Terrorism and Organized Crime Nexus in the Sahel

Abstract

Terrorism and organised crime live in symbiosis. They share services and logistics. The terrorists are enablers of organised crime and organised crime is an extension of terrorism. They live in the same ecosystems, a desert area, or a savannah, at times inhospitable, a network of routes, made of trails, border-crossing points that are prone to attack by various groups, not easily accessible but, a place where the traffickers are at ease with. They know the desert better than anybody else. Guiding and escorting shipments is a service in which the nomadic tribal traders and smugglers that crisscross the desert excel.

The people that live in the Sahel, especially in the core desert area, are of nomadic descent, linked to various degrees to Islam, and have a concept of legality that is atypical. These people have a cultural bond with nomadic life, trade and smuggling. They make little difference between trade and smuggling. Their assessment of legality transcends the dichotomy haram / halal or forbidden and allowed. They adopt other criteria to evaluate whether the act is of benefit for the community or for the self. In an Islamic society, drug and cigarettes trafficking would normally be categorised as haram but in the Sahel, if the smuggler redistributes the benefits to the community, his activity is likely to be accepted.

In Niger for example, where people smuggling to Libya from Agadez was a permanent feature, laws prohibiting human smuggling, were codified only in 2015.[1] Before that year, smuggling of humans was seen as an ordinary, though lucrative, employment. The laws ratified in 2015 were repealed in November 2023 by Niger’s junta leader, Gen. Abdourahmane Tchiani. This decision also implies that all those convicted under the 2015 law would be considered for release by the Ministry of Justice.[2]

This is fertile ground for armed groups that aspire at conquering hearts and minds of the locals because they are already willing to accept a certain level of illegality in exchange of some communal services.

The Sahel is affected by a multitude of security problems which are not exclusively caused by terrorists or insurgents. Alongside those, criminals and traffickers operate a vast network made of thousands of individuals. Any policy designed to re-establish security in the Sahel, must address at the same time these multitude, otherwise, it risks being ineffective.

?

Keywords

Sahel, Africa, West Africa, terrorism, smuggling, hybridization, organized crime

Introduction

Before delving into the core subject of the report, it is important to frame the peculiarities of the forms of terrorism in the Sahel and the transformations or evolutions it went through. At the origins, terrorist groups were groups of bandits. In this context, religion what not a factor or a vision for these groups. Religion gained an instrumental role and became a pretext to legitimise the activities of the groups. Behind this cover, lies the real problem of a widespread and permeating ordinary criminality of the Sahel that now uses religion to justify attacks, pillages, and thefts. Outlaws and bandits who did not transitioned into the status of terrorist lend their services to terrorist groups, with the role of sub-contractors, providing support or executing some actions directly under their command.

Normally, terrorists are not driven by the prospect of financial gain but, in the Sahel, this line of demarcation between willingness to commit crimes, including extremely violent ones, is nuanced. It cannot be stated that organised crime engages in actions solely for financial gain and terrorist groups are completely oblivious to financial gain. They both seek financial gain, with the subtle difference that terrorist seek to justify their actions with the religious cause.[3] The transition from banditry to traffickers and smugglers and, finally to terrorist groups or insurgents, reflects the level of direct engagement of the, now, terrorists. While during the transition their direct involvement was apparent, in later evolutionary phases, they change their financing methods, shifting their attention away from effectively engaging in illegal activities towards their protection and taxation. This change has the advantage of reducing risks and maximising profit with minimum effort. They let things happen and they extract value from this.[4]

There are various hypotheses that purport the existence of some kind of relationship between organised crime and terror organisations in the Sahel. Whether it is for the commission of kidnappings, robberies, for extorting the zakat, drug trafficking or trafficking in human beings, there has been instances in which these relationships existed. In general, jihad-inspired groups, on one side, publicly condemn the use of drugs. For example, the very same groups that were known to have close ties with drug traffickers, MUJAO and AQIM, have burned stashes of hashish in Gao, to show that the use of drugs was not tolerated under their rule. On the other side, they have never publicly condemned the act of drug trafficking, and there is no record of punishment of drug traffickers by any jihadis group in the Sahel.[5]

Following allegation of involvement of MUJAO and AQIM in drug trafficking and kidnapping, there has been an ongoing debate about whether Sahelian groups were genuinely ideologically driven jihadis or rather bandits and smugglers, whose motivation were economic. Involvement in illegal economic activities is rather unavoidable for insurgents’ survival.[6]

The accord of Ane?fis, northeast of Mali, signed by the coalition for the reconciliation in 2015, includes clauses that foresee a compensation on drug shipments paid to armed groups that are raided by other groups, and also recognises the freedom of movement of any kind of commodity in Northern Mali.[7]

Involvement of AQIM and JNIM in kidnapping for ransom and the cigarette trade, suggests the idea that these organizations are simply a front for criminal enterprise. it is difficult to determine whether they act as jihadis to finance their struggle or if they use jihad to provide cover for their illegal activities instead.[8]

Other circumstances in which it is difficult to tell the difference in the branding of a particular criminal act, including violent crimes such as executions, is when these crimes are committed in large towns and cities, independently of whether they are under the control or influence of terrorist organisations. For example, robberies are rampant in Niamey, [9]? Niger, Gao,[10] Timbuktu,[11] and Ménaka,[12] Mali.

Nexus terrorism – organised crime

Normally, cooperation among terrorist groups in criminal, non-terrorist enterprise is rare. They do occasionally ally with other terrorist groups to carry out joint attacks, they share weapons and attend the same training camps. Overall, they tend to cooperate more with organised crime or even with ordinary criminals or traffickers. Terrorists are inclined to keep their operations a secret. Nevertheless, cooperation with criminals is necessary because they are not self-sufficient in at least two resources, knowledge, for example of the territory, routes, safe passages, and provisions such as food, fuel, or any other consumables.[13]

In some cases, terrorist organisations are bands of criminals with the label of terrorists. The effects of their presence is almost the same as the one of banditry, at least in the case of violent non-terrorism crimes. These are the displacement of the inhabitants from a certain region, the diversion of funds that should be channelled through official networks and should generate tax revenue, the creation of further instability and pockets of extreme insecurity. There is a difference in approach to and in perception of authorities by the two entities. Organised crime rings are conscious of the role of the authorities, including law enforcement but, they rarely fight them. Terrorists’ main objective is to harm civilians and fight the authorities violently.? In Senegal, the Movement of Democratic Forces de la Casamance du Sud, a rebel group, manages the illegal trade of wood and hemp, without the need of intermediation or support of criminal groups. The group is notorious for lending security services to African leaders to generate revenue.[14]

In some instances, effective oversight of criminal operations and traffic in the Sahel is not enforced by local armed groups, whether organised crime or insurgents. Those are simply intermediaries working under the orders of leaders of international organized crime based in Asia, America, and Europe.[15] ?The underlying system that enable local networks to operate almost undisturbed is composed by various groups of actors, including those corruptible elements of the authorities, white collar workers, and politicians.[16] This system is not based exclusively on corruption but can be allowed to exist, or tolerated, as long as the smugglers do not collude or coincide with dissidents, insurgents, or terrorists. This tolerance allowed authorities to gather intelligence on security threats along the border.[17]

Terrorist groups and organised crime rings share several characteristics, methods, and tactics. ?This is not a coincidence. It is evidence of the existence of some kind of knowledge sharing and knowledge transfer among the two entities.[18]

Ties between organised crime network and terrorist groups are most useful for both at borders. They are also most dangerous for authorities. These ties are evident at borders between Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Mali, where terrorist groups obtain logistical support, goods and weapons. The links in the region are spread in Benin, Ghana and Togo through ethnic links between members of the fighters’ groups, and members of criminal rings.[19]

The movements of about a thousand ISIS members from Libya, Iraq, and Syria to the Sahel, was largely facilitated by smugglers from the Sahel, who used the same routes that were used by organised crime for smuggling drugs, people, and gold. Organised crime also supplied them with weapons in exchange of protection of their illegal activities. These movements were possible thanks to the porosity of borders and to the non-existence of border controls.[20]

In the eyes of the governments of countries neighbouring the Sahel, terrorism and organised crime activities that originate from the Sahel, are an equally important security threat. They both introduce security challenges and instability.

There are many similarities and few differences between terrorist organizations and drug traffickers. This makes the cooperation between them easier. Terrorists have borrowed their decentralized structure that relies on cells and hotspots from drug cartels. Both types of groups often depend on the same intermediaries for channelling or laundering their money. Both are resilient enough to absorb blows aimed at them by the authorities and can re-emerge under a new form. Both do not recognise state sovereignty, operate in areas beyond the reach of the rule of law, they use intimidation, corruption, and violence to achieve their aim. The main, and probably the only, difference, is in their motive. While organised crime aims exclusively to obtain profit, terrorist organisations have political or ideological motives.[21]

Another difference between the two is their stance towards security. Globally, there are more organised criminal groups than terrorist groups. This can be explained by the fact that organised crime are willing to partially sacrifice their own security and the environmental security if they have the opportunity to extract value from their actions. Conversely, the perpetuity of terrorist actions does not allow for terrorists to make the same choice. The terrorist act does not generate profit. On the contrary, it needs investments, sometimes substantial, and in consequence, terrorists are in favour of preserving their security to a higher degree than organised crime does.[22] Finally, one last difference is that organized crime groups seek to maintain an environment that is ideal for profit-making through illegal activities. They employ violence only to maintain these conditions.[23]

Pressure by authorities does not completely eliminate these groups, sometimes it turns them into gangs.[24]

Terrorists and criminals establish pacts among them like ordinary national or international body would do. Cooperation is possible despite the differences in structure and the locations in which they each operate, and despite the difference between the objectives they pursue, material for organised crime, and political for the terrorists. This kind of cooperation increases both groups strength and makes them more difficult to combat and dismantle. These relationships flourish in the Sahel because of geographical characteristics. The Sahel links multiple regions in Africa, the Middle East, and it is a transit area to Europe and Asia.[25]

Convicts detained in Nigerien, Chadian, and Malian prisons, expiate their sentence in overcrowded cells, where individuals who are detained for membership in organised crime or petty crime are in close contact with hardcore violent criminals, including several jihadis. These prisons act as incubators for new recruits. The jihadis have sufficient time to persuade other inmates, which will be ready for their exit from prison and entry into jihadist organisations. Here, jihadists and organised crime, collude and exchange experiences and intelligence.[26]

Alliances between terrorist groups with organized crime networks are enablers of the internationalization of the crisis in the Sahel. Both types of organisations are extremely mobile, they have tremendous reach, and they operate mainly internationally. Fusing their capabilities enable them to mutually benefit of each other’s means at lower costs and with increased effectiveness.[27]

Terrorist groups of the Sahel have some characteristics which are typical of transnational criminal organisations, and other characteristics that are typical of mafia-type organisations. Like transnational organised criminal organisations, they plan their action in one country and often execute it in another country. They opportunistically deal in multi-commodity illegal trade. They use violence and intimidation to impose territorial control. Their members have specific roles that are permanent, like permanent is their organisation.

Like mafia-type organisations, they want to substitute the state and its institutions. They extort money from civilians through the zakat, they racketeer legal and illegal traders and all other commercial activities under the guise of a protection tax. They do not hesitate to eliminate those who they suspect have collaborated with the authorities, even those who lend their services or their expertise to the state like interpreters or drivers. They purport to take care of law enforcement, administer justice, and carry out punishments, amputations, lapidations, or executions.

JNIM, like ISIS, has been keen to form strong relations with organized crime, for diversifying its financial funding sources but also, and this is a typical JNIM’s trait, to gain a competitive advantage compared to rival terrorist organizations that refuse to join them.[28]

The mobility of groups is an important challenge for security forces. Groups compete for the control of contraband routes, they establish checkpoints and block routes, ensuring that drugs and weapons are transported through specific desert areas. By plotting the location where violent clashes between armed groups took place in the last three years, and the hotspots for contraband, it is noticeable that more than 50 percent of them overlap.[29]

Types of cooperation

Some forms of cooperation is forced by contiguity of territory where organised crime and terrorists operate. Some other types of cooperation may appear as a natural adjustment to the reality in the fields, because it produces mutual benefits. Terrorists may allow a certain degree of autonomy and range of action to criminal groups if not commission their services under payment of a percentage of the profit, as in the case of theft and trade of cattle in the Sahel or the management of illegal mines.[30] These services may extend to providing armed support during travels, sabotaging checkpoints of the authorities, or engaging in armed attacks with them. Some criminals provide a variety of services ranging from illegal trade of fuel, armed escort of convoys, and weapons supply.[31]

There are at least three types of relationships between terrorism and organized crime, and these relationships evolve in space and time. Coexistence implies the presence of terror groups and organized crime within the same space, in the absence of conflict. Cooperation implies regular alliances, for example for the execution of kidnappings and for reselling the hostages by organised crime to terror groups. Convergence is in place when the interests of the two groups are aligned. In an environment that becomes more and more hostile for both like the Sahel, convergence is the most convenient type of cooperation, because of increased pressure by security forces, their common interest is to share operations and intelligence, for example, about the presence of governmental troops in a specific area, where the pressure of the authorities has become higher.[32] Sometimes, the cooperation between terror and criminal groups is in fact a relationship between specific members of these groups. This is the case with AQIM and MUJAO. In these groups, members are driven by motivations that may be in conflict with the motivation of other members of the same group, namely, these members seek rent from organised crime not for the jihad cause but for personal wealth.[33]

There is also a different, more subtle type of cooperation between jihadis and organised crime. JNIM allows its satellite jihadis groups, criminals, and traffickers, to operate under their protection, and offer them logistical and technical support. JNIM, sees the attacks of these groups, such as robberies, kidnappings, thefts, as a service to be used to destabilise an area, thus rendering it less secure, and contributing to the strategic objective of the jihadists. The situation is symmetrical in areas of influence of ISGS. Local criminal rings are assigned areas where they can operate by ISGS, and also in this case, they provide logistics and technical support to organised criminal rings, and in addition, it may coordinate their actions.[34]

In 2020, organised crime acted in close cooperation with terrorist groups in Africa. They have been seen operating together to evict inhabitants of villages and to seize any wealth left behind.[35]

Terrorists may also be willing to establish alliances with organised crime specialised in maritime piracy, robbery and theft at sea. These crime typologies were once widespread in East Africa, where NATO and other international operations have, in recent years, curbed their frequency. Since 2018, the Gulf of Guinea seems to be the new centre of gravity for piracy, kidnapping for ransom, and robbery at sea in Africa, with figures climbing from year to year.[36] Terrorist groups that aim at expanding their front to Gulf of Guinea countries, may use these criminal enterprises to exploit their clout, leveraging the financial impact that their attacks have on the economies of these countries,[37] and to add pressure on their defence,[38] law enforcement, and counter-terrorism capabilities at sea. If this scenario will become reality, we could assist to developments that will include a multitude of attack strategies that will mimic war strategies of state actors.?

Cooperation in kidnappings

Kidnappings for ransom is an important terrorist financing means. The frequency and the rate of success of kidnappings is directly correlated with the instability of the country where they take place, where the central authorities are faint. Thus, this depiction matches the countries in the Sahel region, riddled by political instability, coups d'état, and a continuous state of war. In this climate, thanks also to endemic corruption in the public as in the private sector, millions of dollars paid as ransom are funnelled into the official financial system and are de-facto legitimised,[39] with some of the illicit profit from various types of illegal trafficking being invested in real estate.[40]

Kidnapping occurring in the Sahel may have various motivations and outcomes. The most frequent motivation is for obtaining ransom or with the clear intent of eliminating an adversary who is of strategic relevance such as members of the military or law enforcement, or who has symbolic value such as imams, chiefs of clans, or heads of other informal authorities or communities. The groups’ most probable motivation for kidnapping these persons, is political, and the outcome is often death.[41] In some of the kidnappings, the body of the person abducted was found few days after with bullet wounds. Other kidnappings may have an economic motif. These kinds of kidnappings can be resolved relatively quickly after the payment of a ransom,[42] although there are cases where the hostage was kept much longer and managed to escape, or a ransom was paid.[43] The distinction between politically-motivated kidnappings and those kidnappings carried out by organised crime rings is not clear-cut.

JNIM’S and AQIM, are renown to either kidnap Western hostages themselves or, acquire them from other criminal groups.[44] To note that the price tag of USD 100,000 attached by AQIM to any Westerner delivered to them by any criminal gang, does not apply to Americans, for whom they know that they cannot negotiate any ransom.[45]

The Malian provinces most affected by violence are in the order Mopti, Gao, and Timbuktu, with little variation between them each month; sometimes Gao precedes Mopti. For the type of attack and for the spread of violence and the number of victims, Mopti is the most dangerous region. Here incidents are prevalently armed attacks, assassinations, and kidnappings, which can, in most cases, be marked as terrorist acts. In Mopti, there is also several robberies, kidnappings and attacks that can be linked to either organized crime or terrorism.

Based on the available figures from April-September 2020,[46] one can say that Mopti's and Gao’s incidents have more of a political and terrorist matrix than Timbuktu’s incidents. The aim is, in Mopti and, to a lesser extent, Gao cases, to provoke terror and to finance terrorism. The Timbuktu, and partly, Gao incidents are in prevalence of an economic nature. In these provinces, there have been fewer murders and attacks and more robberies, extortions, and kidnappings for ransom, indicating a more financially driven than ideologically-driven violence. Mopti’s abductions often end with the murder of the hostages.

About 13 percent of violent events perpetrated by Boko Haram, and the Islamic State in West Africa, which operate mainly in Nigeria, Niger, the Lake Chad, Cameroon, include robbery, kidnapping, burning of vehicles and summary executions. 90 percent of these kidnappings are carried out on motorways. The success rate of these actions have made terrorists and organized crime groups become bolder and more dangerous, and their criminal operations and violent incidents multiply, targeting civilians, aid workers, soldiers and politicians. Further, violent actions by these two groups, escalated to attacks on heavily guarded towns and cities and military installations, which often are caches of weapons that are systematically raided.[47]

Cooperation in drug trafficking

The arrival of jihadists in the Sahel, made narcotraffickers a favour. It dislodged that minimum of control by the state that existed along the smuggling routes, which was replaced by armed jihadi’s escorts to traffickers, not only for the smuggling of drugs but for weapons, medicines, and humans.[48]

ISIS adopted a general drug trafficking strategy after losing its strongholds in Syria and Iraq. Losing these territories meant that the organisation could no longer extract resources from commercial activities, oil sales, or from the civilian population there, and reverted to drug trafficking at an international scale. ISIS links between terrorism and drug trafficking are conspicuous in Chad, Mali, and Niger, where the group built contingency of their financial resources by diversifying financial sources, increasing their involvement with drug trafficking. ISIS and AQIM, extract revenue from drug trafficking by imposing taxes to drug traffickers. Drug traffickers and terrorists have mutual interests in cooperating. One needs protection, and the other needs a share of financial gains.[49]

However, AQIM operates in the same area where some of the smuggling and drug trading lines run through. This means that organized crime networks are bound to intersect with their area of operations. AQIM, contrary to what ISIS does, may not request for money against a service or a permit but rather, they racketeer traffickers, to extort rents from their illegal activities.[50]

In comparison to kidnapping, drug trafficking is much more remunerative. One 600 kg shipment of cocaine successfully smuggled would sell for the equivalent of many kidnapping operations.[51]

Cocaine has replaced opiates and cannabis as the most traded drug and has made West Africa, instead of the Levant, the primary geographic center of the trade.[52] Traffic in medicine should be included under drugs trafficking because, often, the producers are the same as synthetic drugs. Counterfeit medicines can be mortal for patients. It is estimated that each year, 500,000 Africans are killed by them. As an example, a counterfeit cough syrup has killed 70 Gambian children in 2022.[53]

Much of the jihad financing activities have no basis in Islamic law. The heroin trade does not only conflict with Islamic beliefs, it requires communication with non-Muslims, whom jihadis consider infidels. This also applies to the jihadis’ increasingly authoritarian tax regime, far from its alleged justification by Islamic institutions.

[54] So, jihadis need to rationalise the fact that they are earning money by dealing with something that is normally haram for Muslims. They do so by defining admissible to accept money if it is for the sake of jihad. Also, they implicitly tolerate the drug trafficking act itself when the market is the one of the so-called ‘infidels’, Europe and the ‘West’ in general.

“If their monies are solely derived from forbidden acts […] such as drug trafficking, then most scholars state that it is not permissible to take from them, or to eat of their monies […] some scholars choose the position that it is permissible, saying: their sins are upon them, and nothing is upon he who takes of it. […] If these traffickers, however, who traffic in forbidden items, such as drugs, give their monies as alms for jihad in God’s name, then it appears to me, and God is all-knowing, that it is permissible to spend these monies for jihad” […][55]

To a large extent, terrorist groups depend financially and logistically on flows resulting from the illicit economy, such as drug trafficking. West Africa is an important transit area for trafficking in cocaine, heroin, and synthetic drugs, and is a hashish production area.[56] Sahelian terrorist organisations’ annual revenues, directly or indirectly derived from organised crime activities in the region, are substantial.

As comparative measure, it is estimated that human trafficking and illegal immigration, yield annually USD one billion, of which terrorist groups seize at least 50 percent. They also seize at least 14 percent of the revenue from drug trafficking, which is believed to be around USD 1 billion 330 million, and they earn roughly USD 50 million a year from kidnapping for ransom. Boko Haram alone, is thought to earn USD 10 million a year from drug trafficking and kidnappings for ransom.[57]

In the Sahel-Sahara, which is an important route for cocaine smuggling with destination Europe, AQIM has been active for many years. The cocaine may arrive from Guinea, Ghana, or Guinea Bissau, and then it is channeled through Algeria, Morocco, to Spain or Libya to Italy. Through the years, AQIM has invested gains from the drug trade into automatic weapons and vehicles.[58] The money derived from criminal activities in which AQIM is involved, also goes into providing physical security against government security forces, rival jihadist groups, and neighboring gangs.[59]

Cooperation in trafficking in human beings and smuggling of persons

Sahelian armed groups have commoditised human beings and deal with them as if they were equally valuable as fuel, gold, or drugs.

Terrorists are known to charge taxes in exchange of protection services, against violence, allegedly caused by criminals and bandits, although often, this violence is caused by themselves.[60] Tuareg used to charge caravans crossing the desert with a safe passage tax. The tradition of charging protection taxes, is therefore an inheritance from those times, considering the influence that Tuareg, and other nomadic cultures, had on the conduct of jihadis groups in the Sahel.[61]

Organised crime rings seek cooperation with terror groups in order to avoid rivalry and clashes. These clashes are possible given the similarities in routes used and the respective reach of the organisations which are always transnational.? This transnationality is a characteristic of the Sahelian tribal life, of the Tuareg, the Bambara, Songhai, Pulsalakanori, and Hawas, in which loyalty to the tribe prevails over loyalty to the homeland.[62]

For all these tribes, it is difficult to discern what constitute a legal traffic and what constitutes an illegal one. Illegal migration is a term that is not in the vocabulary of these people. Drug or weapons trafficking is seen as a trade that brings wealth. In some border areas, traffic is not seen as a significant security risk by the population. Even trafficking in human beings, is perceived as a crime by a very limited percentage of the population in these tribes.

Thus, what outsiders would describe as criminal conduct, has represented a resilience strategy for local communities that has social legitimacy. On the contrary, the continuous opening of the border is the main strategy of communities for dealing with extreme poverty.[63]

In these regions, border controls are weak. This enables terror groups and organised crime to operate almost unfettered. All criminal phenomena are increasing in rate and magnitude in the Sahel, from money laundering to trade in human organs, to cigarette smuggling, arms trafficking, and kidnapping for ransom. These are all typical organised crime events that are connected to terrorism and contribute to weaken the security of the Sahel. It is estimated that, each year, at least 1 million weapons are sold without supervision in the Sahel.[64] Members of terrorist groups that have entered into negotiations with the Malian government in the framework of peace accords, admit that jihadis groups and groups of self-defence, a pseudo paramilitary militia, use the services of the same weapons’ traffickers and describe their relationship as ordinary provider and customer relationship. Sometimes these relationships can evolve in convoluted trade mechanisms. Civilians have bought weapons from Jihadis groups to arm self-defence militia. The Militia itself has, in northern Mali, and at the border between Mali and Niger, become a weapons’ trafficker itself.[65]

ISGS militants engage regularly in trafficking in human beings, including new-born children. They rely on a network of traffickers and smugglers that are involved in a squalid circle of human trafficking and under-age prostitutions. First, the future mothers are smuggled from various cities in Niger or Mali, and transported to rural areas under the control of militants such as Tongo Tongo, in the Tillaberi region.? The final destination of the smuggled adults is Europe through Libya. Often, ISGS only pays the smugglers enough to reach the first leg. So, the young girls that need to continue their travel to Libya are forced to work as prostitutes in so-called connection houses for at least one year. Girls regularly become pregnant. Their child is then sold to adopting families for CFA francs two million, about USD 3,620, for a boy, and CFA francs one million, about USD1,810, if it is a girl.

The babies are mostly taken to cities like Niamey and Zinder. They may be also trafficked to Libya.[66]

The trafficking routes are in continuous expansion and shift in consequence of changing pressure by the authorities. The traffickers seek passage where controls, especially between borders, are lax and try to avoid areas where controls are more stringent. The authorities’ counter-smuggling efforts, particularly those on migration, have contributed to the emergence of new smuggling routes connecting the Niger and Libya, as well as emerging migrant smuggling hubs in southern Algeria.[67]

Hybridisation of terrorism

In the last few years, terrorist organisations kept losing personnel in battle or following strikes by the militaries. The rate of replacement increased noticeably. In some instances, ISGS has relied on instantaneous recruitments of males from villages in Mali and Niger, borrowed from their families for actions that were going to take place few hours later.[68] This proves that their recruitment apparatus is overstretched, and that, in certain circumstances, the indoctrination phase or the verification of aptitude of prospect fighters is bypassed in favour of rapid recruitment.[69] This also suggests that ideology may be replaced by more pragmatic approaches to recruitment. Prospects may be recruited for their familiarity with the handling of weapons or for their knowledge of illegal smuggling routes, rather than for their religious convictions or knowledge of the Quran. Thus, organised crime members are likely to be conscript to the jihadi cause without really believing in it.?

There is a continuous raising of jihadist groups in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa. This process is coupled with the emergence of a type of terrorism that can be defined hybrid, in which, the interests of jihadist groups are intertwined with those of organised crime.

?Terrorism, organized crime and intercommunal violence are often intertwined, especially in peripheral areas where the State’s presence is weak. [70]

The appearance and proliferation of terrorist organisations or insurgents in the Sahel, have transformed what was once defined as economically driven organised crime into a politically-driven one. These groups have put their criminal activities under the label of ideology but in fact, the crimes that they commit seem, at times, to be an end to themselves, rather than a means to an end.[71]

There are areas where terrorism and organised crime equally contribute to a state of insecurity. The north of the Tillabéri region, between Mali and Niger, has been a highly insecure area for several years. Here, the area is under the control of hybrid terrorist groups, which have mixed with bandits and drug traffickers.? The absence of the rule of law, exacerbates civilians living conditions.? The population of Tillaberi is subject to a number of crimes, ranging from cattle abductions to killing and levying illegal taxes. Often it is not clear which groups perpetrates these crimes.[72]

In the last few years, AQIM and affiliated jihadist groups, have exacerbated the economic situation in the Sahel with numerous low-impact terrorist attacks that can be assimilated to organised crime activities, in order to disrupt the hospitality and tourism industry and discourage foreign investments in the region.[73]

Some Sahelian jihadi groups, in particular, Boko Haram, adopted sustainable subsistence strategies by engaging in organized crime networks. This engagement comes with the cost of hybridisation of the jihadis spirit within the terror groups. The jihadist ideological regime based on Sharia then, may be replaced by a regime based on several violent criminal activities. This may lead, in the context of the competition and division between violent jihadist movements, to the dwindling of the jihadist spirit in favour of the criminal activities that preserve the survival and continuity of the group. If the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies improves, the jihadist personality of terrorist groups may disappear, to be gradually replaced by the violent criminal personality of bandits.[74]

Criminal gangs and Boko Haram are collaborating in northwest Nigeria. These bandits are believed to have killed about 8,000 people in the last ten years. This kind of partnership allow these gangs to frame their acts as part of a jihad approved by Allah and their gains as booty of war permitted by Islam.[75]?

Conclusions

The evidence presented in this article highlights the complex and intertwined relationship between organized crime and terrorist organizations in the Sahel region. While there are instances of cooperation and collaboration between these groups, their motivations and objectives are different. Organized crime groups primarily seek profit, while terrorist organizations have political or ideological motives.

The porous borders and lack of effective border controls in the Sahel have facilitated the constant movement of both criminals and terrorists, allowing them to exploit the region for their illicit activities. The cooperation between these groups, particularly in the areas of smuggling, trafficking, and providing logistical support, has strengthened their capabilities and made them more resilient to law enforcement efforts.

The similarities between terrorist organizations and criminal networks, such as their decentralized structures, dependence on intermediaries for money laundering, and disregard for state sovereignty, have made cooperation between them easier. This cooperation not only enhances their operational capabilities but also poses significant challenges for security forces and contributes to the internationalization of the crisis in the Sahel.

Furthermore, the existence of prisons where convicted criminals and hardcore jihadists are in close contact provides an environment conducive to radicalization and recruitment. In these prisons, jihadists and organized crime members can collude, exchange experiences, and recruit new members, potentially fuelling the growth of both types of organizations.

The overlap between areas of violent clashes between armed groups and hotspots for contraband further illustrates the nexus between terrorism and organized crime in the Sahel. Control over contraband routes becomes a strategic objective for these groups, allowing them to finance their activities and expand their influence.

Addressing the complex relationship between organized crime and terrorism in the Sahel requires a comprehensive and multidimensional approach. It necessitates strengthening border controls, enhancing regional cooperation among law enforcement agencies, and focusing on both the security and developmental aspects of the region. Efforts should also be made to disrupt the financial networks of these groups and address the underlying socio-economic factors that contribute to their growth.

By understanding and addressing the interplay between organized crime and terrorism in the Sahel, it is possible to mitigate the security threats posed by these groups and foster stability and development in the region.

Cooperation between terrorism and organized crime: There are various types of cooperation between terrorist groups and organized crime. Some cooperation is forced due to shared territory, while others are based on mutual benefits. Terrorists may allow criminal groups to operate in exchange for a percentage of the profit or commission their services. The cooperation can involve a range of activities such as armed support, sabotage, illegal trade, and providing logistical and technical support.

There are three main types of relationships between terrorism and organized crime: coexistence, cooperation, and convergence. Coexistence refers to the presence of both groups in the same area without conflict. Cooperation involves regular alliances for specific activities such as kidnappings. Convergence occurs when the interests of both groups align, often due to increased pressure from security forces. Sometimes, the cooperation is between specific members of the groups driven by personal wealth rather than ideological motivations. Kidnappings for ransom are an important source of terrorist financing. Kidnappings are more frequent in countries with political instability and weak central authorities. The motivations for kidnappings can vary, including political or economic motives. Ransoms are often paid to secure the release of hostages, but there are cases where hostages are killed. The distinction between politically motivated kidnappings and those carried out by organized crime is not always clear-cut.

The Sahel region, particularly countries like Mali, experiences a high level of violence, including armed attacks, assassinations, and kidnappings. Different provinces within the region have varying patterns of violence. Some incidents are politically and ideologically driven, aimed at provoking terror and financing terrorism, while others are more economically driven, involving robberies, extortions, and kidnappings for ransom. Terrorist groups and organized crime have become bolder and more dangerous, engaging in a range of violent actions, including robbery, kidnapping, burning of vehicles, and summary executions. Their operations have multiplied, targeting civilians, aid workers, soldiers, politicians, and even heavily guarded towns, cities, and military installations. The arrival of jihadists in the Sahel region has disrupted the existing state control over smuggling routes, leading to cooperation between narcotraffickers and armed jihadi escorts. ISIS has adopted a strategy of drug trafficking to compensate for the loss of resources from its former strongholds. They impose taxes on drug traffickers to generate revenue. Cooperation between drug traffickers and terrorists is based on mutual interests: traffickers seek protection, while terrorists seek financial gains. The Sahel region serves as an important transit area for drug trafficking, including cocaine, heroin, and synthetic drugs.

Bibliography

[1] “Seeking alternatives for Niger’s people smugglers”, UNHCR (09/08/2017) https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2017/8/59882a2a4/seeking-alternatives-nigers-people-smugglers.html (accessed 12/01/2021)

[2] “Niger junta revokes law curbing migrant smuggling from Africa to Europe”, France 24 (28/11/2023) https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231127-niger-junta-revokes-anti-migration-law-in-setback-to-eu-strategy (accessed 22/02/2024)

[3] “Le vrai visage du terrorisme Sahélien : le grand banditisme et la criminalité ordinaire”, Catherine van Offelen, Conflicts (28/07/2020) https://www.revueconflits.com/le-vrai-visage-du-terrorisme-sahelien-le-grand-banditisme-et-la-criminalite-ordinaire/ (accessed 20/02/2024)?

[4] “ICCT Situation Report: The Use of Small Arms & Light Weapons by Terrorist Organisations as a Source of Finance in West Africa and the Horn of Africa”, Méryl Demuynck, Tanya Mehra, Reinier Bergema, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (June 2020) https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/2022-12/SALW-as-a-source-of-terrorist-finance-in-West-Africa-and-the-Horn-of-Africa.pdf (accessed 22/02/2024)

[5] “Drug Trafficking, Violence and Politics in Northern Mali”, International Crisis Group (13/12/2018) https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/267-narcotrafic-violence-et-politique-au-nord-du-mali (accessed 08/02/2021)

[6] “Understanding Conflict Drivers and Resilience Factors in the Sahel:

Desk Study”, Dr. Mike McGovern (2013) https://sahelresearch.africa.ufl.edu/files/USAID-USSOCOM-Sahel-Desk-Study-7-Jun-13.pdf (accessed 11/01/2021)

[7] “Le Crime Organisé au Mali: son impact sur une? sortie pacifique du conflit”, International Alert (September 2016) https://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/Mali_OrganisedCrime_FR_2016_0.pdf (accessed 12/02/2021)

[8] Dr. Mike McGovern IBID

[9] “Incident 32 (Niger)- Bulletin d’Information N°018 de la PCMS du G5 Sahel”, PCMS (08/09/2020)?; “Incident 1 (Niger)- Bulletin d’Information N°019 de la PCMS du G5 Sahel”, PCMS (09/10/2020)?

[10] “Incidents 19 and 48 (Mali)- Bulletin d’Information N°018 de la PCMS du G5 Sahel”, PCMS (08/09/2020)

[11] “Incident 59 (Mali)- Bulletin d’Information N°016 de la PCMS du G5 Sahel”, PCMS (06/06/2020)?; “Incidents 52, 56, and 68 (Mali)- Bulletin d’Information N°018 de la PCMS du G5 Sahel”, PCMS (08/09/2020)?

[12] “Incidents 63 and 135 (Mali)- Bulletin d’Information N°016 de la PCMS du G5 Sahel”, PCMS (06/06/2020)?; “Incident 34 (Mali)- Bulletin d’Information N°018 de la PCMS du G5 Sahel”, PCMS (08/09/2020)?

[13] “Dogs and Cats Living Together? Explaining the Crime-Terror Nexus”, Brian J. Phillips, Alexander Schiele, (29/03/2023) Terrorism and Political Violence,?https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2023.2189968 ??

[14] “Le Crime organisé dans le Sahel : L'utilisation du numérique et les politiques de prévention”, Mamadou Mouth Bane, Dakaractu, (24/04/2019) https://www.dakaractu.com/Les-BONNES-FEUILLES-de-l-ouvrage-Le-Crime-organise-dans-le-Sahel-L-utilisation-du-numerique-et-les-politiques-de_a169083.html (accessed 20/02/2024)

[15] “Connections between Jihadist groups and smuggling and illegal trafficking rings in the Sahel”, Serigne Bamba Gaye, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2018) ?https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/fes-pscc/14176.pdf (accessed 22/02/2024)

[16] “For Corruption, Few Places Worse Than the Sahel”, Alex Thurston, IPI Global Observatory (24/09/2012) https://theglobalobservatory.org/2012/09/for-corruption-few-places-worse-than-the-sahel/ (accessed 22/02/2024)

[17] “Transnational Organized Crime and Political Actors in the Maghreb and Sahel”, Jihane Ben Yahia, Riccardo Fabiani, Max Gallien, Matt Herbert, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (January 2019) https://www.kas.de/documents/282499/282548/MDS+17+Transnational+Organized+Crime+and+Political+Actors+in+the+Maghreb+and+Sahel.pdf/9e2145e6-4935-3278-174b-746c91fd18c8?version=1.1&t=1548758044198 (accessed 22/02/2024)

[18] “DJIHADISME – Le Sahel, où se rencontrent terrorisme et criminalité”, Dr. Tawfik Hamel, Le Courier du Maghreb et de l’Orient (April 2017) https://lecourrierdumaghrebetdelorient.info/jihadism/djihadisme-le-sahel-ou-se-rencontrent-terrorisme-et-criminalite/ (accessed 21/02/2024)

[19] “The risks of the expansion of terrorist organizations in the countries of the Gulf of Guinea”, Rim Afric (02/02/2021) https://rimafric.info/node/5694 (accessed 08/02/2021)

[20] “"The African Coast" a safe haven for terrorism!”, Al Alam (13/12/2020) https://www.alalamtv.net/news/5329581/??????-????????--????-???-??????? (accessed 08/02/2021)

[21] “The Trinity of Terrorism, organized crime and Trade”, Centre for Strategic and Diplomatic Studies (28/08/2017) https://www.csds-center.com/index.php/article/?????%20???????%20??????%20?????????%20?????%20???????? (accessed 08/02/2021)

[22] “Ne pas confondre terrorisme et crime organisé”, Roberto Muelas Lobato, Nos Pensées (03/01/2023) https://nospensees.fr/ne-pas-confondre-terrorisme-et-crime-organise/ (accessed 20/02/2024)

[23] Brian J. Phillips, Alexander Schiele IBID

[24] “Hybrid Terrorism in Africa: Religious and Tribal Intersection with Organized Crime”, Al Arab (12/09/2017) https://alarab.news/???????-??????-??-???????-?????-??????-???????-??-???????-????????amp (accessed 08/02/2021)

[25] “The danger of the alliance between terrorism and organized crime - The relationship between armed organizations and drug trafficking networks in North Africa as an example - Issue 8 / Studies and analytical papers”, Siyasat Arabiya (April 2014) https://siyasatarabiya.dohainstitute.org/ar/issue008/pages/art07.aspx (accessed 08/02/2021)

[26] “Surpeuplées, les prisons nigériennes sont des incubateurs pour les djihadistes”, Voice of America (24/07/2020) https://www.voaafrique.com/a/risque-de-radicalisation-dans-les-prisons-du-niger/5514523.html (accessed 12/02/2021)

[27] “Abdul Razzaq Bara confirms that the coalition of terrorism and organized crime helped to internationalize the Sahel crisis”, Algeria Press (no date) https://www.algeriapressonline.com/index.php/news/algeria/2139 (accessed 08/02/2021)

[28] “Morocco's role in confronting security threats in the Sahel region: foundations, challenges and prospects”, Emirates Policy Center (31/12/2020) https://epc.ae/ar/topic/moroccos-role-in-confronting-security-threats-in-africas-sahel-region-premises-challenges-and-prospects (accessed 08/02/2021)

[29] “La charia, ? business du de?sert ?”, Rikke HaugegaaRd, ASPJ Afrique & Francophonie - 1er trimestre 2018 https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ_French/journals_F/Volume-09_Issue-1/haugegaard_f.pdf (accessed 11/02/2021)

[30] “Selon des experts, le crime organisé en Afrique est en train de consolider les réseaux terroristes”, Darren Taylor, The Epoch Times, (29/09/2023) https://www.epochtimes.fr/selon-des-experts-le-crime-organise-en-afrique-est-en-train-de-consolider-les-reseaux-terroristes-2430573.html (accessed 20/02/2024)

[31] “Curriculum de Formation á l’Attention des Ecoles de Formation Judiciaire et d’Application de la Loi – Lutte Contre le Terrorism au Mali”, UNODC, (January 2018) https://pcjs-sahel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Mali-Curriculum-de-formation-jan-2018.pdf (accessed 20/02/2024)?

[32] “Sahel : ??Les stratégies de lutte contre le terrorisme sont inadaptées pour combattre le crime organisé”, Jeune Afrique (09/01/2020) https://www.jeuneafrique.com/877917/politique/sahel-les-strategies-de-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-sont-inadaptees-pour-combattre-le-crime-organise/ (accessed 15/01/2021)

[33] “Challenging the Myth of the Drug-Terror Nexus in the Sahel”, Lacher, W. (September 2013) https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Challenging-the-Myth-of-the-Drug-Terror-Nexus-in-the-Sahel-2013-09-12.pdf (accessed 15/01/2021)

[34] “Comment s’explique la prolifération des groupes extrémistes au Burkina Faso?”, The Conversation (06/09/2019) https://theconversation.com/comment-sexplique-la-proliferation-des-groupes-extremistes-au-burkina-faso-122566 (accessed 22/01/2021)

[35] “Wali: We have seen close cooperation between terrorist and criminal groups in financing and protection”, El Watan (03/02/2021) https://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/5276266 (accessed 08/02/2021)

[36] “Gulf of Guinea records highest ever number of crew kidnapped in 2020, according to IMB’s annual piracy report”, International Chamber of Commerce (13/01/2021) https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/gulf-of-guinea-records-highest-ever-number-of-crew-kidnapped-in-2020-according-to-imbs-annual-piracy-report/ (accessed 11/02/2021)

[37] “Explainer: Why are pirates attacking ships in the Gulf of Guinea?”, Reuters (25/01/2021) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-ship-nigeria-pirates-explainer-idUSKBN29U1RS (accessed 11/02/2021)

[38] Rim Afric IBID

[39] Dr. Tawfik Hamel IBID

[40] Serigne Bamba Gaye, IBID

[41] “Incident 121 (Mali)- Bulletin d’Information N°018 de la PCMS du G5 Sahel”, PCMS (08/09/2020)

[42] “Incident 13 (Burkina Faso)- Bulletin d’Information N°018 de la PCMS du G5 Sahel”, PCMS (08/09/2020)

[43] “Incident 50 (Mali)- Bulletin d’Information N°018 de la PCMS du G5 Sahel”, PCMS (08/09/2020)

[44] “Note d’Analyse – Monitoring de la Stabilité Régionale Dans le Bassin Sahélien et en Afrique de l’Ouest – octobre á décembre 2020”, Zutterling, C. – Groupe de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité (14/01/2021) https://grip.org/monitoring-afrique-octobre-decembre-2021/ (accessed 15/01/2021)

[45] “Understanding Conflict Drivers and Resilience Factors in the Sahel:

Desk Study”, Dr. Mike McGovern (2013) https://sahelresearch.africa.ufl.edu/files/USAID-USSOCOM-Sahel-Desk-Study-7-Jun-13.pdf (accessed 11/01/2021)

[46] “Bulletin d'Information N°018 DE LA PCMS DU G5 Sahel Juillet/Aout 2020”, (September 2020), “ Bulletin d'Information N°016 DE LA PCMS DU G5 Sahel”, (May 2020), “Bulletin d'Information N°017 DE LA PCMS DU G5 Sahel (July 2020); “Bulletin d'Information N°019 DELA PCMS DU GS Sahel Septembre 2020”, (October 2020)

[47] “The impact of violence and organized crime in Nigeria on sustainable development (study)”, Mahmoud Ahmed Qasim, Pharos Center for Consulting and Strategic Studies (14/02/2024) https://pharostudies.com/?p=14931 (accessed 21/02/2024)?

[48] “Liens entre terrorisme et criminalité transnationale organisé – Office Central de Répression du Traffic illicite des Stupéfiants (no date) https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Présentation-Niger-text.pdf (accessed 12/02/2021)

[49] “Drugs are a secret cord linking terrorism and smuggling”, Al Arab (28/02/2018) https://alarab.news/????????-???-???-????-???-???????-???????? (accessed 08/02/2021)

[50] “LRA, Boko Haram, AL-Shabaab, AQIM and Other Sources of Instability in Africa”, (25/04/2012)? https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg73998/html/CHRG-112hhrg73998.htm (accessed 12/01/2021)????????????????

[51] “West Africa’s Growing Terrorist Threat: Confronting AQIM’s Sahelian Strategy”, MODIBO GO?TA – Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (February 2011) https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/133688/AfricaBriefFinal_11.pdf (accessed 12/01/2021)

[52] “Contested Terrain: The New Geography of Drug Trafficking in North Africa and the Sahel Since the Arab Spring”, George C. Kraehe, Small Wars Journal, (24/01/2018) https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/contested-terrain-new-geography-drug-trafficking-north-africa-and-sahel-arab-spring (accessed 21/02/2024)

[53] “Armes, carburant et or, les trafics prolifèrent au Sahel”, United Nations (20/05/2023) https://news.un.org/fr/story/2023/05/1135112 (accessed 21/02/2024)

[54] “Survival strategy - How do terrorist groups think in Africa?”, Shorouk (27/09/2019) https://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=27092019&id=39f55b1a-2bc7-4d0d-8db4-3358d55d87d1 (accessed 08/02/2021)

[55] “Osama bin Laden Letters”, Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point (03/05/2012) https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=708039 (accessed 09/02/2021)

[56] “The Sahel as a Drug Transit Zone: Actors and Political Consequences”, Simon Julien, In Hérodot, Volume 142, Issue 3, 2011, pages 125 to 142 https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_HER_142_0125--the-sahel-as-a-drug-transit-zone-actors.htm (accessed 09/02/2021)

[57] “Motives for Use of Drugs and Terrorist Groups in Africa”, Arab Centre for Research and Studies (31/03/2019) https://www.acrseg.org/41160 (accessed 08/02/2021)

[58] “Al Qaeda linked to rogue aviation network”, Reuters (13/01/2010) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-drugs-security-aviation-idUSTRE60C3E820100113 (accessed 12/01/2021)

[59] “An African Powder Keg: Terrorism in the Sahel”, Geopolitical Monitor (21/07/2020) https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/an-african-powder-keg-terrorism-in-the-sahel/ (accessed 12/01/2021)

[60] “Islamic State’s Financing: Sources, Methods and Utilisation”, Patrick Blannin, Counter Terrorist Trend and Analyses , Vol. 9, No. 5 (May 2017), pp. 13-22, Published by: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26351519 (accessed 10/02/2021)

[61] “Fixing a fractured state? Breaking the cycles of crime, conflict and corruption in Mali and Sahel”, Tuesday Reitano and Mark Shaw, Global Initiative Against Organised Crime (April 2015)) https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/2015.pdf (accessed 10/02/2021)

[62] “The reality of organized crime in the Sahel region of Africa”, Qirat African (27/12/2017) https://www.qiraatafrican.com/home/new/????-???????-?????-??-??????-??????-????????#sthash.JLWO8QqR.dpbs (accessed 08/02/2021)

[63] “Organised Crime in Mali: Why it Matters for a Peaceful Transition”, Raineri, L., Galletti, C. 01/11/2016) https://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/Mali_OrganisedCrime_EN_2016.pdf (accessed 15/01/2021)

[64] Qirat African IBID (accessed 08/02/2021)

[65] “Extrémisme violent, criminalité organisée et conflits locaux dans le Liptako-Gourma”, William Assanvo, Baba Dakono, Lori-Anne Theroux-Bénoni, Ibrahim Ma?ga, Institut d’études de sécurité (2612/2019) https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war-26-fr.pdf (accessed 20/02/2024)

[66] “Women and Babies Trafficking by Islamic State in Greater Sahara”, New Age Islam (01/01/2020) https://www.newageislam.com/islam-women-and-feminism/new-age-islam-news-bureau/-won-t-leave---women-lead-protest-in-india-capital-s-muslim-area/d/120681 (accessed 12/01/2021)

[67] “UNODC reports reveal complex smuggling web across Sahel region of Africa”, Rebekah Yeager-Malkin, Jurist (20/05/2023) https://www.jurist.org/news/2023/05/unodc-reports-reveal-complex-smuggling-web-across-sahel-region-of-africa/# (accessed 22/02/2024)

[68] “Incident 15, section B, Présence signalée d’hommes armés (Mali) Bullein d’Information N°017 de la PCMS du G5 Sahel”, PCMS (08/07/2020)

[69] “Sahel faces surge in violence from terror attacks”, The Guardian (22/01/2020) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/22/sahel-faces-surge-in-violence-from-terror-attacks (accessed 23/01/2021)

[70] “Unprecedented terrorist violence’ in West Africa, Sahel region”, UN News (08/01/2020) https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1054981 (accessed 12/01/2021)

[71] “Les défis sécuritaires au Sahel: une analyse géoplitique”, Mehdi Taje, Centre Franc?ais de Recherche sur le Renseignement (November 2013) https://www.ipinst.org/images/pdfs/CF2R-2013.pdf (accessed 12/02/2021)

[72] “Surgissement, prolifération et intégration des motos-taxis dans les villes camerounaises : Les exemples de Douala et Bafoussam”, Christian KALIEU (22/11/2016) https://www.theses.fr (accessed 08/01/2021)

[73] “Rikke HaugegaaRd IBID

[74] “Survival strategy - How do terrorist groups think in Africa?”, Shorouk (27/09/2019) https://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=27092019&id=39f55b1a-2bc7-4d0d-8db4-3358d55d87d1 (accessed 08/02/2021)

[75] “The most worrying aspect of the Kankara kidnapping”, African Argument (17/02/2021) https://africanarguments.org/2021/02/the-most-worrying-aspect-of-the-kankara-kidnapping/ (accessed 18/02/2021)