Theory of sea power

Theory of sea power

Control of the seas means security. Control of the seas means peace. Control of the seas can mean victory. The United States must control the sea if it is to protect our security. —John F. Kennedy

The Navy has a vital role in protecting world freedom. We can only maintain this freedom through a Navy that has total dedication to that end. Sea power as a concept means more than military power at sea. Sea power describes a nation’s ability to protect its political, economic, and military interests through control of the sea. The principal parts of sea power are naval power, ocean science, ocean industry, and ocean commerce. Sea power encompasses commercial rivalries in peacetime, diplomatic manoeuvring and the clash of fleets in wartime. The concept of sea power has been valid whether the fleets were wooden men-of-war or mighty battleships. It remains sound today, although technology has caused ship-to-ship battles to become part of history instead of part of contemporary tactics. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, was the first person to use the term sea power. He used it in his principal work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, published in 1890. Mahan proposed that there were six conditions required for a nation to have sea power:

1.      An advantageous geographical position

2.      Serviceable coastlines, abundant natural resources, and a favourable climate

3.      Extent of territory

4.      A population large enough to defend its territory

5.      A society with an aptitude for the sea and commercial enterprise

6.      A government with the influence to dominate the sea.

Sea power today includes many aspects of the naval strength of a nation that did not exist in the last century. Sea power now encompasses maritime industry and marine sciences. These industries and sciences add to our national economy by exploring new resources for food, freshwater, minerals, and even living space.

This figure shows a Carrier Task Group, one concept of sea power today. Sea power is a unique resource that nations can use in the oceans. We use it to reach political, economic, and military goals in times of peace and war.

The seas are our lifeline for survival. In addition to being a barrier between nations and a broad highway for ships, the seas are an important source of food, minerals, and metals. We use oceangoing craft to get to these riches. The development of these craft has resulted in the need to provide for their protection. A well-established theory for the economic advantage of a nation is to produce goods and services and exchange them with other nations. Throughout history, nations that have traded this way and conducted a strong foreign trade have prospered and grown in economic and political strength. Those that have failed in commerce have also failed as world powers. Throughout history, no country has ever become a world power without a strong foreign trade. All countries generally have raw materials, but they often have limited quantities. Countries then trade with each other to get needed materials. Modern nations with highly complex economies need more raw materials from other countries. We can often obtain many manufactured goods cheaper from other countries than we can produce them locally. As a matter of economic reality, most nations must trade or decline in strength.

All nations of the world, acknowledge freedom of the seas under international law. When fighting wars, nations do whatever is in their power to prevent the enemy from using the seas. They aim to cut commercial shipping lanes to prevent the enemy from receiving critical raw materials for the war effort. Throughout history, the great nations have been those which controlled the seas. From the ancient times of Persia to the World War II days of Japan, loss of sea power has caused many nations to fail.

One should realize the importance of the States’ ability to maintain control of the seas for the use of the free world. To protect national security and sustain our economy, a nation must continue to take the following actions:

·        Import raw materials from throughout the world, convert them into manufactured goods, and export them to the world marketplaces by ocean shipping.

·        Keep the sea-lanes open and secure in times of peace and tension, and deny them to the enemy in times of war.

Naval theories about sea-power

In the late nineteenth and until the mid-twentieth century, the most influential naval theoreticians were primarily concerned with the study of sea power as a whole and naval strategy in particular. None of them formally recognized the existence of that intermediate field of study and practice between strategy and tactics—today called operational art or operational warfare. Yet, some of their theories actually dealt with many important aspects of operational warfare at sea. For better or worse, the theories of naval classical theoreticians shaped the service culture and doctrine of many navies. These theoreticians need to be critically studied and understood; otherwise, one cannot really hope to fully understand the theory and practice of operational warfare today or in the future.

Blue-Water School Thinkers:

American Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan (1840–1914) and the British naval historian and theoretician Sir Julian Corbett (1854–1922) were the leading naval thinkers of the so-called ―blue-water‖ school. Both men had great influence on the development of modern naval strategy and naval construction. Mahan, ―the father of modern naval history, had a greater and wider influence than Corbett, both during his lifetime and afterward. Mahan’s theories were heavily influenced by the writings of the Swiss-born French General Antoine Henri de Jomini (1779–1869). Essentially, Mahan was not a naval theoretician but rather a historian of sea power. He did not use historical examples to illustrate a theoretical construct; instead, he used naval history to derive lessons that could be universally applied. While Mahan used the example of England’s rise as a sea power to urge his countrymen to emulate her example, Corbett was concerned primarily with the effectiveness of British sea power during conflict with a continental power such as imperial Germany. Corbett based his theories on war and the relationship between strategy and policy on the writings of the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831).

Admiral Mahan:

Mahan’s reputation as a naval historian rests on his two major works: The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, published in 1891, and the two-volume book The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, published a year later. Mahan’s last book, Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land, published in 1911, did not attract as much attention as his previous two major works; however, despite its title, his last book dealt with what is today considered operational warfare at sea. Mahan was criticized for not being a systematic thinker. He failed, for example, to consider factors such as social and cultural conditions in the rise of sea power; the rise of the English middle class, American agrarian discontent, and the rise of Russia were ignored by Mahan.

Borrowing many concepts that were applied in land warfare, Mahan also adopted from Jomini three key ideas: the inherent value of a strategic central or interior position, the principle of concentration, and the close relationship between logistics and combat. Mahan wrote that the strategic value of any place depends upon three principal conditions: its position, or more exactly the situation; its military strength, offensive or defensive; and the resources of the place itself and of the surrounding country. He explained that a place may have a great strength, but its position in regard to strategic lines may be so low that it is not worth occupying it. Also, a place can occupy favourable position but possess little strategic value because of the lack of resources. He wrote that it is ―power plus position that constitutes an advantage over power without position or, more instructively, equations of force are composed of power and position in varying degrees, surplus in one tending to compensate for deficiency in the other. 

Like Jomini, Mahan emphasized the inherent value of holding a central position, yet Mahan did not go to the extreme and absolutize the value and importance of a central position in naval warfare. In his view, a central position is ―contributory not principal, one element of a situation but not the only one, nor even the chief.‖ An interior position would ―enable you to get there sooner but with that its advantage ends. Also, such ―a position does not give also the most men needed to complete the familiar aphorism. The position in itself gives no large numbers, and when left it serves only the defensive purpose of a refuge, a base of supplies, lines of communications. A central position cannot be carried to the field or as reinforcement. He was correct in stating that a central position is of little use if the enemy on both sides is stronger than one’s forces are.

Mahan insisted that a fleet should never be divided and that victory at sea is only possible by fleet concentration. He believed that fleet concentration was the most important principle in naval warfare. In his view, if the concentrated fire of the battle fleet is the principal means by which naval power is to be asserted, the preferred target of such fire is the enemy fleet. This exclusiveness of purpose means concentration of the will upon the object to the exclusion of others. For him, fleet concentration sums up in itself all other factors, the entire alphabet of military efficiency in war. Principle of concentration is equally applicable in naval strategy and tactics.

Mahan explained that the line between strategy and tactics was the point of contact between opposing forces. He insisted that whether engaged in strategic deployment or tactical manoeuvre, the correct course of action is to distribute one’s force as to be superior to the enemy in one quarter, while holding the enemy in check in other quarters and for long enough to allow one’s main attack to reach its full result. Operating from a central position, it is possible to mount a naval offensive along interior lines outward from the centre, enabling the attacker to keep his enemy separated and therefore inferior by concentration against one unit while holding the other in check. He also noted that the physical concentration of one’s fleet forces cannot be successful unless accompanied the commander’s concentration of mental and moral outlook and resolution.

For Mahan, proper naval bases and access to them by the fleet are essential ingredients to a successful maritime strategy. This became all the more necessary since the advent of steam power. He wrote that ―obviously, no ship could steam for any considerable distance without refuelling. Hence, distant coaling stations became a necessity for a fleet it if had to move very far beyond its home waters, at least in time of war.

Mahan paid much attention to the importance of sea communications. In his view, communications dominate war. He explained that sea communications are the most important of all ―strategic lines, that is, those lines connecting what he called ―strategic points. Mahan defined sea communications ―as a line of movement by which a military body is kept in living connection with the national power. For Mahan, sea communications meant not geographical lines, like the roads an army has to follow, but those ―necessaries, supplies of which the ships cannot carry in their own hulls beyond a limited amount. In order of priority, the most important logistical supplies are fuel, ammunition, and food.

Mahan consistently emphasized that navies must be used in offensive action, both tactically and strategically. This aspect of Mahan’s teaching is largely responsible for the neglect by many blue-water navies, , of so-called ―defensive  tasks, such as defence and protection of merchant shipping and mine warfare. Mahan believed that coastal defence had minimal value, and he rejected the argument that the Navy should serve for coastal defence. For Mahan, defence of the coast was a defensive factor while the navy is the offensive factor. In his view, by defending ports one’s naval forces lock up offensive strength in a defensive effort. Such employment is also injurious to the morale and skill of seamen. By giving up the offensive, the Navy gives up its proper sphere. He wrote that any proposal to employ ―a navy as an instrument of pure passive defence is found faulty upon partial examination and these various results all proceed to the one fundamental fact that the distinguishing feature of naval force is mobility while that of passive defence is immobility.

Based on his study of naval history, Mahan contemplated two main methods in obtaining and maintaining command of the sea: decisive battle and blockade. He asserted that the primary mission of a battle fleet is to engage the enemy’s fleet. The one particular result that is the object of all naval actions is the destruction of the enemy organized force and the establishment of one’s control of the water. Control of the sea by reducing the enemy navy is the determining consideration in a naval war. Mahan firmly believed that acquisition and control of the sea’s

communications could be obtained only in a decisive and clear-cut victory, which came to be known as the ―decisive battle. He wrote that ―the success is achieved less by occupying a position than by the defeat of the enemy’s organized force—his battle fleet. The same result will be achieved, though less conclusively and less permanently if the enemy fleet is reduced to inactivity by the immediate presence of a superior force, but decisive defeat, suitably followed up, alone assures a situation. In Mahan’s view, a close blockade might succeed in keeping both merchant and naval vessels bottled up in their own harbours; however, in case the enemy’s fleet escapes from its base, then it must be pursued and ultimately destroyed. He realized earlier than many of his contemporaries that the advent of the torpedo and submarine would impose much greater stress on the blockading force. This, in turn, would force the attacker to keep the ships at a much greater distance from the enemy bases and ports. Expressed differently, a close blockade would be converted into a distant blockade. In his view, the new technological advances would not change of the principles of strategy or its application.

Mahan believed in the value of having a reserve in the conduct of war at sea. In his view, a numerically large reserve operating from a favourable position would ―enable you at a critical moment to be first on hand with the largest force—to concentrate, at the decisive period of a battle or of a campaign. Mahan obviously borrowed the concept of reserve from land warfare; however, even in Mahan’s era the navies usually fought with all the ships they had in commission. In the modern era, the concept of reserve in naval warfare was generally applied in the conduct of major amphibious landing operations.

Jomini devoted an entire chapter in his The Art of War on what he calls descents onto hostile shores. Also, Mahan was surely well aware of the role amphibious landings played in the British conduct of war at sea.

Mahan was cautious in treating maritime expeditions in remote waters or what is now called ―power projection. He wrote that ―as a rule a major operation of war across the sea should not be attempted, unless naval superiority for an adequate period is probable.

Mahan’s ideas on the superiority of capital ships, the decisiveness of major naval battles, and the irregular,

inconclusive, and indecisive nature of commerce destruction were accepted almost without question as the foundations upon which to build navies. At the same time, Mahan’s strong support for convoying as the most effective method for defence and protection of shipping was virtually ignored.

The Germans forgot the most important element of Mahan’s teaching: the critical value of maritime positions in successfully operating on the open ocean. The German ships were prevented from reaching the open waters of the Atlantic. German high seas traffic was stopped, and the fleet was incapable of preventing a British blockade.

Sir Julian Corbett:

Corbett was the only blue-water naval thinker who was a civilian. He was a lawyer by training and a novelist before he embarked on a methodical study of naval history. Corbett’s most important works prior to 1914 were the two-volume England in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power Within the Straits, 1603– 1713, published in 1904, and Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, published in 1911. Corbett was the first blue-water naval theoretician who tried to delineate a possible strategy for a maritime power engaged in war with a superior continental power. He was also the first naval strategist who thought seriously about the direct contribution that maritime strategy could make to a war on land.

In his study of maritime strategy, Corbett made a distinction between what he called major strategy (or grand strategy) and minor strategy. The first deals with the purpose of war, including international relations and economic functions. In contrast, minor strategy is concerned with particulars about waging war, including planning army, navy, or combined operations. He also differentiated between maritime and naval strategy. In Corbett’s view ―a paramount concern of maritime strategy is to determine the mutual relations of one’s army and navy in a plan of war. Afterward and not till then, ―a naval strategy can begin to work out the manner in which the fleet can best discharge the function assigned to it.

Corbett correctly observed that ―it is almost impossible that a war can be decided by naval action alone; unaided naval pressure can only work by a process of exhaustion. Its effects must always be slow, and so galling both to our own commercial community and to neutrals, that the tendency is always to accept terms of peace that are far from conclusive.

Corbett insisted that the object of naval warfare must always be to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it, either directly or indirectly. In his view, command of the sea means ―nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes. To Corbett, maritime communications and their maintenance constituted the essence of naval influence. To keep open lines of operation and lines of communications offered the strategic objective for which the navy would function. Supply lines running from bases to theatres of operations, lateral lines linking theatres, and lines of retreat— that is, supply lines in reserve—were the venues for war. For the most part, maritime communications are common to both belligerents. Corbett wrote that this means that at sea strategic offensive and defence tend to merge in a way that is unknown ashore. Because maritime communications are common, we as rule cannot attack those of the enemy without defending our own. In his view, the object of naval warfare is the control of communications and not, as in land warfare, the conquest of territory.

Corbett asserted that even if local control existed, the fleet would eventually be obliged to seek out and destroy the enemy’s fleet. But even a general command of the sea is not essential to all overseas expeditions; and as long as the weaker fleet remained in existence it would try to avoid a major clash with the stronger fleet. The purpose of the ―control of the sea would depend upon the political conditions under which the control was instituted in the first place. By obtaining a decision [through a major battle] and by establishing a blockade or both, command of the sea—that is, control of communications—could be secured. He stated that not only offensive but also defensive actions, such as protection of friendly shipping, must be taken to accomplish these objectives.  

Corbett wrote that command of the sea is disputed by using fleet-in-being and by conducting minor tactical actions. Command of the sea is exercised by conducting defence against an enemy’s invasion, attack on and defence of maritime commerce, and by support of one’s military expeditions. Corbett clearly mixed the navy’s tasks in exercising command of the sea with those conducted in both offense and defence. For example, defence of the coast and attack on and defence of maritime commerce are conducted by both the stronger and weaker fleet throughout the entire duration of a war at sea. Yet defence and protection of one’s shipping is not only a defensive but also an offensive task. For example, the threat to one’s shipping can be considerably reduced, if not eliminated, by attacking and destroying a major part of the enemy’s fleet. Command of the sea means one’s ability to move across the sea without significant hindrance or opposition while at the same time preventing the enemy from doing the same.

He wrote that for the purpose of framing a plan of war or a campaign, it must be assumed that command of the sea may exist in various states and degrees. He differentiated between general or local and permanent or temporary command of the sea. A general command may be permanent or temporary. In his view, ―mere local command, except in very favourable geographical conditions, should hardly ever be regarded as more than temporary, since normally it is always liable to interruption from other theatres so long as the enemy possesses an effective naval force. Even permanent general command of the sea can be in practice absolute. In his view, ―no degree of naval superiority can ensure one’s communications against sporadic attack from detached cruisers or even raiding squadrons if they be boldly led and be prepared to risk destruction." Corbett explained that general and permanent control of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do nothing, but that he cannot interfere with one’s maritime trade and overseas operations to seriously affect the war’s outcome.

Corbett believed that the principal methods for securing control of the sea are by obtaining a decision and by conducting a naval blockade. In contrast to Mahan, he argued that to accomplish command of the sea it is not always necessary to fight a decisive battle. He wrote that ―under certain conditions, therefore, it may not be the primary function of the fleet to seek out the enemy’s fleet and destroy it, because general command may be in dispute, while local command may be with us, and political or military considerations may demand for us an operation for which such local command is sufficient, and which cannot be delayed until we have obtained a complete decision. 

Corbett correctly observed that a war cannot be successful unless one takes high but prudent risks, and the greatest and most effective of such a risk is a division or dispersal of one’s fleet. Corbett was more accurate in saying that the wars at sea are won by what he called ―strategical combinations, which as a rule entail at least apparent dispersal. essential feature of strategic deployment which contemplates dispersal with a view to a choice of combinations is flexibility and free movement. Experience shows that without a division of one’s fleet, no strategic combinations are possible. Theoretically, it is wrong to put one’s fleet in such a position that would prevent it from ―falling back to its strategic centre when it is encountered by a superior force. ―the less we are committed to any particular mass and the less we indicate what and where our mass is to be, the more formidable our concentration. The idea of division is essential, as is the idea of concentration.

Anti-Access/Area Denial

Throughout the history of warfare, adversaries have regularly attempted to deny one another freedom of movement on the battlefield. Past forms of anti-access served to both protect friendly forces and prevent enemies from gaining positions of advantage. While past forms of anti-movement efforts included barriers such as the Great Wall of China and the Maginot Line; the combination of information, space, sea, and air denial as the emerging threat to  military power projection. anti-access as enemy actions which inhibit military movement into a theatre of operations, and area-denial operations as activities that seek to deny freedom of action within areas under the enemy’s control.

Area denial capabilities consist of advanced counter-maritime and counter-air systems designed to destroy critical

mobile assets, such as surface ships and aircraft. A2/AD also extends into the space and cyber domains that support   operations, and is specifically designed to disrupt power projection.

“The success of any major operation or campaign depends on the free movement of one’s forces in the theatre. Without the ability to conduct large-scale movements on land, at sea, and in the air, operational warfare is  essentially an empty concept.”-Dr. Milan Vego

Modern A2/AD differs from historical iterations of anti-access due to the combination of increased range, accuracy and lethality of advanced, networked weapons systems. Anti-access capabilities consist of land-attack ballistic and cruise missiles which threaten critical air and naval facilities. Counter-maritime capabilities also constitute a major

A2/AD threat to sea control in the region. Many of the weapons are strikingly modern, and include a variety of anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles (ASBM/ASCM) that can also be launched from the air, land or sea.

The submarine fleet has also emerged as a credible A2/AD threat, with multiple submarine types employing a variety of anti-ship and land-attack weapons.

Continental School:

The main representatives of the so-called ―continental school of naval strategy were French Vice Admiral Raoul Castex (1878–1968) and German Vice Admiral Wolfgang Wegener (1875–1956). Castex, whose ideas on naval strategy were broader and more universal, was a more methodical and deeper thinker than Wegener. Wegener’s focus was too narrow because his main and almost sole concern was Germany’s unfavourable geostrategic position at sea and how that situation could be improved in a future major conflict on the continent.

Vice Admiral Raoul Castex:

Castex borrowed Mahan’s historical method on the centrality of sea power and the primacy of the battleship fleet. However, in contrast to Mahan, Castex’s work was focused on strategy as a whole, not solely on naval strategy . He was a prolific writer. His main work was the five-volume Theories Strategiques (Strategic Theories), published between 1927 and 1935. The immediate impact on the French Navy was rather insignificant. Only many years afterward, French naval officers realized the true value and importance of Castex’s strategic ideas. His work was widely respected and accepted in many navies of Latin America and in the Mediterranean. Abbreviated versions of his works were published in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Soviet Russia.

Castex correctly explained that strategy, like a war, is an art not a science. In his view, ―science evokes an element absolute certainty, of relations of cause and effect crystallized into rules so invariable and rigid that they become veritable laws, governing everything and impossible to escape. A scientific law asserts that the same scientific observation will always give rise to the same result, just as mathematical formula generates the same answer whenever the same numbers are used. In his view, ―the simple principles that govern strategy are not chains but flexible guides leaving free play to the creative imagination and to the human spirit in situations that are themselves enormously variable. Precisely here lies the essential character of art—which never entirely breaks free of principles not even of rules but still manifests itself in an unlimited variety of ways.

Castex wrote that in addition to land and naval strategy, there is also what he called general strategy (strategie generale) which transcends and coordinates them. In his view, general strategy unites the actions of armies and fleets whenever the two types of forces must work together.  

Castex held highly contradictory views on the proper relationships between strategy and tactics. To Castex, strategy was ―nothing other than the general conduct of operations, the supreme art of leaders at certain level of the hierarchy and of the general staff that serve them. Strategy prepares the battles striving to bring them about under the best conditions to bring about the best results. Castex clearly confused strategy and operational art. He wrote that strategy ―links the battles together, controlling and coordinating them in accordance with the general inspiration of the campaign while reacting also to events. He also argued that strategy dominates tactics prior to, during, and in the aftermath of a naval battle. He explained that [naval] tactics start ―only at the beginning of gunfire of the first cannon or torpedo, but one can hardly subtract from tactics all of the movements preliminary to the battle on the pretext that they belong to strategy.

Castex asserted that ―strategy is everywhere at every level. It cannot be isolated as governing certain parts but is intermingled in the totality of war itself. There is no longer a strategic operation, since all military activity qualifies. In his view, a commander is acting strategically when he conceives of an operation. However, since his orders must also prescribe the dispositions for the execution of these orders, he is performing tactically at the same time. Likewise, the subordinate who acts tactically in executing orders must also act strategically in conceiving their execution. In contemplating dispositions for executing his plan, the supreme commander acts tactically. In making a fire plan to suit a particular case, a ship’s gunnery officer thinks strategically. Yet this definition leads in practice to the unworkable thesis that everyone at every level of command is simultaneously a strategist and a tactician.

Castex, like Mahan and Corbett, firmly believed that the main objective of, in his words, ―maritime operations was to obtain or at least to dispute the mastery of the sea, that is, the control of the essential surface communications. The objective of naval war was to preserve freedom to use communications and deny the same to the enemy or ―at least, not to be entirely excluded by the enemy from their use. In his view, control of maritime communications has offensive and defensive aspects. Whoever controls sea communications preserves its links with overseas. At the same time, control of maritime communications gives protection of one’s coast against major enemy actions.

He recognized the great economic importance of having control of maritime communications for the continuous functioning of a nation’s commercial and industrial activity. He pointed out that the struggle for mastery of the sea is strongly related to the attack on and defence of communications. Castex wrote that the attack on and defence of maritime communications cannot be considered separately; they are closely intertwined and constantly affect each other. In his view, the [battle] fleet including even the air force, supports and sustains those parts of the navy tasked to conduct the attack on or defence of maritime communications. It is thanks to ―the [battle] fleet that they can operate without excessive hindrance of the enemy.  Moreover, the struggle for control of maritime war cannot be treated as ―a separate operation divorced from the rest of the military effort. However, it cannot at the same time replace the struggle against the enemy battle fleet. In a clear rebuttal of the French Navy’s traditional fascination with guerre de course, Castex warned that ―one must not harbour the illusion that the attack on (the enemy maritime) communications will by itself and without any other operation lead to a decisive victory.

Castex wrote that ―whoever wants to defeat the enemy fleet by combat must necessarily take the offensive without concern for its inherent risks. We need to concentrate as many forces as possible on the principal objective so as to have every possible advantage. Only the offensive can definitely break the equilibrium to produce a decision. Only when accompanied with an offensive executed elsewhere can the defensive lead to a decision and the end of the status quo. The decisive character is the virtue of ―genuine offensive and only offensive capable of bringing about decisions are worthy of the name. He disagreed with the views of those who believed that attack on the enemy maritime commerce alone would lead to the decision. He asserted that the guerre de course has never achieved significant results unless preceded or accompanied by a naval offensive. To achieve the decision, guerre de course requires support by the guerre militaire. Such actions cannot be decisive and hence cannot be properly called an offensive at all. He wrote that the same observation applies to attacks on the enemy coast and territories. However, attacks on the enemy coast are actually the result of the stronger fleet’s success in achieving command of the sea, and they can be decisive provided that the fleet provides effective support to friendly troops on the coast.

Castex agreed with Mahan that the enemy ―fleet must be defeated in order to obtain command of the sea. He wrote that one should direct all his actions against the enemy fleet because its destruction ―will very probably irreparably compromise the rest of the enemy’s organization. The best method of disposing the enemy fleet is to wage a decisive naval battle. In case the enemy chooses to ―shut himself up in port then he has to be blockaded more or less tightly to prevent his emergence or to force him to battle as soon as possible if he does. After having dealt with the enemy fleet, the stronger fleet can exercise command of the sea by conducting other operations. Castex warned that the stronger fleet should not exercise command of the sea prematurely because that might undermine the freedom of action essential to the destruction of the enemy fleet. For him, the fleet and decisive naval battle ―constitute the cornerstone, the foundation upon which we will construct our plans. Command of the sea is ―a military struggle between the belligerent’s fleets, that is to say, between the ensemble of their combat resources, including both naval and air forces under a single chief.

Castex considered what he called ―strategic manoeuvre (actually combination of strategic deployment and operational manoeuvre) as the centre-piece of his strategic theories. In referring to what is commonly understood as strategic deployment, he wrote that the French navy should accept [decisive] battle only after using manoeuvre to create a favourable shift in the naval balance. At the same time, strategic manoeuvre was for Castex a key element in the conduct of an operation. Thus, he clearly confused strategic manoeuvre with strategic deployment / redeployment. He wrote that strategic manoeuvre is a method used by strategists to ―improve the conditions of the struggle [at sea], to multiply the return on her efforts and to obtain the greatest results, whether in the duel between the principal forces themselves or to the benefit of particularly important non maritime requirements. Movement is the primary element of manoeuvre—it is the movement to achieve desired dispositions. Then it is the movement of the principal and secondary forces to exploit the situation thus created and to execute the manoeuvre. Castex observed that strategic manoeuvre ―above all demands space. However, because the ―advent of new machines has compressed both linear dimensions and time, manoeuvre now finds new obstacles. Strategic manoeuvre can be conducted only in a large sea/ocean area offering sufficient space for a manoeuvre; elsewhere, manoeuvre is notably more limited though not absolutely impossible. Castex wrote that the ―logical result of manoeuvre can only be to affirm superiority at the chosen point. When the manoeuvre is directed from the outset against the enemy fleet, the purpose is nothing other than battle, which is in his words ―the summit of the edifice.

Castex clearly recognized that in some situations even an offensive plan must provide for a possibility of conducting a defensive in a certain part of a maritime theatre. Except in a situation where one’s naval strength is overwhelming, it is simply impossible to be ―superior at a chosen point without being weaker, and therefore on the defensive elsewhere. The defensive is often combined with the offensive in time as well as in space. Castex correctly observed that in a war between the two continental states bordering the sea, ―mastery of the sea is, at least in theory, no longer even a necessary condition, since the issue of the hostilities will finally depend on the result of the combat between the land armies. Yet ―command of the sea will most often have a serious effect on the operations of these armies and it will be useful to the power that holds it.

Like Corbett, Castex believed that there is no such thing as total command of the sea. The maritime theatre of operations, unlike the area of land operations is ―constantly travelled by strangers to the conflict. Command of the sea ―is not absolute but relative, incomplete and imperfect. In spite of crushing superiority, the dominance of communications has never completely prevented his enemy from appearing on the water. Even relative mastery of the sea cannot be exercised at all points of the globe at the same time because even the strongest power lacks sufficient force. There has never been general control of sea communications but only local control over specific parts of the theatre or fewer in number, to a greater or smaller extent, and depending upon one’s resources. Sometimes geography and the distribution of fleets shifted local control of the sea to the benefit of the weakened navy. Castex asserted that freedom to use the sea for one’s purposes ―confers opportunities for coastal raids, seizures on the high seas and conditions permitting old-fashioned blockade. By achieving sea mastery, the stronger side can ―paralyze or at least restrict the enemy’s links with foreign countries. It can attack the enemy’s coast and exploit the advantages offered by conduct of ―combined [actually multi-service or joint] operations and dictate the enemy intercourse with neutrals in the conflict.

Castex wrote that the very term command of the sea ―gives the impression that its beneficiary enjoys the marvellous privilege of having to himself the immense expanse of the oceans or building a sort of barricade whose keys put in his pocket these totally banning peacetime users. This is misleading. It is utopian. All of the world’s united fleets would not suffice to achieve it everywhere. Nor would neutrals easily allow themselves to be cut off from trade. In his view, one’s strategic command of the sea very often requires a forced decision about attacking or even invading the enemy’s coast. The term command of the sea is less meaningful than in the past, and it is more precise and less pretentious to speak henceforth only of the mastery of the surface, but in a restricted sense, as we think to master the sea. It is a new dilution, another step on the road to relativity.

Castex had unfavorable views of the fleet-in-being concept as a means of contesting command of the sea by a weaker navy. He explained that it is ―excessive temerity for the inferior party to sail out into battle and destruction one cannot found great hopes of the method of the fleet in being against an active, enterprising adversary who is knowledgeable of his profession. He agreed with Mahan’s view and disagreed with Corbett on the usefulness of the fleet-in-being concept. Castex asserted that the errors of the integral doctrine of the fleet-in-being concept consist of the belief that the mere existence of such a fleet suffices to produce an effect, even if said fleet is moribund, and that it will necessarily paralyze a superior enemy who is master of the sea.

Castex gave much attention and thought to the effect airpower would have on the conduct of war at sea. He was perhaps one of the first theoreticians who believed in the possibility of employing aircraft against enemy maritime commerce and commercial ports. Such attacks will ―constitute a much greater novelty than air attack on commerce at sea.  In his view, air mastery is even more relative than mastery of the sea, and the master of the air cannot hope to forbid it completely to his enemy by any permanent occupation of its three dimensions. The mastery of the air is even at a further disadvantage in this regard than the master of the sea because he can never prevent the airplanes of even the weakest adversary from conducting reconnaissance or even bombardments and then disappearing as quickly as they come.

Castex wrote that the employment of ―the airplane against [maritime] communications will vary completely depending on whether they act against convoys or against isolated ships. In his view, escorted convoys can be attacked ―without hesitation, as a military formation because they leave no uncertainty as to their nationality. He was highly pessimistic as to the ability of a convoy to defend itself against an attack from the air. He asserted that the ships in a convoy are usually large, slow and unmaneuverable, and lacking antiaircraft protection. Castex properly observed that if used, convoys would require strong air cover. There are no sufficient resources to provide too many convoys with the necessary protection. In his view, the number of convoys must be reduced to minimize the number of aircraft required for their defence. At the same time, a ―system of huge and infrequent convoys is unworkable and the necessary concentration of air escorts can be managed if one has the initiative of operations. Castex properly observed if used, convoys would require strong air cover.

Like Corbett, Castex firmly believed in the need for close cooperation between the navy and the army. He explained that the ―relationship between the army and the navy must be as between infantry and artillery. As is infantry the queen of battle so the army is the queen of general strategy. Everything has to be subordinated to it because its success means the success of the general strategy. The navy is often to the army as the artillery is to the infantry; an indispensable support that allows it to accomplish its objectives. He correctly stressed that the success of land operations is, after all, what matters the most. Only victory on land permits the occupation of the enemy territory and would convince the enemy that he is defeated. For Castex, the importance of sea power is directly related to its contribution to the victory on land. Only in exceptional cases can sea-power achieve complete victory by itself.

Castex highlighted importance of geography or physical environment on the conduct of war at sea. He wrote that an attack on and defence of sea communications is heavily affected by geography. Geography provides or withholds positions from which commerce raiders can base their action. It also provides a means of establishing a blockade. In the littorals, hydrography can serve the defender by protecting his coastal communications and hiding them from the actions of the attacker. The outer islands belonging to the defender constitute positions of defence behind which coastal traffic can circulate in more secure conditions; the defender also possesses internal channels or navigable canals, reefs and shallow water. In Castex’s view, the influence of geography on maritime operations is not constant but evolves with technological advances. For example, the water depth affects strategy (actually more accurately naval tactics and to some extent operational art) because of the ―consequences of employing submarines, mines and underwater obstacles.

Castex’s main contribution to naval theory was his insistence on the need to have the conceptual foundations in order to have a sound naval strategy. Such foundations must be transparent and resilient; otherwise, they would not endure under the changing conditions. Castex believed that the absence of a coherent, historically grounded understanding of strategy ―prevented the smooth assimilation during Great War of events that instead created in many minds a profound and unnecessary upset. Like Mahan, he believed in the validity of the historical method in developing a naval strategy. Castex believed that historical principle was the best but not the only source of truth, and that advocates of materiel made an error in their single- minded focus on technology. Yet at the same time, they also offered a useful corrective to the historians’ tendency to think at a level of abstraction that avoided actual discussion of the conduct of war. He firmly believed that naval strategy must acknowledge both historical principles and materiel conditions.

Vice Admiral Wegener:

Wegener was the most important German naval strategist in the interwar years. His main work, The Naval Strategy of the World War, was published in 1929. This book was in fact an enlarged version of his memorandum ―Reflections on Our Maritime Situation, written in February 1915.

He firmly believed that Germany’s policy of building a large battle fleet without securing free access to the open waters of the Atlantic was essentially useless. Wegener was influenced by Mahan and Clausewitz. Hence, his ideas had much greater intellectual depth than those propounded by his many critics. In his memorandum ―Naval Bases Policy and Fleet, written in August 1915, Wegener criticized Tirpitz’s naval construction program. He wrote that the Germans had a force—High Seas Fleet (Hochseeflotte)—sufficiently powerful to pose a real danger to English sea control. However, Germany’s geographical position in the North Sea in relation to the oceanic sea lanes prevented the employment of its fleet’s offensive strike capability with any prospect of success. He pointed out that Germany built a fleet without considering geographical conditions under which its ships must operate and concurrently failed to extend its base of operations as the fleet was expanded.

Tirpitz’s ―risk fleet was conceived in purely military terms. Naval warfare was considered simply for the sake of naval warfare. The High Seas Fleet was established to fight for command of the sea, yet its geographical foundations were capable of supporting only a coastal defence fleet.

Wegener proposed to counter a British blockade by waging so-called ―small war (Kleinkrieg) until the equalization of forces had been achieved and thereafter ―to offer England a fleet engagement under conditions favourable to us; the war has shown that an equalization of forces cannot be attained by way of the Kleinkrieg given the distant blockade. 

Wegener emphasized that a decisive naval battle was meaningful to the war only if it removes obstacles that block the accomplishment of the strategic objective in a war at sea. He explained that war at sea consists of a tactical and a strategic part. The tactical part is the action, while the strategic part is the effect. If the strategic part is lacking as it was in the North Sea during World War I, then the effect is also lacking and only tactical part remained. If the strategic objective is lacking, the battle ceases to be a means. The battle becomes ―purposeless, and therefore, an end in itself. For Wegener, a naval battle was means toward an end, not an end in itself. It has the value only if it inflicts damages on the enemy and then allows ―us to advance step-by-step along the road toward exercising sea control. 

Obviously, a major battle, even a naval victory, will not be commensurate with the objective ―if we purchase victory with the destruction of a considerable part of our fleet. After the major battle we would lack the fleet to exploit the victory and further follow the road to sea control.

In discussing the fleet-in-being concept in his memorandum ―Can We Improve Our Situation on 12 July 1915, Wegener wrote that ―if we [Germans] cannot interdict the economic lifeline of our adversaries from the Heligoland Bight, only purely tactical sorties remain for the High Seas Fleet. He stressed the need to apply an active fleet-in-being concept (or in modern terms, tactical offensive) in the North Sea so that the ―enemy [British Grand Fleet] feels more or less threatened. 

A strong proponent of the need to have an offensive strategy, Wegener wrote that strategy on land is changeable and flexible. Offensive strategy can have no other objective than attaining a geographical position from which to initiate the battle for the commercial arteries of maritime traffic. One must first be able to come within reach of the trade routes; only then can one fight for them.

He dismissed the importance of offensive mining as part of German fleet actions. In his words, ―if the entire fleet goes out on mine laying operations, it does not do so to demonstrate its role as fleet-in-being to the enemy, but only to accord the minelayers the necessary protection. In addition to the night-time employment of the German torpedo boats, the only options open to the High Seas Fleet to ―convincingly demonstrate its activity to the enemy was ―a brief war on trade in the Skagerrak and the bombardment of [the British] coastal areas. 

In his view, naval strategy is tied to the configuration of the coast. He erred in his view that naval strategy is primarily determined by one’s geostrategic position in relation to the enemy’s sea communications. Wegener almost absolutized the importance of geography in the development of naval strategy. He wrote that ―naval strategy extends over wide areas and cannot—without denigrating itself—be held back in check at territorial frontiers that accidentally have been drawn upon geographical charts in the course of history. Wegener wrote that a maritime operation plan is dependent solely upon strategic position and not upon the relative strengths of the fleets. He believed (erroneously) that both strategic position and operation plans are essentially determined by geography and, therefore, removed from human willpower. Irrespective of mutual fleet strengths, strategic position, and operation plan, the ultimate objective of a naval strategic offensive is to achieve equality of geographical positions. Naval strategy is always geographical [by nature], tied to the geostrategic position. For Wegener, naval strategy was the science of geographic position, its changes and its stagnation with regard to trade routes. Offensive strategy is the acquisition of a superior geographical position, while defensive naval strategy aimed to preserve what he called ―positional stagnation. In his view, ―one cannot alter geography—what is lost through battle may be regained only by battle. But what is lost through geography can only be regained through geography.

(One example of an strategic position is to attack Chinese merchant shipping and resources transiting the Strait of Malacca )

Wegener insisted that the main purpose of having control of any strategic position is to exercise command of the sea, that is, control of trade routes from that position. Wegener wrote that every war at sea revolves around freedom of the seas for one’s own shipping. Therefore, ―one could fight all the battles in the North Sea that one wanted to—provided they were offered—but geography upon which everything depended, will not be altered in the slightest, and freedom of the seas would remain far beyond our reach. Wegener pointed out that because of Germany’s unfavourable geostrategic position, no tactical offensive is capable of transforming a defensive operational plan into an offensive one since an offensive operations plan has for its purpose not the maintenance, but the changing, of a strategic position. A strategic offensive ―serves to change the strategic position while a strategic defensive serves to adhere and to stagnate in the strategic position. In Wegener’s view, the German fleet could undertake ―as many sorties from the Heligoland Bight as it like but that would not change the fact that it would remain on the strategic defensive. The biggest weakness of German’s maritime position was that the navy’s largest base of operations in the Heligoland Bight was located far away from any important maritime trade route. In fact, ―the Scotland– Norway trade route lay so far distant that sorties there remained only tactical operations that, lacking lasting effect, could never aspire to control. Scotland’s position dominated all international trade routes, including the German routes, while the German position in the Heligoland Bight commanded nothing. Hence, a strategic defensive aimed to preserve ―a worthless strategic position was useless. Unlike Mahan, he rejected the simplistic belief in the paramount importance of a decisive battle.

Because of his ideas and persistence in pursuing them, Wegener was a highly controversial naval figure in the interwar years. His work as a naval strategist was not officially acknowledged by the German Navy until 1955. Wegener’s ultimate legacy was ―his summons to the naval officer corps to lead German people and their leaders out of their continental tradition and toward maritime considerations.

Conclusion from the theories

Most naval classical thinkers were primarily concerned with highlighting the role and importance of sea power in the rise and prosperity of maritime nations. Another area of their study was naval or maritime strategy. They also paid great deal of attention to naval tactics because the principal means of obtaining and maintaining command of the sea was so-called decisive naval battle. The theoreticians of the blue-water school of naval strategy focused on the need to have a big fleet composed of big ships. They also tried to impress on politicians and the public at large that the navy operates independently. Their emphasis was on offensive naval strategy and decisive battle as the chief method of achieving command of the sea. In contrast, theoreticians of the continental school of naval strategy recognized the interdependence and need for close cooperation between the navy and army. Continental School theoreticians had a generally more nuanced view of command of the sea and the ways of achieving it. They considered naval strategy as an integral part of what is today called national strategy. They recognized that the success in a war ultimately depends on the outcome of the struggle between the opposing armies.

None of the naval classical thinkers formally recognized the existence of operations or operational art as an intermediate field of study and the practice between naval strategy and tactics. However, each of them described and analyzed many aspects of the war at sea that properly belong to the domain of operational art.  Taken together, their theories offer a wealth of information and knowledge on various aspects of naval warfare.  

Modern age Navies

The Navy and the Marine Corps organize, train, and equip Navy and Marine Corps forces to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea. These operations involve sea-based aircraft and land-based naval air components. These forces have five primary tasks:

1.      They must seek and destroy enemy naval forces

2.      Suppress enemy sea commerce gain

3.      Maintain general naval supremacy

4.      Control vital sea areas

5.      Protect vital sea lines of communications

The Navy’s business is to clear the way for the operating forces to accomplish their task, whatever it is. The Navy must drive the enemy’s fighting forces off the high seas, out of the air, and across the seas. The Navy must block the enemy’s sea-lanes and sink its merchant ships and transports. The Navy also provides forces for joint amphibious

operations. It trains all forces assigned to these operations in amphibious warfare as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It also conducts naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, mine laying and controlled mine-field operations, and protects shipping. The Navy joins with the other services in defending  against air attack.

The concept of the “hi-low balanced mix” involves the purchase of a few highly effective aircraft and ships, such as nuclear propulsion aircraft carriers (CVNs) and submarines (SSBNs). At the same time, developing new classes of low-cost ships, such as guided-missile frigates and sea-control ships.

Our nuclear-age world has resulted in a nuclear-age Navy. Although the Navy uses nuclear weapons and guided missiles as its primary destructive weapons, it still maintains, and is improving, conventional weapons. Such weapons enable the Navy and Marines to rapidly deploy and to apply the necessary force to fight a limited war. The Navy leads the way in scientific projects. In the area of navigation, Navy ships can navigate on and under the oceans for days at a time. They no longer rely on traditional sources such as landmarks and stars to fix their position. The Navy continues to improve its propulsion systems. The Navy’s continued improvements in propulsion systems allow Trident submarines to operate undetected beneath the oceans. The newer, faster, and quieter fast-attack submarines prowl the oceans at will. These ships have added a new dimension to the world of undersea warfare. Navies have  made great strides in underwater acoustics, oceanography, and other scientific fields.

Throughout history, the shores of the enemy and the range of  ship’s guns have limited the Navy’s radius of action. Now with the development of long-range aircraft and ballistic missiles, the Navy’s radius of action spans the world. In the past, when ships sailed in a task force, they travelled together in formation. However, that tactic increased the number of losses during an attack. Today, ships are dispersed over a wide area, which increases their chances of survival in the event of a nuclear attack. Although the tactics of fleets have changed, the meaning of sea power and the need for sea power have remained constant.

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE  NAVY

The Navy has two major functions—sea control and power projection

Sea control, total control of the seas for the free movement of all, is the first function of the  Navy. It means control of set air, surface, and subsurface areas, when and where needed. Sea control is crucial to national strategy. It allows us to use the oceans as barriers for defence and as avenues to extend our influences overseas.

Power projection is the second function of the Navy. It is the ability to use sea power throughout the world in the timely and precise manner needed to accomplish a given goal. This covers a wide area. We accomplish power projection by using a broad spectrum of offensive naval operations. These operations include the tactical employment of carrier-based aircraft and the use of amphibious forces and naval gunfire support forces. They also include the strategic nuclear response by the fleet ballistic missile forces.

The functions of sea control and power projection are closely related. Depending on the type of force we are to use, we need some degree of sea control in the sea areas from which we are to project power. The States  have developed the naval forces’ capability to project power largely as one means of achieving or supporting control of the seas.

To carry out the functions of sea control and power projection in support of its mission, the Navy has three functions:-

1.     Strategic nuclear deterrence

2.     A strong naval presence

3.     Security of the sea lines of communications

Strategic Nuclear Deterrence

The effectiveness of the submarine-launched ballistic missile provides the strongest deterrent in strategic nuclear forces. Thus that deterrent is a stabilizing factor in the strategic nuclear balance.

Naval Presence

To achieve naval presence, the Navy deploys operationally ready naval forces to various overseas locations or bases throughout the world. From these locations,  forces can combat hostile forces and support forward-positioned ground and air forces as well as allies.

Security of the Sea Lines of Communications

The success of a forward military strategy depends upon the Navy’s ability to keep the sea lines of communications open. These lines are between the country and its forward deployed forces, its allies, and those areas of the world essential for imports. The most vulnerable areas of these sea lines are those closest to potential hostile bases and farthest from friendly territory. Land-based air and patrol combatant craft aid in the protection of shipping in those areas. The protection of the most vulnerable sea areas requires that Navy forces be present in enough strength to defeat hostile air, surface, and submarine threats. One of the most demanding requirements upon the capabilities of naval forces is overseas deployment. The deployments place great demands upon both Navy personnel and  multipurpose combatant ships.

THE MERCHANT MARINE RESPONSIBILITY IN SEA POWER

The merchant marine plays an important part in the sea power of a country.  A strong merchant marine is to service the fleet as a naval auxiliary during times of war and national emergency.

When States need to get ships quickly to supply the war effort, they seize the ships of the enemy in their ports. They also take possession of ships from foreign private operators in both domestic and foreign trade. they buy foreign ships and increase their shipbuilding efforts.

The Army and Navy used many merchant ships as auxiliaries. They use them as hospital ships, repair ships, airplane carriers, and for other special uses. They devise and used new methods of loading and replenishment. Every inch of the ship’s cargo holds and topside areas are loaded for increased carrying capacity.

Besides importing essential raw materials for defence, the merchant marine transports Army and Air Force personnel during times of war or national emergency. It also transports large amounts of equipment, ammunition, fuel, and other supplies that must follow forces. The merchant marine transports about 97 percent of needed supplies. We must supply about 5 tons of supplies to take care of each person at the front during war. Getting those vital supplies to the right place is a major task. The experience gained from two World Wars and the Korean and Vietnam conflicts taught us how important the merchant marine is.

PEACETIME MISSION

The merchant marine today consists of all commercial oceangoing vessels flying the national flag. Although the merchant marine is not part of the armed forces, it serves with them in wartime. It is subject to unified control under the Maritime Administration during times of war. The merchant marine includes all waterborne transportation— combination cargo-passenger ships, tankers, dry-cargo vessels, river barges, and harbour tugs. Ships include the liner fleet (ships operating on regular schedules). They also include ships contracted to carry cargo to all areas of the world and ships in domestic and foreign trade. The term merchant marine refers to all these ships and their crews.

WARTIME MISSION

In a war, the mission of the merchant marine includes the following:

·        Transport essential materials and cargo needed for the economy and needed to aid in supplying the economic needs of overseas allies

·        Resupply national and allied military forces overseas

·        Provide underway replenishment for wet or dry cargo and other direct services to Navy ships at sea.

·        Increase combatant naval forces by being armed to carry out convoy, antiaircraft, or antisubmarine duties

In wartime or a national emergency short of war, our government can get much-needed ships to perform merchant marine tasks from several sources. These sources include merchant ships flying the national flag or a foreign flag, the National Defence Reserve Fleet, and the Military Sealift Command (MSC).

MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND (MSC) RESPONSIBILITY IN SEA POWER

The Military Sea Transportation Service is set up by combining the sealift missions of the Naval and Army Transport Services.

MSC ships fall into two general classes—the nucleus fleet and privately owned ships under charter by MSC. The nucleus fleet consists of government-owned ships and chartered tankers. Most nucleus fleet ships have crews of civilian mariners who have civil service status. They enjoy the normal benefits of federal employees, but their pay and work rules stem from those of the commercial maritime industry. Private contractors with union crews operate some ships of the nucleus fleet (tankers). The bulk of the nucleus fleet consists of special project ships such as research vessels and those involved in direct support of the Navy fleet.

MSC transports dry and liquid cargo primarily aboard chartered ships and tankers of the nucleus fleet. MSC contracts most of these ships as voyage charters but occasionally contracts them as time charters. Voyage charters contract ships to carry specific cargo to a certain destination. Time charters contract for the use of an entire ship for months or years. All chartered ships are operated by their owners and manned with union seamen. This segment of the MSC fleet varies in size depending on the command’s current requirements. The ships of the Military Sealift Command fleet go where and when needed to support our armed forces. In peacetime and wartime, the MSC fleet is ready to respond immediately if needed to support national, military, economic, and diplomatic policies.

PEACETIME MISSION

In peacetime the Military Sealift Command relies heavily on the national merchant marine. The MSC ships transport nearly 25 percent of all military cargo on privately owned national flagships and other merchant marine vessels. The small size of the MSC-controlled fleet requires the MSC to add to its available sealift forces during involvement in armed conflict.

WARTIME MISSION

During peacetime, the MSC supports the fleet by supplying fuel and supplies. During wartime, MSC ships used in moving troops and supplies to the war zone bear arms for protection. Besides moving troops to the front, these ships provide underway replenishment to allow Navy ships to stay on station. They carry Navy personnel to handle areas such as weapons and communications to allow the civilian crew to continue its normal work. The MSC ships travel alone or in convoys, but they go wherever the fleet goes during a war. They move vital supplies at the front as well as at sea.

THE COAST GUARD RESPONSIBILITY IN SEA POWER

The multi-mission nature of the Coast Guard makes it unique among the armed services. It has an operational peacetime role primarily as a law enforcement agency. It has also humanitarian and disaster relief services ( HADR) and is responsible primarily for the search and rescue mission.

PEACETIME MISSION

The modern-day mission of the Coast Guard is an interesting mixture of duties, including the following:

·        Enforcement of maritime laws and treaties

·        Search and rescue operations

·        Enforcement of U.S. drug and contraband laws

·        Installation and maintenance of aids to navigation

·        Icebreaking operations that keep commercial vessel traffic moving in domestic waters and

·        support scientific research

As the primary maritime law enforcement agency, the Coast Guard enforces the following maritime regulatory laws:

·        Safety regulations for all commercial vessels, offshore structures, and recreational boating.

·        Port safety and security, including ports, harbours, and their approaches

·        The movement of vessels in ports and waterways during crisis situations.

·        Marine environmental protection to prevent and contain spills of oil and other hazardous

substances.

WARTIME MISSION

The Coast Guard is a military service—one that has ships, planes, and boats—it also has a military readiness mission. The Coast Guard works closely with the Navy, undergoes regular refresher training for its major cutters, and participates in joint operational exercises. The Coast Guard assumes the responsibilities of in-port safety and security and commercial vessel safety. The Coast Guard assumes convoy duties as well as antisubmarine warfare missions. Its cutters are well suited for convoy duties as they have a long cruising range and room for armament. The air search and rescue section of the Coast Guard flies rescue missions. It also flies reconnaissance and antisubmarine aircraft.

Conclusion and recommendations

A balanced sea power is the essential ingredient of a national strategy. It is not limited to any one course of action and can meet any type of aggression from the most primitive to the most sophisticated. Today the very survival of a country depends on sea power.

There are certain inescapable conclusions that we must derive from the previous section that the time is of the essence and we have already delayed the same by quite some time. As many of the strategic thinkers have put that a cohesive maritime strategy cannot be formulated without the inspection of the naval and maritime history. When we objectively inspect our own we find that we were the maritime superpowers of yesteryears and past centuries. right from about 2500 B.C till 1300 A.D. we dominated the sea and were controlling the sizable portion of the global trade up to 52% and this is not without a huge naval supremacy which brought out the conquest from the southern to the eastern seaboard till state of Singapore (singha pura - city of the lions). Our good were sought after worldwide and we had a robust shipbuilding. It is during these time the scholars and travellers around the world flocked to India and saw the wonder that it was an called it "the Golden bird". subsequently after our decline in these aspects of sea power we were exposed to invasion and conquest and occupation by foreign powers as we were unable to defend our shores from raiders. We lost our independence and way of life, generations perished under the tyranny of the foreign rules. Hence, we see objective the blue water theorists especially Mahan is correct in predicting the rise and decline of our civilisation vis-a vis our sea power. After independence the political disposition took a rather isolationist and protectionist trade practice and concentrated excessively on self reliance and hence maritime commerce and trade lagged behind, after 1980 and scrapping of the shipping development fund the incipient and infantile shipbuilding industries in India suffered infant mortality. The completion of the death was reinforced by the scrapping of shipbuilding subsidies and incentives and loss of credit lines to shipping by private Indian flag owners. Our entire merchant shipping is on the docks today, our national carriers have downsized tremendously and are inefficient and non-productive. Our trainees from our training institutes are not finding any employment in either Indian flagged vessel or foreign flagged vessels. Though our navy has been strengthened from its past condition through the acquisition of new platforms and weapon systems, we are at significant disadvantage from emerging burgeoning and aggressive power like China who are challenging our in our own neighbourhood and maritime space.

If we draw any reference from the Vice admiral Wegener our geostrategic positioning astride the major sea lions of communication poises us to become the leading sea power of the world as were before our decline. We only need to realign our strategies and focus on our forgotten sector and generate a new structure and policy which will change the destiny of the nation. Most instructive to this effect is the study of the last war we won in 1971 were a major role was played by the Indian Navy in a watershed victory leading to creation of Bangladesh were we employed the strategies of area denial and anti -access against the enemy and dealt a lethal blow. We seriously need to think in terms of sea power and integrate different organs under a new national maritime strategy.