Is it Time to Reevaluate Security in the North Sea? Are There Really Ghost Ships Out there?

As part of its 2030 Climate Target Plan ‘Fit for 55’, the European Commission aims to cut 55% of the continent's greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 before achieving complete climate neutrality by 2050. The Commission is driving the EU’s ambition to reduce harmful greenhouse gasses by setting a highly ambitious plan for the continent over the next 10 years. Key to the Commission achieving those goals is the expansion of maritime infrastructure.

In April this year, heads of state and energy leaders from Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Luxemburg, France, Norway, Ireland and Denmark announced an agreement which proposed to transform the North Sea into the largest green energy production hub in the world. This agreement is contained in the Ostend Declaration. The agreement proposes to double the planned 120GW production capacity of North Sea offshore to 300GW by 2050. To achieve this, the nine countries will focus on a huge construction project, building offshore wind farms and energy islands in the North Sea. By 2050 the expectation is that there should be enough energy being produced in the North Sea to provide energy to every European household.

There is no doubt that Europe must find a long-term sustainable energy source to replace Russian energy. Europe is still in the process of securing those long-term energy supplies and the ambition to transform the North Sea into the largest energy production hub in the world is an attractive alternative to Russian energy. This will ensure less reliance on Russian energy and avoid the situation that Europe has found itself in since the start of the conflict in Ukraine - dependence on cheap Russian energy. The North Sea, historically seen as a major oil hub, will now be transformed into an offshore wind energy hub with enormous potential for carbon storage. It is forecast that in the future, European cables will connect energy islands that will centralise the transmission of energy. Many of the countries involved will be able to connect their offshore power grids through energy islands that will be built and connected by undersea cables in the North Sea. Energy islands will involve the construction of an artificial island, or an island based on a platform serving as a hub for electricity generation from surrounding offshore wind farms. These islands will be connected and distribute power between neighbouring countries.

As this vision for climate neutrality begins to take shape and the expansion of maritime infrastructure gets underway in the North Sea, we must recognise that security of this key infrastructure should be a priority now. For months, media organisations across Europe have been reporting on the presence of Russian vessels roaming around the North Sea gathering intelligence. It is suspected that these vessels are mapping offshore windfarms, the location of electrical cables and gas pipelines, along with internet, data and communication cables. Reports suggest that up to 50 suspected Russian ‘Ghost ships’ have been identified in recent years mapping undersea infrastructure around the North Sea. The Russian mapping of maritime infrastructure is in preparation for conflict with NATO. How serious that conflict may be is unknown, but there is no doubt that conflict in some form, is on the horizon between Russia and NATO. By mapping key maritime infrastructure, Russia will be able to identify the key parts of the network of cables and pipelines where maximum damage and disruption could be caused. An attack on energy islands, electricity cables and gas pipelines could cause economic collapse, communication chaos and potentially loss of life. Be under no illusion, incidents are occurring that are testing the European response to attacks. The attack on the Nordstream pipelines has not conclusively been proven to be the work of the Russians, but it has shown the impact that sabotage can have on essential underwater infrastructure. In October 2022, subsea internet cables between the Scottish mainland and the Shetland Islands were mysteriously cut and days later, further cables were cut in the Faroe Islands. In January 2022, entire sections of subsea fibreoptic communication cables connecting northern Norway to the Spitzbergen archipelago were cut.

These incidents and reports of Russian ‘ghost ships’ mapping European maritime infrastructure are sending an important signal to European leaders that security around energy projects, such as those proposed in the North Sea, must be addressed now. Maritime energy infrastructure in the North Sea is vulnerable and a significant attack on it could cripple Europe. It should come as no surprise that Russia is spending the time and a considerable amount of effort in understanding European maritime infrastructure vulnerabilities, while investing in its capabilities to monitor and target these assets. The Russian thinking on targeting the European economy is clear – if Russia is able to inflict harm and disrupt the European economy, it will naturally erode any support or appetite for any potential conflict.

In April this year, Nordic countries broadcast a series of three jointly produced documentary programs with revelations about clandestine Russian intelligence operations. The documentaries showed Russian trawlers loitering around the Norwegian coastline and Russian underwater ‘research’ vessels sailing closely to wind farms in the North Sea. One of the more prominent pieces from the documentary showed a Danish journalist in a small boat approaching the Russian underwater research ship, Admiral Vladimirskiy, at anchor just off the Danish coast at Sjallands Odde. As the journalist got too close to the vessel, a member of the ‘crew’ appeared with face covered carrying a military assault rifle - all the hallmarks of a military presence aboard this vessel. ?A Russian naval doctrine released last year clearly stated that all civilian Russian shipping and maritime vessels are to assist the country in gathering intelligence. This could mean that there are literally hundreds of Russian vessels gathering intelligence for Russia, on European and NATO vessels, maritime infrastructure and energy resources.

Within the Russian Defence Ministry there is a special purpose department to coordinate this type of intelligence gathering operations. The department is known as the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research. Its main responsibilities are around gathering intelligence on maritime infrastructure, along with mapping and preparing methods of attack against maritime and underwater infrastructure. The department has at its disposal: a fleet of surface vessels, submarines and special purpose submersibles. With potentially hundreds of Russian vessels gathering intelligence globally on maritime infrastructure, it is highly likely that the department’s portfolio of potential targets is growing. Be under no illusions, the presence and overt nature of many of these vessel’s activities, is a deliberate act by Russia. They are intended as a warning to Europe and the West, that Russia is watching and gathering information, and knows the importance of maritime and subsea infrastructure. Europe is vulnerable to attacks on its maritime and subsea infrastructure, we know it……unfortunately so does Russia.?