The threat posed by the 'Putin Doctrine,' as revealed in the war Russia is waging in Ukraine

The crisis over Ukraine challenges us to consider what 'end game' Putin may be prepared to countenance in the face of the unexpected unity and resistance met by Russia (both in Ukraine and internationally). This is particularly pressing giving his own specific apocalyptic language.

When he publicly announced the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, on February 24, he accompanied it with a veiled threat: “No matter who tries to stand in our way or … create threats for our country and our people, they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.” To most observers this was, understandably, viewed as a thinly veiled threat of potential use of nuclear weapons (“such as you have never seen in your entire history”). In the same speech he added: “Today’s Russia remains one of the most powerful nuclear states.” The same nuclear theme was further developed when he claimed, in the same presentation, that Ukraine planned to develop nuclear capability. There is absolutely no evidence of this since Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in 1994-96, and the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, signed by Russia, Ukraine, Britain and the USA, promised that none of these nations would use force or threats against Ukraine; all would respect its sovereignty and existing borders. Clearly, things have changed since then in the mindset dominating the Kremlin.

On February 27, Putin went further. He ordered his country’s nuclear forces to a “special regime of combat duty” (stage 2 of the 4-stage Russian ladder of nuclear deployment) and blamed “illegal sanctions” and “aggressive statements” from countries in NATO for causing him to take this step. The lack of personal responsibility for the crisis was, of course, wholly predictable. It was a totally avoidable ratchetting up of the situation by the Russian leader. It should probably be taken as a threat to NATO not to directly intervene militarily against Russia, rather than as an indication of the proximity of nuclear conflict.

Putin has a track record of making nuclear threats. In 2015 he claimed he had considered readying them during the Russian annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. During that event he reportedly boasted that “Russia is one of the leading nuclear powers...it’s best not to mess with us.”?The Kremlin policy of 'escalate to de-escalate' (a form of weaponized blackmail) is well known. Nevertheless, the very fact that he said this again in 2022 (in the context of a Russian invasion that certainly is not going according to plan) was an alarming move, since rhetoric can become self-fulfilling as an escalator of tension.

Russia has somewhere in the region of 6,000 nuclear weapons and the USA has about 5,500. Most of the 6,000 warheads are held in reserves, with perhaps 1,600 deployed as operational weapons (estimate by Hans Kristensen, the director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists). It is a potentially lethal and catastrophic arsenal. But how dangerous is the current situation?

We are not yet at a point as dangerous as the Cuban Missiles Crisis, but we could be approaching it. And with that comes the very real risk of escalation to nuclear conflict between NATO and Russia.

The unthinkable is a possibility. Something we have avoided since 1945. And the risk is rooted in the nature of the Putin authoritarian regime that now dominates Russia. The ‘chain of danger’ is:

(a) One man’s will is effectively unchallenged within the Russian state. The way Putin dominates the 'siloviki' (people of force), who surround him and constitute his core support, is a feature of the Putin regime. It has accompanied his dismantling of democratic checks and balances and the silencing of critics through force. His mental and moral isolation has increased since he resumed the presidency in 2012 and has accelerated during his obsessional physical isolation since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. He has added a whole new dimension to the concept of a 'bunker-mentality.'

(b) While analysis of 'system,' rather than 'psychoanalysis,' offers a better tool for explaining Putin's current position and behaviour, the latter still has its place. Since 2012 he has become increasingly imperial/tsarist in his personality-based authoritarianism, suppression of criticism, closure to opinions outside his controlled inner circle, demeaning of subordinates obsession with extreme interpretations of Russian history, angry bitterness towards Ukraine and the West. This has clearly been exacerbated by his 'covid isolation' and was vividly demonstrated in the 'imperial' way he addressed advisers on the Russian National Security Council on February 21 (prior to recognition of the Donbas and Luhansk break-away-states). Physically distanced from the president, their responses were choreographed to reflect Putin's obsessions. Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev denounced those whose “goal is the destruction of Russia.” ?Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko claimed that Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine faced “genocide.” Most tellingly, Sergei Naryshkin, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (the SVR RF) was clearly bullied when his replies did not quite fit the preferred script of 'the tsar.' This event vividly revealed the dictatorial, bullying, and closed mind of Putin. It also revealed the fear-driven nature of his 'court'.

(c) In Putin’s mind his personal status and fate is indistinguishable from that of Russia. This is increasingly seen in his thin-skinned responses to perceived slights, and revealed in the anger and resentment he increasingly feels towards the West on behalf of himself - and of course Russia. For Putin, his own identity and that of his nation appear to be indistinguishable. The 'tsar' is the state; the state is the 'tsar.'

(d) He regards Russia as the pinnacle of culture and significance, whose existence (in the form defined by him) outweighs all other global factors. This is sometimes described as Putin's 'Russkiy Mir' (Russia World) view, in which Russia (as defined by him and his supporters) represents a form of superior civilization that is crucial to world history. As recently as 2020 he appeared on Russian state TV asserting that Russia's 'unique civilizational identity' needed both genetic and technological protection. In February 2021 he stated: “I believe in?'passionarnost [ethnic bio-cosmic national energy].' In nature as in society, there is development, climax and decline. Russia has not yet attained its highest point. We are on the way.” In short, Russia (in his view) represents both a bastion of 'traditional values,' and innate ethno-cultural superiority. Such a conflation of 'ultimate good' and a 'particular nationalism' can soon become apocalyptic if such a 'beacon state' faces apparent defeat or frustration (witness the apocalyptic nature and impact of Nazi ideology). Thus framed, preservation of global survival takes second place to defence of Russia. This Kremlin outlook was reflected in late February 2022, when Russian news channel’s anchor, Dmitry Kiselyov, commented - regarding the sanctions being applied by the US and European countries - that if there is no Russia, then why do we need the world?

This is a short ‘chain’ and very dangerous. This is because it risks short-circuiting the very thinking that has held back nuclear war since 1945: ‘Mutually Assured Destruction’ (MAD). This is because for Putin, his personal reversal = national defeat = destruction of all that matters culturally and politically.

In short, what we might call the ‘Putin Doctrine’ threatens (and countenances) global catastrophe in order to avoid personal defeat and humiliation. In a state (ie modern Russia) where checks and balances no longer truly exist, that poses a danger that threatens the world. Even allowing for bullying rhetoric being more of a driver of this than strategic planning, the trajectory is alarming.

The urgent need to oppose Putin (in order to defend civilised values) risks destruction of civilisation itself, if he activates the potential of his apocalyptic form of Russian nationalism. That is the extent of the danger and the dilemma Putin poses. We must oppose him and defend Ukraine. But we must tread very carefully. Because in ‘Putin world’ the chain of events that could potentially lead to global nuclear catastrophe is a very short one indeed. So, we must be resolute and determined in opposing him. But we must also be very careful. Surely it is time for those 'siloviki' to act and replace him?

Martyn Whittock, author of: 'The Secret History of Soviet Russia's Police State' (2020), which explores the influence of this on the nature of the Putin regime; and 'Apocalyptic Politics' (2022 forthcoming), which explores the impact of apocalyptic beliefs on radicalized political ideologies.