A system dynamics view of a behavior-based safety program in the construction industry

This study reports on a failed BBS program implemented in the Singapore construction industry. Interestingly, they also analysed the findings from a systems dynamics perspective.

Given the (largely unnecessary) tribalism between behavioural and systems perspectives, it was cool to see at least a little harmony here [* although it was systems dynamics and causal loop modelling, rather than a broad systems lens. But whatever].

Providing background:

·???????? The BBS program was aimed at reducing “unsafe behaviours” [** I’ll use their wording, even though I have some issues with this language]. This was across nine categories – the image below shows some of the categories and how observers assessed safe vs unsafe behaviour.

·???????? The BBS program involved five interventions: goal setting, feedback, activity-based training, rewards, punishment (which involved a three-strike system).

·???????? They note “there has been ample evidence that BBS initiatives are effective to reduce unsafe behavior” (p203).

·???????? For instance, a 1989 study reviewed 24 BBS studies and found it generally effective. A 1999 longitudinal study over 5 years and 73 companies found an average reduction of incidents from baseline of 26% to 69% in the fifth year. Other studies are also discussed.

·???????? Other studies were highlighted where BBS were not effective or led to deteriorations in safety performance. A study in Hong Kong found a “serious deterioration in safety performance” for access to heights, following the BBS program. This was ascribed to a lack of management commitment, lack of resources, goal rejection, and low hazard perception.

·???????? Brief history of BBS is given, which I’ve mostly skipped here. However, it has its origins in behaviourism. This focuses on human behaviour in terms of environmental consequences. That is, traditionally, “Internal mental, cognitive, and motivational processes are of less interest to behaviorists, although they do not deny the existence and importance of real causes of human behavior” (p203).

·???????? More modern interpretations are noted to have adopted broader perspectives on behaviour, e.g. goal setting and internal approaches to behaviour. Broader perspectives seem to be more prudent, since the “relationships among goal setting, feedback, and performance are complex”.

Next, they discuss some criticisms of BBS. Some being: (page 4)

·???????? One researcher argued that BBS “can cause a blame-culture”.

·???????? As BBS focuses on immediate causes, it “ tends to minimize the importance of creating a safe environment”.

·???????? BBS is also criticised for a “lack of sustainability, as it does not address the internal processes of behavioral engagement in site safety”.

·???????? Others have criticised BBS approaches for primarily dealing with symptoms (as they have a bottom-up approach). Moreover, BBS has been criticised for being “based on an arguable, if not false, premise that safety can be improved by concentrating on changing the behavior of frontline workers”.

·???????? However, these weaknesses, if valid, can be minimised via partnering with other approaches – in the paper they argue cultural change, but it could include many other areas.

·???????? Moreover, BBS “pays little attention to managers’ and workers’ safety attitude, awareness, and values (Geller, 2001), a culture/climate change approach can address the gap”.? Thus, broad efforts should also focus on supervisors and managers.

Next the authors discuss the background on systems dynamics. These methods have been used for decades to understand complex system issues. One approach focuses on the feedback structure in a system and addressing system behaviour and how they generate over time.

Below image is part of the criteria observers used to gauge behaviour.

I haven’t done a good job summarising this paper, so strongly suggest you read the full paper.

Results

Overall:

·???????? The impact of the BBS intervention produced mixed results over 36 weeks.

·???????? No statistically significant improvement was observed across all of the nine categories.

·???????? Although “unsafe behaviour” slightly increased from baseline with excavation, working at height, manual handling, hot work, and traffic management, it was still not statistically significant.

I’ve skipped most of the statistical findings and will focus on their discussion.

One, they note that while behaviourists (apparently) “claims that behavior can be explained without referring to intricate non-behavioral mental (e.g., cognitive and motivational) activities” and that behaviourists, apparently, use “objective behavioral manifestations and observations to verify their truth”, this perspective risks seeing performance in a too strict environmentally deterministic manner (p209).

They use the systems dynamics models to help explain contradictory findings. I can only provide a snapshot here. They identify three major limitations of the program – dynamics of goal commitment, punishment, and using monetary incentives.

1. Dynamics of goal commitment

While safety goals can be important, once a worker’s “goal commitment decreases, the effectiveness of a BBS program is not sustainable” (p210).

Here, goal conflicts can challenge and undermine individual worker goals. That is, in construction, it is “common that a worker has different goals on a single task (e.g., “work safely by following all procedures and rules” vs. “work quickly to improve productivity” and “take risky behavior to satisfy peers” (p210).

They believe intra-individual goal conflicts from the organisation reduce efficacy of individual goal commitments. One interviewee noted how supervisors focus on production progress over slower, but safer options.

2. Punishment

While everybody agreed that punishment created an unfriendly environment, the BBS program used punishment as “a negative reinforcement to suppress unsafe behavior on site”, but “using punishment in behavior modification programs has always been a double-edged sword” (p210).

For one, it can generate major negative social effects, and detrimental to a “friendly and harmonious social environment”. This was supported by their causal loops.

Many workers viewed “BBS observers as “police officers” who enforced the site’s rules and regulations” (p210).

They note that many workers complied with the safety regulations in order to avoid punishment. However, while punishment may improve the continuance commitment, it cannot improve “neither affective commitment nor normative commitment” (p210).

3. Monetary incentive

In this program, monetary incentives were used to motivate workers to follow safety rules and reduce undesired behaviours.

None of the interviewees in this study had an issue with the monetary incentives. However, the authors cite literature on the shaky grounds of incentives – showing mixed effects and a weak link to actual performance.

They cite evidence that monetary incentives can “erode intrinsic motivation and therefore undermine task performance” (p210).

Their causal loops provide some insights on how monetary incentives may not lead to the intended goals. Factors include when the incentives are taken away, or the incentives are no longer valued then commitment drops off.

Moreover, value congruence was likely a factor; said to be closely associated with safety climate and culture. Thus, this implies “that when a BBS program is implemented in a project where there is positive safety culture, it is more likely to succeed. Value congruence is highly likely to bring in recognition, satisfaction, and therefore better safety performance” (p212).

One of their causal loops is shown below, but the full paper has many more:

Link in comments.

Authors: Guo, B. H., Goh, Y. M., & Wong, K. L. X. (2018).?Safety science,?104, 202-215.