Terrorism, Strategy of the weak? SRMC Course Lecturer Andrew Seawards Perspective

‘It is a talent of the weak to persuade themselves that they suffer for something when they suffer from something; that they are showing the way when they are running away; that they see the light when they feel the heat; that they are chosen when they are shunned.’

Eric Hoffer - (1973) American philosopher and author.

As ISIS continue to lose ground in the Middle East many commentators are highlighting the apparent correlation between their increasingly weak status and a switch in strategy from a hierarchical command structure used to dominate ground throughout Syria and Iraq to increasingly relying on a sort of violent franchise often linked by nothing more than an ideological affiliation with which they incite attacks on civilians in the West. Of course such transformations are not unprecedented – a similar modern example would be the contrast in modus operandi of al Qaeda pre and post September 11th 2001. Suffering from apparent over success, the response provoked by arguably the most infamous terror attacks in history made mounting further operations on a similar same scale, or boasting the same level of sophistication impossible. Instead, they resorted to more crude and rudimental attacks. This example shows how strategies in terrorism can be adapted depending on the strengths and weaknesses of those aspiring to conduct terrorist operations and those endeavouring to prevent them. The ISIS example however interests me as the suggestion is as a conventional war fighting force, with their traditional military objects such as physically dominating territory weakens they will naturally shift to a strategy of terrorism. 

…and so I find myself pondering…

Is Terrorism a Strategy of the Weak?

Before I can scrutinize this suggestion I want to acknowledge and resolve the fact that the two terms referred to in the notion, namely ‘terrorism’ and ‘weakness’ are highly subjective, frequently over used, imprecise concepts.

The overwhelming range of proposed and considered definitions of ‘terrorism’ is well documented. A universally endorsed detailed and exact description simply doesn’t exist. The proposal infers it is safe to deduce that terrorism is indeed a strategy rather than a series of arbitrary and isolated incidents. In that context it will be the following depiction of ‘terrorism’ as a strategy to which I will be referring: for a non-state actor to promote a political, religious or ideological mandate by intentionally engaging or threatening to engage civilians and non-combatants in unconcealed acts of violence. It is also important to recognise that describing a group or individual as ‘weak’ is of course a matter of perspective relative to the effective capability of the subjects opposing force.

In 1985 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher declared exposure was a vital element of terrorism. I think of terrorism as a system of communication – a person or group intends to promote his or her objectives and for fear they will be ignored or disregarded elects to deliver the message through the medium of violence. One could argue that by using extraordinary acts of violence the IRA made themselves relevant and forced the British Government to engage in talks with the IRA leadership. In this context it is obvious to see how the application of terrorism might appear highly appealing to a group whom considers themselves politically weak and strives for increased influence.

What about weakness in a fiscal sense? It is thought that the cost of specific attacks is comparatively modest. It has been cited that the Provisional Irish Republic Army (PIRA) required funds of ￡5 million to remain operationally effective. Compared to the estimated ￡1.5 Billion per annum spent on the British response to the troubles. I’m certainly not trying to convince you this expenditure was aimed exclusively at the PIRA however it still demonstrates the colossal divide in economic terms between the sub-state groups attempting to affect change and the states looking to counter their efforts. 

It has been stated that the shift to terrorist methods is a natural progression when a group acknowledges and adapts to the fact they are inferior to their foes military force. This narrative is based on some sound logic. It is easy to see how advocates of force would be dissuaded from engaging an enemy in a conventional armed conflict when clear inferiority in physical capabilities and financial resources would make victory highly unlikely. While this sounds a fair assumption I would highlight however there are precious few examples where two conflicting rivals have matched each other in terms of physical capability. Since the aggressor is not going to achieve their goal through conventional military engagements it has been argued the goal must then be the winning of ‘hearts and minds’, which as I’m sure you will agree, is far from conducive when exhorting violence against the very public you wish to seduce. A possible explanation for this is that those applying the use of physical force to advance their cause hope that such incidents may provoke a gratuitous reaction from the state. It has been proposed that this was the precise intention of the Basque separatist group ETA in the 1960’s. It is thought that the group’s intention was to trigger a disproportionate response from the Spanish authorities. It was envisioned that this in turn would galvanize Basque residents and initiate a resistance the Spanish Government would be unable to curtail. Another example of how terror can be used to help gain popular support and boost numbers comes from Operation DEMETRIUS: the internment without trial of those alleged to have terrorist connections in Northern Ireland. The operation began in 1971 and was imposed by the British Government following an escalation in violence from the IRA whom at the time did not enjoy extensive approval from the Republican Catholic communities. The operation was based on poor intelligence and had overwhelming anti-Catholic rhetoric. Reported cases of mistaken identity and the inclusion of apparent innocent bystanders were widespread. This combined with alleged abuse of prisoners and the employment of heavy handed interrogation techniques by the British Armed Forces lead to disaffection growing amongst the local population and many became involved in the armed engagement aiding the violent separatist efforts. A survey in 1980 revealed 60% of IRA members were attracted to the cause as a direct result of ‘humiliations associated with occupation’. These examples clearly demonstrate how terrorism can be regarded as a tool for enhancing man power and bolstering support. Perhaps it could then be considered if a group feels these are necessary goals then that may demonstrate they perceive themselves to be weak.

We can certainly observe that the strategy of terrorism can boast a number of key factors that may be considered attractive to those striving to insist a bearing upon a much greater adversary. It’s easy to see how a strategist with a mandate to promote may surmise aspects such as lack of physical potency, privation of political capital, financial inferiority and limited popular support can appear to be circumvented through the use of terror campaigns. You could also argue that on occasion the assumption is partially justified. However, as I mentioned, ‘weakness’ is a subjective and inconstant concept.  For me to answer this broad question with an unequivocal ‘yes’ as the evidence might suggest would be to ignore the various perspectives of those entangled in the phenomena, as opposed to just the terrorists and the State. The Sovereignty of Great Britain may not have be especially vulnerable to the threat of brutality from the actions of a handful of extremists claiming to exhort violence in the name of an organisation they have had little more than passive interactions with. The might of the British Police and Security Services, far superior fire and man power and annual budgets running into the billions appear to dominate these would-be ISIS terrorist operators in every way. This view alone is too rudimentary as it ignores the true victims of terrorism. It’s doubtful that during or in the immediate aftermath of an attack many of the unfortunate people caught in the blast of an improvised explosive device at a pop concert or under the wheels of a vehicle being wielded as a weapon would perceive those who carried out the attack as being weak. As such ‘weak’ is a deceptive label that maybe should be applied with a little more caution.

Is Terrorism a Strategy of the ‘Weak’?

Written by Andrew Seaward