Tactical Insights

More than 100 days into the ground war, the Qassam Brigades have not yet shown any sign of weakness in combat. Israeli estimates indicate that the unit fighting in the north did not request support from units in other areas of the sector. Israel has decided to expand the operation and assigned the operations in the south to the Eighth Brigade in the Israeli army, consisting of the Paratrooper Brigade and the 55th Brigade, in addition to the Ouz Brigade, which consists of the Duv Duvan unit, the Majlan unit, and the Aegis unit. Israel has also deployed the Seventh Armored Brigade, the Givati Brigade, the Kfir Brigade, the Kiryat Brigade, the Fifth Brigade, and the 12th Battalion. In contrast, one of the prominent elite units in the Qassam Brigade, which is the most highly trained and equipped, will fight in Khan Yunis.

The military operation in the governorate is one of the most complex in the course of the war, with all the elements that traditional armies fear in urban warfare. The urban environment complicates the task of armies in a small geographical area with a high population density, and readiness to fight in such geographic and demographic terrain poses immense challenges.

Israel relies on the classics of regular armies, aerial campaigns using bunker-busting munitions to target command centers and control before ground maneuvers. The US Army's War College and West Point issued a report warning of the risks of a ground incursion, stating that Israeli intelligence indicates that the air force has not achieved the desired results in previous operations. As for the Qassam, they rely on what is known as the offensive formation, meaning the presence of a fighting force from the elite, drawing from regular armies, raising the level of performance, discipline, and some military traditions.

The soldier in the Qassam executes the leadership's orders and remains in a specific location for weeks without engaging the enemy under any circumstances, avoiding exposure of his location as seen in the Maghazi ambush. There are field units specializing in direct engagement and maneuverability, consisting of small groups of one or more individuals. The Qassam has developed its tactics and is capable of engaging both above and below ground. Its fighters are trained to adapt to oxygen deficiency, lack of natural light sources, and the increased risks of facing unconventional attacks like chemical gas, which Israel used in some tunnels.

Israel deployed its main unit from two axes, with forces penetrating from Kisufim at the decision-making level to completely isolate Khan Yunis from the central governorate, cutting off Salah al-Din Street and continuing its advance through agricultural lands to the coastal line westward at the Rashid Street. It attacked from a southeastern axis from Fakhari, aiming to use Salah al-Din Street as a geographical barrier between the eastern and western parts of the governorate, thereby attempting to disperse the effort of the Khan Yunis Brigade at this stage. At the end of the first week of the attack, Israel's actual troubles began, as the city itself turned from a battleground into a means of war.

The second obstacle was the challenges of detecting and destroying tunnels. Tunnel cleaning is a nightmare for soldiers, as it is a slow and deadly process that disrupts the possibility of using modern technologies extensively, upon which the Israeli army relies according to its doctrine of qualitative superiority. Israel underestimated the strength of its opponent and leaned heavily on technology. These two lines are lethal in urban warfare, as the difference in infantry tactics, according to Americans, lies in identifying and destroying enemy positions, and if the enemy succeeds in neutralizing this equation, it will be virtually impossible to overcome.