Syrian Developments & Implications for Post-Soviet Eurasia

The recent developments in Syria—the collapse of Assad's regime, the capture of Damascus and other major cities by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the so-called opposition forces, and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA)—have fundamentally transformed the landscape in the country, with potential implications for the Middle East region and beyond. Turkish-backed forces have advanced southward from their positions in northern Syria, while US-supported groups such as the Syrian Free Army (SFA) moved north from the south. Concurrently, the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), predominantly led by the PYD-YPG, progressed towards central and southern territories from the northeast. Meanwhile, Israel expanded its territorial control in the Golan Heights.

The shifting dynamics have highlighted the faltering influence of Russia and Iran, which once played critical roles in the Syrian conflict. Türkiye capitalised on this power vacuum, ousting PKK-linked PYD-YPG forces from towns like Tal Rifaat and Manbij and installing a compliant regime in Damascus. This new government has aligned with Türkiye in demanding the dismantling of US-backed PYD-YPG forces. At the time of writing, the durability of the PYD-YPG's presence on the eastern flank of the Euphrates remains uncertain, particularly given ongoing clashes with Turkish-backed forces in northern Syria and conflicts with HTS in the east. The latter recently seized control of Deir ez-Zor from SDF. Israel, for its part, is likely to consolidate its gains and may advocate for the establishment of a Druze state in southern Syria. Russia, meanwhile, has largely remained silent, with reports suggesting a withdrawal of some Russian forces from the northwest.

The confrontation in Syria shows no signs of abating. The potential for clashes between HTS and Israel in southern Syria persists, as HTS has declared its commitment to restoring Syria's territorial unity. The Turkish government has similarly endorsed HTS’s ambitions, with President Erdo?an signalling a new military operation against the PYD-YPG in northern Syria. The recent US bombing of a bridge over the Euphrates underscores Washington's intention to safeguard the PYD-YPG in northeastern Syria, although future policy shifts under the upcoming Trump administration remain uncertain. Trump's prior presidency saw a reduction in US troop numbers in Syria, and his recent statements suggest a waning interest in the region. Should this materialise, it could accelerate the dismantling of PYD-YPG forces, parts of which have reportedly joined HTS. The persistent disagreement between Türkiye and the US over the nature of the PYD-YPG remains a critical sticking point. Türkiye views the PYD-YPG as an extension of the PKK, while the US denies any such association. SDF leader Mazloum Abdi has proposed replacing foreign fighters within the SDF (potentially implying PKK-linked groups) with local forces under US supervision, but the proposal’s prospects are likely negative.

Syria’s future also hinges on the establishment of a credible transition mechanism. Although a new prime minister has been appointed, he lacks parliamentary confidence. Nevertheless, the fact that Assad's parliament has so far remained untouched reflects HTS's recognition of the need for a legitimate transition. Despite Turkish backing, HTS must secure recognition from other key actors, too, which may require tempering its assertiveness.

Although geographically distant, the Syrian conflict carries significant implications for post-Soviet Eurasia. Türkiye's recent manoeuvres, alongside the US and Israel, could be seen as a betrayal of the Astana Process with Russia and Iran. Türkiye’s offer of normalisation to Assad prior to its latest operation was rejected by both Assad, who conditioned it on the withdrawal of Turkish forces and cessation of support for opposition groups, and Moscow. While Türkiye and Russia have historically managed to compartmentalise their conflicting interests across various theatres, Russia may respond to Türkiye's actions in Syria by exerting pressure in regions where Turkish influence has grown, such as Libya, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Following the Second Karabakh War and the war in Ukraine, Türkiye has expanded its influence in these regions through both the Organisation of Turkic States and bilateral relationships. Russia may seek to curtail these advances, pressuring regional actors to reconsider their partnerships with Türkiye. The cooperative rivalry between the two nations may thus reach its limits. Alternatively, Russia may seek some favour from Türkiye in negotiations over the war in Ukraine, where the latter is likely to act as the mediator.

Türkiye’s actions in Syria, if coupled with a successful transition and consolidation of power across Syrian territories, could bolster its credibility as a regional power. Following Assad's fall, Azerbaijan’s pledge to support Türkiye’s reconstruction efforts in Syria demonstrates the regional alliances Türkiye can mobilise. The recent expansion of D-8 membership to include Azerbaijan, at Türkiye’s behest, further underscores the strategic alignment between the two nations, positioning Türkiye to play a leading role in broader geopolitical rivalries.

Iran, by contrast, has suffered a significant blow to its reputation as a regional power. To regain its standing, it may seek closer alignment with Russia and India or explore avenues to strengthen ties with Türkiye. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan noted in one of his recent interviews that the lack of coordination between Iran and Russia contributed to HTS’s successes and Assad’s downfall. Cooperation among these powers will be crucial to preserving Iran’s regional influence.

One tangible consequence of the Syrian developments could be the further complication of the regional disagreements over the reopening of the Zangazur Corridor, linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave and further to Türkiye. Russia and Iran may align their positions to counter Türkiye’s influence. Similarly, the Abkhazia railway project—connecting Russia and Armenia via Georgia—could become a point of negotiation, with Iran potentially playing a mediatory role between Georgia and Russia. These developments reveal the potentially far-reaching ripple effects of the Syrian conflict on regional dynamics in post-Soviet Eurasia.

The evolving situation in Syria encapsulates the complexities of multipolar geopolitics, where shifting alliances and regional rivalries intertwine. Türkiye’s bold moves not only redefine the Syrian conflict but also resonate across Eurasia, challenging established power dynamics. For Russia and Iran, the Syrian developments expose vulnerabilities, necessitating recalibrations of their strategies in both the Middle East and post-Soviet space. Meanwhile, Türkiye’s assertive posture underscores its ambition to cement itself as a pivotal regional actor. Whether these actions herald a new era of influence or ignite fresh confrontations will depend on the ability of regional and global powers to adapt to the rapidly changing landscape. Syria remains both a battleground and a bellwether, influencing the contours of geopolitics in the wider region in the years to come.