Syria: Revisiting Lessons Learned in Iraq

Initially published in August of 2013 but worth revisiting almost 2 years later.

https://www.trackingterrorism.org/article/syria-revisiting-lessons-learned-iraq/critical-lessons

Point of No Return?

Bashar Al-Assad long ago lost legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of Syrians; he crossed a point of no return when his forces began making no distinction between the rebels and ordinary citizens. But despise him or love him, it is irrelevant. What matters is the context of his departure and the resulting effect on the country and the region as a whole. Given the status quo, it remains to be seen if the opposition is capable of forming a competent interim authority to begin to establish an agreed upon framework facilitating a smooth transition from the regime – but it may not be possible without the involvement of Assad.

The challenges in observing and assessing the Syrian conflict is that the public is fed snippets of various parts of the escalations from a multitude of sources in which competing interests and suspicious motivations more often than not serve to cloud the content rather than to illuminate it. What can ultimately be acknowledged is that the situation in Syria is rapidly deteriorating and progressing down the path Iraq did immediately after the U.S. invasion. The parties involved can address and mitigate that part of the scenario which could facilitate other critical processes and frameworks for peace, or ignore these realities and the mistakes of Iraq at the risk of a protracted and expanded regional conflict.

Many in the Middle East along with their Western backers desperately want Assad gone, but with an equally formidable opposition comprised of national and sub-state actors supporting his regime, and in light of the recent critical Hezbullah-aided victory in Qusayr, there is little evidence suggesting Assad will voluntarily step down anytime soon. In fact, given the ferocity with which he has attempted to protect the Alawite grip on Syria, Assad may have already decided if he is to be forced out, it will be on his own terms. With this backdrop, it becomes prudent to analyze the geopolitical implications should the regime be forced to vacate immediately, devoid of any agreed upon framework for an orderly transition towards popular rule; leaving behind not only a leadership vacuum but the absence of a much needed domestic security apparatus to sustain some semblance of general civil order and social normality for the country.

Iraq Revisited

Critical lessons derived from the illegal invasion of Iraq and the subsequent decade-long quagmire demand a more restrictive and guided approach to effectuating total regime change in Syria. Iraq, then and now, is understood by many geopolitical experts to be amongst the greatest failures in U.S. Middle East foreign policy in generations. Many in Washington political circles and the media strongly advocated for the forceful ouster of Saddam Hussein. Few (if any) in those same circles of influence cared enough to posit the devastating ramifications of such an absolute, thorough and systematic deconstruction of Iraq’s sociopolitical structure; almost identical to what is being called for in the de-Baathification of Syria today. To date, the staggering toll on both blood and treasure on all sides of the Iraq conflict measures in the hundreds of thousands of deaths and approximately 2 trillion dollars in U.S. taxpayer sacrifices alone. This does not take into account the millions of livelihoods destroyed as a direct or indirect result of the invasion and the losses of potentially billions of dollars worth of domestic and regional economic activity. Perhaps the exact toll will never be known, but what is possible to discern from the failures evident in Iraq is that there are more formidable enemies to a state other than the factions fighting for control.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headed by Paul Bremer, acting under the direction of a group of neoconservative strategists from the Office of Special Plans within the Department of Defense (DOD), was tasked with implementing the de-Baathification of Iraq across all levels of government, the military and civil sectors; this single-handedly proved to be the achilles heel that plunged Iraq deeper into the abyss from which, gauging from current events, it has not fully recovered 10 years later.

Inherently faulty comparisons were made by the neocon group tasked with formulating the plan for Iraq to a similar strategy of de-Nazification of post-WWII Germany by Allied powers. The resulting success manifesting decades later in Germany, due in no small part to German resilience and ingenuity, was perceived by the DoD to be wholly applicable in Iraq. This fundamental misunderstanding, perhaps even willful ignorance, of Iraq’s national and regional realities along with its sectarian and religious historical context served as the framework from which the severely broken nation was supposed to emerge as a new, modern and unified democratic state. It was obvious to many analysts with expertise in the Middle East that Iraq was not Germany; and any comparisons and vacuous assumptions made to somehow relate the two were completely unfounded. Iraq was left with leadership vacuums across all levels of government, rendering its structural and operational integrity as a state compromised beyond repair. The resulting events that transpired within Iraq were simply a domino effect waiting to happen; and recently the Syrian conflict has managed to gain a foothold in the country, reviving sectarian tensions that killed thousands in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion.

Implications for Syria and the Levant

Syria is not Iraq, but Iraq’s lessons clearly apply for Syria. One would be forgiven in thinking that much is in some manner evident to Washington and its European and Middle Eastern allies. As Secretary Kerry tours the Middle East calling for Assad to step down, while attempting to elicit renewed confidence in Obama’s plans for the Levant, one thing is sure – not much evidence exists that the lessons learned in Iraq are being deployed to give Syrians a chance to build a viable post Assad future.

The opposition, having gathered in Turkey to discuss the way forward, has yet to agree that they agree on anything. Accepting to attend the Geneva meeting to discuss any plans for peace has been largely cast aside due in part to disagreements within their ranks as to whether Assad should step down before negotiations can begin; all the while Syrians continue to die in a rapidly escalating conflict. It is important to note that Free Syrian Army General Salim Idriss in a response to this specific issue put forth by the BBC and prior to the defeat in Qusayr, stated unequivocally that, “the opposition has to go to the conference…we are the fighters on the ground and I am telling them they have to go, they are politicians and they have to go and negotiate and tell our opinions…”.

Highlighting the apparent desperation in the General’s statement and given the exposed disagreements amongst the members of the opposition convened in Turkey, there seems to be some disconnect from the realities on the ground in Syria, specifically where General Idriss and his men are concerned. To believe, as some have suggested, that once given the opportunity to plan for Syria’s transition, the opposition will be able to do so without further escalating the conflict when Assad is removed is to be naive. The unequal hands backing members of the opposition dictate that their respective interests be met prior to any concrete agreements made for the benefit of the Syrian people who are dying daily.

The Syrian opposition is confronted with the challenge to make hard and unpopular decisions for the security and future of the Levant; and unfortunately, Assad must partake in these complex negotiations if only because he is instrumental in being able to guarantee national and regional stability. He has demonstrated a resilience and willingness to tear the country apart in an effort to hold on to power.

Cooler Heads Must Prevail

An immediate and unconditional ceasefire must be established on all sides to better gauge the status quo and effectively address the concerns being brought to the negotiating table. Whether such a ceasefire is even possible now given the nature of the diverse factions involved on the ground is also cause for serious concern. The ceasefire accomplishes several primary objectives. Chief among them is ending the indiscriminate loss of lives and stemming the influx of refugees into neighboring countries, thereby reducing the pressures on the already taxed resources of border nations. This has the potential to restore some level of confidence in the abilities of the opposition to mitigate damages and push for a new way forward, while also allowing for more reason-minded members to rise to the occasion. A reconciliation process is equally important if all sides are to progress beyond the status quo and effectively address their grievances. This has to be a purely Syrian affair.

Killing Assad carries serious and likely devastating consequences for the entire Middle East. It is not an option Hezbollah is willing to accept, as they have demonstrated definitively recently in Qusayr; and they are bound to sustain the conflict because of the invaluable link to Tehran that runs through Syria, supplying them with weapons and funds in their resistance against Israel. Cooler heads must prevail if the Levant is to survive this critical transition, and negotiating with Assad, in this case, is the necessary lesser of two evils.