The TechnologIST: How do nations communicate in a crisis? Learn more in our latest report
Institute for Security and Technology (IST)
Uniting technology and policy leaders to create actionable solutions to emerging security challenges
Welcome back to The TechnologIST, the Institute for Security and Technology’s monthly newsletter featuring exclusive interviews with our experts, sneak peeks into our latest work, and recommended reading from our team. I’m Sophia Mauro , Deputy Director of Strategic Communications. This week, I spoke with Sylvia Mishra and Sahil V. Shah on the #CATALINK Initiative, nuclear risk reduction, and the recent report Strengthening Resilience in 21st Century Crisis Communications .
The following is a preview of our latest newsletter. To subscribe and make sure you don't miss the full story, click the link below:?
How do nations communicate in a crisis??
This May, IST assembled a diverse group of high-level policymakers, scholars, diplomats, and technical experts from across the world, including the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Switzerland, India, Pakistan, China, and Russia as well as relevant multilateral organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), amongst others.?They shared a common goal: examining vulnerabilities of existing communications channels relied on by leaders of states with nuclear weapons in times of crisis.?
Crisis communication channels encourage states to establish trust between leadership and share information, communicate to prevent misunderstandings or inadvertent escalations, and alert one another in the event of a nuclear crisis. Hotlines are crucial to efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war–leaders need to be able to communicate with one another prior, during, and after a conflict or nuclear war. Yet they are susceptible to technical, diplomatic, and policy points of failure, as outlined in our report?To the Point of Failure . Moreover, the systems driving these communication channels are often the first target in an escalating kinetic conflict.?
At the Institute for Security and Technology, we are leading the initiative to build an open-source, additive, multilateral crisis communication technology for use by leaders of nuclear weapons states. Known as?CATALINK , the system aims to prevent nuclear catastrophe by connecting leaders of nuclear states via a system that is trusted, even among adversaries, resilient, even in the event of kinetic conflict, and secure, even against the most advanced cyber attacks.?
Central to our ability to advance the CATALINK initiative is developing an understanding of the evolving state of crisis communication, socializing the effort amongst diplomats and scholars across the globe, and identifying technical requirements for the system.?
In a report released today , Alexa W and Sylvia Mishra share findings from the Track 1.5 dialogue in London, outlining conclusions and recommendations from the group. IST?conducted the workshop under the Chatham House Rule: anything said can be shared, but not attributed to a particular person. Today’s report provides a behind-the-scenes look at the workshop’s discussions, scenarios, and insight.
On 21st Century Crisis Communications
To understand more about the CATALINK initiative and the report released today, I chatted with?IST Senior Nuclear Policy Associate Sylvia Mishra and IST Senior Policy Advisor Sahil V. Shah . The two draw on decades of experience in nuclear and strategic risk reduction and are key players in the nuclear crisis communications space. Sylvia is the author of the recent IST white paper?Nuclear Crisis Communications: Mapping Risk Reduction Implementation Pathways . Sahil recently wrote?“The United States and China Still Need to Talk About Nuclear Weapons ” for Foreign Policy magazine and is a Senior Fellow and Program Manager at The Council on Strategic Risks Risks (CSR)’s Janne E. Nolan Center on Strategic Weapons.
Q: Set the stage for us at the London crisis communication workshop. What point or discussion surprised you most? What do you hope participants took away from the experience?
Sylvia: "IST’s team CATALINK hosted the workshop on the heels of the news of the China spy balloon crisis, the ongoing war in Ukraine, and reports of the U.S.-Russia officials using their military hotlines to avert clashes in Eastern Europe. Headlines of these international incidents helped to showcase an important point which often can get neglected: the vital role that nuclear crisis communications plays to diffuse a crisis. These developments bolstered the case of necessity to engage with allies and adversaries alike to establish secure channels of communications. At present, there is a deep sense of mistrust among major powers. We are concerned that lack of timely and secure communications will deepen mistrust and misperceptions. During times of crisis, prevailing mistrust could lead to miscalculation and even inadvertent escalation or an accidental war. These are scenarios which all state leaders and those of us who work on nuclear policy to reduce risks work wish to avoid at all costs. Attendees at the workshop had diverse perspectives on how best to resolve the issue of crisis communications, but unanimously agreed that there are big gaps in existing crisis communications and that needs to be addressed urgently. I was quite surprised to note how little research and scant literature is available on how the threats of emerging technologies (for instance, artificial intelligence, cyber weapons, deep fakes, and quantum computing, among others) can render existing channels of communications vulnerable. This is a pressing challenge and the global nuclear community needs to address this issue as a priority. Hopefully, participants were able to see the timeliness and urgency of this issue.?We look forward to future collaboration to reduce nuclear risks by strengthening crisis communications."
Sahil: "Sylvia summed up the context in which the workshop occurred beautifully, and I agree that the lack of research on the ways in which emerging technologies can either disrupt or better strengthen crisis communications is a key gap that needs to be filled. In terms of what discussions surprised me the most, I thought that there was one in particular where we fleshed out how crisis communications is viewed in certain capitals, namely Beijing and Moscow, and why they are seemingly opposed to advancing crisis management and risk reduction tools. As we are engaging in a serious effort to strengthen crisis communications, it is important for us to understand what secondary and perhaps tertiary negative effects these tools are seen as having. In order to better identify where the hesitancy and sometimes active resistance comes from in regards to improving the current crisis communications architecture, including from governments that have traditionally engaged more than others on this topic, we need to hear more about the ways in which these risk reduction measures are seen as at all potentially risk enabling measures. Without doing so, we won’t be able to account for the anxieties that inhibit progress or imagine new ways of doing things in light of today’s geopolitical and technical realities."
Q: Strengthening Resilience in 21st Century Crisis Communications ?references “backchannels” that officials use to discuss nuclear concerns, such as WhatsApp and Signal. What is the danger in using these services? How would the CATALINK concept be different?
Sylvia: "In our latest report , we mention that leaders often resort to commonly used commercial messaging platforms like WhatsApp and Signal to communicate matters of national security. As our report indicates, "these platforms are not uniformly adopted across geographies and are not necessarily sufficient for use in times of crisis, especially during escalation prior to nuclear launch in which cyber campaigns may mitigate or eradicate the ability of cellular networks to function well." The CATALINK system is an internationally-driven, secure, resilient novel crisis communications concept being developed by IST and an array of partners which aims to provide an additive secure technical solution to existing crisis communications systems which can operate even post-apocalypse."
Q: Reflecting on the 78th anniversary of the first nuclear test at Trinity Site, how has the approach to nuclear crisis communications changed in the last 78 years?
Sylvia: "In a?reflection piece about my visit to the Trinity Test Site , I shared my thoughts on the "striking juxtapositions" that the site offers. We can see one such juxtaposition in the state of nuclear crisis communications. While it has been more than seven decades since the advent of the bomb, most of the crisis communication systems that nuclear armed states rely on still are legacy systems inherited from the Cold War. While on one hand, states are focused on building more sophisticated weapons systems, we continue to rely on old and arcane crisis communication architectures. This asymmetric contrast reflects a major gap in existing crisis communications systems. These systems are increasingly vulnerable from the threats of emerging and disruptive technologies. It is of grave importance that the global nuclear community see this disparity and take action to mitigate the gaps in the crisis communications landscape."
Sahil: "I would add that I had very?similar impressions after visiting the Soviet Semipalatinsk Test Site in present-day Kazakhstan ?a few years ago. The striking reality of what nuclear weapons can do to the planet and its populations is on full display there in a way that generates a visceral connection to the issue. Over the last 75 years, I think that that connection has been lost as nuclear policy has become more inaccessible and seemingly left in the purview of executive action. Although we have less nuclear weapons in the world now, we have far more players and also seemingly no avenues for meaningful dialogue on how to make risk reduction and disarmament more mutually reinforcing. On one hand, some believe that risk reduction can help better enable a security environment in which we get rid of nuclear weapons, whereas on the other hand, others feel that the security environment has to drastically change before such risk reduction steps are even possible. In a nutshell, it is a chicken-and-egg situation that we did not have during the Cold War – back then, the United States and Soviet Union engaged in robust political and technical diplomacy to find both unilateral and cooperative ways to reduce risks. Such steps were often taken even during moments of deep geopolitical tension, and that is because the sheer weight of nuclear weapons risks was felt and internalized. I can’t say we have the same level of understanding today across all nuclear-armed states."
Q: What are the next steps for improving crisis communications and why is it urgent? What fora for dialogue on these topics exist?
Sahil: "Nuclear-armed states have an obvious responsibility to work together to ensure that they have reliable, technically hardened communication lines that would work not only in the lead up to a nuclear crisis or conflict but also during one and after. The United States is currently coordinating the P5 Process, which includes the five recognized nuclear weapons states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This is the only venue through which dialogue is happening on strategic and nuclear risk reduction amongst those countries. Although it seems that it will take time before the dialogue can move into a more results-oriented space, this is a key forum through which Washington can hear the other sides’ views on crisis communications and help generate stronger common ground on how to best enable current links to serve their intended purposes if new ones are not possible. It is no secret that, for example, Beijing has not been answering senior U.S. military leaders’ calls and that Washington has therefore made the issue a priority in its bilateral diplomacy. Moreover, given the war in Ukraine and related suspension of bilateral dialogue and implementation of the New START Treaty, it is important that the United States and Russia continue to stress-test their leader-level and military hotlines. Additionally, we must not forget the nuclear-armed states that fall outside of the NPT which also should be called upon to ensure they are able to communicate effectively with adversaries."
领英推荐
“Amid rapidly developing emerging and disruptive technologies, the international community will need to undertake measures to insulate existing channels of communication from a variety of attacks and disruptions."
Elsewhere at IST
Hotlines for the Digital Age: Improving Communications in Cyber-Generated National Security Crises
An ongoing negotiation convened under the United Nations First Committee is building a structure to make clear and urgent communication on cybersecurity incidents accessible to every government.?IST's Elizabeth Posegate Vish posits that such a directory could help states de-escalate incidents of concern or seek help with cyber threats .?
IST Statement on the?National Cybersecurity Strategy Implementation?Plan
The Office of the National Cyber Director released the National Cybersecurity Strategy Implementation Plan, outlining a roadmap for putting the Strategy’s goals into action.?IST applauds the Plan’s emphasis on operational collaboration , as well as its commitment to providing rapid cyber incident response support to global partners.
IST Provides Input on National AI Priorities?
This month, the IST team submitted a response to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy ’s request for information (RFI) on the National Artificial Intelligence Strategy.?IST recommends that OSTP and its partners convene experts ?working across industry, government and civil society to develop nuanced understandings of the opportunities and risks posed by the development and proliferation of AI models.?
Virtual Event | Castles Built on Sand: Digging into the Foundation
On July 18, POLITICO cybersecurity journalist John Sakellariadis moderated a conversation with IST’s Zo? Brammer , ?? Silas Cutler , Marc Rogers , and Megan S. , discussing the recommendations put forward in their April report,?Castles Built on Sand: Securing the Open Source Ecosystem.?The authors dug into the specifics of each key recommendation , elaborated on their potential impact, and discussed the viability of public policy solutions.
IST in the News
Aaron McIntosh on ransomware mitigation, response and recovery
On ITWorld’s podcast Cybersecurity Today ,?Blueprint for Ransomware Defense?co-author Aaron McIntosh discussed his work on the #RansomwareTaskForce , ransomware trends, and cyber attacks. "It’s the role of people like me and the RTF…to provide some tools or make resources available to you that you didn’t have before.”
Megan Stifel on secure-by-design and secure-by-default guidance
Many tech giants have yet to adopt CISA's voluntary secure-by-design and -default guidance.?Megan Stifel attributes this to misaligned incentives: ?"We've created an incentive structure in the marketplace that doesn't support accountability, because it's more about the bottom line," she told? The Messenger 's Eric Geller .?
What We're Reading
Want more tech and security content? Check out some of the ISTeam's favorite pieces from the past month:?
The?Institute for Security and Technology ?designs and advances solutions to the world’s toughest emerging security threats. It is a nonpartisan, nonprofit network based in the San Francisco Bay Area dedicated to solving critical international security challenges through better technology and policy.?Donate today to support our mission.
Thanks for reading The TechnologIST!?To be sure you don't miss the next edition,?subscribe here.