Terrorist Tactics

Terrorist Tactics

The Challenge of VIP Protection

In most cases, well-organized protection for a VIP is perceived by terrorists as a significant obstacle. Let's assume a terrorist group takes notice of the appearance of professional security for their intended target. It's possible they may shift their focus to an easier target without our knowledge. However, we do know that the use of lead and tail cars, along with additional protection for the client's vehicle, residence, and office, can effectively deter criminals.

That said, even the most comprehensive security measures can sometimes fail, as tragically demonstrated by the assassination of Alfred Herrhausen, the head of Deutsche Bank.


The Assassination of Alfred Herrhausen

The attack on Herrhausen was orchestrated by the West German Red Army Faction (RAF). The RAF's irregular but effective attacks established them as the most successful left-wing terrorist group in Germany. Let's examine one of their operations and the lessons that can be learned from it.

Alfred Herrhausen, chairman of the board of directors of Germany's largest bank, was more than just a financier. He was a highly influential economist and strategist in industrial policy, as well as a close friend and advisor to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The German government saw the terrorist act against Herrhausen as a devastating blow to society.

Herrhausen was constantly accompanied by a personal security team. During his daily commute, his armored Mercedes, valued at $200,000, was protected by lead and tail cars. However, the RAF militants were undeterred by the seemingly robust security measures protecting their chosen targets. Of the 10 VIPs they attacked, 6 had bodyguards, escort vehicles, or armored cars. Three of them even used fully armored limousines.



The Attack

Herrhausen's residence was in an exclusive Frankfurt neighbourhood. His departure time for work was predictable. Travel routes near his home were limited, requiring passage through a park zone. Near the attack site, there were pedestrian and jogging paths, as well as a parking lot, providing the attackers with ample opportunities for surveillance, preparation, and execution of the attack.

At the attack location, the motorcade had to reduce speed to 50 km/h due to a pedestrian crossing for schoolchildren and a bus stop. A bicycle left by the roadside further impeded the motorcade's progress. Around 8:30 am, Herrhausen's armored Mercedes was blown up.

The explosive device (containing approximately 10 kg of TNT) was hidden on the bicycle's luggage rack, a mere 1 meter from the limousine. The bomb was filled with shrapnel, which pierced the car door and fatally wounded the banker, who was seated in his usual spot in the right rear seat. The driver miraculously escaped with minor injuries.



The Sophistication of the Attack

The explosive device was detonated using a photoelectric sensor attached to one of the white posts lining the road. An infrared beam, reflected by a mirror on another post across the street, completed the circuit. The terrorists meticulously calculated the Mercedes' speed and length, factored in the victim's seating position, and precisely determined the placement of the bicycle with the explosive device. It was designed to detonate the moment the limousine's front end interrupted the infrared beam.

The lead car, about 200 meters ahead of the Mercedes, passed the post without incident. A terrorist dressed in a tracksuit, alerted by an accomplice via radio, had deactivated the photoelectric sensor triggering the explosive device.

Weeks before the attack, an operative had concealed the main wire in the pedestrian walkway's surface. The external wire was likely laid in the park just that morning to avoid detection.


Security Lapses and Lessons Learned

The meticulously planned attack was a significant victory for the RAF, exposing serious gaps in VIP security. The lead car's crew failed to detect the explosive device during their approach. Had they been tasked with detailed route reconnaissance, the abandoned bicycle might have raised their suspicions.

The park zone perfectly suited the terrorists' plans. Ironically, the security team should have identified it as the highest-risk section of the route due to:

  • Proximity to the client's residence.
  • Reduced vehicle speed.
  • Unobstructed surveillance opportunities.
  • Dense rows of trees and bushes.
  • Proximity to the highway.
  • Easy escape routes.
  • Simple camouflage options for attackers (joggers, park visitors, couples, etc.).

The Herrhausen attack illustrates elements common to all terrorist operations. Analyzing this crime leads to several conclusions, the main one being that a determined terrorist organization with sufficient resources will view a "difficult target" as a challenge.

Security services cannot afford complacency, no matter how extensive their human and material resources. Constant vigilance and an understanding that an attack can occur at any moment are crucial.

From an operational standpoint, there are two primary lessons:

  1. The need for timely detection of surveillance on the client.
  2. Preliminary inspection of all travel routes.

The surveillance conducted by the terrorists could have been detected if the security team had been tasked with that objective. However, the security detail failed to identify the meticulous, weeks-long surveillance on the victim, as well as the tampering with the sidewalk surface.

The professional competence of the German Federal Police officers in the lead car proved inadequate, despite their incorrect tasking. Focused on potential ambush locations, they overlooked the abandoned bicycle. The terrorists were so confident in the security team's adherence to protocol that they used the lead car as a detonation timer.

The lessons from a single incident are unlikely to provide aspiring bodyguards with a complete understanding of terrorist tactics. Therefore, we will continue to examine incidents of hostage-taking and assassination attempts on high-profile individuals, including:

  1. The attempted assassination of US President Ronald Reagan in March 1980 in Washington.
  2. The assassination of Aldo Moro in Italy.
  3. The kidnapping of Hans-Martin Schleyer in West Germany.

While we would like to believe that the terrorists' failures were due to preventive actions by security forces, this is often not the case. In most instances, their failures are caused by their own mistakes or external, uncontrollable factors. Terrorists usually have the advantage of surprise and undetected surveillance on their side.


The Global Rise of Terrorism

Between 1970 and 1992, the number of terrorist acts increased dramatically, from 298 to 5,400, a growth of 1,713%. The geographical distribution of these crimes in 1992 was as follows:

  • Latin America: 28%
  • Middle East: 24%
  • Asia: 19%
  • Europe: 18%
  • Africa: 11%

However, these statistics tell only part of the story. According to the FBI report "Bombing Crime Survey," approximately 10,000 bombing incidents were recorded in the US between 1975 and 1984. The analysis revealed that explosives were used in about 7,100 cases, and incendiary devices in 3,019 cases, resulting in 279 deaths and 1,600 injuries. Despite these figures, as the percentages above indicate, the US is still considered relatively "free" from terrorism.

Anyone aspiring to become a personal protection specialist must have a thorough understanding of terrorist tactics. The information available on regional terrorism and individual incidents is vast. Analyzing this information can be considered "special training" that you undertake while reading this article.

要查看或添加评论,请登录

Kornelijus V.的更多文章

社区洞察

其他会员也浏览了