Three countries possess over 50% of Africa’s total wealth
The Exchange: Three countries possess over 50% of Africa’s total wealth
Morocco and Kenya round out the top five African countries, with a total private wealth of US$125 billion and US$91 billion, respectively.
As per this year’s Africa Wealth Report issued by UK investments consultancy firm Henley & Partners in collaboration with South African wealth intelligence business New World Wealth, only three countries control more than half of Africa’s total wealth.
South Africa, Egypt, and Nigeria, with US$651 billion, US$307 billion, and US$228 billion in private wealth, respectively, account for US$1.18 trillion, or 56% of Africa’s total wealth of US$2.1 trillion, which differs from GDP, a monetary measure of the market value of all goods and services produced in a country during a specific period.
Africa’s?wealthiest?countries are South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, and Kenya.
Morocco and Kenya round out the top five African countries, with a total private wealth of US$125 billion and US$91 billion, respectively.
“From a worldwide standpoint, South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt ranked among the top 15 nationals in terms of queries received by Henley & Partners last year.” “South Africa was in fifth place internationally, with 38% increase in 2021, Nigeria in seventh place with 15% growth, and Egypt in fourteenth place with 25% growth,” Dominic Volek, group head of private clients at Henley & Partners, writes in the report.
As evidence of how significantly the ten wealthiest nations affect the continent’s total wealth, South Africa, Egypt, and Nigeria have experienced negative private wealth growth rates of -12%, -23%, and -27% during the last decade, respectively, resulting in a 7% fall in Africa’s wealth growth since 2011.
South Africa has more millionaires per capita compared to any other African country.
Top ten African countries in terms of private wealth in?2022
There are around 136,000 people in Africa with an asset value of US$1 million or even more (or what the poll terms high net, worth individuals). However, only 6,700 have assets worth more than US$10 million. Only 305 Africans hold individual property valued at least US$100 million, with only 21 billionaires across the continent.
Johannesburg, Cairo, Cape Town, Lagos, and?Nairobi?have the highest concentrations of dollar millionaires, with 16,000, 8,200, 6,900, 5,500, and 5,400 residents, respectively.
According to Amanda Smit, the firm’s South Africa managing partner, Mauritius has been “the fastest rising wealth market in Africa in terms of percentage, with an expansion of 74% between 2011 and 2021.” The island also has Africa’s most extraordinary per capita wealth, at US$34,500.
Africa’s Wealth in the Future
According to New World Wealth, Africa will have a 38% wealth increase over the next decade, with eastern African countries likely to lead the way, with “over 60% growth estimated in Rwanda and Uganda by 2031, and over 50% in Zambia and Kenya .”
It goes on to say that this will be fueled by rapid expansion in the technological and professional services industries.
According to the research, “South Africa has the largest luxury market in Africa in terms of revenue, closely by Kenya and then Morocco.” Over the next decade, the African wealth management market is expected to rise by 60%.
According to the report, Africa’s most enormous wealth was recorded in 2012 at US$2.4 trillion, while the largest number of dollar millionaires was 148,000 in 2017. However, the continent has been widely chastised for producing millionaires while leaving hundreds of millions of residents in poverty.
Africa 7 Most expensive cities to Live
Africa’s most expensive cities [Data from Statista]:
On the flip side, here are Africa’s top most expensive cities to live in.
Based on a 2022 Statista analysis, Kampala is the most expensive place to live in East Africa.
As of 2022, Dakar, Senegal, was ranked as the most expensive city in Africa due to high consumer goods costs.
Nairobi is not among the top most expensive cities in Africa.
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Handelsblatt: US-Handelsbeauftragte gegen neue Freihandelspl?ne
Katherine Tai definiert Globalisierung anders als ihre Vorg?nger. ?Mehr Handel ist nicht notwendigerweise besser für alle“, sagt sie im Interview.
Düsseldorf, Berlin?Die US-Handelsbeauftragte Katherine Tai will eine enge Koordination in Handelsfragen mit der EU, lehnt neue Gespr?che über ein Freihandelsabkommen aber ab. Der Geist der TTIP-Verhandlungen sei nun im Handels- und Technologierat (TTC) verk?rpert, sagte sie dem Handelsblatt. Bundesfinanzminister?Christian Lindner?hatte im M?rz vorgeschlagen, die Verhandlungen wieder aufzunehmen.
Statt eines gro?en Handelsabkommens will Tai Abstimmungen zwischen amerikanischer und europ?ischer Seite in vielen Einzelfragen. Daran mangelt es aus Sicht der Europ?er derzeit. Die?USA?haben kürzlich den?Inflation Reduction Act verabschiedet, mit dem die Regierung Investitionen in Energie, Gesundheit und Klima f?rdert.
Umstritten ist, dass dabei umfangreiche Steueranreize für die Autobatteriefertigung in den USA gew?hrt werden.?Mit Hinweis darauf hat der US-Autobauer?Tesla?den Ausbau der Batteriefertigung im deutschen Grünheide in der vergangenen Woche auf Eis gelegt und konzentriert sich zun?chst auf die Fertigung in den USA. Die EU sieht ihre Produzenten benachteiligt und erw?gt eine Klage vor der Welthandelsorganisation?WTO.
Die USA vern?hmen die Kritik ihrer Handelspartner, sagte Tai im Interview. Die Gespr?che mit EU-Handelskommissar Valdis Dombrovskis über die US-Steuergutschriften für Elektrofahrzeuge würden fortgesetzt. ?Wir wollen immer eine offene Kommunikationslinie mit unseren Verbündeten haben.“
Tai hat einen anderen Blick auf die Globalisierung als ihre Vorg?nger:??Die Version der Globalisierung, die wir zu entwickeln versuchen, r?umt auf mit der Idee, dass mehr Handel notwendigerweise besser für alle ist“, sagte sie. Von Deglobalisierung will sie dabei nicht sprechen. Es entwickle sich eine neue Form von Globalisierung, die den Schwerpunkt auf Widerstandsf?higkeit und nicht nur auf Effizienz lege.
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Jamestown: Eurasian Summit of Hidden Tensions and Thin Pretenses
Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 19 Issue: 36
By:?Pavel K. Baev
Samarkand did not go well for Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit hosted by Uzbekistan in the ancient city gathered many leaders of various Eurasian states, from Belarus to Mongolia. But it was Putin’s meeting with Chinese Chairman (the title Putin addresses him with) Xi Jinping that was of crucial importance for the Russian leader. Just a week prior, Putin attended an economic forum in Vladivostok and was encouraged by the message of Li Zhanshu, chairman of the National People’s Congress (most probably outgoing after the 20th?National Congress of Chinese Communist Party next month), who praised the strong dynamics of the Chinese-Russian strategic partnership (Kremlin.ru, September 7). The meeting with Xi, for which Putin had to go to the Chinese delegation’s hotel, was a visibly stern affair (Izvestiya, September 15). The readout of opening statements tells that Xi was concise and noncommittal, while Putin felt obliged to mention Chinese “questions and concerns” regarding the Ukraine crisis (Kremlin.ru, September 15).
The primary difference between these two events was the shocking defeat delivered to the Russian army by the Ukrainian offensive in Kharkiv region. The front lines have stabilized anew, but the political resonance from the rout, which the Russian Defense Ministry tried to explain away as merely a “regrouping,” accounts for the decisive turn in the course of the high-intensity war (Novayagazeta.eu, September 13). The weakness of the motley Russian forces—comprised of depleted regular battalions, gangs of Wagner mercenaries and companies of conscripts from Donetsk and Luhansk regions—has been rudely exposed, so much so that Ukrainian command keeps probing vulnerable points for the next breakthrough (Nezavisimaya gazeta, September 15). Russian “patriotic” bloggers claim that without a mass mobilization, the “special military operation” will be doomed to a humiliating defeat. Nevertheless, the Kremlin has good reasons to assume that public opinion remains indifferently supportive of the war insofar as life in Moscow and St. Petersburg continues “as normal,” minus the subversive rock concerts and theater productions (Meduza, September 13).
At the press conference in Samarkand, Putin made every pretense of controlling the execution of military operations and continuing the offensive push in Donbas, but this denial of the difficult reality on the battleground reassured neither the perturbed Russian elite nor the displeased Chinese leadership (Svoboda, September 16). The self-congratulatory talk about expansion of economic ties does not quite hide the fact that only cooperation in trade has increased, mostly because of price increases on commodities; investments are stagnant, and hopes that China would deliver the Russian economy from a deepening recession have proven groundless (Russiancouncil.ru, September 13). Western sanctions make it profitable for Chinese corporations to buy some additional volumes of Russian oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG), but they are aware of the looming crisis in Russian energy industry, thus even mid-term plans have wide margins of uncertainty (The Insider, September 16). India makes much the same assessments (and cannot expect any new supplies of Russian weapons). As a result, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi found it opportune to inform Putin that “now is not an era of war” (Kommersant, September 16).
Russia’s debilitation in the course of the Ukraine war inevitably weakens its positions in Central Asia, and China is concerned about Moscow’s inability to perform the role of security provider in this conflict-rich region (Rosbalt, September 14). Quite deliberately, Xi Jinping started his first overseas trip since the beginning of the pandemic with a stop in Kazakhstan, where he reassured Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Beijing’s full support for Tokayev’s program of political and economic reforms (Forbes.kz, September 15).
Putin had conversations with each Central Asian leader (presumably more consequential than the SCO formal plenary session), but according to readouts, he never mentioned Ukraine (Kommersant, September 15). He also ignored the violent escalation of border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, progressing with the use of heavy weapons as both presidents pretended to share the atmosphere of “good-neighborliness” in Samarkand (RBC, September 17). The new spasm of armed conflict in the South Caucasus is formally outside the SCO area, but Azerbaijani President Ilhan Aliyev found full support for his new offensive from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, while Putin left the desperate appeal for help from Armenian President Nikol Pashinyan (who found the danger too grave to travel to Uzbekistan) without response (Nezavisimaya gazeta, September 14).
Putin was eager to elaborate on the tensions surrounding Taiwan, and he duly condemned US “provocations” hoping to score a useful point with Xi Jinping (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 15). An escalation of the Chinese-US confrontation is indeed the best chance for Russia to see Western support for Ukraine downsized, and Moscow experts are eager to draw scenarios for naval-air battles in the Taiwan Strait (Ru.valdaiclub.com, August 31). China, however, measures extremely carefully the benefits of a boost of jingoist popular mobilization against the severe economic consequences of initiating a full-scale confrontation with the United States, illuminated sharply by the impact of Western sanctions on the Russian economy (Nv.ua, September 16). Beijing finds it quite agreeable to amplify Putin’s discourse on undercutting US global dominance but knows full well Russia’s diminished value as a military ally (Svoboda, September 12). Recent Russian Vostok-2022 strategic exercises, much diminished in size but still with some joint maneuvers with China, proved that picture-perfect military shows are still what Russian high command desires, rather than real combat training (Voennoe obozrenie, September 10; see?EDM, September 14).
Xi Jinping probably regrets his commitment to a “partnership without limits” with Putin, if only because the Chinese president himself has drawn some exceedingly firm limits on granting symbolic rather than material help to Beijing’s “partner in need.” Xi does not want to see Russia’s defeat and Putin’s inglorious exit, but he neither fancies to ally with a loser nor anchor China to a sinking ship.
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Back in February 2022, Xi missed the opportunity to dissuade Putin from launching his disastrous re-invasion of Ukraine, being too busy with the Olympic celebrations. Presently, the Chinese leader is again distracted with preparations for the 20th?National Congress of his tightly disciplined Communist Party. Yet, he should not miss one critical opportunity. In that political initiative, Xi unexpectedly finds himself on the same page with US President Joe Biden: The two world leaders need to act together for deterring the desperate Russian autocrat from resorting to his means of last resort—the nuclear arsenal. The words “do not” are already spelled out plainly in Washington, DC; hopefully, a stern “do not even think about it” will come from Beijing as well.
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The Strategist: A shift to Asia won’t solve Russia’s economic woes
Russian President Vladimir Putin sought this month to contrast the vibrant economies of Asia with the decadence of the West, signalling that Russia’s future lay with the East.
The economic and political dominance of the United States was waning,?he told an economic forum?in Vladivostok, and the Western elites were blind to the ‘irreversible, or should I say tectonic shifts’ in international relations as emerging nations, led by the Asia–Pacific, played a much bigger role.
‘Asia–Pacific countries emerged as new centres of economic and technological growth, attracting human resources, capital and manufacturing.’
He cited International Monetary Fund estimates showing that Asia’s share of the world economy would rise from the 37% it held in 2015 to 47% by 2027.
He contrasted the Asia–Pacific’s average growth over the past decade of 5% with the United States’ growth of 2% and the European Union’s 1.2%.
He didn’t mention Russia’s average growth of 0.9% over that period, or the IMF’s forecast that the country’s share of the global economy will shrink from a high of 3.5% in 2013 to 2.3% by 2027.
While Russia straddles both the east and the west of the Eurasian landmass, 80% of its population and nearly all its manufacturing lie west of the Urals in the European zone.
Figures from 2020 show that Europe accounted for 50% of Russia’s imports and 50% of its exports, while the Asian share was 42% for trade in both directions. Collectively, those sanctioning Russia, including the EU, the US, Japan and South Korea, account for 60% of Russia’s pre-war trade.
Russia’s ‘forever friend’ in China, by contrast, accounted for about 15% of Russia’s exports and 23% of its imports.
Putin is right to point to the dynamism of Asian economies, particularly China and the ASEAN group; however, much of the growth in prosperity in the region has been generated by its integration into Western-controlled supply chains and is aimed at satisfying Western markets.
Foreign affiliates accounted for more than a third of China’s exports in 2021, and the share is likely higher across the ASEAN nations. The West, particularly the US, remains the principal driver of transformative technological innovation.
It will take time to see how Russia’s trade evolves, but it has permanently damaged its most important markets. Europe and especially Germany will not again allow themselves to become dependent on Russia for energy and vulnerable to Russian economic sabotage.
Although Russia has reaped profits from soaring oil, gas and coal prices, the volume of its fossil fuel sales is down about 20%, with further falls in prospect as the EU imposes new sanctions.
OPEC provides an object lesson on the perils of using the supply of a commodity for geopolitical advantage.
On the eve of the 1973 embargo, the OPEC nations were producing 1,500 million tonnes of oil a year while the rest of the world’s output was 1,400 million tonnes. Within a decade, OPEC annual production had dropped to 850 million tonnes while the rest of the world’s output had soared to 2,000 million tonnes.
Russia’s oil and gas industry will not recover. Many of Russia’s most important fields have declining production and were looking at partnerships with major Western oil companies and service providers to introduce new technologies for lateral drilling to extend their lives. Those partnerships have now dissolved. Western technology would also be crucial for the construction of LNG plants capable of turning a meaningful share of the gas Russia used to pipe to Europe into liquids that could be shipped to global markets.
Although Russia already pipes gas to China and has another pipeline under construction, its capacity is only a small share of the gas it used to send to Europe.
Sanction regimes are never watertight, particularly for commodities that account for about two-thirds of Russia’s exports. Russia will continue to earn export revenue. However, the loss of access to Western technology will hobble the development of Russia’s more advanced industries over the medium term.
Putin declared that Russia was ‘coping well with the economic, financial and technological aggression of the West’, although he conceded that ‘sectors, regions and enterprises’ that depended on Europe either for supplies or as a market were facing some problems.
He described Western sanctions as an ‘aggressive attempt to impose models of behaviour on other countries, to deprive them of their sovereignty and subordinate them to their will’.
There have been?claims?that Western sanctions have met with little success as life goes on as usual in Moscow apart from a few Western shops having shut.
But Russia’s own public statistics show that the sanctions are cutting deep in some sectors. Motor vehicle production in the first half of the year was down 62%, while production of fridges was down 40% and washing machines 35%. Production of electric motors was down 36%, while fibre cables were down by 33%.
Most of the sectors with big falls are technology intensive, although there have been drops of at least 15% in the manufacture of an array of goods including cigarettes, knitted fabrics and plywood, which presumably reflect the difficulty of importing basic materials because of financial sanctions.
Russian airlines have been affected because of difficulties in maintenance. Domestic air travel was down 83% and air freight was down 70%.
Putin railed against the financial sanctions, saying that Russia was taking steps to reduce its reliance on ‘unreliable and compromised foreign currencies’. China has now?agreed?to settle its gas purchases from Russia half in yuan and half in roubles.
‘In an attempt to resist the course of history, Western countries are undermining the key pillars of the world economic system built over centuries. It is in front of our eyes that the dollar, euro and pound sterling have lost trust as currencies suitable for performing transactions, storing reserves and denominating assets,’ he said.
In reality, the value of the US dollar is soaring, and it remains on one side of around 90% of all international transactions. Its dominant role reflects the depth of its liquidity (transactions of any size can be completed without affecting the exchange rate) and the size of US capital markets. While Russia and China can settle their trade in whatever currency they wish, global businesses want to use US dollars to intermediate trade.
The combined force of sanctions, capital flight and export controls have not consigned Russia to ‘economic oblivion’, as claimed in a recent and overstated?paper from academics?at Yale University, but they will have a significant and long-lasting impact on Russian standards of living that no pivot to Asia can overcome.
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Haaretz, Israel.
The Ties That Bind: Erdogan Says He Plans to Visit Israel
As part of warming diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel, the Turkish President went on a charm offensive, meeting with Jewish leaders and local rabbis ahead of his official talks with Israeli PM Lapid at the UN General Assembly.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan told a group of Jewish leaders in New York that he planned to visit Israel, and will meet Prime Minister Yair Lapid on Tuesday on the sidelines of the United Nations 77th General Assembly.
The promise came as part of a meeting on Monday with leaders of American Jewish organizations, convened under the auspices of the Turkish embassy and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, as reported by The Jewish Telegraphic Agency. Erdogan also said that antisemitism is a “crime against humanity,” but did not say exactly when he would visit Israel.
Among the Jewish leaders meeting Erdogan were Malcolm Hoenlein, executive vice chair of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, Ronald Lauder and Jack Rosen, presidents of the American Jewish Congress, head of the Anti-Defamation League Abraham Foxman, and Turkish Jewish Community co-chairs Ishak Ibrahimzadeh and Erol Kohen.
Erdogan will meet with Israeli premier Yair Lapid on Tuesday, on the sidelines of the United Nations 77th General Assembly. The meeting is another step in the ongoing rapprochement between the two countries, which saw the recent?reappointment of an Israeli ambassador to Ankara.
This will be the first meeting of Turkish and Israeli premiers since 2008, when diplomatic relations were downgraded following the events surrounding the?Gaza Flotilla.
Erdogan's charm offensive continued in less official contexts. On Sunday, the Turkish government’s official Twitter account posted a video of Erdogan strolling through Central Park which included a cheerful encounter with Rabbi Rachel Goldenberg of Queens.
As part of global realignments following the war in Ukraine, Erdogan is seeking to?tighten ties with Israel and the West?to ensure Turkey can capitalize on energy exploration development in the eastern Mediterranean, which until now has been?led by Israel?and Greece.
For its part, Israel is seeking to build on the?2020 Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and four Arab countries. Israel hopes to add other Arab and Muslim-majority countries to the accords, a goal that enhanced relations with Turkey would facilitate.
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