Terrorism and Tradecraft

The current public relations battle between the FBI and Apple over the access to the Iphone(s) of one of the terrorists  (and those of possible accomplices) of the San Bernardino shooting has drawn much attention and with it, countless debates over what is the correct course of action. Should Apple create a program to allow federal investigators access to the phone or phones in question with the possibility that the government could apply such a program to other phones or should Apple block any attempts by the government to collect any sensitive information on the phones in question? 

No easy answers; but what gets lost in this battle between the FBI and Apple are the difference in actions of how amateurish terrorist cells and lone wolves operate versus terrorists who benefit from the resources of established terror organizations. Though a number of attacks have been carried out and prevented stateside in the name of ISIS, al-qaeda, and others by lone wolves; their amateurish tradecraft has at times led to discovery prior to the incident or exposed others in their circle post incident because of a lack of operational security.  

Forty years ago and beyond, organized terrorist groups like Fatah/Black September, ETA, Baader Meinhoff Gang and the Red Brigades leveraged networks of non combatants to aid them  (whatever the cause) in appropriating cars, safe houses, mail drops, bank accounts, safety deposit boxes, cover stories, weapons, and more. In some cases, the non combatants, often drawn from the same ethnic, political, or religious background of the terrorist group had no idea that there actions were connected to anything sinister beyond helping a person of the same faith or ethnicity get established in a new town or country. These support and logistic teams were one of three chief elements that the leaders and financiers of organized terrorist groups would manage through intermediaries.

The second element - the surveillance and intelligence teams would be tasked with selecting and monitoring the best targets and escape routes to facilitate their goal - a bombing, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage taking. Those collecting intelligence would leverage a network of locals who may have immigrated from the same country of the terrorists yet have legitimate working papers and language skills and are willing to do what they can for "the cause". 

The third element were the armed combatants, those whose job it was to kill, maim, and terrorize. These men and and a handful of women trained in regimented terrorist camps; some even received training from the KGB if their cause benefited the Soviet Union's goal of disrupting Western governments. Planning and operating in the shadows was the way of life. Some of the terrorists of Black September did not even know the exact target and goal until just days prior to the Munich Olympic Massacre of 1972. Compartmentalization, secrecy, and training led to many terrorist successes. al- Qaida's attack on America on 9/11 followed the operational model of the notorious terrorist groups of 1960s, 70s, and 80s. 

Mirroring the terrorist infrastructure were the worlds' intelligence and counter-terrorist agencies. Governments had the benefit of more resources in fighting terrorists such as electronic and signal intelligence but the covert counter- terrorist infrastructure was similar - Support and Logistics, Surveillance and Intelligence, and the Direct Action elements. All what terrorists would need to subvert the authorities, counter terrorism officers would also require - safe houses, cars, mail drops, cover stories, etc.

The modern day lone wolf terrorist, who may get radicalized or recruited online may not have the resources or tradecraft skills to avoid detection or engage in secure communication. Would a potential ISIS sympathizer or martyr know how to detect someone following him or her? Would a trained terrorist use an Iphone or a pre-paid "burner" phone bought with cash?  Though there are apps designed for Apple and Android smartphones to mask phone numbers and offer high security, purchasing a phone requires a bit of information to be exchanged, is expensive, and leaves a paper trail even if it is to someone else other than the terrorist. A number of cheap burner phones that serve a solitary purpose would be the preferred way to go to minimize exposure; yet I am sure that there is an NSA tool that can track those too.

I am not commenting on whether Apple's stance is right or wrong but the possibility of a greater network of conspirators in the San Bernardino attack is viable though not certain. If accessing the digital information of the San Bernardino shooters' phone(s) is not granted, old tried and true investigatory tools like questioning all known associates of the shooters, surveilling family and friends, and conducting search warrants will be par for the course. Ironically, by not getting access to the Iphone out of privacy concerns, the government may put more people under surveillance to rule out any terrorist connections.