Transformation Framework: Application - Confront the Brutal Facts & Its Obstacles

Confronting the brutal facts is one thing that the IC has done fairly well. At a minimum, the Congress has done the IC a fantastic service in publishing the host of reports regarding 9/11, Iraq, and other subjects, illustrating the shortcomings of intelligence support to foreign policy decision making. The IC certainly could have been defensive about these findings and pontificated about how its role in foreign affairs is really limited and that the need for transformation is similarly limited. However, that is manifestly not the case. We can be relatively impressed about how IC is has reacted. In a sense most circles have said, “We do not care it is not all our fault; we made a mistakes we might not have; now let’s get to work. We can and will be better. This is a historic opportunity to become exceptional and we must take it.” More specifically, the author has never experienced anyone in the IC who was not circumspect and intellectually honest about the fact that the IC can do better.

Most of the same ascribe to an ethos suggesting the IC can and should do more to continuously integrate all its functions better and move towards an efficient enterprise characterized by a mutually exclusive and completely exhaustive set of activities and groups. This is precisely how, after taking steps pertaining to disciplined people, transformation should continue. The IC is not for the lack of smart, analytical, focused people and it ought to use those strengths and talents, along with the IC’s increasing discipline, to uncover all the unsavory details resident in the enterprise.

To transform we must find all our weaknesses and opportunities yet never lose faith that, however grave our overlaps and inefficiencies are, we will prevail in the end. In particular, the IC should, for each agency and organization, identify the current state, overlaps, and gaps in its customer strategy, customer satisfaction and loyalty, enterprise architecture, business architecture, business processes, technical architecture and infrastructure, physical infrastructure, performance measures, and budget expenditures. Each of these represent the major functions that are a part of delivering outcomes to policymakers, customers, and consumers. In short, the IC should construct an enterprise baseline report of considerable depth so we come to a full understanding of our current state and, later, enable determination of a HC.

Meanwhile, we should be cognizant of the Stockdale Paradox. Of course we are looking for all the ugly truths of the IC. However, we should never lose faith we will prevail in the end. Blame should not be placed. Rather, the IC’s chief and other executives should use CBF as a means of pragmatically identifying the current state, not only as part of a tangible architectural approach (BTL term) but as a means of reinforcing that they trust and forthcoming managers and employees foresight. Even if CBF takes considerable time we will have begun to make an all important ‘to do’ and ‘stop doing list’ at the enterprise-, agency-, and organization-, levels. To balance the rigorous pragmatism and reasoned optimism appropriate to CBF we again highlight the four key concepts: lead with questions not answers; engage in dialogue not coercion; conduct autopsies without blame; build red flag mechanisms.

By combining this holistic architectural deconstruction enterprise, agency, and organizational findings related to Q12 and StrengthsFinder, the IC would begin to see its own institutional strengths, shortfalls, overlaps, and gaps. Virtually all of the balconies and troughs regarding people, process, technology, and infrastructure for every mission- and business-related function should become clear. Here we might infer the IC can and should then begin to prioritize and correct each of these. Not exactly.?Rather, The Council should return immediately to the drawing board. With a firm understanding of what is and is not done well within the IC, the chief executive should use The Council to develop a HC for the IC. Doing this ensures that CBF, like L5L, FWTW, precedes the formation of vision, mission, values, strategy and the like. An equally intangible cultural impact is important as well. CBF also plays a part in a creating a performance-based culture, tolerant of the discovery of mistakes, and intentional about taking a disciplined approach to continuously improving in a reasoned and systematic way.

Obstacles

To that end, discipline represents a potential barrier for the IC. The IC has a great deal of analytical and technical acumen. However, we are not necessarily characterized by disciplined people, trained in the ways of how to best design, orchestrate, implement, and manage a complex corporate structure toward an enterprise outcome. Again, this is not meant with disrespect, merely pragmatism. The ethos that drives one to be continuously, proactively better, and essentially look for ‘new work’ is different than being ‘smart’. There are many genius analysts, subject matter experts, collection professionals, and even mathematicians with legendary talent capable of making the most sophisticated code breaking and code making means known to man. However, this genius often manifests itself as an academic community. It produces some great results to be certain. However, it is not fundamentally characterized by a systematic approach with a specific performance outcome in mind and a central enterprise measurement that focuses and aligns action. To smart we must add resolve, introspection, discipline, and a performance ethic.

Another alternative is that the lack of institutional discipline may manifest itself out of the historic lack of central leadership in the IC. The relative separation and historical independence of individual agencies has predominately created, intentionally or not, a knowledge-as-power culture vice only a knowledge-worker culture. This is directly contrary to the kind of openness, trust, and forthcoming mentality needed to uncover all our unvarnished weaknesses and opportunities and improve them. As such it is a threat to

CBF and to transformation as a whole.?

Similarly, since the IC is characterized by a strongly analytical and technically proficient workforce, we may be so largely introverted in our institutional ‘style’ that only particular people will be best to be involved in the transformation steps described in this chapter. It is possible that the best course of action is to allow the larger corps of subject matter experts, in their many forms, to support the day-to-day operations of the IC and deliver its routine outputs, while others such as The Council and supporting leaders, managers, directly address CBF-related discovery. To that end, it is likely a small cadre of likely minded professionals with the enterprise, business, and functional expertise that are best to take the initial steps toward transformation.

Finally, the objective of CBF is not necessarily to re-architect (more on that later) the IC. We merely must know everything we can about the current state of the IC in order to transform it. Similarly, we acknowledge our suppositions regarding obstacles to CBF may be incorrect. The same analytical and technical, even introverted, culture may become a singular strength, seeking, discovering, and fusing findings better than another organizational culture might.