A surfing tragedy with lessons for industry

Summary

On 11th May 2020 five experienced surfers died in the Dutch seaside resort of Scheveningen. Whilst the sea conditions may have been challenging at the time they would not be considered extreme. The formation of a thick layer of sea foam appears to be the cause. This tragedy occurred at the height of the Coronavirus pandemic so did not receive much coverage.

Although surfing has little to do with industry this incident illustrates some learning point that may be particularly relevant. It highlights how difficult it is to comprehend the power of nature. Competent people make mistakes and because they often carry out more hazardous activities their mistakes can have serious consequences. Mitigation can never be relied on and we need to work hard to prepare us to handle uncertainty when things do wrong. Overall we may become adept at understanding routine risks but that does not prepare us for everything that can happen.

Everything we do has a risk. We need to understand that in the context of the benefits we get from the things we do (at work and in everyday life). Our aim has to be to find a balance point between risk and reward, which is continually changing.

Introduction

Scheveningen is a seaside resort in the Netherlands. It is near to the city of The Hague and popular with tourists and water sports enthusiasts. Being on the exposed west coast it receives consistent waves and is home to several surf schools.

On the evening of the 11th May 2020 five young men died at Scheveningen whilst bodysurfing (catching waves without boards). They were all experienced surfers aged between 22 and 38. Three of them were qualified lifeguards and worked as surf instructors.

Investigation and analysis

The alarm was raised soon after the men got into difficulty and attempts were made to rescue them. Two were pulled from the sea but pronounced dead. Two bodies were found washed up the next day and another was spotted floating at sea.

It was reported that the sea was choppy at the time of the incident, with a strong wind. Whilst these conditions may be challenging to the novice, surfers routinely venture into much rougher seas.

The most likely explanation for the loss of life was the formation of a thick layer of sea foam. This is a natural phenomenon created by algae. It seems likely that the wind whipped it up to create a layer that made it difficult to swim or stay above the water. Although sea foams occur quite frequently there seem to be no other reported cases that have had such tragic consequences.

Lessons Learnt

Although surfing has little to do with industry this incident illustrates some learning point that may be particularly relevant.

Natural phenomenon

Nature is powerful and it can be very unpredictable. We instinctively have a good idea of the ‘normal’ types of events that occur but it can be very difficult to properly understand the full potential of natural phenomenon. We sometimes feel we can control or overcome the forces of nature, but it constantly proves that is not the case. For these surfers the sea foam probably seemed like a bit of a nuisance but quite normal. They clearly did not appreciate its danger.

Competent people

We have to remember that competent people make mistakes. This is sometimes overlooked and we are often happy to assign them more hazardous jobs because we view them as being a safe pair of hands. Also, they have the confidence to take on challenges because they feel their experience has prepared them for everything. Less experienced surfers usually restrict themselves to calmer conditions and if they do venture out on ‘big’ days they are usually unceremoniously dumped back on the beach, prompting them to dry off and go home. Most novices would probably not consider surfing in sea foam because it something well outside of their previous experienced.

This incident highlights another more complex issue around competence. Whilst the five men may have all known each other and arranged to surf together, there is no direct interaction between individuals when surfing. This means all five made the same mistakes. We generally assume that improving the competence of everyone automatically improves safety. The logic is that it increases the overall level of knowledge and skill. However, if everyone shares the same competence (e.g. all attended the same training and worked on the same plant) it does not mean that working as group necessarily makes them more able to handle every possible scenario. In fact it can result in groupthink, which can encourage risk taking. It may have been the case that some of the surfers did have concerns about the sea foam but didn’t say anything because everyone else seemed happy to continue.

Mitigation cannot be relied on

It is quite right that we put effort into mitigation but we need to recognise it can never be relied upon. The nature of incidents is that they are unpredictable and once a hazard has occurred there will always be some uncertainty about whether it can be mitigated effectively. We probably need to carry more emergency exercises but we need to make sure they prepare us for the unexpected. Repeating the same exercises where everything goes as we expect is not going to do that. Surfing with other people is always considered to be safer than surfing alone. It allows people to help each other and reduces delays in calling emergency services. Clearly that was not enough in this case.

Hazards and risks

It is easy to convince ourselves that we have every risk under control. The reality is that whilst a hazard exists there is always a risk. What adds to the problems is that we can become adept at assessing routine risks and feel we have a full understanding of what is possible. Assessing unusual risks is particularly difficult. In hindsight it is easy to see that a large quantity of sea foam could be particularly hazardous to people trying to swim. But until an incident of this nature occurs it is difficult to consider it as credible. It is worth noting that other people were surfing nearby at the time of this incident and emerged entirely unharmed. This was a very localised but acute issue and even after this tragedy it is difficult to comprehend the actual risk.

Conclusions

A response to a tragedy like this could be to ban surfing at that beach. Five people have died so it must be dangerous.

Everything we do has a risk. Banning everything may reduce the number of accidents but would the knock-on effect be worth it? One reason why risk assessment often fails to have the impact it should is that the benefits of the activity being considered are not taken into account. This means that the assessment becomes a reason to stop something happening whereas it should be a process for finding out how an activity can take place safely and for making sure everyone understands the risks so that they can decide for themselves whether they are happy with the risk-reward balance.

The recent response to Coronavirus provides us with a graphic example. It was clear that drastic action was required to control the virus but this had a significant impact on nearly everything we do. The knock on effects will be felt for many years to come in terms of employment, education and mental health.

Our aim must always be to appreciate all the risks, account for benefits and identify the correct balance point. This is not a static position and so we have to constantly review our assessment and adapt our approach.

References

[1] Tragedy in Dutch surf capital Scheveningen: 5 dead, more missing. https://wavelengthmag.com/tragedy-in-dutch-surf-capital-scheveningen-5-dead-more-missing (12 May 2020)

[2] Tragedy in the Netherlands: several surfers drown at Scheveningen. https://www.surfertoday.com/surfing/tragedy-in-the-netherlands-several-surfers-drown-at-scheveningen (13 May 2020)

[3] Tragedy Shakes The Epicentre Of Dutch Surfing. https://www.worldsurfleague.com/posts/452038/tragedy-shakes-the-epicentre-of-dutch-surfing. (20 May 2020)

[4] Surfing tragedy that stunned a Dutch beach community. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-52920048. (11 June 2020)