Trump 2.0: Unwitting Ally of 'Systemic Transitional Fluidity'

POTUS Donald Trump, early in his second Administration, has unleashed a whirlwind of change in both domestic political-social arrangements [Trump and Musk's dismantling of government is shaking the foundations of US democracy | AP News, Inside Elon Musk’s War on Washington? | TIME] and USG's fairly well-established foreign policy frameworks and diplomacy. [ Trump's seismic foreign policy shift: From the Politics Desk, What Rubio told U.S. diplomats about the future of foreign aid, as most programs paused - CBS News] Whether on Russia's invasion of Ukraine and US-led support for the latter's defences, or for the Atlantic Alliance's pre-eminence in collaborative Western military security arrangements against Russia or indeed, any other source of insecurity, or indeed on USG approaches to the Kremlin in the post-Yeltsin era, Trump and his senior aides - often new faces within the national security 'establishment' - have turned the tables in unanticipated ways. The one area, where Trump 2.0 resembles Trump 1.0 with remarkable consistency, is USG's China-policy framed in most adverse terms.

Of course, Trump's personal record of 'fire-and-fury'-like rhetorical flourishes atypical of US Presidents, and his continuing histrionics, draw media attention and publicity oxygen away from other, more momentous developments. In that context, it would perhaps be more helpful to monitor what Trump says to excitable journalists waiting to swallow each of his dramatic pronouncements, but to observe, record and examine what his Administration actually does. And divergences if not inconsistencies between rhetoric and action may prove to be a better metric for measuring Trump 2.0's substantive impact to an already dynamic milieu.

The China Narrative: Seeking confirmation as Trump's SoS, Rubio told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "If we don’t change course, we are going to live in the world where much of what matters to us on a daily basis from our security to our health will be dependent on whether the Chinese allow us to have it or not." China, Rubio asserted, was and would remain the 'biggest threat' to US prosperity in the 21st century. [Marco Rubio says China is a threat, affirms value of NATO | AP News] As we know, Rubio won confirmation handily. His first contact with Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, according to the DoS press-release, sounded most undiplomatic and hectoring comparable to his Biden-era predecessor Antony Blinken's lecture at Anchorage in 2021. Rubio, in this account, told Wang of USG's great displeasure and 'serious concern over China’s coercive actions against Taiwan and in the South China Sea.' He underscored the Trump Administration's determination to 'pursue a U.S.-PRC relationship that advances U.S. interests and puts the American people first', as though prior Administrations had done things differently. Rubio also made clear Wang understood USG stood by its commitments to its regional allies - presumably who were threatened by Beijing. [ Secretary Rubio’s Call with China’s Director of the CCP Central Foreign Affairs Commission and Foreign Minister Wang Yi - United States Department of State].

In his discussions with counterparts from Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the EU, Rubio not only discussed collective security in Europe, but also 'China’s continuous challenge to our interests and security, and the need to defend our economies from China’s unfair trade practices.' [Secretary Rubio’s Meeting with Quint Foreign Ministers - United States Department of State]

Rubio was not alone. SoD Peter Hegseth, in his first message to US Armed forces, pledged, 'We will rebuild our military by matching threats to capabilities. This means reviving our defense industrial base, reforming our acquisition process, passing a financial audit, and rapidly fielding emerging technologies. We will remain the strongest and most lethal force in the world...We will work with allies and partners to deter aggression in the Indo-Pacific by Communist China, as well as supporting the President's priority to end wars responsibly and reorient to key threats. We will stand by our allies — and our enemies are on notice.' ?[Secretary Hegseth's Message to the Force > U.S. Department of Defense > Release]

Trump's NSA, Mike Waltz, a noted 'China Hawk.' showed an ability to grasp the power of deterrence resident in offensive capabilities, especially in the cyber realm. Grilled about China's widely-suspected 'threats' to US vital infrastructure such as its power-grid, Waltz replied, 'from my own perspective, as a broader framework, we cannot play perfect defense. We are under a tsunami of cyber attacks, and we just keep trying to defend better. Let's take a hard look at unleashing our private sector and those capabilities. Let's take a hard look at trying to change behaviors in the first place, and that will mean a better, stronger, more capable offensive capability. So that any adversary, if they believe they can destroy our grid, destroy our water supply, destroy our pipelines, if they know we can do the same, then hopefully that prevents it from ever happening in the first place.' [Transcript: Incoming National Security Adviser Mike Waltz on "Face the Nation with Margaret Brennan," Jan. 19, 2025 - CBS News ]

DNI Tulsi Gabbard - two days after being sworn in - told the gathering at the Munich Security Conference. 'The challenges presented by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea similarly demand a united front to advance the cause of peace, freedom, and prosperity. To deter aggression and maintain stability, we look forward to working closely with those who share those interests.' [DNI Tulsi Gabbard Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at Munich Security Conference]

Gabbard's predecessor, and now her colleague as the DCI, John Ratcliffe, has been far more vocally 'dragon-slaying' both in and out of office. As the Director of Central Intelligence, Ratcliffe insisted China presented 'once-in-a-generation threat' to the USA: The CIA the CIA must “continue — and increase in intensity — its focus on the threats posed by China and its ruling Chinese Communist Party,” [CIA Nominee John Ratcliffe: China Is ‘Once-in-a-Generation Challenge' | National Review]

In short, whatever Trump's public statements about his relationships and conversations with Chinese President Xi Jinping, his key National Security picks have made clear their conviction that China remains the only true source of strategic insecurity for US leaders who are profoundly troubled by China's ability to challenge US systemic primacy in a manner that even Russia, with its massive thermonuclear arsenal and demonstrated ability and willingness to prosecute conventional warfare against a Western protectorate - Ukraine - for three years, cannot do.

A Triadic Drama: After President Barack Obama failed to deliver promised 'relaxation' to Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev, [Obama tells Russia's Medvedev more flexibility after election | Reuters] US efforts to wean Moscow off from Beijing's strategic attractions initially sputtered on listlessly under Trump 1.0, but with Joseph Biden determined to deploy Ukraine as a bulwark designed to bloody and drain Russia, there was little prospect of eroding the Russo-Chinese 'friendship without limits.'

The recognition that a semi-united Eurasian supercontinent, led by mutually-friendly regimes in Russia and China, coordinating with Central Asian states, could bolster their shared capability to push back against Western dominion in both Europe and East/Southeast Asia, deepened the counter- China Quad coalition and the triggered the AUKUS triangle. With Japan energetically rearming - indeed - militarizing at a pace not seen since 1945 [Asia-Pacific Security Dynamics: US-China-Japan Triadic Trajectories | SpringerLink], warlike preparations and muscular military displays became the expression of the 'new diplomacy'.

As maritime territorial disputes between China and US-allied Philippines escalated and Manila extended the 'visit' by intermediate-range offensive-capable US Army Typhon missile systems, Japanese, French and USN aircraft carriers and their escorts engaged in joint manoeuvres in the South China Sea, asserting their right to threaten China's stated interests in those waters. [USS Carl Vinson To Drill with French Carrier, Japanese Destroyer Carrier - USNI News].

Shortly after Canberra and Washington complained against a Chinese aircraft challenging an Australian ISR aircraft close to Chinese airspace, reports emerged of a small PLAN flotilla drilling in the Tasman Sea in something of a first. [Chinese warship Sydney: Defence Minister Richard Marles says China must explain failure to give notice] Local media reported much anxiety and semi-official hyperventilation over what some described as 'unacceptable' Chinese conduct - neglecting to mention decades of 'Freedom of Navigation' sorties and close-in ISR flights and surface/subsurface missions in spaces close to China's shores against which Beijing repeatedly protested but rarely took action. Now, sudden escalation by a naval force that was increasingly modern, powerful and blue-water capable - seemingly began touching nerves.

For much of 2024, Russian and Chinese navies drilled together in the Pacific near Japan, occasionally close to US facilities, and on at least one occasion the two air forces sent their aircraft close to the US ADIZ boundaries, to be politely escorted away to safety [Russia begins massive naval drills together with China | AP News, , Why Did China and Russia Stage a Joint Bomber Exercise near Alaska?] Although PLAN flotillas are clearly able to manifest shows of force close to the sources of what Beijing sees as hostile proxies, the fact that for some years Russian and Chinese naval and air forces mounted precisely coordinated and -executed drills near US domains must have deepened DoD planners' anxiety.

This might at least partly explain USG's renewed vigour in trying to end the Ukraine War, lift sanctions imposed on Russia, resume 'normal' transactions and restore usual engagement with Moscow, and thereby erode the cement fostering Sino-Russian strategic cohesion. China being the 'pacing threat' whether with Russia or alone, efforts to isolate Beijing and defeat the PLA in detail are likely to continue. US lead in numbers is clearly declining - and advances in military sci-tech are expected to fill the gaps and maintain the systemic primate's evanescent dominance. Under normal circumstances, given the long history of DARPA's and other DoD-spawned sci-tech miracle workers' myriad breakthroughs, this would be a logical pathway to containing China.

However, as the Biden era segued into Trump 2.0, Beijing presented to the world a series of innovative advances that questioned easy assumptions of US sci-tech supremacy. [China Just Unveiled Two New Sixth-Gen Stealth Fighters, China launches world’s first electromagnetic catapult-equipped amphibious assault ship Type 076 - Global Times, Analysis | Could China’s future Type 004 replace the USS Gerald R. Ford as the world’s most powerful aircraft carrier? China's Hypersonic Weapons: A Threat to the U.S. Military? - 19FortyFive]

Systemic Transitional Fluidity: Without generating clarity, these developments, taken together, could indicate a period of increased tensions as the evanescent systemic primate doubled down on efforts to perpetuate its 'sole-superpower' status in a system increasingly fractured by the assertions of multiple sovereignties. US efforts to wean Russia off China's strategic embrace might or might not work. Will European actors endorse this particular shift? if they did, would they then - as USG seems to be suggesting now - take up the burden of heavy-lifting their own defence needs and consequent expenditures? Would that erode NATO's cohesion as a US0led instrument of planetary domination {the exercise failed in Afghanistan where, after two decades of ceaseless bloodletting against sandals-shod mainly Pashtun militias without college education, US-led forces fled in humiating defeat)? Without effective European partners to share the drain in blood and treasure, will USG engage China in conventional combat far from home? If it did, how could it assure itself of a swift victory? How could it deter or prevent escalation beyond the nuclear threshold? Even if the US and its allies 'won' a nuclear war against China - assuming China managed to lob just a few hundred warheads in a retaliatory second-strike, of which only a few managed to break through the US BMD shield, what kind of celebrations would Trump or his successors feel able to organise?

There is no written record of USG, specifically DoD, thinking on these issues. If D.C. policymakers have not actually thought through these questions and their most plausible answers, but are still ploughing on in preparation for a war with China, would they expect the Chinese state-nation to just sit on its collective hands and do nothing while USG leaders launched their presumed decapitating First-strike? In the end, US leaders may face the paraphrased version of a quandary posed by a CMC General in the late-1980s: will America be willing to sacrifice Los Angeles [or even D.C.] for Taipei or Tokyo?