Terrorists are evil, but ‘rational’ players. How this perspective can inform our counter-terrorism policies
Introduction
The recent surge in both executed1 and foiled2 terror attacks across Europe using primitive weapons like knife and other primitive weapons3 marks a shift in the tactics of terrorist organisations. Unlike in previous decades, where large-scale, centrally coordinated attacks dominated the landscape, recent threats often involve smaller, more decentralised operations that are harder to predict and prevent.
This calls for new ways of understanding and combating terrorism. One such approach lies in applying classic economic theories, particularly game theory4, to analyse and predict the behaviour of these groups. While game theory is commonly used in political science to understand the interactions between states5, its potential to shed light on, and ultimately combat, the strategies of terrorist organisations is less recognised but equally powerful6-8.
Here I argue why by viewing terrorist actions through the lens of game theory, one can gain deeper insights into their decision-making processes and develop more effective counterterrorism policies.
At the heart of game theory is the concept of the "rational player"9 –-a term used to describe an entity that makes decisions aimed at maximising its payoff. In applying this to terrorism, it is crucial to clarify that recognising terrorists as rational actors is not an attempt to justify or rationalise their actions. Terrorism is unequivocally evil, and the actions of terrorists are morally reprehensible. However, by analysing their behaviour as that of rational decision-makers, we can better understand the strategic calculations that drive their operations. This allows us to anticipate potential threats, understand their evolving tactics, and ultimately stay one step ahead in the fight against terrorism.
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Why can terrorists be likened, in theory, to ‘rational economic actors’?
Terrorist organisations, despite their violent methods, often make calculated decisions to achieve specific political, ideological, or strategic goals. Groups like ISIS or Al-Qaeda often choose targets based on their symbolic value or potential to instil fear, rather than random violence. This shows a calculated approach aimed at maximising impact with minimal resources, akin to strategies used in strategic games10. In the following, I break down, with examples, evidence that supports viewing terrorist organisations as rational actors, showing that this assumption has reasonable theoretical backing.
Cost-benefit calculations in choosing and executing missions
Terrorist organisations, much like rational players in any strategic game, carefully calculate the costs and potential payoffs before choosing and executing their missions. This decision-making process involves assessing the resources required, the likelihood of success, the expected impact, and the risks involved. They weigh these factors and aim to maximise their objectives while minimising their exposure to defeat or failure.
The 9/11 attacks on the United States are a clear illustration of this cost-benefit calculation. Al-Qaeda invested relatively minimal resources—19 operatives, basic flight training, and small amounts of funding—yet the payoff was massive in terms of global impact, media attention, and the strategic blow dealt to the U.S11.
Similarly, but on a smaller scale, the London Bridge attack in 2017, where attackers used a rented van and knives, demonstrates how terrorists calculate the cost-effectiveness of their methods. The low cost of the attack contrasted with the high level of fear, disruption, and media coverage it generated, making it a "successful" operation from the terrorists’ perspective12,13. Such calculations allow terrorist groups to sustain their campaigns over time, even with limited resources.
Terrorist organisations also assess the risks associated with their missions, including the likelihood of detection, the potential for failure, and the consequences of those failures. For instance, when planning attacks in well-guarded locations, groups often choose methods that reduce the risk of being intercepted, such as suicide bombings where the attacker cannot be captured alive or interrogated14. This risk mitigation is part of their rational calculation.
Terrorist groups are highly adaptive and respond strategically to the security measures of their targets. When faced with heightened security in one area, they often shift to softer or less protected targets where the likelihood of success is higher. After the September 11 attacks, U.S. and European airports implemented stringent security measures, making it difficult to carry out similar large-scale hijackings. In response, groups like ISIS shifted tactics towards attacks on public spaces such as train stations, markets, and concerts, where security is less intensive, as seen in the 2015 Paris attacks15 and the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing16.
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Changing tactics in response to government policies and resource allocation
Terrorist organisations continuously monitor and adapt to government policies and the allocation of resources aimed at countering them. When governments focus heavily on one area, these groups often alter their tactics to exploit other vulnerabilities. The U.S. drone strike campaign in Pakistan and Afghanistan severely disrupted Al-Qaeda’s central leadership. In response, Al-Qaeda shifted to a more decentralised model, empowering regional affiliates like AQAP in Yemen and Al-Shabaab in Somalia17. These affiliates adopted local strategies, such as using suicide bombings and guerrilla warfare, which were harder for drones to target.
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Learning from past actions
Terrorist groups are not static; they analyse the outcomes of their actions and those of other groups, learning lessons to refine their strategies. This learning process is a hallmark of rational behaviour18,19. The 2008 Mumbai attacks by Lashkar-e-Taiba were meticulously planned after studying the weaknesses of Indian security forces and the impact of past attacks. The group chose to use multiple teams to create confusion and overwhelm the police, a tactic they refined from observing previous attacks that had been less successful. Similarly, the evolution of suicide bombings as a tactic was heavily influenced by the early successes of groups like Hezbollah, which demonstrated its effectiveness to other organisations20.
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Reactions to concessions
Terrorist organisations closely observe the concessions made by governments or other entities in response to their actions, adjusting their strategies to maximise their gains in future negotiations or conflicts. The 2004 Madrid train bombings, carried out by an Al-Qaeda affiliate, led to Spain withdrawing its troops from Iraq21,22. This perceived success influenced other groups to target countries involved in foreign conflicts, hoping to achieve similar concessions. The Taliban, too, adjusted their approach in peace talks, understanding that sustained pressure could lead to U.S. concessions, ultimately resulting in the 2020 Doha Agreement23.
Exploiting power asymmetry
Terrorist organisations are keenly aware of the power asymmetry between them and state actors. They leverage their limited resources to create disproportionate fear and disruption, often forcing stronger powers into overreactions or resource-draining responses24,25. Al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks are a classic case of exploiting power asymmetry. With minimal resources, they inflicted massive damage on the U.S., leading to the costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Understanding and exercising cooperation
Terrorist organisations, like rational players, recognise the strategic value of cooperation26,27. Despite ideological differences, they often collaborate to achieve common goals, pool resources, or amplify their impact. This cooperation can take various forms, including shared training, logistical support, or coordinated attacks. The cooperation between Al-Qaeda and its regional affiliates, such as AQAP and Al-Shabaab, illustrates how these groups work together to expand their influence and capabilities28. They share training camps, exchange intelligence, and provide mutual support in terms of funding and weapons. Another example is the collaboration between Hezbollah and various Palestinian factions, despite their differing religious and political ideologies, to coordinate attacks against Israel. This rational cooperation allows them to punch above their weight and sustain prolonged conflicts.
Game theory sheds light on the strategic interactions not just between terrorists and governments, but also among different terrorist organisations or even factions within the same group29,30. Terrorist groups, much like competitive firms, may either cooperate or compete depending on how they perceive their shared goals or threats. For instance, rival groups might form temporary alliances to pool resources or coordinate attacks for mutual benefit, but these alliances are often fragile and driven by self-interest. Within a single organisation, different factions—such as political and military wings—may have conflicting objectives. Game theory can model these internal power struggles and help us understand why certain factions might push for more extreme actions while others advocate for negotiation or restraint.
The dynamics between terrorist organisations can also be analysed through the lens of the Prisoner’s Dilemma31, a classic concept in game theory. Consider the cooperation between Al-Qaeda and ISIS before their eventual split32. Initially, both groups benefited from cooperating—sharing resources, intelligence, and fighters to further their common goals. However, as their strategic and ideological differences grew, they faced a prisoner’s dilemma. Cooperation promised continued mutual benefit, but betrayal offered the possibility of dominance for one group over the other33. ISIS chose to defect, declaring itself the leader of the global jihadist movement, which led to open conflict between the two. This resulted in significant losses for both sides.
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The use of deceit as a strategic tactic
Deception is a powerful tool in the arsenal of terrorist organisations, enabling them to exaggerate their capabilities, mislead opponents, or mask their true intentions. Like rational players, these groups understand that manipulating perceptions can be as impactful as their actual actions34,35. By deploying deception, they can achieve strategic goals without expending significant resources. Terrorist organisations often exaggerate their strength or the scope of their operations to create an illusion of greater power. For instance, ISIS has frequently inflated the number of fighters or resources at its disposal, using propaganda to present itself as a much larger and more formidable force than it actually is. This tactic not only attracts more recruits and funding but also instils greater fear in their adversaries, leading to overreactions that can drain the resources of those trying to counter them36,37.
Conversely, terrorist groups may downplay their capabilities or the success of their operations to avoid drawing attention or provoking a strong response before they are ready. For example, Al-Qaeda has at times been deliberately vague about its involvement in certain attacks to keep authorities guessing and to prevent immediate crackdowns on their operatives or infrastructure.
Deception is also employed in the execution of attacks. Terrorist groups often use diversionary tactics, such as staging smaller, less significant attacks to distract from their primary operations. For instance, prior to major attacks, groups might engage in lower-level violence or spread disinformation to keep security forces focused elsewhere. Another common tactic is issuing false claims of responsibility for attacks, either to mislead intelligence agencies or to protect the identity of the actual perpetrators.
Another crucial insight from game theory is the role of asymmetric information in the struggle between terrorists and governments. In many cases, terrorists have a better understanding of their own capabilities, objectives, and plans than the governments they target. This creates an imbalance, where governments are often forced to act on incomplete information, making it difficult to craft effective counterterrorism policies38,39. For instance, terrorists may exaggerate their strength or conceal their true intentions to mislead governments into either overreacting or making concessions. This manipulation of information is a calculated tactic that terrorists use to gain an upper hand, much like bluffing in a poker game40,41. On the other hand, governments may also use strategic ambiguity to keep terrorists uncertain about how they will respond, hoping to deter future attacks42.
What have game theory applications taught us about the effectiveness of policies
Game theory provides a powerful framework for analysing the strategic interactions between terrorist organisations and governments. Viewing these interactions as a game provides a theoretical framework through which we actor can anticipate and react to the moves of the other, ultimately enabling us to better understand the underlying logic of the actions of terrorist organisations in order to predict and counter them. For example, terrorists and governments both engage in a kind of strategic dance, where the terrorists might escalate their demands or tactics based on how they perceive the government's willingness to concede or retaliate. This back-and-forth is similar to the concept of a Nash Equilibrium in game theory, where both players reach a point where neither can improve their position by changing their strategy alone, thus leaving them no incentive to change their strategy43.
Moreover, the use of game theory has shed light on why governments often struggle with transnational terrorism, as different nations may fail to cooperate effectively, creating gaps in their collective defence. Past research has highlighted how these failures stem from the different incentives and strategies that governments pursue, often leading to overemphasis on defensive measures at the expense of more proactive strategies44.
Such applications have highlighted that governments often overemphasise defensive counterterrorism measures, such as increased security, at the expense of proactive strategies45. This emphasis on defence can often lead to a suboptimal equilibrium, particularly in the context of transnational terrorism, where the costs of these defensive measures are high, and the effectiveness is limited.
Game theory has shown that international cooperation is often hampered by conflicting interests and strategic misalignments among governments6,44. This lack of coordination leads to inefficiencies, such as over-defending certain targets while leaving others vulnerable and underscores the difficulty of achieving effective global counterterrorism strategies without better cooperation46.
These applications have taught us how proactive counterterrorism measures, such as dismantling terrorist networks or disrupting financing, are often underutilised due to the strategic challenges they present. Proactive measures are seen as strategic substitutes, meaning that when one government takes action, others may feel less compelled to contribute, leading to collective inaction.
Game theoretic applications have also releveled findings related to hostage negotiations with terrorists, where governments’ no-concession policies often break down in practice due to unrealistic assumptions47.
Concluding remarks: What can a ‘rational player’ model offer to Australia’s counterterrorism
Terrorist organisations, despite the depravity of their actions, exhibit behaviours that characterise them as rational decision-makers. Viewing terrorists as rational actors enables the development of more effective counterterrorism strategies. If their actions are driven by rational calculations, then altering the costs and benefits associated with those actions—through diplomacy, targeted interventions, or economic measures—can deter future attacks. This helps potentially allow policymakers to develop models to simulate terrorists’ behaviour, assess risks, and design more resilient societies. By recognising terrorists as rational actors, we can better predict their future actions. This includes understanding how they might react to counterterrorism measures or shifts in global politics. A rational player model helps in anticipating their moves, such as changing tactics or targeting different regions based on perceived vulnerabilities.
Australia, with its geographical location and relatively lower profile as an initial target for terrorist organisations, has a unique strategic advantage in utilising such approach. This position provides Australian counterterrorism agencies with a valuable window of time to observe, analyse, and learn from the evolving tactics of terrorist groups as they reveal their tactics in other regions first. This scenario is akin to a game player who has the advantage of moving second, allowing them to observe the opponent’s move before responding. In game theory, moving second can be advantageous in several types of games, especially those involving sequential moves where the second player can observe and react to the first player’s move49,50.
Recognising terrorist organisations as rational actors does not diminish the moral repugnance of their actions, but it does provide a crucial lens through which to understand and counter their strategies. By applying game theory and similar frameworks, we can better predict and disrupt the calculated moves of these groups, ultimately enhancing the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies and ensuring greater security for all.
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