The Technology Valley of Death, Another Viewpoint

Let’s chat about the technology “Valley of Death”. ?There are many comments and articles on the topic lamenting about the “Valley of Death” and its causes. ?Everyone is frustrated about the lack of technology implementation and innovation across all types, levels, and domains of technology.? Many point a finger at causes such as “not willing to take risks” or “overburdensome requirements”.? So, the typical demand is to loosen requirements.? I want to present an alternative view for your consideration.

In a September 15, 2024 post, I referenced two reports released by independent review boards of two major innovation leading government organizations, the DoD and NASA.? The two reports I highlight are:

• ?NASA at a Crossroads: Maintaining Workforce, Infrastructure, and Technology Preeminence in the Coming Decades (2024). The National Academies released a prepublication of the report last week. https://nap.nationalacademies.org/27519
• Defense Innovation Board (DIB) Report, Aligning Incentives to Drive Faster Tech Adoption, https://innovation.defense.gov

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Each study board found evidence supporting the prevalent rationale that contribute to the manifestation of the “Valley of Death”. ?Supporting statements in each reports include:

• “Mission effectiveness across NASA is compromised by slow and cumbersome business operations that have been a consequence of legitimate efforts to increase efficiency and better coordinate complex tasks.”
• “Proactive urgency does not exist at scale in the Department [DoD], with prevailing attitudes diverting accountability, adapting to legacy bureaucratic expectations and systems, and avoiding calculated risk—all to the detriment of the warfighter.”
• “...what it ultimately uncovered is that the Department [DoD] generally stands in its own way when it comes to aligning incentives to drive faster tech adoption.”

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But let us not be satisfied with evidence that appear to support our confirmation bias around the contributing factors for the “Valley of Death”, instead let’s explore further.?

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The NASA report highlights another little discussed issue that I believe may be a larger contributor. ?The National Academies NASA study states the following:

• “An area that has long plagued NASA is cost and schedule overruns …NASA seems to annually have $3 billion more programs under way than it has funds to support them….? One specific result is that underfunded programs often absorb resources that were planned to be applied to other programs, thereby creating a domino effect that disrupts multiple programs.”
• “Additional Finding 5: NASA faces a continuing challenge in aligning technology development with mission architectural milestones (e.g., “need dates”), determining technology readiness, and prioritizing technology development.”

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I summarize these two findings as:

• Poor acquisition planning and execution resulting in cost and schedule overruns.
• Failure to sufficiently mature technologies to meet transition requirements for acquisition programs.

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Now let’s determine if these two findings are applicable to the DoD.? The DIB report sheds some light on the DoD’s approach to maturing technologies for acquisitions.? The DIB found, “…while programs [technology development] with Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) in stages 6-7 are vital in establishing military viability and paving the way for emergent technology—they receive less than 10% of total RDT&E dollars… “.? But we must look beyond the DIB report to shed any light on the impact of this reported finding on acquisition planning and outcomes as the DIB did share any deeper insights into the impact.

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The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has conducted annual weapon systems assessment on DoD’s major acquisition programs at least since 2016.? Reviewing GAO’s assessments, you will find for the past 20 years, on average, DoD acquisition programs experience 40% cost overruns during the technology development phase of the acquisition. ?For reference, an ACAT 1 program has an estimated RDT&E threshold of more than $525 million1. ?Therefore, using $525 million as a baseline, a 40% overrun is $210 million per program. Extrapolated over 20 programs, it is equivalent to $4,200 million or $4.2 billion in cost overruns across the DoD. ?Worse yet, technology development cost and schedule overruns do not generally translate into manufacturing or operational cost savings.

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Consider the following potential impacts because of the DoD investing “less than 10% of total RDT&E dollars” to mature technologies:

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Point 1: ?Consider that “not willing to take risks” is not the contributor to the “Valley of Death” that many make it out to be.? Instead, consider that the information may suggest Program Managers are taking technology risk in the acquisitions they manage equivalent to a $250 million financial risk, on average.

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Point 2: ?I suggest that the information indicates a contributor the technology implementation of the “Valley of Death” is a lack of available resources resulting from technology risks. ?When acquisition programs exceed their budgets by $250 million during the initial phases of an acquisition, it likely depletes planned resources for requirements such as reliability and maintainability, much less freeing up funding for other technology insertions. ?As noted in the example above, a $4,200 million cost overrun is equivalent to funding the $525 million technology development budgets for 8 new ACAT I acquisition programs.

Point 3: Consider the question, "Does the underfunding of technology maturity contribute to poor acquisition planning and execution resulting in cost and schedule overruns?"

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While I do not discount the common complaints and contributors to the technology “Valley of Death”, I hope this brief discussion provides a broader picture on other and potentially more relevant contributors.

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1.??????? https://www.dau.edu/acquipedia-article/acquisition-category-acat