Tower block Fire Safety (Its time to speak out)

Sydney Dekker and his thoughts on the drift to failure perhaps have some resonance here. Apparently rational (but probably rationalised) decisions are made without any consequences in the short term. Further decisions are made which reinforce or accept the earlier ones thereby normalising and justifying the situation.....and then something nasty happens as the drift away from safety enters the unsafe zone and latent failures are realised.

Just listened to your interview (my Mum in Scotland told me about it). The first sensible commentary I've heard / read. Yes I was also shocked at the degree of internal fire spread. Yes the immediate priority is to assess the risk in each building and deliver appropriate solutions. Every major life loss accident makes me think of the 30-year engineering failure theory (Walker & Sibly, Proc. ICE 1977). Was there a similar accident before? Yes, Summerland, Isle of Man, 1971. Scroll forward 28 years to the Garnock Court fire in Irvine, 1999. A 12-storey block of flats destroyed in 10 minutes by a fire spreading externally via combustible cladding. One fatality. A Scottish select committee investigation revised the building regulations - spread of fire on external walls must be inhibited. An inquiry will eventually figure out the systemic failures in the English regulatory regime that let this happen. Main question - how did so many people across so many disciplines manage to create this major hazard, followed by - how did it get accepted?

Professor Dix, Just heard your interview on ABC Radio National's 'The World Today'. https://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2016/s4692411.htm As a professional with an aerospace design background, it is unfortunately very easy to see where the vulnerabilities in what led to this tragedy are. Your previous work has identified these issues, yet the various industry and regulatory bodies (in the UK at least) seem not to have a clue or no interest in rectifying the underlying vulnerabilities in how the system of construction and certification appears to operate. That engineering/design requirements can be flagrantly ignored would suggest to me that there are too many unethical and incompetent people involved in this sector.

The manufacturer clearly states on their website the panels are not for residential use, it took me one minute to find it, it's not complicated, just simple diligence. One minute of reading and choosing correctly, sadly the lesson was learnt in the Madrid tower, nobody died so it got ignored. Chimney effect, lack of sprinklers, stay put policy all have effects of course, but fundamentally this was down to lots of people not reading clear guidelines that those panels are not for residential buildings. UAE has seen many buildings with the same problem, and sprinklers inside have stopped deaths, so should be fitted always, with power backup too, but panels that are fitted that are not for that purpose is wrong and sadly simply to find out

The design of the building, having only one entrance and exit route, is perhaps a bigger issue in this day and age. There was no mention of pressurisation to protect that single route and that would probably have been unfeasible. Kings cross demonstrate d the need for segregated routes for emergency services and escapees.... The building may well have been past it's useful life without even more expensive additional work such as external / additional before escapes. Upgrading to current standards and best practice is the bigger and more expensive issue....