international cooperation and organizations such as UNFCCC and IPCC, impeding the conduct of negotiation and fundamental processes. To some extent, it might also negatively affect science and technology cooperation, especially between China and the US. On the other hand, most argue that withdrawal will remove obstacles set by the US and trigger new global leadership. Especially China can make a bid for this position, since they have strong motivation for strengthening their efforts, mainly air pollution and technological market leadership.
There are even those who advocate that the world would be better off without the US in the Agreement. Luke Kemp has argued that a rogue US could cause more damage inside than outside the Agreement. He warned that the example of Kyoto suggests that US withdrawal is unlikely to unravel Paris in the short-term, but a second Republican term may trigger a domino effect. However, because the success of Paris largely relies on a pledge and review process, a domino effect could also occur without withdrawal. A great power that willingly misses its target could weaken the soft power and lay bare the legal porousness of the Agreement, undermining any confidence. A laggard with an effective veto at the table could seriously damage effective negotiations. Kemp emphasized that the international community should be more concerned about the actions of the US, rather than whether they are symbolically cooperating. Many are concluding that the US should be able to participate, but that the rulebook can’t be weakened to suit the US, as was the case with the Agreement, which was significantly determined by what the US wanted.
We should be more concerned about the actions of the US, rather than whether they are symbolically cooperating.
A withdrawal could make the US into a climate pariah and provide a unique opportunity for China and the EU to take control of the climate regime and significantly boost their international reputations and soft power. The absence of the US will force large developing countries to take on more burden and the next years will show if they are up for the challenge. If COP 25 tells us anything, it is that the ambitious statements by many Parties reacting to Trump's announcement, might be part of a large diplomatic game embedded in the global climate regime. Nevertheless, the long-term trends indicate that green, low-carbon, sustainable development will continue to advance on a global level and the withdrawal of the US is unlikely to change that. If only this would happen fast enough.
Future developments
In February 2019, Senator Edward Markey and Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez released a 14-page resolution for their Green New Deal (GND). The GND calls for economy-wide action to “achieve net-zero GHG emissions through a fair and just transition”. This action would consist of transitioning to 100% renewable, zero-emission energy sources, including investment in electric cars and high-speed rail systems, and implementing the "social cost of carbon". However, the GND is highly unlikely to pass under the current administration. In August 2019, major public health and environmental groups, including the National Resources Defense Council, took legal action asking to overturn the Affordable Clean Energy Rule, claiming that Trump’s do-nothing plan not only fails to reduce planet-warming missions, but also breaks the law. At COP 25 in Madrid, the US congress committed to act on the climate crisis, despite the statements of the President.
A lot will be at stake at the 2020 elections. Macron insisted that, even if Trump withdraws, the US would still be very welcome to join again. If Trump loses the 2020 election, it is very probable that the Democratic President would join again. If Trump wins, the Agreement could be altered in order to allow non-party measures. Through amendments to Article 6 a market link between subnational states and international carbon markets could be created. Ideally, a more semi-global approach with punitive carbon border tax adjustments could be taken. If the main factor holding back effective treaties would be a Republican-controlled Senate, domestic legislation and the use of sole–executive agreements could provide a way forward.
While Trump’s announcement shows a misunderstanding of the agreement and the importance of multilateral diplomacy, it doesn’t imply the unravelling of the global climate regime. Rather, the loud and swift international reaction at the time indicated the regime’s resilience. The same may not be true of US standing in world affairs. Staying in the Agreement would be a low-cost way to generate goodwill in the international community and leaving can be seen as undercutting something valued by US allies. The cost to be paid by the world economy to achieve the Agreement would be significantly higher if the US would cease their efforts. The equity implications of such a scenario would be profound. Ambition in the new NDCs, due in 2020, should be significantly higher. However, at COP 25, legal language on ambition and many other aspects was weakened instead of strenghtened. With the moto "no deal is better than a bad deal", the responsibility to decide on various essential draft texts was again transferred to COP 26 in Glasgow.
The weak outcomes of COP 25 might imply a negative "Trump effect" instead of the positive one discussed in this article. Countries' pledges to amp up their ambition to compensate for the USA lagging behind, were not yet realized, nor does there seem to be a lot of hope for this to happen soon. However, this does not take away the fact that a US administration that is at best disinterested, at worst hostile, is the last thing the climate regime needs. New leadership in the form of a strong coalition between the EU and China could still take numerous forms: linking their emissions trading systems or a more ambitious jointly determined contribution. The resulting trade pressure and loss of competitiveness and political influence could drive US climate action.
New spheres of authority are being created, with transnational, subnational and private initiatives that have the ability to strengthen what was built by the UNFCCC. Initially other countries seemed to be triggered to work harder. The doom scenario of the Paris Agreement collapsing under the pressure of the US is not that likely. However, with so many broken promises at COP 25, hopes are not high for COP 26 in Glasgow, with or without the US.
Special thanks goes to prof. Katja Biedenkopf of KU Leuven and her course on Global Environmental Politics, in the context of which I wrote this article.