Three Outlines of the Post-Russo-Ukraine War Settlement

#ukraine #russoukrainewar #warandpeace #conventionalarmscontrol #peaceagreements

Three Outlines of the Post-Russo-Ukraine War Settlement

by William Lippert

A recent article (link below) discusses the post-Russo-Ukraine War European security order, making some proposals about new institutions and deterring future Russian aggression through training Ukrainian forces and placing foreign troops in the country. The second idea is easy; there are innumerable mechanisms to place foreign troops in Ukraine – with the most important requirement (legal, political, and practical) being Kyiv’s consent. Given the war in progress, there is no doubt that Ukraine (unless it has been defeated by Russia) will welcome foreign troops friendly to Ukraine – whether they are part of NATO or not. Unrealistic it may be, for example, the presence of Indian, Japanese, South Korean, Singaporean, or Mexican troops would be a dramatic global statement, and might also deter Russia from future aggression without provoking Moscow with fears of NATO aggression.

But the post-war European security architecture will depend first and foremost on how the war ends – something which the otherwise insightful authors, Professors O’Hanlon (who was one of my favorite professors) and Howard do not emphasize. As a golden rule, post-war agreements reflect how wars end – a not especially counterintuitive notion. Wars in which one side is decisively defeated, or faces decisive defeat, tend to have the post-war conditions dictated by the victor. The two World Wars serve as dramatic and clear-cut examples, but one could also cite the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the American Civil War, and the Russo-Finnish Wars (1939-1944). Wars can also end with a victor, but one in which the victory is far from total. The 1999 Kosovo conflict, The Russo-Georgian War, and the Arab-Israeli Wars resulted in a clear victory – but they were not as decisive as the wars previously listed. And then there are outright stalemates, such as the Korean War.?

Almost all of these conflicts ended with an agreement – whether a full peace treaty or an armistice – which reflected the relative military balance at the conflcts’ end. In brief, decisive victories gave the victors a free hand to dictate the peace conditions; while a clear but indecisive victory gave the victors strong, but not unlimited, bargaining power; and stalemates gave neither side significant leverage in negotiations.?

To put it another way, victors don’t give up lots of stuff and permit the defeated power to impose upon them conditions that they otherwise would not accept. Tokyo did not get Hawaii demilitarized, and Saddam did not get any chunks of Kuwait.?

When it comes to arms control (my PhD dissertation topic), in a decisive victory, the victors have often imposed substantial restrictions on the defeated states. Prohibitions of weapons such as submarines and aircraft, demilitarization of certain areas, and limits on the size of the militaries (both in terms of equipment and personnel) are just some examples. When the conflict ends closer to a stalemate, restrictions tend to be mutual, such as in the Korean War (establishment of a DMZ) and the 2015 Minsk Agreements which were supposed to deal with the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

This is not to say that O’Hanlon and Howard’s proposals are unrealistic. They are, in a Ukraine light victory. However, they lowball, or under-achieve, if Ukraine wins a decisive victory. While it is not likely to see Ukrainian troops parade through Red Square, one may recall that Imperial Russia was defeated and signed a punishing peace agreement in March 1918 – the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk—even though the Germans had only seized a relatively small part of Russia (for example, major Russian cities such as St. Petersburg and Moscow were never lost, and Russia itself stretched all the way to the Pacific Ocean). Then there is the distinct possibility that NATO will enter the war – in which case Russia’s defeat becomes much more likely and decisive. A complete collapse of the Russian military with regime change could give Ukraine and its supporting coalition enormous power to dictate a crushing peace agreement on Russia which might, for example, impose harsh military restrictions in return for lifting of sanctions and wavering of some or all war reparations.

A qualified Ukrainian victory would not do much more than solidify Ukraine’s gains. We might see this, for example, if Ukraine recovers most or all of its pre-2022 or even pre-2014 territory, but the Russian military remains intact for all intents and purposes and Moscow’s regime remains in place, even if there is a new leader. This situation would lend itself to O’Hanlon and Howard’s proposals: a post-war arrangement which does everything possible to protect Ukraine without provoking Russia to try again, and not imposing any one-sided limits on the Russian military (though a balanced and mutual agreement would be possible).

A stalemate might be the worst outcome, merely creating a weak demilitarized area and giving Russia time to reconstitute its forces while Ukraine stiffens its defenses, either freezing the conflict for decades or merely creating a pause for another bloodbath. A stalemate would also be less likely to result in resolving the broader security issues which led to the war in the first place, such as NATO expansion, arms racing, Russian aggression, and mutual interference in domestic affairs.

The possibility that no one west of the front want to stomach is Ukraine’s collapse. There are no indications of this – today – but wars are often difficult to predict at any point in time, at least until the conflict is almost over. And even then, a shocking event – such as Prussia’s salvation when Russia’s leadership changed in 1762 (the Second Miracle of the House of Brandenburg) and Russia sought peace with instead of victory over Prussia. So we cannot discount that Ukraine could end up losing the war – decisively – in any number of scenarios. Just to list a few: the utter collapse of foreign support to Ukraine, a series of successful Russian offensives thanks to foreign support and mass mobilization, or a change in Kyiv’s government (perhaps due to unacceptable losses).

The O’Hanlon-Howard article is hardly alone in discussing the end of the war and Europe thereafter. Along these lines are articles and debates about whether or not Ukraine should negotiate and what should they offer or settle for. These articles go along the lines that Kyiv should be prepared to accept a reasonable deal today to Kyiv should never negotiate.

But these are not the only options. Kyiv will likely negotiate in some way – even if it is to accept Moscow’s surrender in Brest-Litovsk fortress (where Russia had surrendered in 1918). This article has set out three frameworks for how a post-war settlement might look, without any prediction which outcome is more likely.