Threat Related Evacuations: Beware of the Phrase 'An Abundance of Caution'
Today I posted a link to the news of multiple closures of venues in the last couple of weeks after the receipt of threats.? I was surprised to receive a bit of pushback on my post, in which I had suggested that evacuation after threat should not be automatic. A couple of people contacted me (but did not post)? ?along the lines of ‘out of an abundance of caution’ etc.? evacuation is the best way forward.? I would be clear that I have no inside information about the recent incidents (including at schools in the UK) and I would not wish to second guess the professionals dealing with them. ?My comments are more general. ?Evacuation is never risk free. ?It brings with it risks of its own, some of which are substantial. ??It can also cause serious disruption and economic loss.?
In planning for handling a malicious threat it is not acceptable to use evacuation as the default position.? This may well be the outcome that the criminal/terrorist wants.? It may be unnecessary.? It may be dangerous.? It may of course be the right thing to do.? Planning, training and exercising must be designed and executed to help those that have to get to the best possible decision.? It is entirely foreseeable that public institutions, places of education and transport systems will receive malicious threats.? Such bodies must therefore give some consideration about what they will do when one is received.?
There are a wide range of ways that such threats can be received.? The threat vector is actually more significant for the investigation of the threat rather than determining the initial operational response, although multiple threats may be evidence of the determination of the perpetrator to be heard.
This is not the place to go into detail about the content of plans (which will vary from institution to institution) but I would make a couple of general points:
Do the people who are likely to receive or be told of the threat know what to do?
Is it clear WHO makes the decision about what actions are required (including no action)?
Has the decision maker been trained??
Does the plan support the decision maker by showing options with associated considerations?? Is the decision maker aware of the likely consequences of their potential decisions?? A lot of ‘thinking’ can be done in advance.
How does the plan touch others, eg multi occupied sites?
How are decisions reviewed (for example on escalation)?
Who liaises with the police?? On this point are we talking about the local first attender or a specialist department?? Are the police giving advice or attempting to give an instruction?? Getting the interface right with the police is vital.? The police are unlikely to understand your organisation – there must be genuine dialogue – JESIP principles should be applied as far as possible.? Clarity of responsibility is best understood in advance of decision making – this is especially true when ‘working in the grey’ (a phrase that is best avoided in real life!) and when the stakes are high.
Every threat (as compared to good intentioned mistakes/information) is a crime which must be investigated.
If an evacuation takes place WHO will decide that the site can be re-occupied and HOW will they come to that decision.
If an evacuation takes place HOW will displaced people be cared for and communicated with?? HOW will they be kept safe (who will search the area they sent to for example)?
What will happen if the threat is made good?? What are the implications for other locations etc?
What if the threats are regular?? How will this alter the response?
Are plans informed by the past experience of the organisation and of others?? This experience might be of a threat that was handled the day before or experience that covers many years.
There is much to say on this subject.? But for the purposes of this brief ramble around (a few) of the issues it is sufficient to say that this is a matter that should be considered by organisations of all sizes and that staff confronting the problem should be TRAINED and EXERCISED.?
NOTE
I will produce a proper article on this subject which will go into a bit more detail in the meantime this will do - I would be grateful for comments but I am keen to avoid the sharing of extensive detail on a public site.
#BTPHG
Principal BSC, Dir. 3DAssurance, Senior Advisor, ISARR, Crisis Response Journal Advisory Panel, ISE Advisory Council, Member of the Institute of Professional Policing, Intelligence and Security - Bucks New University
1 年Thanks for this Phil, and I share your concerns about the use of the term 'Abundance of Caution' - as in some cases, not all, it is an unnecessary abundance of caution and not supported by the threat assessment. I'll leave things there for the time being as it's important not to share sensitive operational methodology and techniques on public forums, but I have written extensively on this topic. The whole point of a threat assessment process is to avoid having to take an 'abundance of caution' approach, but rather to make a reasoned judgement based on the information available at the time. This of course may result in an immediate evacuation, but depending on the assessment could mean that no further action is required. As I mentioned in my earlier response, overreacting can be as dangerous as failing to act. I'll explain more when we next catch up!