Today in History: President Nixon's China Trip

by Achala Gunasekara-Rockwell, PhD

Introduction

The visit of Pres. Richard Nixon to China (21-28 February 1972) marked a pivotal moment in the history of US-China relations. This visit marked the first time a US president had visited the People's Republic of China (PRC) since its founding in 1949, and it signaled a significant shift in US foreign policy toward China. The culmination of this visit was the issuance of the Shanghai Communiqué, which outlined the foreign policy views of both nations and pledged to work toward the normalization of diplomatic relations, which continues to have profound implications for the global landscape.

The Background of the Shanghai Communiqué

Prior to President Nixon's visit to China, the United States had not recognized the PRC as the legitimate government of China since it took power in 1949. Instead, Washington maintained diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, which had been established by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government after its defeat in the Chinese Civil War. Washington and Beijing had remained estranged for more than two decades, and this visit signaled a significant shift in the Cold War dynamic. The US had previously adopted a policy of containment toward China, but this visit marked the beginning of a new era in US-China relations.

The Significance of the Shanghai Communiqué

The Shanghai Communiqué represented a major breakthrough in US-China relations. Although the United States did not immediately recognize the PRC, the two countries agreed to establish "liaison offices" in Beijing and Washington, which served as a precursor to formal diplomatic relations. Washington also acknowledged the PRC's position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China, effectively weakening US support for the ROC as a separate entity. The Communiqué also enabled the US and China to temporarily set aside the issue of Taiwan and focus on opening trade and communication.

Furthermore, the Shanghai Communiqué signaled a shift in the geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific region. The Communiqué stated that the United States and China would take action against any country that sought to establish hegemony in the region, which was a significant departure from the US policy of containment toward China during the Cold War. This commitment paved the way for closer cooperation between the two nations and helped to stabilize the region in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Despite these positive developments, the Shanghai Communiqué did not resolve all the issues between the United States and China. On several issues, such as the ongoing conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and Israel, the two countries were unable to reach a common understanding. Nevertheless, the visit of President Nixon to China and the issuance of the Shanghai Communiqué represented a significant step forward in US-China relations and paved the way for the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1979.

Conclusion

The visit of President Nixon to China in 1972 and the issuance of the Shanghai Communiqué represented a historic moment in international relations. The Communiqué signaled a significant shift in US foreign policy toward China and paved the way for closer cooperation between the two nations. Although the Communiqué did not resolve all the issues between Washington and Beijing, it represented a significant step forward in the relationship between the two nations. Today, the US-China relationship remains one of the most important and complex relationships in the world, with implications for global trade, security, and geopolitics.

For more information on US-China relations, read the following JIPA articles and more:

Preventing War in the South China Sea, by LCDR Todd Moulton, USN

Aggressive Chinese endeavors in the South China Sea (SCS) will develop into hostiles between the United States, China, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries if Washington, Beijing, and ASEAN do not take steps to quell rising tensions. Sea routes through the SCS carried more than five trillion dollars’ worth of trade last year,1 including Middle East energy, which is vital for the growing Chinese economy. The United States and various countries throughout South and Southeast Asia are alarmed at China’s assertive naval actions throughout the SCS and China’s extensive SCS land reclaiming efforts. A brief understanding of SCS maritime disputes is key for comprehending current regional anxieties and will help explain why the area is important to all relevant players, including the United States. Washington will need to employ its diplomatic and military instruments of power to blunt China’s offensive posture and reassure its Indo-Pacific allies of the US commitment to the region. Washington can pursue numerous policy efforts to deescalate the increasingly unstable situation and maintain US preeminence in the region. These courses of action will demonstrate that the United States can achieve its regional goals by employing a mixture of multilateral and unilateral measures.

---

"Assessing China’s Motives: How the Belt and Road Initiative Threatens US Interests," by Lt Col Daniel Lindley, USAF

China’s Belt and Road Initiative continues to be a source of debate across the international community. Some foreign policy experts contend it is a means for China to establish an alternative to the existing liberal international order. While it is certain to provide some positive outcomes to the Chinese people and participating countries, considerable evidence suggests that China’s motivations and means for implementation warrant concern. Critiques accusing China of debt-trap diplomacy have considerable merit. Additionally, should the Belt and Road Initiative achieve its planned vision, it is on the trajectory to challenge the national interests of the United States and its European and Indo-Pacific allies and partners. Forging strong multinational efforts that focus on targeted infrastructure investments and shift supply-chain dependence away from China will be necessary to balance the influence obtained by the Belt and Road Initiative.

---

"Bold and Unprecedented Moves: Building a US-Taiwan Defense Strategy in the Strait of Taiwan and South China Sea," by Lt Col @Julian Thomas, USAF

This article argues that through revised national policy, the United States should enforce an explicit security guarantee for Taiwan, leverage Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capabilities, and employ a counter antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy to curtail China’s aggressive overtures within the South China Sea (SCS). First, this article examines why US national policy makers should explicitly guarantee the defense of Taiwan. It also highlights the impact of the United States’ current “strategic ambiguity” policy language upon the backdrop of China’s ambitions to reclaim Taiwan. Second, this text deliberates how Taiwan can leverage US joint force capabilities such as IAMD to inject uncertainty, fear, and high cost into China’s calculus to seize and hold Taiwan. Third, this narrative explains how Taiwan should employ a counter A2/AD zone strategy to deter or resist China’s use of force within the SCS. Fourth, this manuscript examines opposing views on how increasing the United States’ joint force efforts with Taiwan could create an unnecessary flashpoint between the United States and China. Finally, this text concludes that the concepts mentioned above could lead to greater regional interoperability to curtail China’s aggressive overtures within the SCS.

---

"Let Taiwan and the Quad Fight Side by Side: How Can the Quad Incorporate Taiwan into Its Military Deterrence against China?," by Dr. Liang-chih Evans Chen

In response to a highly potential military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait, both the United States and Taiwan must look for a strong?collective?defense framework against China’s threat, and the?Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD or Quad), composed of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, is a decent platform for that concept. The Quad has a good basis for developing a mutual security system in the Indo-Pacific, although it is still far from a real military alliance. I contend that the Quad can?keep working on legalizing and institutionalizing the mechanism while also developing its military strategy. At the same time,?the Quad and Taiwan can develop to incorporate one another into their mutual defense network starting with lower-grade meetings, then moving to summits and foreign affairs-defense (2+2) ministerial conferences, intelligence sharing, joint staff assignments, and joint military exercises. The Quad–Taiwan?defense cooperation preserves several options to establish their common military strategy and?accumulate energy in deterring and denying China’s island invasion plan. Rather than?enthusiastic discussions of these “the Quad Plus Taiwan” issues, however,?going back to the beginning to persuade each other to take the next step is more important.

---