SYRIA: A decade of geopolitical rift
By Daniel Ozoukou
Political scientists have analyzed the 2011 social unrest in several Arab countries as a demand for regime change. The authoritarian regimes of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria were shaken by huge mob protests across these countries for democratic change, this phenomenon named the Arab Spring resulted in the collapse of the Hosni Mubarak (Egypt), Ben Ali (Tunisia), and Muhammar Kaddafi (Libya) regimes. Bashar Al Assad (Syria) remained in power thanks to the support of Russia and Iran and the deep geopolitical rift between the United Nations Security Council's five permanent members. ?In 2012, the deep geopolitical rift derailed the peace process and political efforts to deal with the Syrian conflict. In 2015, Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah security forces engaged in direct military operations against insurgents and Western proxies. Since 2022, Russia’s securitization capacity has been affected by its Ukrainian war. In 2024, the Israeli robust military strategy against Hezbollah and Iran jeopardized the Assad security system. Thus, in mid-December 2024, terrorist organizations, including the Hayat Tahir al-Sham (HTS), took the opportunity to conduct a robust military operation against the Syrian Security Forces. As a result, the former president, Bashar Al-Assad, fled to Moscow, and the HTS took control of state institutions. While analysts currently debate post-Assad governance and the capacity of terrorist organizations to effectively lead the state, the contribution aims to recall not only the drivers of the conflict but also the geopolitical rift that prevailed before Assad's downfall and how the divide between the great powers jeopardizes the maintenance of the International Peace and Security.
Drivers of the conflict
?????? Narratives of the Syrian conflict point out that graffiti scrawled on the wall by adolescents in Daraa (110 km) south of Damascus are the seeds of violent and deadly conflict. Inspired by the Arab Spring, the Syrian adolescents wrote on a wall, "The people want the fall of the regime." These young boys wanted to send messages to the forty-year ruling regime. Hafez al-Assad (father of Bashar al-Assad) ruled the state from 1971-2000, and his son Bashar Hafez al-Assad succeeded him in 2000. At that time, he was the commander-in-chief of the Syrian Armed Forces and was prepared to rule the country. The arrest of adolescents by the Syrian Security Forces escalated rapidly to mass protests across the country. The Independence Day protests resulted in a blood bath, and 200 demonstrators were killed. Furthermore, in Hama, Assad security forces attacked a protest mob, killing 100 protesters [1]. Thomas Weiss stressed that “the bloodshed and suffering inflicted by the Bashar al-Assad regime are far worse than Gaddafi’s, with upwards of 130,000 dead.” [2]
The peace process
In February 2012, the United Nations-sponsored peace talks in Geneva under the mediation of Kofi Annan. Unfortunately, the peace initiative was deadlocked and Annan resigned two months later. He lamented the lack of a common international community vision of the Syrian crisis. In January 2014, the UNSC initiated another peace talk with the Lakhdar Brahimi. This initiative failed again because of a lack of confidence and a deep divide. The rift among permanent member states of the UN Security Council precluded a positive outcome from the peace deal.
Diverging voices: EU and Western allies vs China and Russia
The failure of the peace process fueled the conflict, and amidst brutal repression of the population, the EU issued several statements "denouncing the violent repression of demonstrators and urged Assad to "exercise the utmost restraint across the country and to meet legitimate demand and aspirations of the people?with dialogue and urgent political and socio-economic reforms." [3] The EU indicated that Bashar Assad had lost legitimacy in the eyes of the Syrian population and urged him to step down.[4] The great power leadership, including President Barack Obama (US) President Nicolas Sarkozy (France) Prime Minister David Cameron (UK), and Angela Merkel (Germany), urged Assad to resign.[5] In that context, they sponsored resolutions demanding the resignation of President Assad, but China and Russia vetoed those resolutions. Western powers' calls did not have an impact on the prevailing situation, and the situation shifted to an armed confrontation between the Assad loyal army and non-state entities in mid-2011. The Assad Challengers rapidly sized strategic northern cities, including Aleppo, one of Syria’s largest towns [6]. On April 22, 2013, the EU lifted the oil embargo when the oil field fell under revolutionary opposition rule. The EU indicated that "before approving oil transactions, competent authorities should consult with the Syrian National Coalition opposition and Revolutionary Forces."[7] One month later, the Western allies lifted the arms embargo "with possible export of arms to Syria. [8].
In response, Russia and China vetoed most UN Security Council resolutions on Syria. They criticized "western and Arab states for covertly and overtly arming the rebels."[9] They stressed that lifting the arm and oil embargo was a way to reinforce insurgents, both economically and militarily, to achieve political change in Syria. Further, the Russian representative indicated that "Syria cannot be considered in the Council separately from the Libyan experience’. He emphasized that” the international community was alarmed by statements that compliance with SC resolutions on Libya in the NATO interpretation is a model for the future actions of NATO in implementing the responsibility to protect. He underscored: the ‘’Unified Protector’ [the name of NATO’s operation in Libya] model could happen in Syria.’’[10] Porleta Carla (2012) explained reasons underpinning the Russia veto: "The strategic importance of Syria to Russia does not only emanate from the lucrative weapons deals it secures, but also from being the host of Russia's only maritime base in the Mediterranean’’[11]. She noted that ‘’Losing Syria, Russia's last stronghold in the Middle East, would be a major psychological and reputational setback." [12]
Russia Securitization move
From 2015 to 2016, Russia deployed security forces in Syria and engaged in robust military operations. Since President Putin's troop intervention in Syria, Bashar al-Assad has recovered territories previously held by rebel movements. Russia deployed the most sophisticated weapons and air defense system. [13] Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah's intervention was instrumental in the Ba'athist regime's “renaissance.” From 2016 to 2018, Assad took control of some strategic cities in the northern areas, including Aleppo and Daraa (the birthplace of the protests) and, most importantly, the Damascus suburbs.? The Sino-Russian dual campaign to protect the principle of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention of the Westphalian system [14] should be considered with discernment regarding Russia’s military diplomacy and territorial war (annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine 2022). Moscow’s true objective is to ‘’maintain a geostrategic balance and international security, cultivate a favorable international image and status as a responsible member of the international community, and promote its economic and political interests.[15] On September 16, 2016, Putin initiated peace talks with Turkey and Iran to discuss crucial issues including territorial annexation and the disarmament of Hayat Tahir al-Sham militias in Idlib [25] but Erdogan rejected the deal.
Turkey’s agenda
Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia supported armed rebel factions together with the US-led coalition, which was strongly opposed to Bashar al-Assa. [16].? Terrorist organizations in Syria indicated their readiness to seize power when the Assad regime was defeated. Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups were spotted in Syria with the establishment of the Islamic caliphate, which claimed approximately one-third of Syrian territory with Raqqa (442.6 km north of Damascus) as the capital. [17] The presence of terrorist groups complicated the situation more as they" "espoused a more virulent Salafi-jihadist ideology and focused on seizing territory and creating their own states"[18The international community was concerned about the emergence of Al Qaeda-affiliated militant groups, including Jabha al Nursra (JAN), the Islamic State in Iraq, and the Levant. ?From 2016 to 2019, Turkish troops, together with their allies, conducted military operations in the Euphrates Shield, Aleppo, Afrin, and Idlib. That military offensive '' drew warnings of a humanitarian disaster. [1]" President Erdogan stressed that Turkish military strategy aimed to defeat the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), which he repeatedly slammed to have a link with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey [19]. The YPG is the main fighting element of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a strategic partner of the US in the fight against the ISIL group [20].
?Moreover, the Turkish government established a pro-state that ensured administrative and relief programs for the displaced people. "The Turkish military and governmental presence in the northern areas represented the final stage in brief, but fraught, history of local governance in the region." [21]. In violation of international law, Turkish authorities have annexed a sovereign state and put in place a parallel administration in cities under their control. Turkey proceeds by the co-option of local institutions. Co-option and support are the two distinct forms of intervention. "Co-option refers to Turkish institutions?replacing?their Syrian counterparts, while support can mean anything from funding and training to working?alongside?local Syrians." [22] Under that political policy, on September 8, 2016, Gaziantep Mayor Fatima Sahin headed to Northern Syria and visited Jarabulus. It was the first Turkish authority to visit Syria at the beginning of the 2011 crisis [23]. Furthermore, Turkey's Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) has established water and electricity facilities. Generators for water pumps and three kilometers of a new line from the border town of Karkamis that would supply 31.5 KW were provided by the AFAD and the Turkish electrical company. The Ministry of Health created a medical unit to assist people affected by the conflict.[24]
??In conclusion, the decade of the geopolitical rift hampered the peace process and collapse of the Assad regime. Since December 2024, the terrorist organization HTS has been leading the country with the support of the international community. However, what can we expect from such cooperation? What are the necessary steps for building trust and ensuring lasting cooperation?
References
[1] Nour Ali Hama, the city that defies Assad, August 1, 2011.
[2] Weiss T. P.12.
[3] Turkmani R., Haid M, et al.. Role of the EU in the Syrian conflict 05/16.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Yacoubian M. Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad, July, 2020.
[7] Rim Turkmani and Mustafa Haid The role of the EU in the Syria conflict 05/16.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Hudson J. Why did Kofi Annan fail? Atlantic August 2, 2012.
[10] Alex J. Bellamy from Tripoli to Damascus. Lesson learning and the implementation of the Responsibility to
Protect International Politics Vol. 51, 1, 23–44 2014.
Porleta et al. [11] (2012) "The EU's sanctions against Syria: Conflict management by other means Security Policy Brief, 38.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Yacoubian M. (2020) ‘’Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad’’ US Institute for Peace.
[14] Muharrem E. The Syrian Crisis as a Proxy War and the Return of Realist Great Power Politics, 1/2017.
[15] Directorate General for external policies of the Union: The positions of China and Russia in the United Nations Security Council in light of the recent crisis of 2013.
[16]Marshall A. (2016) From civil war to proxy war: history and current dilemmas, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27:2 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129172
[18] Ibid.
[19] Reuters EU furious
[20] Reuters furious with Turkey, EU officials threatened sanctions on October 11, 2019.
[21] Ibidem
[22] Gregory Waters Between Ankara and Damascus: The role of the Turkish state in north Aleppo
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.