TransFAIR Pricing must be Right!
There is no doubt about it, BEPS will be at the root of the tax revolution of the century. Although it will have a big impact on corporate treasurers, it looks as if most of them are not being very proactive – as if they were already in complete compliance. Yes, as far as "Transfer Pricing" (TP) goes, there may seem to be an element of "the more things change, the more they stay the same" about it, since the rules basically already exist. But it will still require a comprehensive review of existing procedures. Looking at it more closely, it will be no easy task to put the documentation and case-by-case approach into place. A transfer pricing strategy needs to be well thought through, coordinated with the tax department, and implemented. Treasury department services can no longer ever be provided for free. Treasury departments will no longer be just cost centers, as they often are now. The margins and fees received must be coherent, consistent, and substantiated in all cases. Total transparency will also affect treasury activities. ?
?BEPS ("Base Erosion Profit Shifting"), a new tax paradigm?
The OECD's BEPS recommendations, if they are adopted by all the G20 countries, and by other countries that choose or are forced to adopt them, and if they are transposed into national law, will inevitably lead to far-reaching and lasting changes in the approach to tax. Perhaps it will mean the end of the great tax principle of being entitled to choose "the route that leads to the lowest tax charge"? Will it be possible or desirable to optimize your tax position? With all 15 BEPS Actions put forward and implemented, tax has become more complex than ever.
The fiscal transparency that governments want (particularly for obvious budgetary reasons) will result in an increase in complexity in international taxes; there can be no doubt about it. All countries are now relentlessly tracking down all sources of taxes that might be due to them. For instance, if all countries adopted CFC (i.e. “Controlled Foreign Company”) rules of the German type, the result would be that the tax authorities of each of them would seek to take all dealings and financial transactions right back to their source, to ensure that they were not being cheated. Against that, you might think, there is nothing new about transfer pricing principles under BEPS. The change will be this: as of now, they will be applied for and checked. It is this aspect of the BEPS actions that will affect inter-companies’ financial dealings in all MNCs (Multi-National Companies). The tax authorities will, as they have been doing over the last few months, focus on treasury operations, which are substantial by their very nature, to ensure that they are not being done out of any taxes due to them through financial structuring, excessive profit transfers, or for any other reason.
The more things change, the more they stay the same
The principles of transfer pricing are not new. By contrast, the way they are dealt with and applied will change. In the future, they will have to be observed, and observance will have to be properly demonstrated. Everything, every service and every financial transaction will have a specified price, a price that is specific to it and reasonable. Just as a company would not (in principle) sell at a loss, a group entity will not "sell" or render services to another entity for free, just because it is one of the family. Mates’ rates should no longer exist within multinational groups. Furthermore, within the family or within a group, members will not all be treated the same; each will have their own specific transfer price. The aim is to avoid all excess in either direction and not to give any one entity (and therefore the whole group from a consolidated point of view) a tax advantage, by over-billing or under-billing services to another subsidiary or affiliated company. Transfer pricing principles aim to produce (international) fairness in tax and to ensure that no country loses out through the simple effect of transferring exaggerated profits that are taxed at a lower rate, or not taxed at all, in the destination country. The OECD and Mr Saint-Amant, the French guy who heads up the "BEPS" initiative, want to prevent "tax shopping" and "treaty shopping" between countries – the frantic tax competition that can mar relations between countries and undermine the health of their public finances.
BEPS in practice
What does BEPS mean for corporate treasurers in practice? These transfer pricing rules will apply to MNCs. For all transactions between companies in the same group, these rules demand that several principles be observed, the most crucial and sacrosanct, of them being "at arm's length" and "cost plus". Treasury transactions obviously account for only a minuscule portion of inter-companies’ dealings. However, they are important because of the amounts involved, the volumes dealt and the special interest that the tax authorities in the various countries pay them or will pay them in the future. For treasurers this means treasury fees where they are acting on behalf of others, and margins when acting as intermediaries (that is as the group's in-house bank). We note that the tax authorities setting aside BEPS, which is not yet in force, are focusing more and more on financial transactions, asking a hundred and one questions about the whys and wherefores of the margins applied. Recent scandals, leaks, revelations about rulings, all of which are legal but have hitherto been kept secret, the low amounts of tax paid by some MNCs globally and the witch hunt atmosphere all explain this revival of interest, and consequently the need to make appropriate preparations. Ideally, treasurers would cover their operating costs by generating a margin (i.e. the "cost plus" principle of billing a base cost plus a margin that is usually between 5% and 7%). They should also routinely adopt a spread appropriate to the circumstances, depending on the risk incurred, and the risk that the counterparty would represent on a stand-alone basis. The second of these is much more difficult to implement.
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The difficulty lies in evaluating the internal counterparty's credit risk and deciding on what credit score to give it. As far as it goes, that causes additional work rather than any major difficulty, because in the final analysis a controlled subsidiary is usually underwritten by its parent company. The real difficulty lies in deciding on its own special spread. Based on (1) the subsidiary's implicit rating, (2) its business sector and (3) the country to which it belongs, the rating will vary, and with it the spread to be applied on a loan. The full or partial support of its parent company obviously influences the rate to be applied, as it significantly reduces the risk. For hedging transactions, it is trickier to decide on the spread and therefore for the tax authorities to check it. Taking a few "pips" extra on a foreign exchange hedge would seem to be very easy and realistically impossible to challenge.
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What is the ideal spread, you ask?
To apply the ideal spread to a subsidiary, you must (1) calculate and estimate it on a case-by-case basis (2) use comparisons like the stand-alone basis and (3) document it. The crucial point will be the spread applied to loans. For this you need a tool to calculate the counterparty risk represented by a subsidiary coherently and consistently, for example by awarding it a rating or credit score. This will make it possible to decide on a spread appropriate to its risk. If the risk is borne by the treasury center or the holding company, they should of course be remunerated as a result, but reasonably by comparison to current market practice. However, market practices and spreads keep changing, as indices such as the iTRAXX show. The actual spreads charged by banks are volatile. The exercise of calculating and estimating them is therefore tricky. Even though recently developed tools may exist (e.g. Bloomberg, S&P, Moody’s, etc.…), they do not easily give the exact "right" spread to apply. At best, you will have an indication or a broad range, particularly at the boundary between investment grade and high yield. You can find indicators, ranges of spreads and indicative levels, but they are often not very precise. They leave plenty of room for interpretation. Any other method that would support your price would be welcome. The bank's indicative price would be ideal. However, why do banks today provide a comparative with no chance of winning the business? So, this exercise is tricky since there are three factors at work (Financial results of borrower, business sector and country risk) and the possible support or underpinning of the parent company. From an exercise that, on the face of it, looks simple, we can very soon end up with a difficult task, that cannot always be done systematically and which needs to be harmonized throughout the group. There seems to be room for interpretation and for a certain amount of flexibility. For instance, if your solution gives you a spread corridor, an offer from a bank could upset it or change it. It would be wise to be slightly lower than slightly higher.
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The guiding principle might be to apply a spread lower than the market spread that would enable each party (the parent providing the finance and the subsidiary doing the borrowing) to gain something. For deposits, the rate should also include a spread. You would give the market rate less a minimal spread. But that becomes a problem when rates are negative. This is the case with cash pooling structures, for example. How can you not remunerate a subsidiary or apply a negative rate on its deposits at a time when current accounts are still at 0% (no penalty). Things are in the process of changing…
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All the information backing up the rates applied must now be documented, as must the relationship between the parent company and its subsidiary. This might, for example, be by a wide-ranging agreement, such as a Master Agreement or a Service Level Agreement, setting down the overall relationship (a sort of framework agreement) along with the type of services rendered. The methods of deciding on margins and spreads must also be documented. The documentation aspect may involve equipping yourself with a tool to make sure it happens. The margin should be applied to loans; on deposits; on foreign exchange, interest rates and commodity hedges; and, on issues of guarantees (both bank and parent company). Treasury fees must be charged for advisory services rendered, for administration on behalf of subsidiaries, for payment, for financing, for managing the bank relationship, for reporting under EMIR or any other regulations, for analysis or valuation, for preparing accounting entries, etc. The list cannot be comprehensive. Fees may also cover IT systems installed and administered on behalf of subsidiaries, for example the Treasury Management System or the Payment Factory solution, etc.
Standardizing does not mean being 100% effective in tax terms
By applying methods consistently and coherently, we obviously run the risk of not being tax effective or no longer being totally tax effective. For example, we may end up charging a loss-making entity whereas the treasury center is being taxed on its profits. Transparency involves fairness and the risk of inefficiency, unfortunately. This exercise therefore calls for an analysis of what exists now compared to what will exist in the future, to work out the optimal position while at the same time ensuring compliance.?
It will be no easy thing for groups that are working with no margin (at cost) to suddenly start charging their subsidiaries. For those that are already being charged, it may be necessary to "sell" them a change of method, and the accompanying cost. Even within a single group, we should never overlook the political aspect. We always need to seek the CFO's backing. This change must also be supported by top management to be "sold" internally. Charging margins and fees internally may well give rise to intense and difficult discussion (although inevitable as TP rules are compulsory). However, central treasury, using its expertise and the parent company credit rating, should be able to justify more competitive market prices and demonstrate real value added, synonymous with additional cost for the subsidiary receiving the benefit of it. The saving or cost of harmonizing and standardizing margins and other fees will be arrived at by comparing the deductibility of the margin (for the company being billed) compared to the tax on it (for the company doing the billing). If you can deduct the margin from the subsidiary's taxable income, and if central treasury's tax rate is lower, there will be net saving, and vice versa.?
Substance over form
Even though this may involve organizational changes, it may also provide opportunities for reviewing margins (upward) and for optimizing the tax situation even further. Some groups do not apply margins and provide services to their subsidiaries at cost. Other companies are prudent and do not charge exaggerated margins or apply the same margin to everyone regardless of their credit risk. Obviously, full optimization would involve charging the subsidiaries on a case-by-case basis, and only if that gave rise to a tax benefit. Sadly, that will no longer be possible. Coherent arrangements will be the order of the day. Everyone in the same boat is the rule prevailing today. Estimating the net tax cost or saving (the tax cost or saving on the margins) is therefore crucial to averting any future upsets. When preparing budgets, it would be a good idea to include these charges (treasury fees). Transfer pricing must be more effective than ever (nothing will ever be free of charge again), fair, like charges made by independent parties such as banks, justified by real services and documented, and finally evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The well-known IFRS principle of “substance over form” must also be applied. Central treasury will become a profit center if it wasn't one before, since it will generate a margin on hedging transactions and through charging fees for services rendered. The group's in-house bank can no longer just be a service center or cost center. This may be a good opportunity to centralize treasury operations further, if that had not been done before. Whether we like it or not, we will become profit centers (small and modest profits obviously, thanks to the cost-plus principle) something that has always been foreign to our mindset. For treasurers, the ?profit center" means "speculating" without necessarily having a real underlying risk. For some people this will be a real revolution!?
Nobody will be starting out absolutely from scratch; but we all need to review our internal procedures and ensure that everything complies with the principles laid down by BEPS. "If you know the value of money, go try to borrow some", as the saying goes. This is the very basis of transfer pricing.?
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Fran?ois Masquelier, Chairman of ATEL
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Disclaimer: This article was prepared by Fran?ois Masquelier in his personal capacity. The opinion expressed in this article is the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the view of the European Association of Corporate Treasurers (i.e., EACT).
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