Symbolic Skirmishes in a Time of Containment and Deal-Making

Whether the Doha talks between spy chiefs from the mediating countries succeed or fail, the specter of military strikes between Israel, Iran, and their proxies remains a possibility. This is because turning verbal agreements into written commitments is neither an easy nor a quick process. Side agreements may already account for the need for controlled, retaliatory military operations while de-escalation guarantees are being formulated and documented. These skirmishes may take a new form, but they won't escalate into a full-scale war if the negotiations in Doha succeed. However, if those talks collapse, as we may see by the time of publication, the threat of serious war will follow. Yet even then, the conflict will likely neither be prolonged nor extensive, no matter how severe the retaliatory strikes are. Instead, this may serve as a prelude to major deals after the destruction, with Lebanon, in particular, standing on the brink. So what compromises do these success scenarios involve? And what will the military landscape look like if the ceasefire negotiations in Gaza fail?

The U.S. Department of Defence, the Pentagon, is bolstering its military footprint in the region, dispatching troops and the U.S. Navy. Its message to all concerned parties is clear: America will not flee from a war in the Middle East. Instead, it will intervene alongside Israel if Iran initiates a conflict, or if matters spiral out of control due to a decision or miscalculation by Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, or other factions in Iraq.

Iraq has clearly understood this message, and through its Foreign Minister, Fuad Hussein, it has decided to postpone the announcement of the end of the U.S.-led international coalition's mission in the country due to recent regional developments. During a joint press conference with his Turkish counterpart, Hakan Fidan, in Ankara, Hussein stated that Iraq opposes any wars in the region. Essentially, Iraq has joined Egypt and Jordan in adopting a neutral stance on the Gaza war, limiting its support to Palestinian civilians and advocating for a ceasefire in Gaza. In short, Iraq is not ready at this critical moment to set a date for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from its territory, a decision of significant importance.

Only Lebanon has acquiesced to Hezbollah and Iran's appropriation of its sovereign decision-making, linking its fate to the Gaza war. Initially, President Biden's administration seemed to accommodate this reality rather than confront it, appearing to yield to the facts on the ground imposed by Hezbollah, under the guidance and coordination of the Revolutionary Guards—the true rulers in Iran. The support front for Hamas in Gaza isn't led by Israel's neighboring states but by the Iran axis, which refers to itself as the "resistance axis," using proxies in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria.

Neither the Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah, nor the Houthis are at the negotiating table in Doha. Hamas, the direct party to the Gaza war, where Israel has shown its military, moral, and humanitarian failures, is represented through Qatar and Egypt. However, the elephant in the room in Doha is Iran, represented by the Revolutionary Guards, not by the new president, who is struggling to resist the Guards' dominance over decision-making.

The Biden administration is doing everything possible to reach a ceasefire and secure guarantees for all parties. It does not want to entangle the United States in a war against Iran and its proxies, a situation Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and public sentiment in Israel might push it toward. Essentially, this is the Biden-Obama team that has always sought understanding with Iran rather than confrontation or punishment, as former President Donald Trump did.

Despite the administration’s frustrations with Netanyahu, his government, and Israeli public sentiment, U.S. military aid to Israel continues under the directives of President Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris. This aid will not stop but will increase. The Biden team expects Middle Eastern leaders to understand the strategic alliance between America and Israel and what it requires. They want these leaders to help lead Kamala Harris to the U.S. presidency and block Donald Trump's return to the White House.

Despite the intelligence and experience of its members, Biden’s team continues to make blunders due to its lack of a strong sense of American leadership and its voluntary submission to blackmail under the guise of necessary and unavoidable compromises. The team adopts short-term pragmatism by pushing players toward tactical agreements rather than political solutions. What it seeks is a ceasefire and the exchange of captives and prisoners while avoiding political issues such as assigning blame or discussing a Palestinian state and a comprehensive settlement.

The Biden team understands Iran's central role in Hamas's decision-making because Tehran controls the support front and the potential expansion of the war. Therefore, they are engaging in bargaining and negotiations with Iran through third parties, under the premise: Facilitate the success of the Doha negotiations and the ceasefire, and we will open a new chapter in U.S.-Iranian relations.

The Biden team also recognizes the need to save face for Iran, Hezbollah, and Israel by allowing for pre-agreed, limited military strikes that are more symbolic than substantive. Delaying retaliation and responses to retaliation is part of this face-saving process—keeping actions limited and symbolic, rather than leading to an expanded war that would destroy, rather than save, everyone’s faces.

If matters don't escalate into a still unlikely major war, retaliatory operations intended to restore honour and prestige may target the port of Haifa and damage some infrastructure, but they will avoid targeting Ben Gurion Airport, for example. Similarly, Israel's response will likely avoid targeting Beirut's Rafic Hariri Airport; if it does, it may be limited to damaging runways.

The real danger lies in Israel continuing to target senior figures in Hezbollah or Hamas, which could escalate the shadow war and disrupt the rules of engagement that govern military operations. If either side decides to break these rules, a serious war could bring devastation to Lebanon. The United States will not restrain Israel if Hezbollah decides not to follow the rules of engagement; instead, it will support Israel. This message was conveyed by Amos Hochstein, the U.S. envoy responsible for the Lebanon-Israel file, to the Lebanese government during his recent visit. He urged them to separate Lebanon from Gaza and work to neutralize Lebanon, especially since the Doha negotiations are focused solely on Gaza. Meanwhile, secret talks between the Biden team and leaders in Iran, along with Gulf Arab states, Egypt, and Jordan, aim to achieve the major deal that the Biden administration dreams of.

Such a deal would leave a significant mark on President Joe Biden's legacy and serve as a critical achievement for Kamala Harris in her presidential campaign. Even if it only manages to contain rather than resolve the Gaza war, this would be a half-success beneficial to the Democrats, despite the dangers of relying solely on transitional and temporary measures and incremental solutions and battles, within the containment strategy dictated by pragmatic needs, according to the Biden team's thinking.

The Doha talks adopted pragmatism as viewed by intelligence officials, aiming to stop the conflict in Gaza. Yahya Sinwar's assumption of Ismail Haniyeh's duties after his assassination in Tehran did not deter the American side from proceeding with the negotiations. Instead, they saw Sinwar's sole leadership of Hamas, both militarily and politically, as centralizing decision-making, preventing it from being lost in Palestinian divisions, even within Hamas.

The intelligence delegations to the Doha talks included CIA Director William Burns, U.S. envoy to the Middle East Brett McGurk, Israeli intelligence chief David Barnea, Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) chief Ronen Bar, and Israeli army hostage coordinator Nitzan Alon. The Egyptian side was led by Abbas Kamel, head of General Intelligence. The talks in Doha were convened by Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, with intelligence leaders in attendance. Hamas was represented in the negotiations through Qatar and Egypt, both of which made every effort to ensure the talks' success.

The containment principle may be necessary as a pragmatic step toward a ceasefire, prisoner exchange, and a technical, non-political agreement to extinguish the fire and halt the attrition, while the cards are reshuffled based on the realities on the ground in Gaza. This means that Benjamin Netanyahu will secure the release of Israeli hostages, helping him in new elections in Israel and sparing him from trials. However, it also means that Netanyahu will have to eat his words and accept Sinwar and his leadership of Hamas in Gaza.

Meanwhile, the Biden team is working on the dream deal that would lead Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel, but they lack the firm strategy needed to force Israel to accept a two-state solution. This team may believe the decision lies with Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman, who, with his courage, can make historic and fateful decisions. However, it would be a mistake to assume that Saudi Arabia will reward Israel for its actions in Gaza unless Israel backs down from rejecting the two-state solution and begins a new negotiation process—one different from the elastic "Middle East peace process" that has led nowhere.

The grand deal, if achieved, will not succeed if it merely adopts the containment principle. It requires a comprehensive strategy that goes beyond strategic ambiguity or secret deals and understandings, as seems to be the case with Iran. The real question is whether the Biden team is prepared to appease Iran by legitimizing its proxies at the expense of sovereignty in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria.

The Arab Gulf states, especially those assisting in the indirect U.S.-Iran dialogue, must recognize the danger and implications of U.S. acknowledgment of Iran's "right" to retain its proxies. This is an Arab responsibility. During Barack Obama's tenure, the Gulf states were deliberately excluded under the pretext that the negotiations were strictly about the nuclear issue, when in reality, Iran imposed political conditions, chief among them preserving its regional role through its proxies and affiliated militias.

This time, the Gulf Arab states have no excuse, nor do they have any interest in agreeing to secret U.S.-Iranian deals that undermine the sovereignty of Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria—deals that would also serve as a ticking time bomb against the Gulf states themselves.