Are too many security practitioners still fighting the last war or servicing past public organisations and roles?

It is often an age-old observation of recruits and new soldiers that everyone seems to be fighting the last war, not the plausible next engagement or threat. 

Entire systems, focus, processes, weaponry and experience, has been built around the last war. 

Changing the machine bureaucracy takes time, approvals and countless stakeholders, resulting in evolutionary lag.

History is littered with 'catch up' campaigns as a result. 

Young soldiers are highly critical of older soldiers obsession and focus on threats gone by, but when many of them become old soldiers themselves, they exhibit very similar if not identical obsessions of how the last campaign, war or 'enemy' was perceived. 

Policing is a local affair for the most part. 

Highly contextual and specific to limited geography and communities. 

Routine, history, reenforcing events and machine bureaucracy take time to change. 

Often it takes a significant, catastrophic, contemporary threat event to take place before a change can be facilitated or a paradigm shift occurs. 

Elevation within the ranks of policing frequently results in more of an administrative or political role; all too often far removed from the local community and tactical policing challenges of the day. 

Even so, senior officers revert back to 'the good old days' or period upon which they were directly engaged with communities, criminals and threats. 

Specialists, intelligence practitioners and former public security representatives carry the same bounded rationality, ideology and constrained paradigms. 

In short, past pedigree and experiences carry with it a lot of baggage, most of it dated, highly contextual or most relevant to the public security and safety sector. 

Much of these experiences and baggage don't map or relate to directly to private or corporate security. 

Moreover, significant bias and a very narrow view/focus of the world is introduced. 

I know this from experience. 

Transitioning from the military influences your ideology, perception, practices and focus to a far greater degree than you might accept. 

I've discussed and experienced the same issues with colleagues and co-workers from the police, intelligence and government sectors too.

Your thinking is often black and white in terms of 'enemy' and 'threats' but disconnected from your new environments, benefactors and most importantly, private assets. 

Value apportioned to state, public and national assets are significantly 'different' to that of the private and corporate sector. 

Recalibration is required, at the very least. 

Moreover, you run the significant risk of wasting a lot of private-sector money, resources, time and opportunity fixated on minority issues or those more relevant to past vocations, public security or past wars. 

A practical example of these legacy influences and pursuits are most visible as security conferences and conventions. 

Exhibitors, providers and offerings are dominated by public security apparatus, policing culture, state intelligence practices and militarised sales pitches to corporate security practitioners. 

Few, if any, are exclusively corporate or private security requirements. 

Sure, everyone loves toys, but curious, expensive and engaging artefacts is a better term for a lot of them. 

The easiest sales of these toys and systems are those where the corporate buyer is still living in the past, fighting the last war or servicing past public organisations.

When you are surrounded by like-minded (groupthink) communities that all have past public security pedigrees, it is not difficult for assimilation to the group to become the norm. 

Private security compliments and ties into public security strategies but it isn't the front line in all instances or requires total self-sufficiency. 

In locations where public security is deficient; introduction of a class system or security for the rich and prosperous creates its own benefits and threats, many of which are poorly considered in detail. 

Reflexivity is required. 

Self-evaluation of one's ideology, one's influences and one's primary pursuits is required. 

What are you focused on? 

What is relevant to your specific, current corporate organisation? 

Is the system, tool, initiative or process really benefiting your private security needs or servicing a culture of group public security initiatives that you want your company to pay for? 

How aware is your organisation that they are paying for public security benefits first and corporate security benefit second, if there is a private security benefit? 

How do shareholders, communities and public security officials feel about this practice? 

Honesty, self-evaluation and critical analysis of core beliefs, practices and influences are required. 

Not an easy or simple undertaking. 

Look around. 

Are you fighting the last war, servicing past public security organisations and agendas or really serving your current private/corporate security benefactors? 

Can you prove it? 

Food for thought

Tony Ridley

Enterprise Security Risk Management & Security Science.