Today in History: The Conclusion of Japan's 2.26 Incident
Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs
An international forum aimed at forging Indo-Pacific policy, strategy, and partnerships.
Introduction
The 26 February Incident of 1936, also known as the 2.26 Incident, was a failed coup attempt by a faction of the Japanese military against the government of Prime Minister Keisuke Okada. The incident is significant for several reasons, including its impact on Japanese politics, its role in the militarization of Japan, and its influence on the events leading up to World War II.
Background
The coup attempt was conducted by a faction of officers within the Imperial Japanese Army who were dissatisfied with the government’s perceived weakness and corruption. The Kōdō-ha, or “Imperial Way,” faction was made up of a diverse group of officers, including both junior and senior officers, and was active within the military throughout the 1930s. The group was highly influential in shaping Japanese military policy and played a key role in the events leading up to World War II.
The Kōdō-ha
The group emerged in the 1920s and was influenced by the ideas of the so-called “National Defense State” theorists, who argued that Japan needed to develop a strong military and an authoritarian government to protect its interests and expand its influence in Asia.
The Kōdō-ha faction believed that Japan’s government was weak and corrupt, and that it was not doing enough to advance the country’s interests. They also believed that Japan’s military needed to be strengthened and expanded to protect the country’s territorial integrity and promote its interests abroad.
One of the key goals of the Kōdō-ha faction was to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy, including the use of military force if necessary, to protect Japan’s interests and expand its influence in Asia.
One of the potential threats to Japan’s security that the Kōdō-ha identified was the Soviet Union. The faction believed that the Soviet Union was a significant threat to Japan’s interests in Asia and that it needed to be dealt with forcefully. They saw the Soviet Union as a communist state that was hostile to Japan’s traditional values and way of life, and they believed that Moscow was seeking to expand its influence in Asia.
The Kōdō-ha argued that Tokyo needed to take preemptive action against the Soviet Union to protect Japan from this perceived threat. The faction believed that a surprise attack on Soviet forces in the Far East would be the most effective way to achieve this goal. This idea was based on the belief that Japan had a window of opportunity to strike before the Soviet Union had the chance to fully mobilize its military.
The Coup
On the morning of 26 February 1936, the Kōdō-ha launched a coordinated attack on key targets in Tokyo, including the prime minister’s residence, the War Ministry, and the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department. The coup was conducted by a group of around 1,500 soldiers and officers, who were divided into several groups and sent to seize control of key locations in the city. The plan was to take the prime minister and other government officials hostage and force them to accept the Kōdō-ha’s demands. The group also attempted to gain control of the radio station to broadcast their message to the public.
However, the coup quickly began to unravel. Other factions within the military, including the Tōsei-ha faction, remained loyal to the government and began to push back against the rebels. Some of the rebels were quickly defeated, while others were able to hold their ground for a short time before being overwhelmed. Many of the soldiers and officers involved in the coup were young and inexperienced, and they lacked the support of senior military leaders. By 28 February, the coup was over.
Aftermath
The Japanese government launched a series of trials to prosecute those responsible for the failed coup attempt. The trials were conducted under the jurisdiction of the Japanese military, and more than 3,000 people were arrested and charged with various offenses, including mutiny, rebellion, and conspiracy.
The trials were characterized by a lack of due process and were criticized by many as being politically motivated. The military-controlled courts were accused of being biased against the defendants and of using coerced confessions to secure convictions. Some of the accused were subjected to torture and other forms of mistreatment to extract confessions.
Despite these criticisms, the trials resulted in many convictions and death sentences. Over 400 people were sentenced to death, including many junior officers and soldiers who had been coerced into participating in the coup attempt. Many others were given long prison sentences or forced to resign from the military.
The trials and their aftermath had a significant impact on Japanese politics and society. They contributed to the further militarization of the country and the increased influence of the military in government decision-making. The harsh punishment of those involved in the coup attempt also served as a warning to others who might be considering similar actions in the future.
Overall, the trials following the 1936 February 26 Incident reflected the political and social tensions that were present in Japan at the time. They highlighted the struggle between the civilian government and the military establishment for control over the country's future direction, and they had long-term implications for Japan's post-war reconstruction and the development of its democracy.
Influence
Despite the failure of the coup, the 2.26 Incident had a significant impact on Japanese politics and society. In the immediate aftermath of the event, the government cracked down on dissent and implemented a series of measures designed to curb the power of the military. The incident also led to the ouster of Prime Minister Okada and the appointment of Admiral Keisuke Suzuki as his successor.
More broadly, the 2.26 Incident played a role in the militarization of Japan and the country’s increasing aggressiveness in the years leading up to World War II. The Kōdō-ha’s belief in Japan’s destiny to become a dominant power in Asia, as well as their willingness to use force to achieve that goal, foreshadowed the country’s later actions in the region.
The 2.26 Incident not only had implications for Japan’s foreign policy but also highlighted the underlying tension between the country’s civilian government and its military establishment. The coup attempt was driven by a perception among the military that the government was weak and corrupt, and that it was not doing enough to advance Japan’s interests on the world stage.
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This tension between the civilian government and the military establishment was not unique to the 2.26 Incident but was a broader issue in Japanese politics at the time. The military had gained significant power and influence in the years leading up to the incident, particularly in the form of the Imperial Japanese Army, which had become a dominant force in Japanese society.
The 2.26 Incident further strained the relationship between the government and the military, leading to increased military influence in government decision-making and a breakdown in civilian control over the military. This would ultimately contribute to Japan’s descent into war, as the military establishment gained more power and influence over the government’s decision-making processes.
Postwar Impact
The tension between the civilian government and the military establishment also had long-term implications for Japan’s post-war reconstruction. The need for strong civilian control over the military was recognized by the Allied powers during the occupation of Japan, and efforts were made to ensure that the military would be subservient to civilian authorities in the post-war era. This helped to prevent a repeat of the breakdown in civilian control over the military that had contributed to Japan’s descent into war.
Conclusion
The 26 February Incident was a significant event in Japanese history that had far-reaching consequences for the country’s politics and society. The failed coup attempt highlighted the growing power of the military and its willingness to use force to achieve its goals, while also underscoring the tensions between the military and civilian government. Ultimately, the 2.26 Incident played a role in the militarization of Japan and the country’s increasing aggressiveness in the years leading up to World War II.
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